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Summary
In its simplest form, veil piercing means holding additional persons besides the 
formally liable parties liable for corporate obligations. Having said that, the concept 
is heavily and regularly contested in every aspect, and the simple form perhaps only 
exists in the minds of naïve scholars and optimistic attorneys. Before 2015, there 
had not been a clear consensus on whether veil piercing was even possible. With 
its KKO 2015:17 decision, the Supreme Court of Finland accepted veil piercing 
without the support of any statutory provision. The decision directly addressed veil 
piercing, shed some light on its requirements, and confirmed the relevance of some 
opinions found in legal literature.
Based on KKO 2015:17, the veil piercing requirements can be defined as follows:
1. The use of corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or 
shareholder’s control
2. in a way that is artificial and reprehensible
3. causing damage to the corporation’s creditors or evasion of a legal duty.
These requirements are rather ambiguous and open to interpretation. In this 
research, I dubbed them the abstract test. The main research objective was to make 
the abstract test more concrete, which I set out to accomplish in two steps. First, 
I sought more accurate interpretations of the parts of the abstract test. Second, 
I identified relevant objective factors from the day-to-day reality of businesses 
operating under the corporate form. Ambiguities surrounding the test abound, but 
the central issues can be approached through the following questions:
1. When can the courts apply veil piercing?
2. How should the parts of the test be interpreted?
3. Who should be held liable?
I approached these questions through the legal-dogmatic method and through 
legal comparison. However, I used legal dogmatics in a form that differs slightly 
from the traditional one. The traditional view of legal dogmatics has emphasized 
authoritative legal sources, and legal decisions have involved matching the facts of 
a case with whatever was laid down in those sources. Veil piercing, however, would 
not exist if this view were adopted completely. In fact, there are few authoritative 
sources in instances of veil piercing, the piercing decisions are always contra legem 
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and two authoritative sources are often in conflict. Therefore, instead of applying the 
traditional view, I used an approach developed by Juha Karhu, because it suits veil 
piercing situations much better. His situational-sensitive legal dogmatics approaches 
a case from facts to norms. First, one needs to correctly assess the total situation 
and its legal implications. Only after this does one search for the norm or several 
norms that are relevant to the situation. The norms constitute a field of assessment, 
where each norm only serves as an argument and inspiration in the legal assessment. 
Further, the significance of each individual norm is not determined until the impact 
of all the norms has been considered.
As for the method, I used an approach referred to as practical legal comparison. 
The aim is not to compare the legal systems on the level of legal praxis or legal 
culture. Instead, I take a more modest approach and analyze sections of law and case 
law from foreign jurisdictions. According to Jaakko Husa, this sort of comparison 
aims to resolve interpretative problems in domestic law. Foreign material is not 
considered a legal source in this study, but along with its argumentative patterns 
and formulations, it is used in arguing the discussed decisions. The material can be 
used as support, but one should bear in mind that it originates from foreign legal 
systems. Sometimes the systems are so different that the material does not qualify 
for analysis. Even though practical comparison does not delve deep into the legal 
systems being compared, this research seeks to discover at least whether there 
is some prohibitive difference making it impossible or undesirable to utilize the 
material. I chose the compared legal systems based on their compatibility with the 
Finnish system, number of veil piercing decisions and global influence on company 
law. With these criteria, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States proved 
the most desirable targets for comparison.
Despite the practical focus of the research questions, it is imperative to assess and 
determine suitable theories that can explain veil piercing. For this purpose, I assessed 
two theories that have been discussed in the Finnish veil piercing literature. Of 
these theories, the earlier one concerns conflict of norms. According to it, piercing 
situations are viewed as conflicts where two norms of the legal system demand 
results that mutually exclude the application of the other norm, whereupon one of 
them must yield. When piercing the veil, one of the norms is  limited liability or 
separate personality of a corporation. The other norm varies case by case. A more 
recent explanatory theory is to view veil piercing through prohibition of the abuse 
of rights. This principle currently holds no definitive formulation, which led me 
to derive one myself. In doing so, I first referred to the European convention on 
human rights, after which I went through Finnish case law and literature. I defined 
the prohibition of the abuse of rights principle as follows: 
The effects of a legal action can be denied if either the action is taken with 
unacceptable motives or its consequences prove unacceptable. Additionally, 
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the denial requires that the use of the legal action does not match the intended 
purpose of the utilized legal norm, i.e., the use is artificial.
In the end, I noticed that these two theories can be unified and that there is no 
need to choose between them. In fact, they can even be viewed as a continuum: First, 
the conflict of norms means that two norms contradict each other and one must 
yield. Next, prohibition of the abuse of rights means that the effects of a legal action 
can be denied if the action is taken with unacceptable motives or if the consequences 
prove unacceptable. Finally, taking legal action that does not match the intended 
purpose of the utilized legal norm supports finding the motives or consequences 
unacceptable. To conclude, it seems that in a conflict of norms the issue at hand is 
recognized on an abstract level, whereas prohibition of the abuse of rights can be 
applied to actually resolve the conflict.
Veil piercing situations have previously been addressed in diverse and specific areas 
of legislation. The KKO 2015:17 decision cited artificial property arrangements, 
environmental damage liability and tax avoidance as examples and sources of analogy. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court cited pay security case law, using it to present an 
example of piercing the veil. I analyzed all the mentioned sources to discover their 
contribution to developing the piercing doctrine. These single provisions reflect 
the common criterion upon which the veil piercing doctrine can be built. They are 
accepted statutory provisions that target abuse and extend liability or allow setting 
aside the legal form and basing the decision on the facts of a case. I examined and 
analyzed several norms for comparison, after which I specified the ambiguous 
requirements of the abstract veil piercing test. I discovered multiple commonalities 
that can help interpret the veil piercing test more accurately. The common elements 
were intent, risk isolation, business reasons, artificiality, substance over form, control 
and deviation from standard patterns.
Additionally, I analyzed several legal norms that have functions similar to veil 
piercing. I discovered that the norms and veil piercing partially have shared objectives 
and even overlap in their application to some extent. The main difference between 
the two was that existing legal norms such as asset recovery and debtor’s dishonesty 
focus on transactions, whereas veil piercing has no such limitations. I also performed 
a case-specific examination to further isolate the choice of remedies and specific 
application of veil piercing. The difference based on a transaction focus described 
earlier held up well and it turned out that the cases examined could not be resolved 
using transaction-based doctrines. On the other hand, this also revealed that the veil 
piercing doctrine is not meant to target transactions. It turned out that the primary 
issue is to make a choice between using tort law and veil piercing. In the end, the 
cases could not be resolved with tort law doctrines without unduly compromising 
and extending the most central principle of tort law: causality. Yet, veil piercing 
does seem to require some causality between establishing the arrangement and 
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the damage. Based on my analysis of the choice of remedies, I concluded that veil 
piercing requires a special kind of loose causality between corporate use and damage 
that is almost always present. Therefore, its significance should not be emphasized 
when deciding whether to pierce or not.
I then moved on to interpreting the veil piercing requirements. I first examined 
control and the use of the corporate form. It became clear that whether using the 
corporate group structure, intercorporate relations or shareholder control, they 
all point to the corporate form. In addition, they all require control over the 
corporation. Control turned out to be a key element in piercing decisions, even if 
the corporate group structure or intercorporate relations was used. The next step was 
to determine who holds control in a corporation, whether through share ownership, 
management positions, contracts or actual power even without a formal relationship 
with the corporation. If a formal control position disagrees with reality, then anyone 
with actual control is relevant in terms of veil piercing.
In veil piercing case law, a certain level of control has been deemed necessary for 
piercing to apply, and control has been defined based on a combination of share 
ownership and management positions. In KKO 1996:2, a straw man argument 
was found and the control requirement for piercing was fulfilled by de facto control 
combined with some contractual rights given to the controller. In KKO 1997:17, it 
was silently assumed that a 66.7% ownership would constitute control. Control in a 
corporation is elusive, however, and the multiple methods of dividing or allocating it 
makes the assessment case-specific. One thing is absolutely certain, though: control 
alone never justifies piercing.
The second requirement for veil piercing is artificiality, which I have defined based 
on the analogous doctrines of artificial property arrangements and tax avoidance. 
Artificiality means using a corporation in a manner that is not in line with honest 
business and trade. According to the Company Act, the purpose of a corporation 
is to generate profits to the shareholders. Thus, anything beneficial to that group 
would contribute to the business purpose, removing any grounds for artificiality. 
If the company has no business whatsoever, the use of such a corporation is always 
artificial. Similarly, if the business reason is founded solely on an unlawful model, 
then the use is artificial. In these two situations, should the corporation also have 
a business purpose, piercing becomes a balancing act as to whether the business 
purpose is significant enough compared to the artificial use. Alternatively, the 
situation could allow for piercing if the corporate use, to which the piercing claim 
pertains, has no connection to the business itself.
In the KKO 2015:17 decision, artificiality was paired with reprehensibility. 
I analyzed the concept of reprehensibility through unacceptable consequences 
and unacceptable motivation. The unacceptable consequences section consisted 
of two subcategories, the first of which involved excessive or undue damage. This 
was considered in relation to artificiality. The fewer genuine business operations a 
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corporation has, the more readily present the excessive or undue damage criteria 
are. The second category involved the unacceptable ramifications view, emphasizing 
the incentives that a judgment allowing some form of corporate use might give to 
business operators. If the judgment legitimizes a use obviously harmful to society, 
then the consequences are unacceptable in terms of the piercing test.
The unacceptable motivation part was divided into three subcategories. I first 
discussed corporate arrangement’s creator’s intent to do damage and to benefit 
at someone else’s expense. This led to confusion with the core element of limited 
liability, which logically results in benefits if negative risks are realized. I solved this 
issue by emphasizing the difference between abstract motives to benefit and specific, 
known and predictable motives to benefit. The second subcategory is systematic 
and unconcerned operation for personal gain. I crystallized this criterion into a 
systematically construed disparity in the allocation of negative and positive risks 
resulting in personal benefit at the expense of others. The third issue discussed was 
fraudulent behavior and misrepresentation.
The next part of the research concerned possible situations resulting from a 
corporate arrangement. Veil piercing requires the use of the corporate form either 
to evade a legal provision or to cause damage to creditors. Evasion in this case covers 
situations where the corporate arrangement is aimed to either allow or prevent 
the application of some provision of law, thus creating a result that is legally either 
forbidden or impossible. Causing damage to creditors covers any detrimental 
result imposed upon creditors. This part of the piercing requirements is usually not 
disputed, as it is most often obvious. The nature of a creditor’s position could also 
have an effect on whether a piercing claim should be accepted or not. This is based 
on the notion that if the creditor has been able to affect the terms of the relationship 
and to decide whether to become a creditor, she should not be allowed to alter the 
deal ex post. The creditor has had the opportunity and even the duty to research the 
arrangement before becoming a creditor. Based on this influence, creditors can be 
classified as voluntary and involuntary ones. These categories, however, should not 
be considered decisive, because within these categories, the level of each creditor’s 
actual influence differs a great deal. For instance, a bank and an employee are both 
voluntary creditors, but their influence on the outcome of the contract creating their 
credit relationship is completely different. The more influence the creditor has had, 
the less likely it is that piercing is in favor of that creditor.
Next, I proceeded to examine the relevant, objective supporting factors in a veil 
piercing case. These are circumstances in corporate operations that manifest or 
at least hint toward the fulfillment of the more abstract piercing requirements. I 
began the investigation by assessing the way in which inadequate resourcing might 
evidence the unacceptable motives and artificiality of an arrangement. Inadequate 
resourcing referred to situations in which a corporation operates with capital that is 
clearly inadequate compared to the liabilities it is likely to face. The difficulty with 
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this criterion is that the required level of resources is hard to determine. I examined 
the decision of KKO 2017:94 and made a thorough comparative analysis of the 
possible methods of determining the correct level of resources. This resulted in a 
failure to deduce an objective standard. However, I managed to make a somewhat 
explicit subjective standard and concluded that the resources are inadequate if the 
corporation cannot operate sustainably in face of reasonably predictable liabilities. 
The assessment also needs to address the issue from the perspective of the controller. 
If the controller has assessed bona fide that the resources are adequate, they should 
be considered so. I also found that anything that can be used to satisfy the creditors 
should be considered a resource and that assets provided by shareholders typically, 
but not always, speak of bona fide intentions.
Thereafter, I addressed the disparity between benefits and negative risks. I defined 
this through the following elements: (1) systematic amassment of credit and/or 
negative risks on one entity; (2) placement of assets on another entity; (3) business 
operations practiced by two entities in symbiosis, e.g. when one cannot operate 
without the output of the other; and 4) having no valid business reason to justify 
the separation, which speaks to the unacceptable motives and artificiality of an 
arrangement.
After this, I examined the criteria for commingling and confusion. Commingling 
was defined as the commingling of assets and employees, where the controller 
uses or assigns assets, employees or their work arbitrarily between the entities 
involved, disregarding the entity to which they formally belong. This may suggest 
reprehensibility of the arrangement and control over the entities. As for confusion, 
I defined it as inability to determine the real operator. This criterion emphasizes the 
perception of the third parties and the impression they get. If they get the impression 
that an operation was not that of the formal operator, this would support piercing.
I then proceeded to discuss the artificiality of dividing an existing business. 
Although it is a new aspect of veil piercing in Finnish literature, it is backed by 
case law. I address the issue through situations in which a business was originally 
practiced in one entity and later in a part of it. In such a situation, an especially 
high risk for costs is transferred to a separate entity without actually changing the 
operation in any way. This supporting factor is especially vulnerable to the existence 
of legitimate business reasons, that is, the divided part of the business may develop 
into something more than what it was when it was part of the original. The artificial 
division of an existing business speaks to artificiality and unacceptable consequences 
or motives.
Finally, I inspected an extensively-discussed piercing factor originating from the 
United States. Neglecting corporate formalities is controversial in the US, and the 
issue has also been topical in Finland on a few occasions. Based on my analysis, 
this factor has little to do with piercing situations and would lead to a mountain 
of problems if adopted. Nevertheless, its significance could not be explained away 
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entirely. Thus, neglecting proper documentation on transactions and contracts, 
disregarding formal decision-making procedures, and overlooking issues in 
accounting could potentially play a role in support of piercing.
The final research question concerned the liable party. The potential liable parties 
traditionally include of the shareholder, the controller and the economic unit. Instead, 
I would strongly support using an approach involving the removal of advantages. 
This approach can result in the liability in casu of any of the other mentioned targets 
without compromising them in an arbitrary manner. I investigated four situations in 
which advantages appear in in various ways. Each of these situations was backed by 
case law. The analysis showed that locating the advantages leads to different results 
depending on the construed arrangement. Even the allocation of liability is based 
on overall assessment and in casu examination. While the traditionally liable parties 
appeared as candidates, they should not be viewed as the sole targets for liability, and 
liability definitively should not be based on the formal position of a party.
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Tiivistelmä suomeksi
Yksinkertaisesti ilmaistuna samastaminen tarkoittaa jonkun muodollisesta vas-
tuusta vapaan henkilön asettamista vastuuseen yhtiön velvoitteista. Näennäisestä 
yksinkertaisuudesta huolimatta samastaminen on sekava ja usein kiistanalainen 
oppirakennelma. Ennen vuotta 2015 Suomessa ei ollut selvää linjausta siitä, onko 
samastaminen edes mahdollista. Tuolloin korkein oikeus viimein hyväksyi samasta-
misen ilman kirjoitetun lain tukea ratkaisussa KKO 2015:17. Ratkaisussa samasta-
mista käsiteltiin suoraan, sen edellytyksiä valotettiin ja siinä myös lausuttiin suoraan 
eräistä samastamisesta oikeuskirjallisuudessa esitetyistä käsityksistä.
Ratkaisun oikeusohje voidaankin tiivistää siten, että yhtiön erillisen oikeus-
henkilöllisyyden periaate voidaan syrjäyttää, jos:
1. konsernirakennetta, yhtiöiden välisiä suhteita tai osakkeenomistajan 
määräämisvaltaa 
2. on selvästi käytetty keinotekoisella ja moitittavalla tavalla siten, että 
3. siitä on seurannut esimerkiksi yhtiön velkojien vahingoittaminen tai lakisää-
teisen vastuun kiertäminen.
Tämän oikeusohjeen elementtien tulkinta on varsin avonaista eikä niille voida 
määrittää yksiselitteistä sisältöä. Tässä tutkimuksessa kutsun tätä oikeusohjetta 
samastamisen abstraktiksi testiksi. Tutkimuksen pääasiallinen tavoite oli tehdä 
abstraktista testistä konkreettisempi. Aloitin tämän tehtävän etsimällä tarkempaa 
tulkintaa abstraktille testille. Seuraavaksi etsin käytännön yhtiötoiminnassa esiin-
tyviä helposti todennettavissa olevia faktuaalisia järjestelyjä, joilla on relevanssia 
samastamisharkinnassa. Vaikka abstraktin testin epäselvyydet ovat lukuisat, niin 
keskeisiksi tutkimuskysymyksiksi muodostuivat:
1. Mikä on samastamisen edellytysten oikea tulkinta?
2. Milloin vastuu voidaan asettaa samastamalla?
3. Kenet tulisi asettaa vastuuseen samastamalla?
Lähestyin näitä kysymyksiä oikeusdogmaattisella ja oikeusvertailevalla tutkimus-
metodilla. Käytin oikeusdogmatiikkaa hieman perinteisestä poikkeavalla tavalla. 
Perinteinen tapa painottaa oikeuslähdehierarkiaa ja ratkaisu tehdään sovittamalla 
tapauksen faktat oikeuslähteissä kuvattuihin normeihin. Tällainen perinteinen nä-
kemys ei pysty selittämään samastamista. Samastettaessa vahvoja oikeuslähteitä on 
XIX
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
vähän, ratkaisu on aina contra legem ja usein ne vähät oikeuslähteet ovat ristiriidassa 
keskenään. Perinteisen lähestymistavan sijaan sovellan Juha Karhun tilanneherkkää 
lainoppia. Ratkaistavaa tapausta lähestytään faktoista ja ratkaisussa edetään kohti 
normeja. Ensin pitää hahmottaa oikein kokonaistilanne ja sen oikeudelliset seurauk-
set. Vasta tämän jälkeen voidaan etsiä tilanteeseen relevantteja normeja. Relevantit 
normit otetaan ainoastaan argumentteina ja inspiraationa oikeudellisessa arvioin-
nissa. Kunkin merkitys ratkeaa vasta, kun kaikkien relevanttien normien vaikutus 
on määritelty.
Oikeusvertailevien osioiden metodina käytin niin sanottua käytännöllistä oi-
keusvertailua. Tavoitteena ei ole vertailla oikeusjärjestelmiä oikeudenkäytön tai 
oikeuskulttuurin tasoilla. Sen sijaan tavoite on vaatimattomampi. Analysoin osia 
lainsäädännöstä ja oikeuskäytännöstä muista oikeusjärjestelmistä. Jaakko Husan 
mukaan tällainen vertailu tähtää kotimaisessa oikeusjärjestyksessä ilmenevän tulkin-
taongelman ratkaisuun. Ulkomaista materiaalia ei mielletä oikeuslähteeksi, mutta 
sitä käytetään argumentaatiomallien ja määrittelytapojen löytämiseksi. Tällaista 
argumentaatiotukea voidaan hyödyntää, mutta on muistettava, että se on lähtöisin 
vieraasta oikeusjärjestyksestä. Joskus materiaali on lähtöisin niin erilaisesta järjestel-
mästä, ettei sitä voida hyödyntää. Tässä tutkimuksessa ei mennä syvälle hyödynnet-
tävyyden arviointiin, joskin löydetyn argumentaatiotuen osalta pyritään arvioimaan 
vähintään hyödyntämisen selkeästi estävien erojen olemassaolo. Vertailtavat oikeus-
järjestykset on valittu käyttäen kriteereinä yhteensopivuutta Suomen järjestelmän 
kanssa, samastamistapausten määrää ja valtion globaalia yhtiöoikeudellista merkit-
tävyyttä. Näillä perusteilla vertailukohteiksi valikoitui Ruotsi, Yhdistynyt kuningas-
kunta ja Yhdysvallat.
Vaikka tutkimuskysymykset ovat käytäntöorientoituneita, on silti tärkeää mää-
rittää ja arvioida soveltuvia selittäviä teorioita samastamiselle. Tässä tutkimuksessa 
keskityttiin pääasiassa kahteen teoriaan, joista molemmat on tuotu jo aiemmin esiin 
kotimaisessa oikeuskirjallisuudessa. Ensimmäinen ja vanhempi selittävä teoria on 
normikonfliktiteoria. Sen mukaan samastaminen nähdään kahden normin välisenä 
konfliktina, missä kaksi oikeusjärjesyksen normia vaatii erilaisia lopputuloksia ja nämä 
lopputulokset sulkevat toisen normin soveltamisen pois kokonaisuudessaan. Toisen 
soveltamisesta on luovuttava. Samastettaessa toinen konfliktiin osallinen normi on 
aina joko osakeyhtiön osakkeenomistajien rajoitettu vastuu tai yhtiön erillinen oikeus-
henkilöllisyys. Toinen konfliktiin osallinen normi vaihtelee tapauksittain. Tuoreempi 
selittävä teoria on oikeuden väärinkäytön kielto. Tällä periaatteen omaisella teorialla 
ei ole vakiintunutta sanamuotoa. Tässä tutkimuksessa määrittelin periaatteen sana-
muodon Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimuksen sekä suomalaisen ja oikeuskäytännön ja 
–kirjallisuuden kautta. Määrittelin oikeuden väärinkäytön kiellon seuraavasti:
Oikeustoimen vaiktukset voidaan kieltää, mikäli oikeustoimi on tehty epä-
asiallisin tarkoituksin tai sen seuraukset osoittautuvat epäasiallisiksi. Lisäksi, 
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kieltäminen vaatii, että oikeustoimen käyttö ei vastaa sitä käyttötapaa, mitä 
oikeustoimesta säädettäessä on tavoiteltu.
Huomasin tutkimuksen aikana, että nämä kaksi teoriaa on varsin pienellä vaivalla 
yhdistettävissä. Niitä voidaan kohdella jatkumona. Ensin normikonflikti määritte-
lee sovellettavat normit ja varmistuu niiden ristiriidasta. Tämän jälkeen oikeuden 
väärinkäytön kieltoa voidaan soveltaa konfliktin ratkaisemiseen.
Samastamista on aiemmin käsitelty kirjoitetussa laissa erityistapauksittain ja 
rajoitetun soveltamisalan puitteissa. Ratkaisussa KKO 2015:17 nimettiin ulos-
ottokaaren mukaiset keinotekoiset järjestelyt, ympäristövahinkolain mukainen 
rinnastettavuus ja verotusmenettelylain veronkiertopykälä esimerkkeinä. Ratkai-
sussa todettiin nämä säädökset analogisiksi oikeuskäytännössä esiintyvän samasta-
misdoktriinin kanssa. Samoin korkein oikeus siteerasi ratkaisussa palkkaturvalain 
soveltamista koskevaa aiempaa samastamiskäytäntöä. Tutkimuksessani lähdin näistä 
analogialähteistä määrittämään tarkempaa sisältöä samastamisdoktriinille. Nämä 
lainkohdat edustavat niitä yleisiä periaatteita, millä väärinkäytöksiin on aiemmin 
puututtu. Tarkasteluni perusteella löysin näiden lainkohtien ja samastamiskäy-
tännön väliltä lukuisia jaettuja elementtejä: motiivin korostaminen, negatiivisen 
riskin eristäminen, liiketoiminnalliset syyt, keinotekoisuus, oikeudellisen muodon 
sivuuttaminen tosiasiallisen luonteen perusteella, määräysvalta ja tavanomaisista 
muodoista poikkeaminen.
Näiden analogisten lainkohtien lisäksi tarkastelin samastamisen kanssa samanlai-
sia sääntelytarkoituksia toteuttavia lainkohtia. Huomasin näiden lainkohtien olevan 
osittain päällekkäisiä ja sääntelevän osittain samoja toimintamalleja kuin samasta-
minen. Pääasiallinen ero oli se, että nämä olemassa olevat lakisääteiset instrumentit, 
kuten takaisinsaanti ja velallisen epärehellisyys, vaativat soveltuakseen varallisuuden 
siirron, kun taas samastamiselle ei vastaavaa edellytystä löytynyt. Seuraavaksi tarkas-
telin vielä vaihtoehtoisia vastuudoktriineja kahden samastamistapauksen faktoista 
lähtien. Tarkoitus oli tutkia, onko samastamiselle olemassa oma soveltamisalansa, 
missä muut vastuudoktriinit eivät toimi. Tällainen soveltamisala löytyi. Varallisuu-
den siirtoon perustuva rajaus voitiin tämän tarkastelun perusteella vahvistaa, sillä 
tapauksissa vastuuta ei olisi voitu perustaa varallisuuden siirtoihin. Pääasiallinen vas-
tuumuodon valinta oli vahingonkorvauksen ja samastamisen välillä. Analyysin pe-
rusteella huomasin, ettei tapauksissa voitu perustaa vastuuta vahingonkorvaukseen, 
ilman että tingittäisiin mittavasti syy-yhteys vaatimuksen selkeydestä. Havaitsin, 
että myös samastaminen vaatii heikomman asteisen syy-yhteyden järjestelyn luomi-
sen ja vahingon välillä. Tällainen syy-yhteys juontuu rajoitetun vastuun luonteesta 
ja on läsnä jokaisessa samastamistapauksessa. Siten syy-yhteydelle ei voitaisi antaa 
samastamista puoltavaa merkitystä.
Seuraavaksi siirryin samastamisen edellytysten tulkintaan. Ensimmäisenä niistä 
käsittelin määräysvaltaa ja yhtiömuodon käyttöä. Päättelin, että konsernirakenteen, 
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yhtiöiden välisten suhteiden tai osakkeenomistajan määräysvallan käyttö kaikki 
tarkoittavat yhtiömuodon käyttöä. Lisäksi, kaikki nämä käyttötavat edellyttävät 
määräysvaltaa osakeyhtiössä. Seuraava askel olikin sen määrittely, mihin määräysval-
ta yhtiössä perustuu. Se voidaan perustaa osakkeenomistukseen, hallituspositioihin, 
toimitusjohtaja asemaan, sopimukseen tai jopa tosiasialliseen määräysvaltaan ilman 
muodollista velvoittavuutta. Jos muodollinen asiaintila ei vastaa todellisuutta, niin 
tosiasiallinen määräysvalta on merkityksellistä samastettaessa.
Toisena samastamisen edellytyksenä otin käsittelyyn keinotekoisuuden. Kei-
notekoisuuden määritelmä löytyi analogisia lainkohtia tarkastelemalla. Ymmärsin 
keinotekoisuuden yhtiömuodon käyttönä, mikä ei edistä osakeyhtiöinstituution 
taustalla olevia tavoitteita rehellisen liiketoiminnan ja vaihdannan edistämisestä. 
Siten keinotekoisuus vaatisi sen näyttämistä, ettei yhtiön toimintaa voida selittää 
järkeväksi liiketoiminnallisilla syillä. Jos liiketoimintaa ei ole, yhtiömuodon käyttö 
on aina keinotekoista. Jos yhtiön liiketoiminta perustuu vain laittomaksi todettuun 
liiketoimintaratioon, yhtiömuodon käyttö on keinotekoista. Päätös pitää perustaa 
punnintaan liiketoiminnallisten tarkoitusten ja muiden tarkoitusperien välillä, mi-
käli yhtiöllä on liiketoimintaa.
Seuraava edellytys oli moitittavuus. Analyysini perusteella ymmärrän moititta-
vuuden joko epäoikeudenmukaisena lopputuloksena tai epäasiallisina motiiveina. 
Epäoikeudenmukaisena lopputuloksena voidaan pitää liiallista tai odottamatonta 
vahinkoa sekä sellaista tilannetta, missä järjestelyn hyväksyminen oikeudenkäynnis-
sä johtaisi yhteiskunnan kannalta tuhoisan kannustimen luomiseen. Epäasiallisena 
motiivina voidaan pitää tarkoitusta toisen vahingoittamisesta tai hyötymisestä toisen 
kustannuksella. Samoin epäasiallisena voidaan pitää systemaattista ja piittaamatonta 
korkealla riskillä tapahtuvaa oman edun tavoittelua. Joissain tilanteissa myös ereh-
dyttäminen tai väärän kuvan luominen sopimuskumppanille voivat tulla kyseeseen 
moitittavuuden edellytyksen täyttämiseksi.
Tutkimuksessa käsittelin seuraavaksi testin viimeistä osaa. Samastaminen edellyt-
tää, että yhtiömuodon käytöllä on aiheutettu lakisääteisen vastuun kiertäminen tai 
vahinkoa velkojille. Lakisääteisen vastuun kiertämisenä voidaan pitää mitä tahansa 
toimintaa, millä saadaan aikaan sellainen asiaintila, mikä on laissa nimenomaan 
kielletty tai lakia sovellettaessa mahdoton. Velkojille aiheutettu vahinko taasen 
kattaa minkä tahansa velkojille epäedullisen muutoksen oikeustilassa. Velkojan vai-
kutusmahdollisuuksien olemassaolo vaikuttaa siihen, voidaanko samastamisvastuu 
asettaa. Jos velkoja on tuossa asemassaan täysin ilman omaa myötävaikutustaan, 
samastamiseen tulisi suhtautua suopeammin. Lähtökohtaisesti sopimusvelkojat 
voivat valita, haluavatko he sitoutua sopimukseen ja vaikuttaa siihen, millaisiksi so-
pimusehdot muodostuvat. Kaikki sopimusvelkojat eivät kuitenkaan voi vaikuttaa 
näihin asioihin samassa määrin. Siksi pitäisi samastettaessa tarkastella sitä, kuinka 
kattava vaikutusmahdollisuus näillä velkojilla on ollut. Mitä enemmän velkoja on 
voinut vaikuttaa sopimuksen sisältöön ja mitä todellisempi mahdollisuus hänellä 
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on ollut valita haluaako sitoutua vai ei sitä kielteisemmin samastamiseen tulisi 
suhtautua.
Seuraavaksi siirryin tarkastelemaan samastamisharkintaa tukevia apufaktoja. 
Nämä apufaktat ovat yhtiön toiminnassa havaittavia olosuhteita, jotka kertovat 
abstraktimman samastamisedellytyksen olemassaolosta. Ensimmäinen käsiteltävä 
apufakta oli aliresursointi. Sen voidaan katsoa tukevan arviointia keinotekoisuu-
desta ja moitittavuudesta. Aliresursoitu yhtiö toimii resursseilla, jotka ovat selkeästi 
riittämättömiä toiminnan odotettavissa oleviin vastuisiin. Resursseina otetaan 
huomioon yhtiön varallisuus ja kaikki sellaiset erät ja instrumentit, mitkä tarjoavat 
velkojille suorituksen. Tällaiselle resursoinnin tasolle ei voida asettaa selkeää rajaa, 
vaan siihen tulisi suhtautua enemmänkin periaatteena. Tämän seurauksena pitäisi 
antaa merkitystä määräysvallan käyttäjän käsitykselle riittävästä resurssien määrästä. 
Jos hän vilpittömässä mielessä piti resursseja riittävinä, pitäisi niitä kohdella siten 
myös samastamisharkinnassa.
Seuraavana käsittelin järjestelystä saatavien etujen ja negatiivisen riskin eristä-
mistä. Tällaisessa toiminnassa 1) negatiivinen liiketoiminta- tai muu riski eristetään 
tai kerrytetään yhteen oikeushenkilöön; 2) varallisuusarvoiset erät eristetään tai 
kerrytetään toiseen oikeushenkilöön; 3) liiketoimintaa harjoitetaan näiden kahden 
oikeushenkilön välillä symbioottisesti siten, ettei toisen toimintaa voitaisi harjoittaa 
ilman toisen myötävaikutusta; ja 4) eikä kahden oikeushenkilön järjestelyä tai sen 
ylläpitoa voida selittää järkeväksi liiketoiminnallisilla syillä. Tähän liittyy läheisesti 
myös liiketoiminnan keinotekoiseksi jakamiseksi nimeämäni apufakta. Jos kuvattu 
negatiivisen riskin eristäminen tehdään jakamalla olemassa oleva liiketoiminta, tämä 
puoltaa vahvemmin samastamista.
Tämän jälkeen käsittelin sekoittumista samastamista tukevana apufaktana. Se-
koittumisella tarkoitan tilannetta, missä ulkoapäin ei voida enää tunnistaa, mikä 
tuotannontekijä kuluu millekin järjestelyyn osallistuneelle yhtiölle. Sekoittuminen 
voi liittyä esimerkiksi yhtiövarallisuuteen, työntekijöihin tai annettuun julkiku-
vaan. Sekoittumisen voidaan katsoa puoltavan keinotekoisuusharkintaa. Toisinaan 
sekoittuminen voi olla niin perusteellista, ettei yhtiön kanssa asioiva velkoja pysty 
erottamaan, minkä järjestelyyn osallisen yhtiön toiminnasta kulloinkin on kyse. 
Tällöin voidaan puhua todellisen toimijan hävittävästä sekoittumisesta ja tällainen 
tilanne voidaan tulkita sen vahingoksi, jonka olisi tullut pitää yllä yhtiöiden erilli-
syyttä. Viimeinen apufakta oli yhtiömuodon käyttöön liittyvien muodollisuuksien 
laiminlyönti. Sille ei voi antaa suurta merkitystä samastettaessa, sillä yleensä nämä 
muodollisuudet on säädetty muiden kuin velkojien oikeuksien turvaamiseksi.
Viimeinen tutkimuskysymykseni keskittyi samastamisvastuun kohdentamiseen. 
Kenet voidaan asettaa vastuuseen samastamisella. Perinteisesti vastuutahona on 
pidetty osakkeenomistajaa, mutta oikeuskäytännöstä tällaista rajoitusta ei voida 
perustellusti vetää. Potentiaalisia vastuutahoja ovat osakkeenomistajan lisäksi mää-
räysvallan käyttäjä ja yritys taloudellisena yksikkönä. Oikeusvertailun tuloksena 
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päädyn suosittelemaan joustavampaa lähestymistapaa, mikä perustuu järjestelyllä 
saavutettujen etujen kieltämiseen. Tämän lähestymistavan omaksumista tuki myös 
oikeuskäytännön analyysi. Samastamalla pitää päästä erilaisiin lopputuloksiin oikeu-
denkäynnin kohteena olevan järjestelyn luonteen mukaisesti. Tämä lähestymistapa 
myös sallii kaikkien edellä mainittujen tahojen vastuun, mutta ei rajoita samastami-
sen käyttöalaa vain yhteen niistä. 
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1.  Why This Research?
In its simplest form, veil piercing means holding additional persons liable for 
corporate obligations. Having said that, it is heavily and regularly contested in every 
aspect, and the simple form exists perhaps only in the minds of naïve scholars and 
optimistic attorneys. Every major veil piercing decision from the courts ends up 
under academic scrutiny and criticism. Depending on the author, the decision is 
either too broad in its use of the doctrine, not broad enough or should have used 
the liberal interpretation of some other legal doctrine. This has led to a surmounting 
wall of scholarship seeking to explain, re-explain and deny the existing doctrine. The 
book you are reading is but another brick in that wall.
One could easily question whether my addition to the scholarship is necessary 
or even beneficial. I would answer to such an objection: probably yes. The novelty 
in my research is the development of the relatively fresh Finnish piercing doctrine 
as well as its provision of access to Finnish and Swedish piercing doctrines for the 
international discussion on the subject. The contribution might be humble, but it is 
worth the effort.
2.  The Landmark Decision KKO 2015:17
The central theme of this research is the Finnish veil piercing doctrine as it is 
during its final stages of writing in the fall of 2019. Before 2015, there had not been 
a clear consensus on whether veil piercing was even possible.1 It had appeared in 
few Supreme Court cases since 1929, though many claimed these cases had either 
lost their significance or that only indirect piercing had been accepted. The KKO 
1997:17 decision was interpreted so as to allow the possibility of piercing and some 
significant factors were identified from it.2 So the possibility was there, but no one 
could predict the lightning bolt.
With the KKO 2015:17 decision, the Supreme Court of Finland accepted 
veil piercing without the support of a statutory provision.3 The decision directly 
1 However, many in the legal literature interpreted prior case law to imply the courts’ intention not 
to deny the possibility of veil piercing. See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 303, Toiviainen 2002 at 109–110, 
Huhtamäki 1999 at 143–146 and Leppänen 1991 at 295–299. The KKO 1997:17 decision is most com-
monly mentioned, along with some appellate court cases.
Cf. Huttunen 1996 at 5–7 and Mäntysaari 2002 at 49. Mäntysaari denies any possibility of piercing, 
whereas Huttunen claims it has not occurred ever.
2 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 301–302 and 407–408.
3 See also the commentaries on the case Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 and Villa 2015. Piercing 
was accepted earlier in KKO 1996:2, though that case did not give out general requirements of veil pierc-
ing. Also, that case is 21 years old at the time of writing, so using the more recent case is necessary. The 
decision is still valid, though the legal context around it has evolved.
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addressed piercing the veil, shed some light on the requirements of piercing, and 
confirmed the relevance of some opinions from legal literature.4 In addition, it 
serves as a prime example of how the general principle prohibiting the abuse of rights 
works in corporate law.5 This decision and the legal opinions referred to therein 
form the basis of the veil piercing test construed here. Other decisions and opinions 
are noted for support or criticism. The main points for criticism are the ambiguity of 
the construed piercing test and the uncertainty of liability questions that ambiguity 
results in. This should be ignored for now, as this research seeks to eliminate much of 
that criticism by seeking objective criteria to show the more abstract and ambiguous 
requirements of veil piercing.
Due to the major importance of this decision, I will provide a rather thorough 
description of it. The case was about a Finnish corporation named Verkkokauppa 
and its Estonian subsidiary, Arctecho.6 The court found that Verkkokauppa had 
practiced part of its business through Arctecho and thus had avoided paying 
remuneration for private copying. The court reviewed the ownership and control 
structure of the corporations and deduced that the central interest in the division of 
business was avoiding the said legal obligation. Verkkokauppa was held liable for the 
neglected remunerations along with Arctecho.
Arctecho had sold storage devices exclusively to Finnish consumers via 
verkkokauppa.com. On this website, the user selected a product category called 
“direct deliveries.” Selecting this category transferred the user to a page that informed 
that she could order products directly from the warehouse of verkkokauppa.ee from 
Estonia without having to pay the remunerations. After making a purchase, the 
client received a confirmation email from an employee of Verkkokauppa, and the 
contact information given was that of the Verkkokauppa. The confirmation email 
made no mention whatsoever of Arctecho or verkkokauppa.ee. 
Of the of Arctecho stock, 51% was owned by S, 29% by Verkkokauppa, and the 
rest by two board members of Verkkokauppa until 30 June 2009. After said date, 
the entire stock was owned by Verkkokauppa. S also held the positions of CEO 
and chairman of the board of directors in Verkkokauppa. At the same time, S was a 
member of Arctechos’ board of directors, which only had two positions.
Teosto, the Finnish agency for the collection of remunerations for copyright 
usage, argued that Arctecho had been founded only to avoid the legal obligation of 
paying remunerations and that Verkkokauppa should be held liable for the neglected 
remunerations as the real operator of the business. Verkkokauppa denied liability 
4 Namely those presented by Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2010 at 18–19, Tammi-Salminen 
2001 at 290–294 and Mähönen – Villa 2006 at 140–143.
5 Villa 2015 at 535.
6 The fact that the subsidiary was foreign holds no meaning for the future interpretation of the veil 
piercing requirements. See Savela 2015 at 409 and 412.
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and claimed that Arctecho was an independent limited liability company situated in 
Estonia and, as such, its liabilities could not belong to a Finnish corporation.
In its defense, Verkkokauppa had claimed various other reasons for situating 
Arctecho in Estonia, such as taxation and general level of costs. However, Arctecho 
was shut down right after the remunerations were demanded, despite the fact that 
it could have continued the business and just added the remuneration to the selling 
price of the products, as is customary. The Supreme Court found that the sole or 
primary purpose of the corporation was to avoid the remunerations.
The fact that Arctecho had itself acquired the products it was selling from 
manufacturers and contracted the product logistics was not enough to prove that 
Arctecho was an independent actor. In addition, from the customers’ viewpoint, 
Arctecho’s operations appeared as Verkkokauppa’s business. The Supreme Court 
found Arctecho to be completely dependent on Verkkokauppa. Verkkokauppa 
had, in fact, conducted a part of its core business via Arctecho in order to achieve 
an advantage by avoiding legal obligations. Considering ownership and control 
relationships, the Supreme Court reasoned via elimination that the key objective 
for founding a limited liability company in Estonia and operating the business from 
there was, in fact, avoiding the legal obligations. The conduct of Verkkokauppa was 
found reprehensible enough to set aside Arctecho’s position as a corporation separate 
from its owners, and Verkkokauppa was held liable for the neglected remunerations.
3.  The Test for Veil Piercing
3.1.  The Abstract Test
The Supreme Court took a strong stand in regards to veil piercing in the KKO 
2015:17 decision. It named specific but abstract requirements under which the veil 
can be pierced and the separate personality of a corporation ignored, although only 
in exceptional cases.7 These requirements can be defined as follows:
1. The use of corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or 
shareholder’s control
2. in a way that is artificial and reprehensible
3. causing damage to the corporation’s creditors or evasion of a legal duty.8
7 See KKO 2015:17 at 29.
8 The Supreme Court described the result part of the test (part 3) as examples of the result, meaning 
other results could be relevant also. Through extensive review of domestic and international literature, I 
have arrived at the understanding that these two examples are comprehensive. I cannot name any other 
situation, at least if evasion of legal duty is understood broadly.
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In the strictest sense, this test is an obiter9 statement of the Supreme Court, 
but it did utilize the test in this decision, and it has referred to the test in several 
following decisions. The test has thus garnered legitimacy, although it is still not a 
formally binding argument within the legal source hierarchy. Its compelling nature 
comes from the analogical extension to similar cases.10 This research is largely about 
discovering the correct situations where this extension can be made.
This new construction needs to be compared with some of the older ones to 
determine their relation to each other and whether prior literature and case law can 
be used in veil piercing interpretation henceforth. Fortunately, the Supreme Court 
did comment on a few opinions from the legal literature and created its formulation 
of the piercing doctrine based on them.11 There is thus an unbroken connection 
between earlier literature and the constructed test. The piercing case law after the 
landmark decision has cited the KKO 2015:17 decision every time. The body of case 
law and literature thus forms a continuum.
This construction does not allow the judge to reach a decision about whether to 
pierce the veil. It is too ambiguous for this. Every aspect of this test needs further 
elaboration. The use of corporate form itself is self-explanatory. It means simply that 
a corporation is involved. The traditional requirements of control and dependence 
are likewise rather simple to place. Corporate form simply cannot be used without 
controlling the corporation to at least some degree. Controlling a specific part of the 
corporate operation can enable abuse just the same as total domination, though in a 
more limited situation. Dependence, as understood in this work, entails situations in 
which another entity controls some vital resources needed to operate, and through 
this control, it can dictate how the dependent entity acts. Dependence, use and 
control are thus intertwined.
Artificiality and reprehensibility are to be kept separate. Reprehensibility is the 
moral condemnation of an act and artificiality is the use of something for which 
it was not intended. Combined, these two could be called improper use—a term 
borrowed from the US veil piercing doctrines. They are, however, separate issues and 
are presented as such in this work.
Both evading a provision and causing damage to a creditor mean evading an 
obligation. Provisions place restrictions and create duties. The actor is under an 
obligation to honor them. A debt must be paid whether it is based on a contract or 
legislation.12 This work will occasionally refer to evading an obligation, and it should 
be understood as meaning both or either of these.
9 About the role of obiter statements in the Finnish prejudicates, see Launiala 2018 at 2 and 8. An 
obiter statement in Finland is an allowed argument in the legal hierarchy but is not binding. 
10 The precedent’s binding effect comes from its role as a model rule or a paradigm case, which is then 
analogically extended to future cases. See Siltala 1998 at 149–150.
11 Namely Tammi-Salminen 2001, Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2010 and Mähönen – Villa 2006.
12 Similarly Pönkä 2012 at 233.
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3.2. Objective Supporting Factors
I am placing many of the factors seen by earlier case law and legal literature as 
justification for veil piercing under the new test as supporting factors.13 They are 
objective facts detectable from the corporate records, other written material, through 
witness statements, etc. They are real-world phenomena. Naming reprehensibility as 
an evidence theme seems hard, but through these objective facts, one can show it in 
court. They are often enough to fulfill the more general requirements by themselves, 
but sometimes a combination of many is needed.
The division between supporting factors and the actual veil piercing test also 
abides by the Supreme Court’s standing in the Verkkokauppa decision. In the 
decision, the Supreme Court first formulated a general test for piercing and then 
proceeded to assess the facts of the case with that test.14 Earlier legal literature has 
formed two schools of thought regarding the justification of veil piercing: those 
emphasizing objective circumstances and those basing it on abuse of corporate form 
and improper conduct.15 The model suggested in this work applies both methods in 
a two-tier structure. The abuse/impropriety model is the general test and objective 
circumstances form the supporting factors used to prove the fulfillment of the 
requirements of the general test.16
It is important to further stress how veil piercing always emphasizes the 
significance of the facts of the case and their overall assessment. The decisions are case 
by case, and the unique facts are always decisive. Although more general wording is 
attempted in this work, further elaboration on the subject will prove that the matter 
is deeply fact-specific and in casu. The doctrine should be carefully considered case 
by case and applied only in exceptional situations.17 One key objective of this work 
is to determine the relevant elements of these exceptional situations where piercing 
should apply. For this purpose, I seek to detect patterns of objective criteria that can 
allow for veil piercing.
13 The supporting factor structure is copied from the structure of the Enforcement Code 4:14. See 
Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 152.
See also af Schultén 1984 at 96–97. He states that level of integration and inadequate capital are not 
grounds for liability, per se, but significant factors that should be taken into account in the assessment.
14 See KKO 2015:17 at 30–34.
15 See Leppänen 1991 at 302 and those cited therein.
16 The model is similar to the one formulated by Linna and Leppänen concerning the artificial prop-
erty arrangements. See Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 152.
Putting the matter into Per Ekelöf ’s terminology helps understand it better. The general test consists of 
three complex facts, which are formed by many factual circumstances. See Ekelöf 1945 at 247.
17 See KKO 2015:17 and Savela 2015 at 404.
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Figure 1. The piercing doctrine and supporting factors
4.  On the Concept of Piercing the Veil
4.1.  Defining Veil Piercing
Many different definitions for piercing the veil could be presented. At this point, 
the distinction should be made between veil piercing as the result of an action and 
veil piercing as a doctrine. The doctrine of piercing the veil refers to the set of rules 
and requirements that enable the result of veil piercing: assimilating attributes of a 
corporation and a formally separate person, for example, holding the shareholders 
liable. As a term, veil piercing refers to the doctrine and the remedy. Usually, these 
two uses are not easily confused and one can easily deduce which is meant from the 
context. If used in verb form, to pierce the veil, it means the result. For clarity, I will 
do my best to always refer to veil piercing doctrine when talking about the legal test. 
This, in turn, means that other expressions of veil piercing refer to the result.
In the US, piercing the veil means disregarding the corporation’s separate legal 
personality or the shareholder’s limited liability. The disregard can be utilized to 
reach various results depending on the case. It has been used to establish jurisdiction,18 
prevent evasion of a statute19 and of course the most recognized use of holding a 
shareholder liable for corporate obligations. Here, the term veil piercing refers to 
the remedy, the disregard. Alternatively, the veil piercing doctrines are such that 
they result in veil piercing as a remedy and only that. The remedy of veil piercing is 
available through multiple different doctrines, but there are specific doctrines solely 
for piercing the veil.
The main interest in previous research has been with the shareholders’ liability 
in corporations that have few shareholders or with parents’ liability in corporate 
18 See, e.g., Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1925), Empire Steel Corporation of Tex-
as, Inc. v. Superior Court of LA County (1961) and Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co. (1968).
19 State v. Swift & Co. (1945).
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groups.20 Veil piercing has been viewed as a doctrine that allows holding the 
shareholders liable over obligations of the corporation.21 Especially the parent in a 
corporate group has been named the target of piercing liability. Opinions sometimes 
seek the liability of “the economic unit.”22 Alternatively, identification or tort law 
principles have been cited to define piercing, placing liability on the controllers 
or actors causally affecting the damaging result. A definition of veil piercing is 
imperative to understand the following text, however, and the potentially liable 
party can affect the definition greatly.
Compared to these traditional views, I  adopt a wider view of things in this work. 
Anyone who uses the corporate form to damage creditors or evades a provision can 
be the target of veil piercing liability. The capability of using the corporation rather 
strictly follows the one with control, though it is entirely possible that some party 
other than the controller can gain advantage from the separate personality of the 
corporation.23 This was explicitly stated in the KKO 2017:94 decision in which, 
another corporation was held liable. Onenatural person owned all the shares and 
controlled both of them.24 Similarly, the test laid out in KKO 2015:17 does not 
limit the view into any predetermined person or position. Instead, it views the use 
of the corporate form. The full discussion on the liable party would not fit well in 
this section before introducing the comparative methodology. Therefore, I will refer 
the reader to section V.7. It should be noted, however, that the liable party and the 
definition of veil piercing are highly interrelated issues, and they are separated in this 
work only because of technical reasons.
This work will not confine the view on veil piercing on shareholders’ liability 
alone. In its decision in KKO 2015:17, the Supreme Court named piercing as 
a disregarding the separate personality of the corporation without a provision of 
law enabling the disregard.25 However, it did not specify which entity should be 
liable. Separate personality no doubt protects the shareholders, but its effects 
are not limited to them, even if the Company Act 1:2 explicitly states that the 
company is a separate legal person from the shareholders. This statement needs to 
be interpreted as a necessity to emphasize this separation, which would surely be 
challenged otherwise. A personality separate from all other persons in the world 
20 KM 1992:32 at 355.
21 See Huttunen 1963.
 See also af Schultén 1984 at 77–122, Huhtamäki 1999 at 142–152, Vandekerckhove 2007 at 528–532, 
Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 298–303 and 405–409 and Sandström 2015.
22 See, for example, Leppänen 1991.
23 See also THO 5.1.2016 15/948, where the employee of the corporation benefitted from the sepa-
rate personality as he contracted with the corporation. Moderating contracts section of law does not allow 
accounting for the circumstances of the owner. The veil was pierced and the circumstances were taken into 
account. See chapter III.5.1. for further analysis on the decision.
24 Similarly in KKO 1996:2.
25 See KKO 2015:17 at 29.
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in itself is obvious and needs not be explicitly mentioned. Every person is an entity 
separate from the corporation. In this sense, the corporate veil can be found between 
any entity and the corporation. There is a veil of limited liability even between all 
natural persons. Even in case law, the veil between two separate entities other than 
the shareholder and the corporation has been pierced.26
The Supreme Court in KKO 2015:17 also deemed the disregard possible with 
either piercing or a legal exception to the rule of separate personality.27 This is a clear 
separation of the law-based instruments and piercing. Thus, piercing is applicable 
only when there is no provision of law allowing for the disregard of separate 
personality.
It is from these observations that the definition of piercing stems. Veil piercing 
could be defined as holding another person liable for the liabilities of the corporation 
without a provision of law allowing for such liability. This definition is wide enough 
to include the piercing situations that originate from neglecting monetary liabilities. 
It is, however, incapable of including situations in which a norm was evaded by using 
a separate entity, for example, if the company was divided to avoid co-operation 
duties based on the number of employees. In these cases, the general identification 
would be capable of explaining these situations.28 With this in mind, piercing 
is understood in this work as holding another person liable for the circumstances, 
attributes or obligations of the corporation without a provision of law allowing for such 
treatment.29
This is a rather wide interpretation of veil piercing, but in its reach, it matches 
the formulation of the doctrine laid out in the KKO 2015:17 decision. Additional 
support could be derived from Sweden. The Swedish legal literature is obsessed with 
resolving a similar issue. The argument is over whether veil piercing is a norm that 
should be systemized only under company law, tort law or as a general principle 
of the legal system.30 Wiktor Brandell sees many benefits in the broad definition of 
piercing as a general principle. It allows combatting corporate abuses in areas of law 
besides company law, it generates a larger body of case law, and it therefore leads to 
a better-developed doctrine, which in turn makes the legal state more certain. The 
formulation under a broad principle does not prevent creating more specific rules 
when necessary.31
Another key concept in this work is risk. Risk is understood here to cover both the 
positive chance for profits (positive risk) and the negative chance for losses (negative 
26 See KKO 1996:2 and KKO 2017:94
27 See KKO 2015:17 at 29.
28 See Rudanko 1982 at 99. Similarly, see Lindfors 2008 at 315.
29 See also Brandell 2018 at 15–17 and Atlas Maritime v. Avalon Maritime (1991) at 779.
30 For a description of this debate, see Brandell 2018 at 14–17.
31 Brandell 2018 at 14–17.
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risk).32 Typically, the word is used to cover only the negative aspect. Even though 
using the dual meaning of the word risk could potentially alienate some readers, the 
vehement pursuit of objectivity and accurate language demand these to be separate. 
From this follows the term risk separation, which means separating the positive and 
negative aspects of risk. Risk isolation, on the other hand, would mean isolating 
negative risk from positive, giving it essentially the same content as risk separation.
Following this definition, the target arrangements for veil piercing are those where 
someone uses the corporate form to select which attributes to place in entities in a 
manner that separates the benefits and liabilities and leads to unacceptable results 
or undue harm to others. This is a very general description, and as the length of this 
research shows, a lot of further elaboration is needed to distinguish when the veil 
can be pierced from legitimate limitations of business risk for which the corporate 
form is designed.
?
Figure 2. The simplified arrangement piercing remedies
4.2.  Direct and Indirect Veil Piercing
In Finnish legal literature, veil piercing has sometimes been split into two categories: 
direct and indirect veil piercing.33 Direct veil piercing occurs when the controller 
or another person is held liable for the obligation of the corporation. Indirect veil 
piercing occurs when one entity is not allowed to enforce its debt from the other 
32 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 177–184.
33 See af Schultén 1984 at 81, Leppänen 1991 at 285–286, Huhtamäki 1999 at 142–144. Cf. Hut-
tunen 2007 at 127.
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entity.34 The same division exists in the United States,35 where the indirect piercing 
is called equitable subordination. The United States has adopted slightly different 
piercing tests in each situation.36 In Finland, though, the division does not affect the 
analysis when determining whether the veil can be pierced. It is only about choosing 
the form of remedy for the situation: personal liability or subordination of debt 
claim.
Indirect piercing has expressly been accepted in the Finnish case law as early 
as 1929 in three separate decisions.37 In these decisions, the parent company 
was denied the status as a creditor because the subsidiary had been a separate 
corporation only in appearance, and it was in fact owned by the parent and 
operated to fulfill the business purposes of the parent. The parent was not 
allowed to demand payment on the debt it held from the subsidiary.
In this study, I do not follow this division, as it only affects the solution adopted 
and not the analysis on whether the veil should be pierced or not. The veil piercing 
assessment is the same. The only difference is on the result adopted. Direct veil 
piercing as a solution means that the corporate veil can be pierced and the controller 
will be held liable for the obligations of the corporation. Indirect piercing as a 
solution means that the corporate veil can be pierced and the controller should not 
be allowed to claim  debt. These are only different solutions to remedy the wrongs of 
the cases. Direct and indirect veil piercing are just ways to categorize these solutions 
from an ex post perspective—after the veil has been pierced.38
The whole dichotomy is about the inter-entity relation in which the legal effects 
occur.39 In direct veil piercing, the liability occurs in the relationship between the 
controller and the creditor. In indirect veil piercing, it occurs in the relationship 
between the corporation and the controller. Veil piercing assessment is not tied 
to these relations. It is the totality of the arrangement that is determinative.40 The 
34 The debt needs to be borrowed capital. If the debt is in essence, albeit not in form, equity capital, veil 
piercing is not necessary as the payment can be denied without it. See Leppänen 1991 at 310.
35 See I.6.1. of this work.
36 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. (1939).
37 See KKO 1929 II 638, KKO 1929 II 639, KKO 1929 II 640 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292–
293.
38 For a somewhat supporting opinion, see Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 408–409. They are of the opinion 
that direct veil piercing is possible within the doctrine created in the KKO 1929 II 638–640 decisions. 
The doctrine they find from the case is that the parent cannot have a real receivable from the subsidiary 
if the subsidiary is, in fact, owned by the parent and operates as branches of the parents’ business for eco-
nomic purposes of the parent. From this, they derive that, in a similar situation, the subsidiary cannot have 
obligations separate from the parent, and thus, the obligations of the subsidiary are de facto obligations of 
the parent.
39 See Leppänen 1991 at 285–286 and 315–316.
40 KKO 2015:17.
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totality includes all the relationships around the corporation and how they affect 
each other. The change in one relationship affects other relationships around it. 
Piercing creates the creditor a right to make a claim directly with an additional party 
or alters the relations among the controller, the corporation and the creditors.41 This 
process accounts for elements that appear in every relation among the complex. Only 
ex post can this alteration be reasonably thought to occur in a single relation. Ex ante, 
they all affect the outcome, and ex post consequences are discernable as relation-
specific. The totality of the arrangement provides the justification for piercing, after 
which the effects appear in an isolated relation. The plausibility of these effects also 
acts as the necessary interest that allows for making a piercing claim in the first place.
The categorization reflects the tradition of analytical jurisprudence and 
is ultimately traceable back to Wesley N. Hohfeld’s fundamental legal 
conceptions.42 These conceptions, by nature, are useful when assessing the 
justification of a decision and the legal relationships it has created after the 
decision has been made. They are meant to assess the existing relations, 
not how those relations are formed. Veil piercing involves the creation of a 
subjective right in one relation based on a justification that exists in another. 
The framework is unable to process this transition. On the other hand, it can 
be argued that the controller based on the duty of loyalty is already related 
to the creditor, and the liability is only a sanction for violating the right that 
the creditor possesses. This would lead to a circle since the existence of the 
controller’s duty of loyalty itself necessitates extending the contents of one 
legal relation to another. The corporation-controller relationship creates 
the duty of loyalty on conditions resembling veil piercing. The controller, 
by definition, exercises power in the corporation-controller relation.43 This 
power enables her to control how the corporation exercises its power when 
forming the corporation-creditor relation. The controller does possess power 
over the corporation-creditor relation as she can determine the use of the 
corporation’s power. The power of the controller in the corporation-controller 
relation makes it possible to sabotage the realization of rights within the 
corporation-creditor relation. The power utilized in this manner possibly 
gives the creditor the power to demand sanction. The whole question with 
veil piercing is whether this use of power can justify liability. This question 
cannot be answered by Hohfeld’s conceptions or its derivatives.
41 See Leppänen 1991 at 285–286, Huhtamäki 1999 at 144 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 291.
42 See Hohfeld 1913, Hohfeld 1917, Ross 1934 at 185–203 (as cited by Zitting 1951 at 2), Zitting 1951 
at 2–5, Wikström 1980 at 250–251 and Kurki 2015 at 445–447. See also Niemi 1996 at 19 and 66.
43 About power over another relation see Kurki 2015 at 442.
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Legal literature has accepted this division thus far, but little attention has been 
devoted to the choice between them. Indirect veil piercing does not usually occur 
outside bankruptcy, so this conflict does not usually exist outside of bankruptcy. 
Nothing prevents applying direct veil piercing in bankruptcy, though. So how 
should the choice be made between the two?
Tatu Leppänen gives a detailed explanation of the results of each choice but makes 
little effort to give recommendations on which is preferable. Direct piercing would 
mean adding another liable person, who would be just as liable for the debts as the 
debtor. This would add assets to satisfy the bankruptcy creditors’ claims. Indirect 
piercing would mean that one creditor is denied the status of a creditor or is at 
least allowed payment only after other claims are fully satisfied. This does not add 
assets but decreases the claims, thus increasing the share other creditors receive from 
the bankruptcy estate. Leppänen does favor indirect piercing over direct piercing 
because its benefits are collectively divided between the creditors.44
From this, it is clear that indirect piercing is less intrusive toward the one held 
liable. The liability is limited to the sum of the debt denied, whereas direct piercing 
would potentially place all assets at risk. As later discussed in this work, piercing 
claims are creditor-specific, and collective claims in the name of the bankruptcy 
estate should not occur outside specific situations.45 Direct piercing would thus only 
mean placing all the assets responsible only against the receivables of the creditors 
demanding piercing. It is therefore not clear which form of piercing is less intrusive. 
Case by case, this is easily discernible, and the amount of the potential liability seems 
higher in direct piercing as multiple creditors could claim piercing. With indirect 
piercing, the amount of the potentially subordinated debt is also usually entirely 
controlled by the holder of that debt. Control and liability amounts suggest that 
indirect piercing is a less intrusive remedy. It should thus be favored when both are 
available.
5.  Research Method and Research Questions
5.1.  Setting a Research Question
The motivation for this research comes from the unclarities and lack of interpretative 
certainty the formulation in KKO 2015:17 left us with. My attempt in this research is 
to make the rather ambiguous veil piercing doctrine more concrete and predictable. 
This is not a clear cut research question though. This goal should thus be divided 
into simpler questions as follows:
44 Leppänen 1991 at 278 and 285–286.
45 See V.8.3.2. of this work.
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1. When can the courts apply veil piercing?
2. How should the parts of the test be interpreted?
3. Who should be held liable?
The work does focus on these issues, though the analysis does show, that none of 
them can be provided with an explicit answer. Much of the findings in this work are 
negative in the sense that it is easier to detect situations and interpretations that are 
not applicable in a piercing case. Still, eliminating these false situations does make 
piercing doctrine more clear, even if the central essence and purpose of the doctrine 
are not entirely revealed. . It could even be questioned, whether the ambiguities 
can be eliminated at all. The nature of veil piercing as a general norm or a standard 
created in case law is, arguably, inherently open for interpretation.46
The first question relates to issues about wording the piercing test. I have accepted 
the KKO 2015:17 wording as the basis for this with minor modifications based 
on legal literature. The second question is an attempt to deduce a typical piercing 
situation, or a real world arrangement which veil piercing could potentially remedy. 
The third question is about the concrete aspects of veil piercing test. This section of 
the work requires me to first define what is meant with each abstract part of the test. 
Second, it requires a thorough explanation of what are the concrete real life actions 
and facts one could cite in a piercing case. Finally the fourth question sets us forth to 
determine who could and who should be held liable. 
5.2.  Research method
5.2.1.  Exclusions
I use legal dogmatics and legal comparison in a very specific way as the methods 
of this research. In the next chapter, I will explain how I use them in detail. Before 
that, I find it necessary to exclude a few methodological choices. These exclusions 
are valid—even popular—methods where piercing is concerned. For several reasons, 
though, I found them lacking and decided against them. These rejected ideas mostly 
center around law and economics and considerations of efficiency. 
The first idea I explicitly reject in this research is the argument that the cheapest 
cost avoider should hold the liability. Although in most cases the cheapest cost 
avoider is likely the corporate controller facilitating an arrangement, this sort of 
examination is still often derailed. I have taken the view that veil piercing targets 
arrangements in which someone deliberately creates a situation using a corporate 
form in which they are able to separate assets and liabilities, or negative risks. The 
46 I thank the inspector of my thesis, Hanne Søndegaard-Birkmose, for pointing out this possibility to 
me. I whole heartedly agree with this statement.
14
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
argument goes that veil piercing decisions condemn these intentions to be of benefit 
at the expense of someone else. The cheapest cost avoider argumentation bypasses 
the intention altogether in an attempt to arrive at the most efficient conclusion. I 
resent the idea that malicious intentions are legitimized in this manner by simply 
referring to efficiency. Efficient does not mean just.
Another rejected idea is that veil piercing decisions should be balancing act 
between benefits of limited liability and the injustices it has created in the current 
case at hand. This is the approach much of the United States legal literature has 
adopted.47 Limited liability is the rule, and the economic analysis of it reveals that the 
rule has many beneficial effects.48 It does create several—often severe—externalities 
too. This sort of argumentation would also result in a solution based on extra-legal 
considerations of efficiency. If the benefits of the limited liability in the case exceed 
the externalities, then should the veil not be pierced? The benefits for society as a 
whole created by limited liability are irrelevant in individual piercing cases.49 The 
decisions should be made by considering the purposes behind each of the applicable 
norms to detect abuse.
5.2.2.  Legal dogmatics
5.2.2.1.  Generally About Legal Dogmatics in this Work
Legal dogmatics is the backbone of any legal research. It provides answers to 
questions of interpretation and content of the law. I seek to clarify the interpretation 
of the veil piercing doctrine as it was laid out in KKO 2015:17. As I am sure most 
readers of this work are quite familiar with this method, I will only provide a quick 
description of its basic structure. Instead, I will focus more on how the subject of veil 
piercing forcefully and specifically emphasizes legal dogmatics. The traditional view 
of legal dogmatics has emphasized the authoritative legal sources, and decisions were 
about matching the facts of the case to whatever was described in those sources.50 
Veil piercing would not exist if this view were adopted completely. There are few 
authoritative sources, the piercing decisions are always contra legem51 and two 
authoritative sources are often in conflict.
Instead of the traditional view, the approach developed by Juha Karhu suits veil 
piercing situations much better. His situational sensitive legal dogmatics approaches 
the case from the facts toward the norms. First, one needs to correctly assess the 
47 About the discussion, see, for example, Bainbridge 2000, Millon 2007 and Cheng 2014.
48 Easterbrook – Fischel 1991 at 41–62.
49 Similarly Oh 2013 at 93–94. He argues that from a positive and normative standpoint, there is no 
basis to presume that efficiency-based rationales for limited liability necessarily govern veil piercing. He 
goes further and notes that until this conceptual path linking veil-piercing and limited liability can be 
extirpated, the prospect of a cogent remedy will remain illusory.
50 Karhu 2003 at 803.
51 See also Pöyhönen 2000 at 175.
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total situation and its legal implications. Only after this, one searches for norms that 
are relevant for the situation, of which there can be several. The norms create a field 
of assessment, where each norm is only an argument and inspiration in the legal 
assessment. The significance of each norm is determined only after considering the 
impact of each norm.52 I will take this approach throughout this work, though it 
is especially discussed in the theoretical chapters II.2 and II.3. In these chapters, I 
make a specific analysis of veil piercing, on which norms are parts of the assessment 
and what sorts of arguments they bring in the assessment.
I would summarize the differences in approach between the more traditional 
legal dogmatics and situational sensitive legal dogmatics through the following 
characterizations. The traditional view begins by defining the relevant description 
of events and recognizing the potential norms that could be applied to the 
situation. Next, a choice is made on which norm shall be applied. Principally, 
selecting one excludes the others. Then the an attempt is made to resolve the issue 
by applying that norm and no relevance per se is given to the excluded norms and 
the interests and purposes behind them. The emphasis is on the clarity of each 
norm and its application in the hierarchical structure of norms. The view is more 
hierarchical. 
The situational sensitive view begins by recognizing the totality of the situation, 
what are the practical consequences of the situation and what norms, law and other 
legal substance is related to the situation. Next, the relevant norms are inspected to 
refine the central arguments that norm provides. This argument is then used when 
balancing the interests of the parties and the strength of the argument is determined 
only after its consequences on the parties rights have been determined. Determining 
the consequences on the parties rights also determines the effects the norm has on 
the other relevant norms in the assessment. Decision making is about combining 
and coordinating these interests and consequences. The emphasis is on coordination 
and not having to compromise excessively on any of the core interests or purposes 
behind each relevant legal norm.
These differences become more explicit through examples from veil piercing 
context. If the traditional view is applied, veil piercing becomes more strongly 
about conflict of norms. The core interests and purposes have relevance in resolving 
the conflict. Interpretation then attempts at a choice between the two conflicting 
norms. This is done by describing the relevant arrangement in question and 
comparing it to the arrangements each of the norms in the conflict are meant to 
represent and regulate. The better match is chosen and the other is discarded. In 
piercing context, the question could be for example, should the two companies 
in the arrangement be considered separate in relation to employees even though 
both of them have acted like an employer would. The resolution is reached by 
52 Karhu 2003 at 803–804.
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selecting between the legal norm determining employer and company laws separate 
personality norm.
In the situational sensitive view, veil piercing is understood more strongly 
through the prohibition of abuse of rights. The interpretation is about coordinating 
different views on appropriate behavior from the relevant norms, the consequences 
their application would have and what interests are those norms based on. For 
example, the Company Act 1:5 does not determine the purpose of the company 
exhaustively or the Company Act 1:2 limited liability is not conclusive. Instead, they 
are just representations of different interests in the assessment. The assessment also 
implements the consequences the application of the relevant norms would bring and 
the control each interested party has on those consequences. All of these interests are 
but arguments and they can be discarded in the assessment, if the control capabilities 
are not used in accordance with the interests the norms are based on.
As for the legal source hierarchy,53 veil piercing is a rather problematic topic. There 
is no written law, and even preparatory works have very little on the subject. Written 
law and preparatory works have significance mostly through the analogous norms 
and their interpretations. The creation of the piercing doctrine comes from case law 
and seems to involve some form of moral condemnation and ramification views. 
Legal literature also played an unusually large role in the creation of the piercing 
doctrine in KKO 2015:17. The analysis is thus reliant on weaker sources of law since 
the compelling sources remain silent.
Much of this work is dedicated to formulating the veil piercing doctrine. The 
main tools of this research are analogy and interpretation. Legal dogmatics utilizes 
grammatical interpretation—choosing from different possible meanings for the 
expression.54 Aulis Aarnio defines four rules for it: a) no part of the law should be 
interpreted as to leave it unnecessary or meaningless; b) the expressions used in law 
must be given the same meaning in different contexts unless there is sufficient reason 
to differ; c) the interpreted expression should not be given a meaning that differs 
from the general usage of the expression; and d) if the terminology used in law 
differs from the general usage, the legal terminology is given preference.55
The subject of veil piercing places an emphasis on the second part of these 
interpretative rules: the expressions used in law must be given the same meaning 
in different contexts unless there is sufficient reason to differ. The veil piercing test 
introduced in KKO 2015:17 uses several expressions that have no immediately 
apparent meaning. These terms are such that they have been used somewhere else 
in the legal order. Interpreting the meaning of these terms would then fall under 
this rule. For example, in this research, I will take the terms control, artificiality, and 
53 See Aarnio 1982 at 87–96 and Aarnio 2006 at 287–338.
54 See Aarnio 2006 at 246–248.
55 Aarnio 1982 at 103.
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reprehensible manner and inspect their usage in law and determine whether there is 
a reason to interpret them differently in the veil piercing context. Section V of this 
work is largely based on this sort of inspection and analogy.
Analogy, the comparison for relevant similarity, is a useful tool in the doctrinal 
tool bag. It purports that similar articles of law or court cases offer interpretative 
support for one another.56 The problem with analogy lies in discovering relevant 
similarity. This requires the interpreter to divide the facts into elements small 
enough and then recognize the similar relevant elements in the compared items.57 
Similar phenomena need to be treated the same, whereas different phenomena 
need to be treated differently.58 With veil piercing, analogy receives an especially 
heightened significance. One could even argue that the Supreme Court built the 
entire test based on analogy on artificial property arrangements, tax avoidance and 
comparable party considerations on environmental damage liability. These are the 
primary situations where the existing written law allows for disregarding separate 
personality or limited liability in the corporate context. They no doubt prove to be 
a key influence when clarifying the meaning of different parts of piercing doctrine 
based on general case law that allow the same result. Sections III and IV of this work 
are dedicated to discovering better sources of analogy and excluding the potential 
but inferior sources.
5.2.2.2. Making the In Casu Overall Assessment
The nature of the piercing doctrine does seem to give its own characteristics to 
the methodology used to examine it. Yet one more characteristic should still be 
mentioned. The veil piercing decision is always made in casu and is based on the 
overall assessment59 of all the relevant facts of the case. As there is no written law 
norm limiting the facts, the assessment can become rather messy. There are certain 
repeating patterns and commonalities in case law, though. Certain patterns of fact 
have been confirmed to support piercing and certain others to oppose it.
Answering this in casu overall assessment and detecting subtle variations require 
precision tools. My approach here is heavily inspired by the four criteria used by Juha 
Pöyhönen to assess co-operation in civil law matters. These are the 1) operational 
environment, 2) overall arrangement, 3) interest holder and 4) risk position.60 These 
criteria can be used to detect more subtle variations in legally relevant situations. If 
the traditional view looks at complete rights, this approach allows us to view the 
formations of those rights as a process and attach relevance to different stages.
56 Aarnio 1982 at 104.
57 Aarnio 1982 at 104.
58 As Juha Karhu has emphasized about equal treatment in several lectures.
59 KKO 2015:17 at 28–29.
60 Pöyhönen 2000 at 162–184.
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Operational environment means the ordinary and typical way in which some 
norm or institution is used. The determination of ordinary could also look 
into the future and at what practices will become ordinary and typical. If done 
this way, one needs to determine how these practices should be to distribute 
negative risks fairly.61 In a corporate context, this would mean the operation 
of a legitimate business. There is a clear pattern emerging in piercing case law 
where the existence of a legitimate business prevents veil piercing.62 Deviation 
from this brings us to the territory where we need to assess the distribution 
of negative risks.
In short, the overall arrangement means that the view on legally relevant 
factors is not limited to a single legal relation. Instead, one can account for 
all the entities that are interconnected and affected somehow by whatever 
happens in one relation.63 For example, a parent corporation’s commands to 
the subsidiary in a parent-subsidiary relation can easily affect the subsidiary-
contractor relation. The decision is made based on the plurality of connections 
instead of isolating its effects into one. 
The interest holder is a deviation from the traditional view of the rights 
holder. Instead of the formal legal right, an interest holder is determined 
through practical aspects. Whoever has an economic interest in the overall 
operation is an interest holder. The stronger the connection, the easier it 
should be to disregard the formal outlook. Instead of the formal legal label, 
one needs to look at what happens in reality.64 If we combine this factor 
with the overall arrangement criterion, we find one key disparity in law: the 
economic effects of an operation materialize through the combined efforts of 
the interest holders instead of subject-specific accumulation.
The risk position seeks to emphasize how the parties in the arrangement 
have determined their negative risks as well as the chance for benefits from the 
operation they pursue together. This determination should not be unilaterally 
altered. Pöyhönen sees the norms that allow for assessing proportionality or 
moderation as tools to match liability to the risk positions of the parties.65 I 
argue that veil piercing has a similar function.
I have not used these terms systematically in this work, hence their position is 
noted as inspiration. These criteria offer a capable framework through which the 
detection and overall assessment of relevant facts can be made. Certainly, veil 
61 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 162–167.
62 See III.4.2.2. of this work.
63 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 169–172. He even uses veil piercing as one example of a situation where this 
sort of interconnectedness is especially relevant.
64 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 173–174.
65 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 177–180.
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piercing does seem to require the use of several of these perspective changes that 
Pöyhönen’s model makes in comparison to the traditional views. It demands viewing 
the totality of legal relations instead of a single one, looks into the economic reality 
behind the legal form, assesses the allocation of benefits and liabilities and even gives 
relevance to the ordinary and typical use of the corporation’s form. The discussed 
model seems highly compatible with the existing case law.
I have made it my mission in this work to detect patterns of fact, of corporate 
conduct and of real-world actions. This gives the analysis here a distinct tint. These 
patterns do not necessarily have legal relevance as such, but rather they speak of the 
motives and purposes behind the arrangement. They form relevant legal material 
for the overall assessment and allow going beyond the singular legal relation. 
For example, siphoning assets and practicing corporate operation benefitting 
only another corporation under the ownership of the same shareholder have no 
legal relevance in themselves. They can be relevant in asset distribution norms or 
competition law, but not usually in liability issues. When these actions are examined 
as part of a pattern of conduct, they could be interpreted to reveal the intention 
of the person forming the arrangement or how these actions affected even those 
outside the immediate persons involved in an unacceptable manner. This is then 
given relevance in the piercing assessment. As such, the research almost resembles 
the evaluation of evidence instead of legal dogmatics. It examines real arguments 
as well as the causality in the rational decision-making process. It goes under the 
surface of legally accepted conduct to examine the reasons and rationales behind it, 
seeks significant patterns and proceeds to give these patterns meaning within the 
piercing test. The analysis is very much about discovering, on a practical level, what 
conduct veil piercing is meant to deter.
5.2.3.  About the Legal Comparison Method
I have chosen to do a legal comparison. Thus, a comparative method needs to be 
adopted. The basis of the compared veil piercing doctrines is deeply embedded in 
case law and opinions in legal literature. The doctrine is often guided by principles, 
moral judgments and deducing intentions from certain facts. These qualities 
naturally guide us toward certain methods of legal comparison.
When planning the comparison, I considered three comparative methods. First, I 
thought about using the legal transplant method.66 In short, legal transplant means 
taking some specified legal rule or system from one legal system and hypothetically 
placing it in another. Then the research would assess potential incompatibilities, 
problems and other issues this new material would cause. With veil piercing, 
this approach would prove problematic. The veil piercing doctrines in foreign 
66 About legal transplants, see Watson 1974, Linna 1987 at 183–187, Linna 2010 and Husa 2014 at 
924–927.
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jurisdictions are not precise. It would be moot to implant some vague formulation 
from a foreign jurisdiction and assess how it would fare in the Finnish legal system. 
Even if the transplant is only about the core concept or idea of the legal rule,67 with 
veil piercing, even that core is debatable. The answers the legal transplant method 
would have provided would amount to claims based on assumptions of these foreign 
doctrines, solidifying the forms of these doctrines beyond that which has been 
achieved in their home jurisdictions. Legal transplant will not work as a comparative 
method in the case of veil piercing.
The second option would have been to adopt the functional comparison method, 
as it is traditionally understood.68 This would have allowed me to name a socio-legal 
problem and view other legal systems’ answers to that problem. This would probably 
have led me to inspect quistclose or constructive trusts in England or some other 
liability doctrines. I most likely would have encountered the veil piercing doctrines 
also. This method would have confined my research to a single problem or a set of 
them. This would have been a plausible approach, though it would have required 
me to first answer the socio-legal problem answered by veil piercing within the 
Finnish legal system. It is only through thorough research that I can answer this 
elementary question—in any legal system. As it turns out, that question itself is such 
that analyzing it would benefit from comparative material. The lack of legislation 
combined with the ambiguous wording in the Supreme Court decision in KKO 
2015:17 make veil piercing a doctrine that, in wording alone, could apply to any 
situation where a corporation’s creditor did not receive full payment. The compared 
socio-legal problem is not yet identified clearly enough—or there are multiple—to 
allow a functional comparison.
This has left me with a more light approach to legal comparison. Instead of 
answers and example solutions, I am simply looking into the foreign legal systems 
for inspiration, case examples and additional arguments. The approach is that of 
practical legal comparison.69 The aim is not to compare the legal system on the level 
of legal praxis or legal culture. Instead, I take a more modest approach and analyze 
sections of law and case law from other jurisdictions. According to Jaakko Husa, 
this sort of comparison aims to resolve some interpretative problem in domestic law. 
Foreign material is not considered a legal source but is used to argue the decision 
with support from the argumentative patterns or formulations from that foreign 
material.70 However, the bare citation of such judgments outside the comparative 
67 Husa 2017 at 924.
68 About the functional comparative method, see Husa 2013b and Husa 2013a at 10–13. About the 
rejected modern view, see Zweigert – Kötz 1998 and Husa 2013a at 13–16.
69 Husa 2013b at 5 and 7. Alternatively, the approach is a so-called first-degree comparison, the light-
est form of comparison usually utilized in preparing legislation. See Husa 2010 at 715.
70 See Husa 2013b at 5 and 7 as well as. Also Husa 2010 at 709 and 713.
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context is overly simplified and therefore misleading.71 The material can be used as 
support, but one must not forget the fact that they originate from a foreign legal 
system. Sometimes the systems are too different and the material should be rejected. 
Even though practical comparison does not delve deep into the legal systems 
being compared, this research still seeks to discover at least whether there is some 
prohibitive difference making it impossible or undesirable to utilize the material.
I have placed this sort of interpretative problem as the research question in this 
work. What are the requirements of veil piercing in Finland? How should the 
test introduced in KKO 2015:17 be interpreted? Thus, the comparative method 
that fits the research questions is a practical legal comparison. The validity of this 
choice is further strengthened with a glimpse at Lord Neuberger’s argumentation 
in a landmark veil piercing case from the United Kingdom. He discusses foreign 
veil piercing literature to support his own remarks.72 The ambiguous formulation of 
piercing doctrine makes all piercing cases hard cases that have no easy answer. And 
in such cases, comparative arguments are the most useful.73
Much of the material I will inspect when performing the legal comparison is not 
legal norms or veil piercing rules. Instead, the comparison often focuses on questions 
of the relevance of facts, e.g., when a corporation is inadequately capitalized or what 
facts show that the assets have commingled. Naturally, the legal systems individually 
formulate the norms that determine how they understand these terms and thresholds, 
e.g., how much capital is adequate. 
The Finnish legislation gives the courts relatively free reign to assess the reliability 
and meaning of the evidence. There are only a few rules as to the assessment of the 
evidence. This makes the veil piercing comparison even more fertile. These sorts of 
factors are based on logic and reason, which of course are universal and independent 
of any legal system. It would thus seem especially useful to look into the types of 
reasoning courts abroad have utilized when piercing. An example of this would be 
to question when corporate affairs and funds have been commingled so thoroughly 
that it supports piercing.
I have decided to call my study multijurisdictional. I refer to multijurisdictional 
as an inter-jurisdiction connection. The analysis does not only seek to address 
the significance of foreign material for the purposes of Finnish doctrine, but also 
seeks the development of the internal doctrine of the foreign system. Merits of 
my research in this regard would be especially significant for Sweden. The word 
multijurisdictional in the title could easily be replaced with legal comparative and it 
would still be representative of the research here. The idea behind the term is about 
71 Fabér v. Hungary ECHR 24.7.2012 dissenting opinion of Helen Keller at 17. See also Husa 2013b 
at 9–10.
72 See Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd at 75–78.
73 See Husa 2013b at 16.
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a research connecting several legal systems or jurisdictions, detecting similarities and 
seeking inspiration – for both the author’s home jurisdiction and the foreign system.
Now that the method has been chosen, the next step is to select the legal systems 
utilized. Although I have considered several others, mainly from Europe, in the end, 
I chose the Nordic countries. The United Kingdom and the United States seemed 
to offer the most material and the Nordic countries more useful material for the 
Finnish system. In addition, the practical aspect of language skill was a factor in 
choosing these.
The United States and the United Kingdom are more distant than the Nordic 
region, though their abundance of material makes them more relevant.74 They are 
both also very significant countries in global economics. Additionally, in corporate 
law matters, they are often the example others seek to emulate. This does not seem to 
matter that much since veil piercing is most concerned with the two global corporate 
law norms. They are the very basic tenets of corporate existence that appear in most 
corporate legislations: limited liability and separate personality. The rest of the 
corporate law is of lesser importance, although the norms on creditor protection 
and asset transfer often serve to limit the need for veil piercing.75 They do not affect 
the requirements of piercing, however.
Going further, Russia and China have both adopted a piercing section into their 
company legislation. Researching those jurisdictions is unfortunately beyond my 
means, as I do not speak either language. Fortunately, Kirill Tervo76 is currently 
conducting research in the Russian system. Next, I will introduce the piercing 
doctrines in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway and Denmark as 
well as provide the arguments for their inclusion in this research.
6.  Contextual Information on the Selected Legal  
Systems of Comparison
6.1.  United States
6.1.1.  Single or Multiple Piercing Doctrine(s)?
The United States is perhaps the most prominent veil piercing jurisdiction. The 
doctrine has had plenty of time to develop since its inception in 1809.77 Generally, 
74 Although they are not as foreign as the Finnish Company Act of 2006, they did heed the UK as a 
point of influence. See HE 109/2005 at 14–15. See also Airaksinen 2013 at 449–450 for a description of 
the criticism sparked by adopting common law elements into Finnish Company Act. He also provides a 
good answer to that criticism – mainly that not that many elements were adopted.
75 See, for example, Alting 1994 and Miller 1998.
76 Attorney at law, Ad Astra Asianajotoimisto Oy and an LL.D. Candidate, University of Helsinki.
77 Bank of Deveaux v. United States (1809).
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a jurisdiction does not have too many piercing cases and even fewer landmark cases. 
In the United States, however, around 3000 relevant piercing cases have emerged.78 
It should be noted that the United States is a large country and a leader in the global 
economy. Both of these factors dictate that many cases should arise there, as many 
companies were established. In addition, at least by reputation, US culture has a low 
threshold for litigation. Veil piercing doctrine has had both the time and quantity to 
develop. Arguably, the US version of veil piercing is the most advanced in the world.
A distinction needs to be made between different states within the US. Each 
state has its own veil piercing doctrine, case law and judicial context,79 which makes 
a meaningful comparison to “the US doctrine of piercing the veil” impossible. 
Instead of one doctrine, there are 50–60 of them, counting one for each state, one 
for the federal level and several limited context doctrines allowing veil piercing.80 
This multitude forces some choices on the comparison. I could choose one or even 
several doctrines and focus my analysis on these. Undoubtedly, some of the US 
doctrines are more prominent than others. New York State utilizes a well versed 
and highly developed agency variation of veil piercing and houses a lot of business, 
thus generating a lot of cases. Delaware has more companies registered there than 
any other jurisdiction in the world but is notoriously lax in its regulation over the 
corporations and has no significant case law on piercing.81 California82 and Texas 
are large jurisdictions and have some case law on piercing, even though Texas later 
excluded the application of veil piercing in its Business Corporation Act.83 Illinois 
seems to have an especially well-argued veil piercing doctrine.84
Although it would be plausible to choose any of these jurisdictions for comparison, 
I have chosen a different route. Most comparative essays between the US and other 
jurisdictions make no distinction by state. They analyze the US veil piercing doctrine 
without much discussion on whether such a single doctrine even exists. It does not, 
but the comparison is still valid. The doctrines adopted by the States are remarkably 
similar.85 Sam Halabi has even argued that the variance between different states can 
78 Oh 2010 at 89.
79 Statutory law, especially procedural rules.
80 For example, the Deep Rock doctrine in bankruptcy. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. 
(1939).
81 About the applicable piercing doctrine in Delaware, see Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co. (1992) at 
793–794. See also Bendemer 2005 at 389–391 and Oh 2010 at 116–117 stating the Delaware approach 
to piercing as restrictive.
82 See the vague Californian standard for piercing from Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) at 
300–306. See also Oh 2010 at 118–119.
83 At 2.21, though it is debatable whether this exclusion has prevented veil piercing entirely. SSP Part-
ners v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation (2008), Egan 2015 at 81–82 and Sparkman 2016 at 
369–371.
84 See Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source (1991) and the cases cited there.
85 On the similarity, see Marcantel 2011 at 195–196.
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be explained by procedural rules, and the veil piercing norm itself is identical.86 While 
I cannot verify his observations, as analysis on these rules would constitute extensive 
research on its own, the similarities between the doctrines are still striking. Even those 
researching veil piercing in the United States seem to treat the doctrine as singular.87 
Lately, though, the scholarship around veil piercing has changed. The US 
literature seems to have shifted from a purely legal discussion about the relevance of 
certain factors in piercing to quantitative analysis on the prevalence of certain factors 
according to statistics.88 This sort of research has scarce practical utility in determining 
when the courts pierce the veil, as it only measures the cited factors in reasoning and 
not their weight or content.89 The other prong of the literature assesses the economic 
and social justifications of limited liability and analyzes whether veil piercing should 
be accepted as a limitation to limited liability.90 Treating the US doctrines as a single 
body is no doubt practical and fits the comparative methodology I have adopted in 
this research. The aim is not to make a deep analysis of the systems compared but 
rather to take a short look into how things are done in other jurisdictions to spark 
inspiration and discussion in Finland.
Another problem with comparing to the United States is that the piercing doctrines 
there are vague, unprincipled and hard to interpret. There is no clear norm to compare 
to, and variance of relevant factors in court opinions is vast. This is explained at least 
in part by the fact that veil piercing is an equitable remedy.91 Equity, in a broad sense, 
is the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the 
rigidity of strict legal rules. It is “individualized justice,” or the power to adapt the 
relief to the circumstances of the particular case. Equitable relief has always been 
subject to the discretion of the court, as opposed to a matter of right.92
This leads to a situation where almost all aspects of the Finnish veil piercing 
doctrine have come up in some case in the US—and are often interpreted in multiple 
manners. With this sort of result, the comparison does not look into how things are 
in the US, but rather recognizes the relevance of that factor and initiates a discussion 
as to how it should be relevant for piercing. This is like taking a shortcut in the 
development of the Finnish doctrine. We see the considerations and the possible 
86 See Halabi 2015 and Philip Morris Companies Inc. Litigation Manual on Intercorporate Liability 
(1989).
87 For example, Bainbridge (2000), Millon (2007) and Cheng (2011).
88 The shift began with Robert B. Thompson in 1991 and much of the modern discussion seems to 
utilize some statistics methodology. See Thompson 1991, Thompson 1999, Swain – Aguilar 2004, Georga-
kopoulus 2007, Boyd – Hoffman 2010, Georgakopoulus 2010 Matheson 2010 and Oh 2010. At the least, 
current discussion cites some of these studies and seeks to explain their results. Discussing this approaches 
utility in legal reasoning; see Millon 2010.
89 Similarly Millon 2010 at 18–19.
90 See Millon 2007, Bainbridge 2000, 
91 All Star, Inc. v. Fellows (2009) at 813.
92 See Peterson 2017 at 68 and those cited therein. See also Oh 2013.
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results as well as the arguments around them. It is also important to note that the 
United States generally has less strict rules on creditor protection.93 Thus, many of 
its issues resolved by piercing could have been resolved with creditor protection 
instruments existing in law here.
Many a writer has noted the creditor-friendly environment in the European 
continent when compared to the US.94 The legal tools available for creditors’ 
protection are numerous. Corporate management enjoys less freedom when 
using the corporate funds, asset recovery has a wider range of application, 
tort liability is more comprehensive and liability cannot be further restricted 
in the bylaws.95 Many of the veil piercing decisions made in the US could 
probably have been resolved within statutory doctrines in Europe.
In this research, I have chosen to examine the veil piercing doctrines. The broader 
approach focusing on a veil piercing remedy would no doubt have also been plausible. 
Let me note that the distinction between these is not clear by any means. Many of 
these interact and commingle with one another, for example, these two previously 
mentioned doctrines: misrepresentation and fraud can be used as elements supporting 
piercing decisions when applying the instrumentality test, or alternatively, they can 
justify extending liability in the corporate context based on causal relation.
6.1.2.  Doctrinal Archetypes
Even as I choose to approach the US veil piercing doctrine as singular, it is worth 
noting the few influential variations within this singular doctrine and offer some 
background information. The veil piercing doctrines adopted by the States can be 
divided into several archetypes. The unique abundance of cases makes it strange 
to choose a few to introduce here. There are simply too many possibilities and 
landmark cases. Thus, I have chosen to introduce three doctrine archetypes instead 
of landmark piercing cases.96 The most popular archetypes are the instrumentality97 
test and agency test.98 These could also be categorized as piercing rationales, e.g., 
explanatory models cited to allow veil piercing.99
93 See for example, Nerep 2015 at 23.
94 See Miller 1998 at 144–148 and Leppänen 1991 at 299 and those cited therein.
95 In the US, many liability forms can be excluded with a notion in the bylaws. See, for example, Del-
aware Limited Liability Company Act Title 6 Subtitle II 18-1101.
96 For an introduction of other archetypes and systemizations of the piercing standards, see Cohen 
1998 at 18 or Figueroa 2012 at 719–731.
97 Alternatively “mere instrumentality.” I have included the alter ego test in the instrumentality test, 
although it was deemed to be separate from other veil piercing tests in Castleberry v. Branscum (1986). My 
choice is based on the extensive similarities shared with the instrumentality test.
98 See Oh 2010 at 81–82.
99 See Oh 2010 at 133–134 and Hamilton – Booth 2006 at 400–410.
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The instrumentality test is based on the work of Frederick Powell100 and was 
established in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio:
Where a parent corporation, at the time of the transaction complained of, 
(1) exercises control over its subsidiary not in a manner normal and usual 
with stockholders, but to such extent and in such manner, in disregard of the 
subsidiary’s corporate paraphernalia, directors and officers, that the subsidiary 
has become a mere instrumentality or department of the parent’s own business 
and the parent, under the unreal form of the subsidiary, is the real actor in 
the transaction; or where the business and officers of the two corporations 
have become so inextricably confused that it is impossible or impracticable 
to identify the corporation that participated in the transaction attacked; and 
(2) where such control has been used by the parent to commit fraud101, or 
violate other legal duty, or has been used to do an act tainted by dishonesty or 
unjust conduct violating plaintiff ’s rights or under circumstances giving rise 
to an estoppel; and (except in estoppel cases) (3) where such fraud or wrong 
results in unjust loss and injury to plaintiff, — the court, in disregard of the 
corporate entity of the subsidiary, will hold the parent liable. 
The alter ego test allows disregarding the corporation when “there is such unity 
between corporation and individual that the separateness of the corporation 
has ceased and holding only the corporation liable would result in injustice.”102 
The test is minimal in its wording, but incorporates mostly the same elements as 
instrumentality.103
The agency test was crystalized by Judge Cardozo in Berkey v. Third Avenue 
Railway Co.104 “Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by 
the general rule of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. 
Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice. 
The logical consistency of a judicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times 
when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be 
defended or upheld. This is so, for illustration, though agency in any proper sense is 
missing, where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a 
fraud upon the law.”
100 See Powell 1931 at §6. See also Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 11–14.
101 Not common law fraud but some broader category of fraudulent behavior usually involving misrep-
resentation or misleading. See Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 31 and Cheng 2011 at 28.
102 Castleberry v. Branscum (1986).
103 Similarly, see Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 14–15.
104 at 95.
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The agency doctrine of veil piercing is easily confused with the doctrine of 
agency—a legal relationship where one party authorizes another to act on her 
behalf.105 They should not be thought to be the same.
Other than these three, courts often use so-called laundry lists as veil piercing 
tests. These lists include numerous objective factors. If these factors match the reality 
of the case at hand, then some relevant aspect of piercing is proven. Usually, these 
laundry lists seek to establish dominance and control. Frederick Powell, the father of 
the instrumentality test, also presented one influential list like this.106 The court in 
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp. (1963) later utilized that list, and other 
courts have followed the example.107 Here is the list in its entirety:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
(b)  The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers.
(c)  The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d)  The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or 
otherwise causes its incorporation.
(e)  The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f )  The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the 
subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent 
corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent 
corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of its officers, 
the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the parent 
corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the 
parent corporation’s own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
(j)  The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the 
interest of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corporation 
in the latter’s interest.
(k)  The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
The problem with this sort of list is that items (a)–(d) are quite ordinary practices 
in corporate groups. Inadequate capital is extremely hard to determine, as we will 
find out later in this research.108 Item (f ) can also be interpreted as an attempt to 
105 See also Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. (1936) and Cheng 2011 at 27.
106 See Powell 1991 at §6.
107 See for example Bernadin, Inc v. Midland Oil Corp. (1975), where eight of the eleven matched and 
the court pierced the veil. Several lists exist, for example, see Barber 1981 at 374–375 and Krendl – Krendl 
1978 at 52–55.
108 See V.6.2. of this work.
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save the business in distress.109 Other than that, the list is functional. Perhaps the list 
should be divided into two categories where items (a)–(d) would be used to show 
the opportunity to abuse and the rest to show abuse. Still, there is no additional 
guidance as to weighing and balancing these factors.110 It should be noted that much 
more extensive lists exist,111 and an author has even noted that these listed factors are 
virtually limitless.112
6.1.3.  How Good a Comparison Target is the United States?
These tests do have many common elements with the Finnish veil piercing doctrine 
as established in KKO 2015:17. Their wordings are completely different, but 
after deeper analysis, the same decisive factors start to emerge. All require using a 
corporation, and all give meaning to the level of control one has over the corporation. 
Each requires some sort of moral condemnation or unjust result. The instrumentality 
test gives a more comprehensive list of objective elements, but the others, including 
the Finnish doctrine, give these elements relevance when piercing.
Some additional questions as to the nature of veil piercing exist in the US literature. 
Whether veil piercing is a doctrine in equity or a legal remedy has relevance on whether 
the proceedings utilize a jury.113 US literature holds the nexus of the contract’s view of 
the corporation as dominant,114 whereas in the Nordic region, the entity theory prevails. 
The US legal literature seems hellbent on law and economics research and makes veil 
piercing an issue of limited liability and its externalities. The Nordic approach finds its 
basis more on the prohibition of abuse and upholding policies behind norms.
This introduction into the US veil piercing doctrines should be sufficient for 
the reader. It is against this background that the later comparative discussion takes 
place. Superficial similarities in the veil piercing tests seem obvious. Unfortunately, 
wording in all the tests as well as the Finnish veil piercing doctrine are vague and 
thus extremely open to interpretation.115 Analyzing just the wording of piercing 
doctrines would be an effort in vain, as none are capable of deciding a court case 
without a lot of material from outside the wording. In this regard, the laundry list 
presented provides a better grasp on what really justifies piercing. It offers objective 
factors instead of metaphors to be proven true by objective factors. As I proceed 
109 For a horrible decision where the continual of the subsidiary’s debt was held against the parent and 
in support of piercing, see Ampex Corp. v. Office Electronics, Inc. (1974). About the case, see also Cheng 
2010 at 557.
110 Bainbridge 2000 at 42 discussing the 20-item laundry list from Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland 
Meat Co. (1962). Even more critically, see Millon 2007 at 1327–1329.
111 See, for example, Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 52–55, introducing a 31-item list.
112 See Cohen 1998 at 35.
113 See Bainbridge 2000 at 2, especially footnote 4 and the cases cited there.
114 See Bainbridge 2000 at 10.
115 Bainbridge even calls all these piercing tests and their names irrelevant as none are able to provide a 
bright line standard. Bainbridge 2000 at 36–37.
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further in this research, you will notice that most similarities emerge in the objective 
factors and in how they show the intentions or purpose behind the arrangement. 
That intention can be to perform an act tainted by dishonesty (as worded in the 
instrumentality test) or to use the corporation in an artificial and reprehensible 
manner (as laid out in the Finnish piercing doctrine). Ultimately, the veil piercing 
tests and the Finnish doctrine are all ambiguous and uncertain enough that the 
same interpretations easily fit the wording in any of them. Thus, it makes no sense to 
examine their wording and the differences between the doctrines.
6. 2.  United Kingdom
6.2.1.  The Development of Veil Piercing in England
The United Kingdom’s approach to veil piercing seems more reluctant to pierce than 
any of the others examined here. The law there relies heavily on the landmark case 
Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd.116 The case is famous, or notorious, in company law, 
so only the briefest elaboration on it is provided here. In the case, Aron Salomon 
had transferred his business to a company. He owned 20 001 of the 20 007 shares in 
the company, and the claimant argued that Salomon should be liable for the amount 
the company owed the claimant. The House of Lords adopted an extremely formal 
view of the incorporation: the company either is or is not a person. Since the proper 
formalities of incorporation were followed and no fraud was present, the claim was 
rejected. This established the formal approach to corporate legal personality and a 
hostile approach to veil piercing that continues to this very day.
Despite this background, veil piercing is not unheard of in the UK.117 Of the 
older cases, Gilford Motor Co v. Horne (1933)118  is worth mentioning.119 The second 
era of piercing started after World War II and culminated in the decisions of Jones 
v. Lipman from 1961 and DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London 
Borough Council in 1976. The DHN decision established the single economic unit 
116 1897 AC 22. About piercing in the pre-Salomon era, see Allan 2015 at 564–568.
117 About the development of the doctrine, see Allan 2015 at 571–573.
118 The effects of a contract with a prohibition of competition clause were extended to a company 
owned by the one bound by the agreement.
119 Piercing in taxation exists even earlier. See Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing (1899) at 245 and 
St. Louis Breweries v. Apthorpe (1898) at 112. Also, for successful piercing-related cases, see In Re Darby, 
Brougham  (1911), Rainham Chemical Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co (1921), Smith, Stone & 
Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham (1939) at 121.
Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute, Ltd v. MacDonald (1940) is also of interest here, as in the 
decision, the court contemplated that the separation of legal entities was irrelevant as long as the final 
interest was with the members. The case was not a piercing case, though. It was about the interpretation of 
the statutory concept “sell” and its usefulness is doubtful. Technically, the decision did consider the club 
only as a collective of the members’ interests.
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theory of veil piercing.120 Finally, in 1978, the decision in Woolfson v. Strathclyde 
Regional Council established some useful requirements for veil piercing. According 
to the decision, it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special 
circumstances exist, indicating that [the company] is a mere façade concealing the 
true facts. This wording is ambiguous, loose and open to a lot of interpretation. Still, 
it offers more than what existed before it.121 In Adams v. Cape Industries plc in 1989, 
the strict approach to piercing was once again upheld, but the court provided some 
more elaboration as to situations potentially allowing piercing.122 Three possibilities 
were named: fraud, agency and the single economic unit.123 The Court in Adams 
explicitly rejected the single economic unit line of piercing.124 Two major cases,125 
Trustor AB v. Smallbone (No 2) and VTB Capital plc v. Nutritek International Corp, 
emerged after Adams, though they did not alter the law around piercing.
In 2013, the United Kingdom Supreme Court gave the decision in Prest v. Petrodel 
Resources Ltd. It was a divorce case in which the husband had placed property under 
the ownership of several companies he owned. The question in the case was whether 
the court could transfer the properties to the wife given that they legally belonged 
not to the husband but to his companies. The case was not resolved with piercing, 
but the obiter discussed the doctrine extensively. In it, Lord Sumption makes a 
strict distinction between veil piercing, which disregards the separate personality 
of the company and is thus a true exception to Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd., and 
situations where some other established remedy compels the controller to exercise 
their control in a certain way.126 
In the obiter, Lord Sumption accepted the six principles of veil piercing from 
Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif (2009): (i) ownership and control of a company were 
not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil; (ii) the court cannot pierce the 
corporate veil, even in the absence of third-party interests in the company, merely 
because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice; (iii) the corporate 
veil can be pierced only if there is some impropriety; (iv) the impropriety in 
question must, as Sir Andrew Morritt had said in Trustor, be “linked to the use 
120 The era did include the following cases too: re FG (Films) (1953), Merchandise Transport v. British 
Transport Commission (1962), and Wallersteiner v. Moir (1974), see especially at 1013. See also the tax 
case Littlewoods Mail Order Stores v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1969), especially at 1254–1255 and 
Gallagher – Ziegler 1990 at 296–297.
121 Much like the KKO 2015:17 decision in Finland currently.
122 See also Vandekerckhove 2007 at 69–73.
123 The line was earlier established in DHN Food Distributors v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Coun-
cil (1976).
124 See Vandekeckhove 2007 at 72.
125 Several less impactful also: Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd. (1992) and Ord & Anor v. Belhaven 
Pubs (1998), Beckett Investment Management Group v. Hall (2007) and Stone & Rolls v. Moore Stephens 
(2009).
126 See also Mujih 2016 at 41.
31
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability”; (v) to justify piercing the 
corporate veil, there must be “both control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) 
and impropriety, that is, (mis)use of the company by them as a device or facade to 
conceal their wrongdoing”; and (vi) the company may be a “facade” even though it 
was not originally incorporated with any deceptive intent, provided that it is being 
used for the purpose of deception at the time of the relevant transactions. When 
these are present, the court can pierce the veil to provide a remedy for the particular 
wrong done by those controlling the company. After accepting this, he goes on to 
review the case law in order to determine what could be a relevant wrongdoing. He 
deduces that there are two: concealment and evasion.127
6.2.2.  Concealment and Evasion
In a concealment case, the interposition of a company or several companies is 
used to conceal the identity of the real actors. The courts can then identify the real 
actors, assuming that their identity is legally relevant. According to Lord Sumption, 
concealment cases are not veil piercing at all, but the court merely looks behind the 
façade to discover the real facts concealed by the corporate structure. At this point, I 
assume Lord Sumption means that the court should check the legal relevance of those 
facts and decide the case based on them. I do not agree with him on the point that such a 
move would not constitute veil piercing.128 The corporation is the formal actor, and the 
court’s decision essentially deems that someone else is the real actor. It holds the actions 
of one entity as those of another in a manner that disregards the separate personality.
In an evasion case, the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right 
against the controller that exists independently of the company’s involvement and if a 
company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company will defeat 
the right or frustrate its enforcement. These cases are veil piercing in Lord Sumption’s 
understanding. This would limit veil piercing to cases in which someone has an existing 
liability and uses the company so that the liability is not fulfilled. It is not an abuse129 to 
cause a legal liability to be incurred by the company in the first place.130
127 Before this new formulation, the UK veil piercing cases relied heavily on traditional common law 
doctrines such as agency, trusteeship and tort liability principles instead of a systematic approach specific 
to piercing cases. See Cheng 2011 at 3 and 7 as well as 41.
128 See Allan 2015 at 576–578 and 582 and, similarly, Hannigan 2013 at 21 and 30–35. Hannigan 
provides a much more comprehensive analysis on how the dichotomy is incapable of discerning between 
concealment and evasion cases. Similarly, three judges sitting the Prest case doubted the wisdom of such 
division. See Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) at 92, 100 and 103. 
129 Note that the English legal system has no principle prohibiting the abuse of rights but does have 
a principle where the incidents of most legal relationships between persons (natural or artificial) on the 
fundamental assumption that their dealings are honest. This often leads to the same result as prohibition 
of abuse (Lord Sumption in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013)). Thus, when talking about abuse in the 
context of the English system, there is no connection to the prohibition of the abuse of rights. 
130 at 28 and 34. See also Persad v. Singh (2017) at 783–784 conforming to this view.
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This sort of distinction is nothing new. Several jurisdictions make a clear distinction 
between identification and veil piercing.131 In identification, the courts give priority 
to the reality of the situation instead of strict adherence to entity law doctrine if 
a strict interpretation of a provision in a particular case would lead to injustice. 
Lord Sumption’s concealment principle could be characterized as an identification 
doctrine, and the evasion principle seems like a severely restricted form of veil 
piercing doctrine. This division is not unheard of in Finland, and Swedish literature 
often makes this distinction.132 The division between identification and veil piercing 
is hard to make, and perhaps a final answer is unattainable. Some authors categorize 
identification and veil piercing strictly in separate categories, as Lord Sumption 
did. Some others, on the other hand, consider identification a subcategory of veil 
piercing. Finally, some characterize identification as a result attainable through veil 
piercing, as is done in this research.133
Veil piercing doctrine is summarized in this way: “when a person is under an 
existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which 
he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing 
a company under his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the 
purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the 
advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate legal 
personality.”134 As I do not agree with Lord Sumption’s dichotomy, I will add to 
this definition the concealment principle. Here, this is at least practical for research 
purposes, though it might not match the reality of law in the United Kingdom. This 
alteration is justified at the least in this work because the veil piercing doctrine in 
Finland does cover both concealment and evasion situations. Therefore, it would 
be counterproductive to exclude the other when trying to derive inspiration and 
examples for developing the Finnish doctrine. The piercing test could be crystalized 
into elements based on the Prest decision and the principles accepted in it:
1. Control over the corporation
2. Evading an existing liability or restriction. Alternatively, concealment of 
actors
3. Deliberately 
4. By using a company
5. Allows for depriving the controllers of the advantage.
131 See Vandekerckhove 2007 at 13–14.
132 For a Finnish situation, see Savela 2015 at 402–403. For a Swedish discussion, see Stattin 2012 at 
933, Andersson 2014 and Sandström 2015.
133 On these categorizations, see Vandekerckhove 2007 at 13–14.
134 Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) at 35.
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6.2.3.  How Good a Comparison Target is the United Kingdom?
If we compare the crystalized piercing test above to the Finnish construction of the 
doctrine, the similarities are striking. The biggest difference is the limitation to the 
existing liabilities. The Finnish doctrine undoubtedly includes these situations but 
is not limited to them. The United Kingdom’s doctrine, as formulated here, also 
emphasizes intentionally doing the relevant wrong in the form of concealment or 
evasion. This is also similar to the Finnish doctrine, as I will later analyze in relation 
to the impropriety requirement in V.4. of this work. Again, the main difference is 
that the United Kingdom’s doctrine offers a much more limited application. In the 
Finnish doctrine, the impropriety can at least potentially be shown through other 
means. Another thing that is slightly different in Finland is that the concealment of 
actors is not mentioned explicitly but seems to fit the broader terms adopted in the 
doctrine’s formulation.
Now, having formulated my understanding of the United Kingdom’s veil piercing 
doctrine, I would like to proceed by analyzing the relevant case law in order to discover 
the facts relevant to fulfilling this test. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom’s case 
law is not very rich in this sense. The literature has adopted much the same attitude. 
Most of the decisions focus more on doctrine building on an abstract level. When 
these decisions cite previous case law, they usually only describe the arrangement 
and some relevant aspect to the theory they are building. Per the facts of the case, 
these decisions seem to cite only the relevant norm evaded and whether there was 
control. Only rarely do these decisions cite objectively determinable factors similar 
to those present in Finland or the United States. The discussion in case law is also 
mostly obiter, and the cases are decided based on different norms. This can also 
reflect which facts are reported as relevant to the decision. This is further supported 
by the fact that the only successful piercing decisions, Gilford Motor Co Ltd v. Horne 
(1933) and Jones v. Lipmann (1962) and Wallersteiner v. Moir (1974), are the cases 
that offer the most in terms of similar considerations of objective factors.
This lack of objective factors could easily be explained with the much more 
restricted, explicit and easier to show interpretation of relevant wrongdoing in the 
United Kingdom’s piercing doctrine, the wrongdoing being shown with concealing 
relevant actors or avoiding an existing liability. Although this makes the piercing 
doctrine apply to a much more limited array of problems, it also makes it more 
predictable and causes it to require less supportive factors. This makes the United 
Kingdom’s doctrine a rather cumbersome comparison target in this research, as the 
aim here is to detect the objective factors relevant to veil piercing. For these reasons, 
the United Kingdom’s case law is scarcely on relevant comparison points and appears 
on a lesser frequency throughout this work.
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6.3.  Sweden
6.3.1.  The Landmark Decision
As in all the jurisdictions discussed, the limited liability and separate personality 
are the strong default rules, exceptions to which rarely appear. Sweden is a peculiar 
country in relation to veil piercing. The doctrine’s existence has consistently been in 
question,135 while at the same time, the materials used to prepare government bills 
have explicitly recognized its existence.136 Even after the Supreme Court directly 
addressed the issue, some opinions seek to question the relevance of piercing 
doctrine.137 The Swedish doctrine of piercing the veil was accepted and somewhat 
formulated in the Swedish Supreme Court in NJA 2014 s. 877.138 According to the 
decision, veil piercing is based on abusing the company form.139 Later case law at 
lower courts shows that the precedent is followed.140 
The following is how the Supreme Court of Sweden construed the veil piercing 
test on a general level in NJA 2014 s. 877.
1. The business conducted has been a clear abuse of the company form for 
purposes other than those justifying the limited liability shield.
2. The abuse needs to be determined with an overall assessment, accounting 
for conditions such as capitalization, independence, shareholders’ ability to 
influence the business and the nature of the creditors.141
The doctrine in Sweden is worded differently than in Finland, though they hold 
many similar elements. The Swedish doctrine names abuse142 directly, whereas in 
Finland, it is divided into artificial and reprehensibility.143 In fact, the Swedish 
decision seems better able to recognize the nature of artificiality in abuse. It names the 
use of the corporate form for purposes other than those justifying a limited liability 
shield as a relevant aspect in abuse. This is extremely similar to how artificiality in 
135 For example, see Svensson 2010 and Karlström 2014.
136 See SOU 1987:59, prop. 1990/91:198 at 43, SOU 2001:1 and SOU 2008:49.
137 See Adestam 2015 Nerep 2015 and Brandell 2018.
138 Crystalized but not exhausted, as piercing should be allowed in other sorts of arrangements also. 
The case should be viewed as an example, saying “at least in this sort of arrangement piercing is possible, it 
is possible in other situations also.” Andersson 2014. See also Svea Hovrätt no. T 11882-13 and Brandell 
2018 at 7.
Cf. Sandström 2015 at 11. He limits the precedent’s effects limited to companies abusing procedural 
norms, i.e., processbolage.
139 See also Lindskog 2010 at 7.1, Eklund – Stattin 2016 at 82 and Brandell 2018 at 14–16.
140 See Brandell 2018 at 7–9.
141 NJA 2014 s. 877 at 12.
142 Missbruk in the original language.
143 Or, alternatively, abuse is only the background theory in Finland depending on whether you agree 
on the shortened definition of abuse as artificial and reprehensible use.
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the Finnish KKO 2015:17 decision should be interpreted.144 The overall assessment 
is the same in both countries, though the Finnish Supreme Court did not give a 
general list of factors. In short, the two countries’ landmark decisions seem to have 
adopted very similar concepts.
6.3.2.  Exceptional Circumstances
Another strange choice in the Swedish Supreme Court’s formulation of piercing 
doctrine seems to be the possibility of placing liability in särskilt kvalificerade fall: 
exceptional circumstances. The meaning of this statement is never provided and 
leads to guessing in literature and practice. The answer could be derived from the 
understanding that the NJA 2014 s. 877 decision should not be thought to exhaust 
the veil piercing doctrine, though. In legal literature and other cases, different factors 
have been proven significant for piercing evaluation. Veil piercing requirements were 
characterized a bit differently before the landmark decision; they were construed to 
require disloyal use of the corporation, undercapitalization, dependence and seeking 
self-interest.145 Brandell understands the exceptional circumstances criterion to 
mean all the traditional elements of veil piercing.146
Through this background, veil piercing becomes an in casu weighing act of 
relevant criteria, of which some sort of list could be given as follows:
1. Determinative influence over corporate actions.147
2. The corporation had inadequate resources in relation to the foreseeable 
operation.148
3. The corporation sought especially risk-filled operations.
4. The corporation was not independent of the shareholders.149
5. Who owns the corporation shares and how many shareholders are there, as 
well as who in reality holds control over the corporation.150
6. The damage caused needs to be unreasonable, for example, caused by 
disloyal or reprehensible behavior.
7. The totality of the circumstances.151
144 See V.4.2. of this work.
145 About these characterizations, see Moberg 1998 at 68–70.
146 Brandell 2018 at 11 and 15.
147 Mentioned in NJA 2014 s. 877 and NJA 1947 s. 647.
148 But this criterion should not be given too high a significance, lest veil piercing becomes but a capital 
protection rule. See Brandell 2018 at 18. See also Stattin 2008 at 443–444, discussing viewpoints on 
making veil piercing a capital protection rule.
149 NJA 1947 s. 647 described this in a manner that the corporation, in reality, is nothing but an exe-
cuting organ of the shareholders.
150 See also Stattin 2008 at 438–439.
151 A vague criteria established in NJA 1947 s. 647 and repeated in NJA 2014 s. 877.
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8. Voluntary or involuntary creditor.152
9. The creditors’ awareness of the relevant circumstances in piercing 
assessment.153
10. Disparity of risks and benefits.154
The veil piercing doctrine in Sweden was uncertain until the 2014 decision, and 
previous case law was explainable through other legal doctrines as well.155 In NJA 
2014 s. 877, the Swedish Supreme Court expressly discussed ansvarsgenombrott, 
veil piercing, and the applied legal norm conforms to the piercing doctrine. Thus, 
it would be possible to discuss these other characterizations in a work focused on 
veil piercing. The decision mentioned surprisingly few older cases usually associated 
with veil piercing, however. Similarly, it only discussed a few opinions previously 
presented in legal literature. This could give the impression that the rest of the case 
law does not matter to the Supreme Court of Sweden and that the literature, in 
their opinion, can be ignored.156 But there is no strong basis for this. It can hardly 
be thought that prejudicates or literature lose their meaning if a single case fails to 
mention them.
The conditions established in the decision of the Supreme Court of Sweden 
had already been addressed both in earlier case law and in legal literature. It can be 
submitted that conditions set out by the Swedish Supreme Court are more objective 
and well-founded in facts than the piercing requirements in Finland. In Sweden, 
particular attention is paid to the resources received by the company, i.e., whether 
a company is provided insufficient resources in comparison to the foreseeable 
operation costs.157 Yet some discussion remains as to whether the capitalization 
structure is used only to demonstrate the dependence of the company.158 It supports 
piercing if a company has no independent economic purpose but rather only furthers 
the shareholders’ personal interests.159 Shareholder’s ability to influence the business 
translates into control rights. The nature of creditor relations means the different 
152 Mentioned in NJA 2014 s. 877.
153 See NJA 1992 s. 375 and Stattin 2008 at 450–452.
154 See Andersson 2014 at 3.
155 For these characterizations, see Moberg 1998 at 60–68, Lindskog 2008 at 327, Svensson 2010, Ades-
tam 2015, Rönnheden 2015 at 183 and Sandström 2015. Outside veil piercing, the situation in NJA 2014 
s. 877 has been addressed in literature with interpretation of the trial cost compensation norms. They have 
been solved by establishing joint liability in such arrangements where the trial claim is pursued through 
an entity not capable of meeting the trial costs in case of loss while at the same time being entitled to  the 
economic benefits in case of positive results. 
156 See Sandström 2015 at 1.
157 See Rodhe 1984 at 487 and the juristiesekretar memo in NJA 2014 s. 877. See also Rönnheden 2015 
at 179 and SOU 2008:49 at 55.
158 See Andersson 2014.
159 Similarly Andersson 2015.
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treatment of voluntary and involuntary creditors. Involuntary creditors might be in 
need of additional legal protection, and thus, it is submitted that piercing should be 
awarded in their favor more easily than for voluntary creditors.
As for the liable party, the Swedish piercing doctrine is also traditionally tied 
to the shareholder,160 although the NJA 2014 s. 877 decision names other parties 
potentially liable as well if the circumstances so require.161 Of the significant 
conditions mentioned in the decision, both independence and the shareholders’ 
influence relate specifically to the shareholder rather than some other party. 
Earlier case law relating to piercing has mostly been about shareholder liability.162 
Additionally, opinions in the legal literature both before and after the NJA 2014 s. 
877 decision seem to support such a view.163 The emphasis is on the shareholders’ 
liability, but we cannot rule out other potential liability situations. The Swedish 
piercing doctrine certainly seems capable of accommodating them. Cases just have 
not appeared yet.
6.3.3.  How Good a Comparison Target is Sweden?
The Swedish legal system is the closest equivalent to the Finnish legal system and is 
an extensive source of influence in any area of law in Finland. Thus, it is easy to justify 
using it as a comparative point. The shared history and similarities make it better 
suited to adopt direct interpretations and not only inspiration. Unfortunately, the 
Swedish piercing doctrine is not well developed—just like the Finnish doctrine. The 
central theme of this work is highly practical as I seek to establish as many known 
patterns of objective criteria as possible, which can allow for veil piercing. This focus 
creates a disparity with the Swedish literature, though. Much of the scholarship on 
piercing is dedicated to the question of whether veil piercing is company law, tort law 
or general principle. While interesting, this discussion does not serve the purposes 
of my research here. Perhaps the development of the more practical aspects of the 
Swedish piercing doctrine will also receive a boost from my research.
160 See Moberg 1998 at 49–51, Nerep 2015 at 22 and Sandström 2015.
161 Similarly Andersson 2002 at 122.
See also NJA 1942 s. 473, where liability was based on who was actually the byggherr, the person liable 
for a construction project, as described in law. The case is reminiscent of piercing, though liability can be 
based on the position as a constructor.
See also Sandström 2015 at 11. He cites the case RH 2011:24 and, based on it, he is of the opinion that 
the board members are potentially liable only if the shareholders cannot be identified.
162 See the cases mentioned in the NJA 2014 s. 877: owner liability in NJA 1935 s. 81 and shareholder 
liability in NJA 1947 s. 647.
163 See Rodhe 1984 at 486, SOU 1987:59 at 12, Andersson – Johansson – Skog 2010 at 1:9 and Sand-
ström 2015.
See also Andersson 2014. But he speaks of the real persons behind the company and those who sought to 
benefit from the limited liability.
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As for the underlying theory of abuse, Andreas Rönnheden sees a clear connection 
with veil piercing in NJA 2014 s. 877 and some earlier case law164 where the specific 
uses of law were deemed abusive. Abuse in the cited case law meant using a legal norm 
for purposes that were clearly incompatible with the purposes of the norm. Through 
this examination, he concludes that the liability norm used in the NJA 2014 s. 877 
decision is not exclusive to company law, but rather reflects a more general principle 
of civil law. Even so, he concedes that the principle is not yet concrete.165 The opinion 
of Rönnheden is interesting because of the more concrete take on abuse. Through 
accepting abuse as the general principle behind piercing, the Finnish and Swedish 
legal statuses on piercing come yet one step closer to one another. It should be noted, 
though, that the Swedish literature does not discuss this issue to the extent that 
Finnish literature does. Thus, no clear consensus exists in Sweden.
Another issue is that this work adopts a different view of veil piercing, namely 
that it can place liability on controllers and beneficiaries, among others.166 Much of 
the Swedish literature starts with the notion that piercing is only about shareholder 
liability and derives doctrinal limitation from this perspective. These pieces are hard 
to include in the discussion. As explained earlier, I think this limitation in Swedish 
literature is misplaced, and there is certainly room for other liable parties in the 
interpretation of piercing doctrine. The material and inspiration flow in this regard 
might be from Finland to Sweden.
The final key difference between the Finnish and Swedish piercing doctrines is 
the emphasis on subjective elements. In Finland, case law and analogous doctrines 
give significance and even decisive weight on the intent to evade or damage. Swedish 
doctrine, however, does not seem to require any subjective elements and is instead 
based on objectively discernible criteria. Subjective elements might have some 
relevance, but their significance is undeniably lesser than in Finland.
6.4.  Norway and Denmark
6.4.1.  Norway
Norway has adopted the most restrictive approach on veil piercing. There is no clear 
precedent setting out requirements for veil piercing. There are a few decisions from 
the 1990s that give some support for veil piercing.167 Veil piercing is also recognized 
in legislative preparatory works for company legislation.168 Nonetheless, the existence 
of the veil piercing doctrine is open to debate in Norway, as many legal scholars 
164 Namely NJA 1996 s. 389 and NJA 2005 s. 608.
165 Rönnheden 2015 at 184.
166 See V.7.5. of this work.
167 Rt. 1991 at 119, Rt. 1996 at 672 and Rt. 1996 at 742.
168 See NOU 1992:29 at 43 and NOU 1996:3 at 190.
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perceive the doctrine to be replaceable, at least in part, with tort law principles.169 
The 2010 Hempel decision did involve piercing considerations, though the case itself 
was be resolved with the interpretation of section 51 of the Pollution Control Act.170 
This case remains the most prominent piercing example from Norway.
The state of veil piercing law in Norway is understood here as uncertain but 
potential. There are no clear instances of application, though the possibility of 
one emerging exists. Should piercing be considered, relevant conditions would 
be dependence of the company, inadequate capitalization, improper use and the 
nature of the creditor relation.171 When assessing the independence of a company, 
one needs to take into account whether it can be recognized as separate from the 
owner considering the company’s reliance on the owner in regards to finance and 
management and whether assets are transferred between the company and the 
owner randomly, e.g., without formal distinction.172 Inadequate capitalization 
can be understood the same as in Sweden, i.e., when a company is provided with 
insufficient capital in relation to the operations the company engages in.173 Improper 
use of the company simply means that the use constitutes an unfair practice toward 
creditors when accompanied by inadequate capitalization and commingling of the 
involved entities’ assets.174 The nature of the creditor relation again means that the 
involuntary creditor should be awarded piercing relief less stringently, whereas the 
voluntary creditor should not be awarded piercing relief.175
The Norwegian doctrine of piercing the veil is thus founded mostly on opinions 
in the legal literature. From this standpoint, the Norwegian piercing doctrine 
does not inspire much optimism as to relevant comparative material regarding 
veil piercing. Most Norwegian cases are such that veil piercing was considered and 
thought possible but ultimately denied in the case. This does give some material as to 
factors relevant to piercing. Norway does not have a developed doctrine to compare 
with, however. This led to the conclusion of only including the major piercing cases 
from Norway.
6.4.2.  Denmark
Two sources from Denmark are highly cited in Nordic jurisdictions. Leaving those 
two out would be an obvious flaw as they have helped shape the piercing doctrine in 
169 See Hagstrøm 1993 at 279, Sjåfjell 2010 at 155 and Woxholth 2014 at 131.
170 13 Mar. 1981, No. 6.
171 Hagstrøm 1993.
172 See Ot.prp No. 23 (1996-1997) at 117. See also the creditor’s basis for the claim in Rt. 1996 s. 672 
at page 675. The claim was denied, though the Supreme Court did not address this issue. Similarly Sjåfjell 
2010 at 155.
173 See HR-2016-1440-A, Hagstrøm 1993 at 257–262 and Ot.prp No. 23 (1996-1997) at 117.
174 See the creditor’s basis for the claim Rt. 1996 p. 672 at 675–676, but in the decision, the inspected 
companies were not found to have commingled assets.
175 See Ot.prp no. 55 (2005-2006) at 125.
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the Nordic region. The first source is Erik Werlauff ’s dissertation, “Selskabsmasken.” 
In it, he argued that it could be possible to pierce the veil when a company is 
inadequately capitalized in relation to the company’s operations. This holds true 
especially when the company engages in a dangerous activity with high chances 
of tort liability.176 The second important source is the UfR 1997 s. 1642 decision 
where the veil was pierced. It shows three factors relevant to piercing: commingling 
of assets, risk transfer and relative undercapitalization.177
Several important patterns of veil piercing can be drawn from these two sources. 
Commingling of assets means mixing finances and property, for example, so that 
one of the companies that controls the assets provides the other with funds when 
needed. Shifting risk and allocation of profits are also of importance. If one company 
gets a disproportionate share of the profits while the other holds the liabilities, veil 
piercing could apply.178 Werlauff ’s thoughts on undercapitalization are also very 
comprehensive and are discussed in more detail later.179 The Danish system is thus 
mostly utilized using the UfR 1997 s. 1642 case as an example of commingling and 
citing Werlauf ’s views on undercapitalization.
176 See Werlauf 1991 at 31.
177 The requirements of dependence and unfair practice should be added, though. See Schwarz-Hansen 
2001 at 436–437.
178 See UfR 1997 p. 1642.
179 For a more thorough analysis on the subject of capitalization in Danish piercing doctrine, see Wer-
lauff 1991 at 75–76 and 518–519.
II  THEORIES
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1.  General Theoretical Considerations  
Regarding Veil Piercing
In legal literature, veil piercing has been justified, analyzed and construed through 
many theories. There are almost as many of these theories as there are authors on 
the subject of piercing.180 Fortunately, the Finnish literature is largely in unison. The 
prominent view is that veil piercing reflects the prohibition of the abuse of rights. 
In older literature, it was construed as a conflict of two norms181 leading to different 
results.182 Upon closer inspection, I will reveal that the abuse and conflict of norms 
views are easily compatible with one another. 
The prominent abuse of rights characterization is vague and uncertain in its 
application, as is the nature of legal principles. One should remember that it is not 
used here as the explanation for piercing decisions. It is the justifying theory behind 
the veil piercing doctrine itself. Piercing is a case law–created doctrine that reflects 
the prohibition of the abuse of rights principle. This does not mean that the principle 
does not affect the form taken by veil piercing. In my understanding, legal principles 
are formulated through their avatars in legislations. The specific norms reflect the 
principle, and when enough of these norms exist, the principle exists.183 When the 
principle exists, then it will start affecting the interpretation of these legal norms. 
It is a symbiotic circle where changes in the understanding of the pieces affect one 
another. Such is the case with veil piercing. The prohibition of the abuse of rights 
principle affects the formulation of the veil piercing doctrine. When established, the 
veil piercing doctrine supports the existence of the principle and might help shape 
how that elusive principle is formulated in future instances.
In this section, I will endeavor into the abyss that is the prohibition of the abuse of 
rights doctrine and combine it with the older conflict of norms view of veil piercing 
and the judgment-proofing characterization. This view will affect how I formulate 
the veil piercing doctrine later in this work. I will briefly delve into a few other 
theories that are perhaps capable of complementing veil piercing doctrine in several 
specific situations but are not particularly useful as a general theory behind piercing. 
Finally, I will address the nature of veil piercing liability.
180 For example, Cheng (2010) construing it as unjust enrichment. Bainbridge (2000) using economic 
efficiency considerations, Macey – Mitts (2014) seeing it as an issue of public policy enforcement, Bran-
dell (2018 at 14–17) describing the Swedish discussion on the nature of the doctrine.
181 Here, the term means conflict of two norms that would lead to different results. This should not be 
confused with conflict of laws in the sense that it is understood in private international law. See definition 
in the Merriam-Webster Law Dictionary at conflict of laws.
182 See Huttunen 1963 at 199. 
183 See Karhu 2007 at 185.
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2.  The Conflict of Norms
2.1.  Description of the Conflict
It is only fitting to discuss the older theory first to provide some insight into the 
historical developments in our understanding. Due to the absolute wording of OYL 
1:2 providing for limited liability and separate corporate personality, veil piercing 
is always a contra legem decision. Accepting the contra legem result is justified by 
viewing veil piercing as a conflict of norms.184 Allan Huttunen introduced this 
characterization into the Finnish piercing literature. Two norms of the legal system 
demand results that exclude the application of the other norm. One must yield. 
When piercing the veil, the other norm is a limited liability or separate corporate 
personality of the corporation. The other norm varies case by case.185 It can be a 
provision of another law or an interest protected by the legal system. For example, 
in KKO 2015:17 it was the artist’s right to remuneration for private copying of their 
work and, more specifically, the remuneration duty laid out in Copyright Act 26 a 
§ Paragraph 1.
The company act clearly provides a person with the means of controlling a 
corporation and accepts the control as legal. The act has clear tort provisions 
covering the undesirable actions of the management, the shareholders and the 
corporation. If the corporate players follow the provisions of the company act, they 
should not face liability. This is a key element of the corporation. Yet the veil can be 
pierced even when all the provisions of the company act are followed. Veil piercing 
liability is liability without a specific statute to induce it.186 The lack of statutory 
support mandates some justification from within the legal system. The conflict of 
norms characterization provides this support easily: the decision is contra legem no 
matter which norm is upheld. All that is left for the court is to determine which 
norm should be upheld.
Making this determination can easily spiral into a massively complex pro contra 
argument. Luckily, the legal literature provides some guidance. It seems natural to 
start with the original author’s views of the conflict of norms characterization of 
184 Please note that when two norms truly conflict, the normal rules of applying laws do not apply. 
When deciding the applicable law, for example with the lex specialis rule, the laws do not conflict. In 
conflict of norms, there are two applicable norms, and no formal rule exists in determining which norm 
should yield. 
185 See Huttunen 1963. The conflict characterization is mentioned in Sweden and also in relation to 
whether a särskilt kvalificerade fall, an especially weighty reason, to pierce is present. See Sandström 2015 
at 5.
186 There exists a consensus in the legal literature that the case is not veil piercing should the liability be 
based on a provision or general principles of property law. See, for example, Huttunen 1963 at 157–158, 
Villa 1997 at 375, Huhtamäki 1999 at 142 footnote 4, Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 290 and Mähönen – 
Villa 2015 at 298.
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veil piercing. Huttunen sees the corporate law forming its own closed sphere of 
legislation. Conflicts regarding corporations are to be solved using legal tools from 
within this sphere, and outside considerations are not to distort or disturb the rules 
set within the sphere. When piercing the veil, he places the norms of limited liability 
and legal personality above other norms of the legal system. They are primary but 
can be put aside if the interest to pierce is high enough. Veil piercing is a process of 
weighing between two conflicting norms. Huttunen places the burden of proof of 
this interest on those wishing to pierce the veil. Limited liability is assumed to be the 
stronger norm, the frontrunner in the conflict of norms. It follows that veil piercing 
is to be an extremely rare remedy.  Judges should remain cautious when piercing and 
should apply it only in extreme circumstances.187
Building on this, Seppo Villa justifies piercing with the need to strengthen the 
creditors’ protection when the corporation has caused damage or when shareholders 
have abused the corporate form to the detriment of the creditors. Limited liability 
is the explicit default rule, and veil piercing is the rare exception, possible only in 
exceptional circumstances. He, too, sees the situation as a conflict of norms, where 
norms supporting piercing are weighed against limited liability. The decision is made 
in casu, and the weaker norm must yield to the stronger one. Piercing applies when 
the facts of the case and other legal norms demand disregarding limited liability or 
separate personality. Veil piercing without a statutory norm justifying it is a conflict 
between elementary principles of our legal order.188
These two researchers agree about the need to give separate personality and 
limited liability the priority. The Supreme Court of Finland also emphasized the 
exceptional nature of veil piercing.189 It is easy to conclude that the default is not to 
pierce, and the party claiming veil piercing has a heavy burden of proof to overturn 
the default.
A similar characterization of veil piercing has been put forward more recently 
in Sweden. Daniel Stattin suggests viewing piercing as a weighing process 
between the reasons behind adopting the separate personality and the rules 
that demand its disregard by veil piercing.190
187 See Huttunen 1963 at 199. Later, Gerhard af Schultén and Seppo Villa have accepted this weighing 
model. See af Schultén 1984 at 96, Villa 1997 at 377 and Villa 2015 at 535 and 540.
Similarly in Sweden, see Brandell 2018 at 15. See also Adestam 2015 at 16. He sees the composition 
of piercing situations through the purpose behind the norm that creates liability for the company. That 
purpose can create the need for heightened creditor protection, in which case the limited liability does 
not prevent holding the shareholders liable.
188 See Villa 1997 at 377, 382 and Villa 2015 at 533, 535 and 540. See also KM 1992:32 at 373 and 
Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 299 and 405.
189 KKO 2015:17 at 29.
190 Stattin 2008 at 455. See also Brandell 2018 at 15–16. In tax law context, a similar view has been 
forwarded. See Hjerner 1983 at 282.
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2.2.  Resolving the Conflict
When two written norms conflict, the solution must be found from the lesser sources 
of the law. When both sides of the scale are stacked equally with written law, the 
solution needs to be derived from case law and real arguments.191 Since piercing is 
seen as a conflict of norms—written law norms to be exact—the real arguments and 
case law become extraordinarily important in determining the outcome, especially 
since the preparatory materials for legislation have little to say about piercing.192 All 
relevant facts need to be evaluated, and overall assessment determines the weaker 
norm that must yield.193
When performing an overall assessment, all relevant elements and facts of the 
case are considered as a whole. The elements present in real life are considered 
important in showing the true nature of the case. The overall assessment is not 
confined to separate legal actions, either.194 Related legal actions, whereas formally 
irrelevant circumstances for the inspected action, do still affect the outcome. 
Their relevance can be extended beyond their specific parties or circumstances. 
An action can be perfectly fair and valid when viewed narrowly as a single action. 
Another related but separate action can then erode this balance. When the veil is 
pierced, the formal outlook is disregarded, and the judicial evaluation focuses on 
the factual contents of the case.195 Viewing legal actions as separate would serve to 
hide the factual content of the assessed arrangement and would instead serve to 
uphold the formal outlook, which is often the intention behind constructing these 
arrangements.
191 With real arguments, I refer to impact analysis, practical arguments and consequential arguments. 
This refers to an allowed legal source that complements written law and precedents when the interpreta-
tion is unclarified. These arguments are based on the assessment of the desirability of certain legal inter-
pretations in light of the societal or economic effects it creates in that specific case or in the society as a 
whole. See Mathis 2011, especially at 5–7 and 20.
192 Mainly that no provision regarding piercing is needed in the OYL. See Osakeyhtiölakitoimikunta 
1990:n mietintö at 374–375, although in the pay security context, there is a mention. See HE 104/1998 
at 17 and HE 219/2009 at 6.
193 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 299. See also KM 1992:32 at 374 stating that no single factor can 
justify piercing.
194 See Kolehmainen 2009 at 605 and KKO 1983 II 12. He analyzes the mentioned case and derives 
that the separate legal relationships (contracts between separate entities) were examined as a whole in 
consideration to legitim. The decision was based on the fact that the overall result was that the children 
were in equal standing due to the donations initiated by the testator but performed by the testator and 
a third party. If interpreted formally and separately, the child receiving the donation directly from the 
testator would have received preheritance and the other one not. The treatment of the children would not 
have been equal.
195 See Havansi 1979a at 41 and Leppänen 1991 at 284.
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For example, the cluster of related contracts should be examined as a whole when 
assessing ownership over some property.196 Different elements of ownership can be 
divided between persons by separate contracts, for example. Control rights can be 
formally allocated to a multitude of persons, but contractually, they can agree to 
vote according to the wishes of one. The totality of these legal actions is meaningful. 
If inspected individually, the actions are acceptable or not enough to trigger legal 
consequences.
In the United States, the situation is similar. A totality of the circumstances 
test assesses all known and relevant information and is an examination 
of an issue in light of all known and conceivable circumstances, excluding 
nothing and giving no one fact, action, or condition a controlling influence 
upon the assessment. In the context of veil piercing, a court must at least 
review the various factors enumerated in prior cases but also has the liberty 
of considering all other known and conceivable circumstances.197 A careful 
review of the entire relationship between various corporate entities and their 
directors and officers is necessary.198
The spirit and purpose of the norms is significant in resolving the conflict. 
If tension exists between how the norm is actually used and how it was meant 
to be used, it is easy to conclude that the norm is not serving its purpose; it is 
only formally applicable but does not abide by the real-life situation it aimed to 
address. If the other conflicting norm is used as it was meant to be used, then it 
should be allowed protection. It abides by the intention behind the legislation, 
whereas the other norm does not. Disregarding the other norm would not violate 
the principles the system law meant to create. The problem is determining the 
spirit and purpose of the law. This task must be performed with both conflicting 
norms. As the opposing norms do differ, the task is always in casu. Piercing always 
196 See, for example, KKO 1997:146, where two formally separate contracts were so closely related 
that they could not be assessed independently. The same person controlled a constructor company and a 
housing co-op. First, he acted as the representative of the constructor and pledged the whole stock of the 
housing co-op as collateral to a bank. Then, as the representative of the co-op, he pledged the buildings 
the co-op owned as collateral to himself and his wife. The latter collateral was deemed inefficient versus 
the bank.
The Supreme Court argued that this kind of situation requires the court to assess the purpose of the 
first collateral and the comprehensiveness and value of the second collateral while keeping an eye on the 
first collateral. Despite the rather confusing wording in the decision (the translation aims to preserve the 
original), we can deduce that the decision is based on the purpose of the first pledge and the effects the 
second one has on the first.
197 See Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007) at 1067. See also Peterson 2017 at 74 (citing Bouvier Law 
Dictionary 2012) and Barnco International Inc. v. Arkla, Inc. (1993). This is approach is often critiziced in 
literature. See for example, Millon 2007 at 1330.
198 Jones & Trevor Marketing v. Lowry (2012). See also Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 47.
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involves limited liability and separate personality. I will analyze their spirit and 
purpose in the next chapter. 
Though it is possible that two formal interpretations of norms are in conflict, 
another situation exists. The conflicting norm opposing limited liability or separate 
personality might be in conflict only because it is interpreted in view of its purpose. 
This should not alter the conflict situation though, as interpretation to uphold the 
purpose is a perfectly valid interpretation method.
2.3.  Interpretation of Norms in the Conflict
When two norms collide, interpretation is one way to resolve the tension. One 
norm bends to eliminate the seeming conflict. If a decision can be reached with 
interpretative creativeness, the norms do not really conflict.199 A true conflict of 
norms exists only when interpretation cannot resolve the tension. Nevertheless, 
there are certainly some similar elements to consider regardless of whether an actual 
conflict exists. An interpretative solution is needed when applying (or not applying) 
a statute is seen as necessary to achieve the materially correct resolution. It should be 
noted that interpretation is a less invasive tool compared to a contra legem decision 
from the conflict of norms model and should therefore be the primary tool.200
An interpretative solution means interpreting a seemingly inapplicable 
provision so that it becomes applicable. It stems from the argument that the statute 
should govern certain actions that it does not seem to govern when interpreted 
grammatically, or it should not govern certain actions it does seem to govern. For 
example, one could interpret the term operator to include the formal operator, the 
one running the day-to-day operations, or the one making the key decisions in the 
long-term operation. This would extend the legal liabilities of the operator to other 
parties who are not formally operators but who do, in fact, perform the operator’s 
usual functions.
Traditionally, there are two schools of interpretation.201 One is the formal school, 
and the other the realistic school. The formal school denies the possibility of going 
beyond the exact wording of a provision. It must be interpreted precisely, and no 
extensive interpretation is allowed. The realistic school allows interpretation even 
contra to the wording when it is necessary to achieve the results intended by the 
legislator. Both schools of interpretation have their strengths and weaknesses. 
199 Määttä 2013 at 180. Only after the interpretative solutions have been exhausted can the norms be 
said to conflict.
200 See Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 600.
201 For a general overview of these schools, see, e.g., Tikka 1972 at 125–128 and Aalto-Heinilä 2018. 
These are more prominent concepts in tax law and are discussed more widely in that context. For an 
overview, see Streng 2019 at 52–53.
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The formalistic interpretation is highly predictable and promotes legal certainty. 
The decisions may be unpractical, but at least they do not come as a surprise. The 
realistic interpretation achieves the materially correct answer better. It enables the 
decision-maker to look beyond the formal façade to the purposes behind the norm 
and base the decision on what is actually happening. As an externality, it can be 
rather unpredictable or even random in its application. Realistic interpretation is 
more casuistic and less general, which leads to a growing body of case law.
When piercing the veil, both formal and realistic interpretations are usually 
present. It falls almost naturally on the party demanding veil piercing to make an 
argument for realistic interpretation, upholding the purpose behind the norm 
and applying all the relevant facts. It is argued that the legislator did not intend 
for the corporation to be used in such a way, and thus, whichever norm conflicts 
with separate personality or limited liability must be extended by piercing in order 
to preserve the purposes behind that norm. The classic, albeit a bit naïve, defense 
against piercing is that Company Act provides for separate personality and limited 
liability, and the court cannot make a contra legem decision. This is an extremely 
formal interpretation of the law.
The arrangements targeted by piercing are designed to match the existing 
interpretation of the law. Often, this means the formal interpretation is challenged 
in a piercing decision. For example, creating a subsidiary to sell data storage devices 
means that the parent is not the seller in the sense that would create a remuneration 
duty. In a formal sense, the conflict does not exist. Only after we accept the realistic 
interpretation can we even see the conflict. The remuneration duty exits to create 
certain effects in reality, and those effects should be enforced regardless of the adopted 
wording. Adopting the realistic interpretation does not inevitably lead to veil piercing, 
but veil piercing situations often require utilizing the realistic interpretation.
Since a piercing situation forces us to adopt the realistic interpretation on one side 
of the argument, adopting the formal interpretation on the other side of the norm 
conflict becomes unacceptable. Formal interpretation of the separate personality or 
limited liability norms would mean rejecting the realistic interpretation altogether, 
as it gives priority to the formal interpretation. It would make no sense to state 
that “the purpose of this norm is to guarantee the artists’ remunerations for private 
copying and the concept of remuneration duty should be interpreted accordingly” if 
the issue is resolved with a shrug in the next sentence—the corporation is an entity 
separate from its shareholders. This would effectively mean denying the existence 
of a conflict or subordinating the realistic interpretation to the formal one rather 
arbitrarily.202 It seems obvious that the situation described does not enable veil 
piercing. It is only a statement of whether the formal or realistic interpretation 
should prevail in the case.
202 As is done in the UK. See Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991).
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Since veil piercing is known to be possible, we can effectively rule out formalism in 
its strongest form. If viewed as a conflict of norms, the courts cannot resolve a piercing 
claim by simply referring to the wording of the law and basing their interpretation 
solely on it. They need to make some sort of prioritization between the norms, and 
this would more easily be solved with some considerations for the purposes behind 
the conflicting norms. Basing the decision on the wording alone means making 
a statement on whether formal or realistic interpretation should prevail.203 This 
realization itself has some significance in the development of the veil piercing doctrine. 
It lends credibility to the view that uncharacteristic use of the corporate form is more 
prone to piercing and gives us tools to assess the artificiality of the corporate use. The 
view is also in harmony with the abuse of rights principle, which gives significance to 
whether the inspected use fulfilled the intended core purposes of the legal institution. 
Most importantly, it explains away the naïve defense against piercing, and the court 
can make a contra legem decision when the use of the corporate form does not match 
the purposes behind creating the corporation institution.
3.  The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights
3.1.  European Convention on Human Rights Article 17
3.1.1.  Purpose and Interpretation
A functional starting point to the prohibition of the abuse of rights would be the 
European Convention on Human Rights Article 17. The exact text reads:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Limiting rights is possible only when there is a direct link between pleading a 
right and the illegitimate purpose—the aim to destroy the rights of others.204 For 
example, one can attempt to use freedom of speech to incite racism.205 The inciter 
can then have their right to free speech denied. Only the abused right is denied. 
Rights not directly used for the illegitimate purpose cannot be limited or denied.
203 The result could be turned upside down, though. What if the result of piercing test is a justification 
for which the model of interpretation should prevail in the case. This explanation is not plausible, as going 
through the test requires interpreting legal norms.
204 See Pellonpää 2012 at 26.
205 On the subject, see Lobba 2015.
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The prohibition of the abuse of rights is not a concrete rule. It means that one 
cannot make a claim based on human rights if that claim unreasonably limits the 
human rights of someone else. The prohibition is also impossible to refine into a 
concrete rule. It is best understood as a principle or principle-like norm.206 It offers 
a juridical formulation for assessing moral values: a more objective assessing tool. 
It allows us to control the thought process used to reach moral condemnation. It 
is easy enough to find whether someone is claiming a right under the convention. 
Likewise, there is no trouble determining whether someone’s actions harm someone 
else. In addition, those actions can be linked to the claimed right. Still, it fails to 
make the assessment totally objective; moral condemnation is still decided on the 
basis of a subjective opinion.
The court of human rights has emphasized that Article 17 can be applied only 
in exceptional situations in order to prevent someone from taking advantage of 
the provisions of the convention.207 In the case law of the court, prohibition of the 
abuse of rights is linked only to certain rights. The cases revolve around racism and 
freedom of speech, even though the article is, at least in theory and according to its 
wording, applicable to any right that allows a person to act in a certain way.208
The moral argument comes into consideration when assessing which right is 
deserving of protection. It links to the wording “destruction” and “limiting to a 
greater extent.” Destruction is just a form of limitation, the most extreme being 
when the right is limited to the point that it no longer exists. When discussing the 
limitation, the article becomes a scale.209 On one side is the right from which the 
action derives its acceptability, and on the other side is the right limited. The juridical 
assessment basically stacks arguments on each side. Both rights are originally of the 
same weight, value and importance as they are rights given in the convention. It 
would seem obvious, though, that some rights take priority over others. It would be 
unacceptable if, for example, protection of property was given the same weight as 
the right to liberty.210
206 Similarly Lobba 2015 at 250–251.
207 See Paksas v. Lithuania 2011 at 87. See also Pellonpää et al. 2012 at 851–853.
208 See Linna 2004 at 623–630. Similarly Bezemek 2016 at 10–11.
For different opinions, see Lindfors 2008 at 303–307. She denies the application of the prohibition of 
abuse of rights on transfers of property. Similarly, see Kangas 2005 at 158.
209 See Linna 2004 at 626. Sometimes the process is more of a guillotine that cuts one rights appli-
cation to the case from the beginning and excludes weighing. See Bezemek 2016 at 16–19 and the case 
Perincek v. Switzerland 27510/08.
210 This becomes amusingly elaborate with an example from video games. In some games, the player is 
free to construct buildings anywhere within the confines of the terrain. It is possible that another player is 
sleeping somewhere in the map. One player could construct a wall around the other, preventing the other 
player from leaving the area after they wake up without destroying the wall. The wall builder could claim 
it his right to construct a wall and not to have it destroyed. The trapped person would then claim that 
the protection of property is used to destroy their right to liberty. It seems obvious that property is not 
protected in this situation.
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The most vexing troubles stem from the concept of abuse. The classic dilemma 
is how something can be considered abuse when the law does not condemn it. The 
textbook meaning for abuse is improper or excessive use or treatment.211 This is 
not helpful at all. The concept of improper is just as hard to grasp as abuse. How 
can something be improper when the law allows it? Clearly, no legal scholar can 
be satisfied with moral condemnation as a basis for legal liability. The answer could 
be sought from the intended purpose of the institution. What did the legislator 
intend to achieve when the used legal institution was made? Juha Pöyhönen defines 
abuse of rights as an attempt to realize one’s rights under conditions in which the 
core function of that right does not come to be, whereas the person in relation 
to who the right is claimed faces undue harm.212 I understand the core function 
through the legislators’ intent. The European Court of Human Rights decisions in 
Paksas v. Lithuania213 and Garaudy v. France214 supports this definition. This view 
has something in common with the disparity of legal form and economic reality 
construction adopted in tax evasion and artificial property arrangements. 
Two possible interpretative uses for the abuse clause have been identified. 
One is the guillotine effect. This effect allows the court to deny protection of an 
interpretation of the convention in its entirety.215 For example, holocaust denial 
in any form is abusive and cannot be anything but seeking to destroy the rights of 
others, and thus, it does not enjoy protection of the freedom of speech clause.
Another possible interpretation of the abuse clause is to use it as an interpretative 
principle.216 The prohibition of a certain action would be covered by the appropriate 
clause in the convention, and limiting the right given in that clause would be assessed 
according to the usual standards of limiting human rights added with considerations 
from the abuse clause, broadening the court’s power to limit the rights. For example, 
writing a racially motivated book can be outside the protection of freedom of speech 
if the content of the book seeks to destroy the rights of an ethnic or religious group. 
We immediately notice that the abuse clause as an interpretative principle is much 
more sensitive to the facts and circumstances at hand. Unfortunately, this approach 
is currently not utilized by the European Court of Human Rights.217
211 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abuse.
212 Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87.
213 Paksas v. Lithuania, 2011 at 87.
214 Garaudy v. France, 2003.
215 For a description of the guillotine effect, see Lobba 2015 at 239–243. 
216 See Lobba 2015 240–241 and 250–251 and the cases cited therein.
217 See Lobba 2015 at 241–243 and 250–251, arguing that the guillotine approach prevails at the mo-
ment.
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3.1.2.  The Convention’s Usefulness in the Finnish Legal System
If the Court of Human Rights does not abide by this characterization, could the 
domestic system still use it? Tuula Linna is of the opinion that the abuse clause is 
seldom applied because human rights have clearly defined requirements for their 
limitation. The abuse clause does not serve the limitation process in itself, but 
rather it is an evaluative tool for determining situations in which human rights 
are applicable. Discussing protection of property, she asserts the question: is the 
property arrangement that is done with the intent to damage the creditors at all 
protected by the protection of property clause? She seeks the answer from standard 
norms of interpretation and the doctrine from which the norms are to be interpreted 
according to their ratio. No norm can have the ratio of violating the rights of 
others. The abuse clause then appears as a guideline for this process.218 This almost 
completely matches the characterization of the abuse clause as an interpretative 
principle, although Linna does not make a direct reference to it.
The question reverts to whether we can accept using the abuse clause in the 
convention as supportive arguments when forming the domestic principle on the 
abuse of rights.219 The purpose behind the abuse clause was to safeguard the democratic 
society and its institutions from actions that rely on the convention’s rights in an 
attempt to weaken or destroy them.220 Heidi Lindfors notes that this purpose is rather 
farfetched when the domestic manifestations of the abuse of rights prohibition 
such as asset recovery and artificial property arrangements are examined.221 Still, 
protection of property could be construed as one institution of the democratic 
society. In fact, its inclusion in the convention supports this. It should also be noted 
that abuse situations appear similar despite the abused norm—an attempt to realize 
one’s rights under conditions where the core function of that right does not come to 
be, whereas the person in relation to who the right is claimed faces undue harm.222 
 
 
218 See Linna 2004 at 627–628.
219 For support, see Linna 2004 and Pöyhönen 2001. Cf. Kangas 2005 at 158 footnote 19.
See also Lindfors 2008 at 305. She is skeptical about using the abuse clause to support the domestic doc-
trine of the prohibition of abuse of rights.
220 See Refah Partiisi v. Turkey 2003 at 99 and Lobba 2015 at 244–245.
221 Lindfors 2008 at 305. She cites Judge Jambrek in Lehideux and Isorni v. France 1998 in support 
of this opinion. The cited opinion, in my understanding, specifically lists a possible application of the 
abuse clause: the aim of the offending actions must be . . . or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to 
destroy the rights and freedoms of others. As examples of the applicable situations, the opinion holds racism, 
undemocratic methods, hatred and violence. None of these accommodate the protection of property in 
their meanings. However, that final part of the citation that I have emphasized here leaves room for any 
action that is likely to destroy the rights and freedoms of others. So, even in this opinion, there is room to 
include the protection of property.
Similarly see Kangas 2005 at 158.
222 Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87.
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It is this more abstract doctrine that is utilizable as material even in the domestic 
system;223 they are analogous to one another. The purpose behind adopting the abuse 
clause in the convention would only serve to limit the application of that specific 
abuse clause, not to prevent its use as a source for analogy.
3.2.  The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights in the Finnish Legal System
3.2.1.  The Vague Legal Principle
Due to the prohibition of the abuse of rights nature as a legal principle, its 
application can be extended to rights given in the Finnish constitution and even 
written law norms. It is laid out in the convention of human rights and can be used 
within the confines of it as such. The effects of the convention “trickle down” into 
the national legislation.224 Although prohibition of abuse of rights has no mention 
in the constitution, it has resonance in a number of norms within the written law of 
Finland.225 Artificial property arrangement provision especially can be viewed as a 
manifestation of the prohibition of abuse.226 A growing number of such norms and 
case law suggest the adoption of the prohibition of abuse as a legal principle within 
national law.227 As such, even if the case considered is not a human rights matter, 
prohibition of abuse can apply. We do not need to base the claim on the convention 
of human rights.228 We can operate within the boundaries of the national law and 
still apply the principle and systematic model of the convention. 
There is no actual need to make veil piercing a human rights matter, although 
it could easily be done.229 Usually, the only right from the convention involved 
in veil piercing is the protection of property. Article 15 of the Finnish 
Constitution provides the same right. Although not a right bestowed in the 
convention, Article 18 of the Finnish Constitution providing for freedom of 
223 To be exact, the convention is binding even within the domestic system.
224 For weak support of this, see KKO 2011:72 at 6. The Supreme Court notes that the Finnish as-
sessment of freedom of speech versus protection of private life matches the European Court of Human 
Rights’ practices. Similarly in KKO 2010:39 at 10.
225 See also Linna 2004 at 632–638. For example, Enforcement Code 4:14, Law on Certain Neighbor 
Relations Section 13, Contracts Act Section 36 and Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage 
Section 7.
226 See Pöyhönen 2001 at 314 and Linna 2004 at 635–637. Cf. Lindfors 2008 at 304 and Kangas 2005 
at 158.
227 Confirming that the prohibition of abuse of rights exists in Finnish law; see, for example, Linna 
2004 and Pönkä 2012 at 233–242.
228 In a similar tone, see Tammi-Salminen 2013 at 360.
229 Especially since the horizontal effect of constitutional or human rights is neither unanimously ac-
cepted nor unproblematic. See Libera -säätiö at 42–43 and 46–47.
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business is worth mentioning here.230 The right to use the corporate form falls 
within the scope of freedom of business. Everyone has the right to use the 
corporate form in pursuit of income.
Protection of property is defined in the Human Rights Conventions First 
Protocol Article 1: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law.
The key part of the wording is “peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.” 
The definition of possession has grown extensively, and it covers real 
property, chattel and intellectual property. The protection reaches every 
right bestowing economic benefits, licenses and economic interests.231 The 
creditor’s right to payment no doubt falls within the definition. On the other 
hand, corporations enjoy the protection of property too and so does the 
corporate controller.
When an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
is perpetrated by a private individual, a positive obligation arises for the State 
to ensure that property rights in its domestic legal system are sufficiently 
protected by law and that adequate remedies are provided whereby the victim 
of an interference can seek to vindicate their rights.232 The State has an active 
duty to ensure that private individuals cannot exhaust the rights of others.
Other than the convention on human rights, abuse of rights is also prohibited 
in the domestic legal system of Finland. Abuse of rights means using formally 
acceptable legal actions to achieve unacceptable results, such as harming others or 
results clearly against the fundamental basis of the legal system.233 Prohibition of 
abuse is commonly mentioned but rarely analyzed.234 In the KKO 2011:68 decision, 
this sort of analysis is performed. Its existence derives support from several written 
law norms as well as case law. Prohibition of the abuse of rights is an existing general 
principle in domestic law.235
230 The translation, whereas inadequate in its capacity to explain the meaning, seems the best in com-
mon use. Freedom of business here means that everyone has the right to acquire income with a labor, 
profession or business of their choice.
231 Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v. The Netherlands 1995 at 53.
232 Blumberga v. Latvia 2008 at 67.
233 See KKO 2011:68 and HE 82/2001 at 86.
234 See, for example, HE 82/2001 at 86, KKO 2007:99, KKO 2011:72, KKO 2015:46, dissenting 
opinion in KKO 2018:9 and KKO 2018:78.
235 KKO 2011:68 at 12, KKO 1991:148 and KKO 2003:126. See also Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 
242–287, Pöyhönen 2001 at 313, Linna 2004 at 622 and Pönkä 2008 at 67.
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Perhaps the strongest source to derive the contents of the domestic prohibition of 
abuse principle is the Contracts Act section 33.236 It states: 
A transaction that would otherwise be binding shall not be enforceable if it 
was entered into under circumstances that would make it incompatible with 
honor and good faith for anyone knowing of those circumstances to invoke 
the transaction and the person to whom the transaction was directed must be 
presumed to have known of the circumstances.
Application of the section is limited to contracting parties, although older case 
law has consistently allowed extending it to protect third parties from contracts that 
have been made with the intent to harm said third party.237 
From case law, Matti Rudanko derives a principal statement that the 
Contracts Act section 33 can be extended to cover decisions of the company 
management and even the general meeting since they can limit the liability 
of the company actors. This prohibits a certain type of self-dealing, as the 
constructor is not allowed to free herself from liability for actions made in 
the co-op.238 This does not help with veil piercing, though. The significance 
is in principle at best, as the effects of a contract can be extended beyond the 
contract parties. 
In the KKO 2011:68 decision, the Supreme Court examined the prohibition 
of abuse doctrine.239 According to the decision, the assessment on whether a legal 
action can have the effects it would have if its contents were upheld must account 
for the motives behind the legal action and its consequences. If the motives or 
consequences are not acceptable, the legal action can be abuse. The purpose is to 
deny effect from legal actions that would prevent third parties from realizing their 
rights or damaging them.240 The weakness in this reasoning comes from the motives 
or consequences being unacceptable. What is unacceptable seems determinable only 
case by case.
In legislation, several norms have adopted similar models. For example, the 
artificial property arrangements clause in Chapter 4, Section 14 of the Finland 
Enforcement Code recognizes the subjective intent to avoid enforcement. Similarly, 
the Tax Avoidance Clause in the Law on Taxation Procedure Section 28 requires the 
236 KKO 2011:68. Prohibition of abuse of rights is also mentioned in Section 7 in the Legal Aid Act.
237 See KKO 1961 II 100, KKO 1962 II 80, KKO 1975 II 89 and KKO 1978 II 55. See also Rudanko 
1982 at 32–41.
238 See Rudanko 1982 at 32–41.
239 About the decision, see Tammi-Salminen 2013 at 359–360.
240 See KKO 2011:68 at 12. See also Pönkä 2012 at 242.
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intent to avoid taxation. The subjective part is only half of the coin, though, as both 
of these sections require objective criterion also. Namely, they require a disparity 
between the legal form giving the arrangement and the economic reality behind 
it. The disparity is largely based on whether the use of the legal form matches the 
normal use and intended purpose of that form.241
3.2.2. More Accurate Interpretation and Formulation
If we return to the useful formulation of the prohibition of abuse of rights Pöyhönen 
has provided, we can see that the same disparity is present there also. The formulation 
was that a person seeks to realize her right under circumstances in which the essential 
purpose of said right does not realize, while at the same time the rights of some 
party affected by the realization would be excessively or unduly damaged.242 The 
key thing to note here is what essential purpose does not realize, which includes 
two requirements: one, the right has some purpose for its existence, and two, that 
purpose does not come into reality in its current use. Taking this one step further, 
the legal form is meant to match the purpose of that form and the use of a right 
constitutes using a legal form. This disparity is called the artificiality requirement in 
this work. There is much more discussion on it in upcoming chapters.243
Pöyhönen’s formulation holds similar elements to the KKO 2011:68 decision, 
though the formulation Pöyhönen suggests is more focused on the objective 
assessment of the artificiality and existence of damage. The same weakness as in the 
Supreme Court decision still persists, though. Excessive or undue are determinable 
only case by case. Still, the formulation brings an additional element to the 
assessment: the essential purpose of the supposedly abused right not being fulfilled. 
This criterion matches the argumentation in an older Supreme Court decision as 
well as the KKO 2015:17 piercing decision.
In KKO 1992:145, abuse of rights appeared in a situation where multiple 
contracts exist and they in part derive their content from one another. Then 
the court should not uphold the abstract separateness of each contract, but 
should consider the aims of the overall arrangement and the legal effects 
created by the totality of these contracts.
A Finnish bank had given an on-first-demand guarantee to counter a loan 
given to the Iranian Ministry of Housing and Urban Development from an 
Iranian bank. The contract Finnish bank had agreed that the guarantor had to 
pay the sum on demand without question. The Iranian bank then demanded 
241 See V.4.2. of this work.
242 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87. For a similar definition, see Pönkä 2012 at 233–234. See also KKO 
2011:72 at 6 and KKO 2010:39 at 10.
243 See especially V.4.2. of this work.
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payment. The Iranian bank had later been nationalized, and thus the close 
relationship between the Iranian bank and the ministry allowed the Finnish 
bank to invoke the same defense against the Iranian bank as the Iranian bank 
could have invoked against the ministry, despite the contract stating that no 
right existed. The primary guarantor could have claimed itself not liable since 
there were no unpaid receivables from the other party to the construction 
contract. The original debt, the payment of which this complicated financial 
scheme was devised to guarantee, had ceased to exist. Claiming payment from 
an on-first-demand guarantee in such a situation was seen as an abuse of rights.
The decision is easy to place into the formulation of Pöyhönen. The essential 
purpose of the contractual right was to secure the construction project. The Iranians’ 
attempt to use the right did not match this purpose. At the same time, the Finnish 
bank would suffer excessively, making a payment without acquiring anything in 
return. Formally, the on-first-demand guarantee was completely independent of the 
original contract. It was to be paid if the Iranian bank had to pay the guarantee it had 
given to the ministry. In this situation, demanding payment from the Finnish bank 
was an abuse of rights.244 Facts and contracts from the overall arrangement were 
examined as a whole, and the decision was based on the totality of the arrangement. 
The case was determined through the purpose of the arrangement and damage. 
Arguably, the unacceptable motivation could also have been used in the decision. 
The Court did discuss the close relation of the Iranian parties and how that might 
have affected their willingness to go through with the demand. 
Based on this inspection, the Finnish legal system prohibits the abuse of rights. 
A synthesis between the Supreme Court decision and the reflective sections of law 
combined with Pöyhönen’s formulation seems easy to reach. The effects of a legal action 
can be denied if those actions are taken with either unacceptable motives or the consequences 
prove unacceptable. Additionally, the denial requires that the use of the legal action does 
not match the intended purpose of the utilized legal norm, i.e., the use is artificial.
The last question is whether the disparity between the intended purpose and the 
use is a necessary requirement or just supportive and optional. No distinction can 
be made from the current case law or sections of law reflective of the prohibition 
of abuse. They have all had the artificial use present. The sections of law require it. 
Even in the KKO 2011:68 case, the disparity was deducible from the case facts.245 
The decision in its obiter statement of the prohibition of abuse did not seem to 
244 About fraudulent behavior related to these on-first-demand guarantees, see Kurkela 2011 at 655.
245 Similarly, see the dissenting opinion in KKO 2000:91. In it, the use of formal legal status was seen 
not to match the reality of the case. In specific terms, the employee had received an announcement from 
the employer a week late, and the employment had formally ended although, in reality, the requirements 
for immediate termination were not present.
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require it. Nor does the European Convention on Human Rights Article 17 require 
the disparity, although the presence of such would no doubt support the finding of 
abuse. At this stage, I would hold artificiality as a requirement. This decision is based 
mostly on the fact that it has been present in all the relevant domestic cases and is a 
requirement in the sections of law that are reflective of the principle.
This issue is of no consequence for veil piercing, though, as the formulation of 
the piercing test in KKO 2015:17 explicitly names artificiality as one requirement. 
In fact, the piercing test seems to merge the unacceptable motives or consequences 
with the artificiality requirement. This raises the idea of whether one can even exist 
without the other. Perhaps the unacceptable motives and results are achievable 
only through the artificial use of legal forms, rights and norms. Whichever way, the 
KKO 2015:17 would suggest holding artificiality as a requirement for applying the 
prohibition of abuse principle. Using the KKO 2015:17 decision to formulate the 
prohibition of abuse principle would constitute recursion within this study. Modern 
veil piercing case law is to be the theater on which the formulated background theory 
is tested. If the theory is created through them, the test becomes meaningless, as it 
will no doubt match the case law it was derived from.
3.3.  The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights and Veil Piercing
In this section, I will discuss veil piercing and the Finnish abuse of rights principle.246 
I intend to derive a form of the abuse of rights doctrine that is as precise as possible 
but that still explains Finnish case law around piercing. This work does not assume 
that abuse of rights is the best background theory or framework for understanding 
veil piercing. The intention is more about testing two commonly made claims: 1) 
that the veil piercing test reflects the prohibition of the abuse of rights principle;247 
and 2) that veil piercing is the remedy for abuse of the corporate form,248 although 
246 Veil piercing could be viewed as a human rights issue—a weighing between the creditor’s and the 
controller’s rights where both parties claim protection of property—though it is not necessary. It is suf-
ficient to operate with the prohibition of abuse of rights principle and rights provided in the national 
legislation. For support, see Hemmo 2003 at 56 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 247–282.
247 Villa 2015 at 534. See also Pöyhönen 2001 at 314, Linna 2004 at 653–636, Vahtera 2018 at 265 
and Lindholm 2018 at 33–34. Linna is of the opinion that piercing represents the abuse of rights doctrine 
at least if causing damage is the only other requirement for piercing. If using the corporation in a manner 
that does not fulfill the purpose of the corporate institution is required for piercing, she sees the abuse of 
rights doctrine alone as insufficient. It would need to be accompanied by other requirements.
See also Pönkä 2012 on whether or not a connection between the prohibition of abuse of rights and veil 
piercing is accepted; in reality veil piercing remedies the abuse of limited liability.
248 See KKO 2015:17 at 29 Leppänen 1991 at 286, Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 289 and Villa 2015 at 
534 and 542 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 407–412.
Cf. Huttunen 2007 at 142. He unconditionally denies using vague considerations of abuse as a basis for 
piercing the veil. See also Huttunen 1963 at 197–198, where his opinion was not as unconditional.
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these questions are arguably one and the same. If the veil piercing test reflects the 
prohibition of abuse principle, then the conduct it is capable of targeting is indeed 
abuse.
To recap, I construed the prohibition of the abuse of rights principle in the Finnish 
legal system as follows: The effects of legal action can be denied if those actions are 
taken with either unacceptable motives or if the consequences prove unacceptable. 
Additionally, the denial requires that the use of legal action does not match the 
intended purpose of the utilized legal norm, i.e., the use is artificial.
If we look at the test laid out by the Supreme Court in KKO 2015:17, we notice 
extreme similarities. Its legal arrangement, or legal actions, were the use of group 
structure, intercorporate relationships or shareholders’ control. All of these methods 
utilize the limited liability shield or separate personality if they are viewed in the 
more general stage. The next part of the test was literally artificiality, although it was 
not given a more specific explanation. Later in this work, I provide a more in-depth 
analysis on the meaning of artificiality and why it is indeed defined through the 
purpose of the corporate form. The unacceptable motives or consequences part is 
a bit harder to match between the two. The KKO 2015:17 decision required the 
corporate use to be reprehensible. In several successful piercing cases, this criterion 
has been fulfilled by determining the intention or motive behind the arrangement.249 
Unacceptable consequences have not been cited in piercing case law at this point, 
although arguably, the results of legal actions made artificially and in bad faith are 
unacceptable.
The veil piercing situations could be inserted into the formulation of the 
prohibition of abuse principle. Abuse of the corporate form means
 – using the corporate form, especially limited liability shield and separate 
personality, as a method (legal action/legal arrangement);
 – allowing the controller to escape an obligation or to evade a legal norm 
(unacceptable motives/consequences); and 
 – if the arrangement does not satisfy the requirements of honest commerce, 
i.e., the basic purpose of the corporation as an institution, this supports the 
finding of abuse (artificiality).250
Although the definition of abuse of the corporate form could be constructed 
a bit differently, the overlapping criteria seem significant enough.251 It seems that 
the prohibition of abuse of rights principle is capable of explaining the veil piercing 
doctrine as it was laid out in KKO 2015:17. The similarity is comprehensive enough 
249 KKO 2017:94, KKO 2015:17 and KKO 1996:2.
250 Similarly Villa 2015 at 534.
251 Similarly in Sweden, Håkan Andersson (2014 at 3) recognizes the connection between veil piercing 
and abuse of law as well as the ambiguity it brings. Abuse of law was also mentioned in NJA 2014 s. 877. 
See more in V.4.3. of this work.
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that the same ambiguities plaguing the prohibition of abuse principle seem to bother 
veil piercing also, though in a more specific context. What is artificiality? What is 
reprehensible use? How to discern the motive behind the arrangement? The veil 
piercing doctrine seems to be just a corporate-specific recreation of the principle.
The piercing decisions that have emerged after the KKO 2015:17 utilized 
this piercing test. Later in this work, I will explain in depth how the artificiality 
and reprehensibility should be assessed in veil piercing case law. It turns out that 
artificiality is indeed a disparity of the legal form and the reality of the case, i.e., 
the use does not match the purpose of the corporate institution.252 Reprehensibility, 
in the current case law, is shown most strongly through the intent to achieve the 
described results of creditor damage or evasion of legal norms.253
In literature, the prohibition of the abuse of rights principle has been discussed 
alongside duty of loyalty. Ville Pönkä distinguishes between the contract law 
principle of duty of loyalty and the duty of loyalty created by the principle 
of the prohibition of abuse of rights. The main difference according to him 
is that the duty of loyalty in contract law creates duties to act, whereas in 
the prohibition of the abuse of rights, duty of loyalty only requires refraining 
from action. Based on this, it could be argued that the prohibition of the 
abuse of rights creates a duty of loyalty to the corporate controller, not to 
abuse that control in a manner that would prevent the creditor from receiving 
payment.254 I am basing this on the fact that the corporate form causes a 
special negative risk to the creditors as the controller is able to benefit from 
limited liability and separate personality to the creditor’s detriment.255 There 
is a disparity of control over the circumstances. Disloyal use of rights is abuse 
of rights.
4.  A Unified Theory
The prohibition of abuse of rights and conflict of norms are highly compatible in 
the end. They could even be viewed as a continuum. The conflict of norms states 
that two norms are in contradiction and one must yield. The prohibition of abuse 
states that the effects of a legal action can be denied if those actions are taken with 
unacceptable motives or if the consequences prove unacceptable. If the use of legal 
action does not match the intended purpose of the utilized legal norm, this supports 
252 See V.4.2. of this work.
253 See V.4.3.3.1. of this work.
254 See Pönkä 2012 at 234–235. See also Hemmo 2003 at 56.
255 See also Linna 2004 at 626.
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finding the motives or consequences unacceptable. It seems that the conflict of norms 
recognizes the issue at hand on an abstract level, so the prohibition of abuse can be 
used to determine an actual resolution for the conflict. The key difference is that the 
conflict of norms approach would better allow for considering the purposes behind 
the violated norm. At this point, it is useful to remember that the prohibition of 
abuse is also capable of taking that into account through artificiality. When assessing 
the unacceptable consequences, we can look into how thoroughly the purpose of 
the other conflicting norm is violated or whether the violation extends to the core 
content of the right.256
Based on this, I would conclude that both the conflict of norms and prohibition 
of abuse are useful as background theories for piercing. Both are capable of offering 
something unique that matches veil piercing situations, although both are separately 
capable of explaining piercing decisions. No synthesis or co-operative use is required, 
but the overlapping suggests that it could be useful to view them together. That is, 
if we do not explain away the conflict of norms altogether. By this, I mean that the 
prohibition of abuse could be understood to include the conflict of norms approach. 
If we look at the European Convention on Human Rights prohibition clause, we 
easily detect the conflict structure there. According to it, no right may be used just 
to destroy someone else’s rights under the convention. Two rights are in conflict and 
one must yield. The prohibition of abuse clause acts as a tool to solve the conflict. 
The clause has a built-in justification for adopting a contra legem solution or resolving 
the conflict of norms in favor of the more valued purposes behind the conflicting 
norms.
The Finnish prohibition of abuse principle is less definite in this. The effects of 
some legal action can be denied if it is used with unacceptable motives or if it results 
in unacceptable consequences. There is no obvious conflict in this construction 
of the principle. However, no party has an interest in claiming abuse unless their 
interest is violated. The legal system accepts only valid interests as a basis for trials. 
That means that those interests need to be based on some norm. The same is true 
for the legal action: there is no need to resort to the prohibition of abuse principle 
if the legal action is not valid. Thus, whenever the prohibition of abuse principle 
is invoked in trial, there are two conflicting norms: the one depicting the violated 
interest and the one enabling the legal action.
This varies a little in the evasion of law situations. There is generally no interest 
other than the correct application of a norm of the law, and it is up to some 
government authority to enforce it. In these situations though, the conflict is even 
more apparent, the norm application of which conflicts with the norm granting 
separate personality or limited liability to a corporation.
256 Similarly, see Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87.
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5.  Other Theories
5.1.  Judgment Proofing
The aforementioned theories seem most prominent in the Finnish veil piercing 
doctrine. I would still discuss a few theory contenders that are perhaps not as 
comprehensive. Instead, they are capable of more accurately explaining a portion of 
piercing decisions. I will discuss judgment proofing theory, unjust enrichment and 
policy enforcement.
First up is the judgment proofing model. This explanatory model is especially 
attractive since it fits well with several key elements of piercing. In addition, it is 
capable of explaining the different treatment of involuntary creditors at the theory 
level instead of arguing at the level of application. At its core, this model is capable 
of explaining the piercing decisions that place liability on involuntary creditors. It 
falters somewhat with voluntary creditors and does not address situations in which no 
creditor suffers damages, i.e., the evasion of law situations. Both of these are included 
in the veil piercing test of KKO 2015:17. Still, the theory offers an explanation for 
an easily discernable part of piercing situations. Additionally, it explains the part of 
piercing that is viewed in the literature as the core target for piercing. Finally, it is 
capable of explaining the recent case law in Finland257 and Sweden258 perfectly. Some 
of the older cases do not match that well.
Lynn LoPucki argues that nearly all judgment proofing has a single essential 
structure, a symbiotic relationship between two or more entities, in which one of 
the entities generates disproportionately high risks of liability and another owns a 
disproportionately high level of assets. The business is divided into asset entity and 
operating entity. Through the contract that unites them, the two entities allocate 
the gains from the operation between themselves. Typically, the asset-owning entity 
guarantees payment of selected contract obligations of the liability-generating 
entity (the “operating entity”) necessary for the latter to continue in business.259 
The contract uniting them can be lease agreement, secured lender contract, a sale, 
franchise agreement, licensing agreement, corporate group relation or any other 
arrangement capable of allocating value within the symbiotic relationship.260 Because 
the owning and operating entities divide the unified business between them, the two 
together have all the characteristics of a unified business.261
257 KKO 2015:17, KKO 2017:94 and KKO 2018:20.
258 NJA 2014 s. 877.
259 See LoPucki 1998 at 149.
260 LoPucki 1998 at 152. Similiarly, see Oh 2013 at 93, stating that everyone has apparently forgotten 
that veil piercing originated as an equitable procedure to remedy the problem of unenforceable judg-
ments.
261 LoPucki 1998 at 153.
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LoPucki recognizes three kinds of advantages from the symbiotic relationship. 
The first is the prospect for mutual gain that would have held all the constituents 
of the unified business together had the business not been split into owning and 
operating entities. That is, the constituents will want to contract with the entities of 
the judgment-proof business for the same reasons they would have wanted to contract 
with the entity of the unified business. The second advantage is the continuing 
savings from externalizing the tort liability that the unified business would have 
had. Working together, the entities of the judgment-proof business have the same 
earning power as the unified business but lower costs of liability. They can divide 
the savings between them by contract. The third advantage is saving the transaction 
costs that would have to be incurred to redeploy the assets and constituents of the 
business if the owning and operating entities severed their relations. To minimize 
the amount the operating entity could capture through opportunism, the owning 
company would retain the right to terminate the relationship to the maximum 
extent consistent with the business needs of the operating company.262
The key aspects of this theory are:
 – symbiotic relationship between the entities
 – one-sided selective treatment of debtors to the detriment of judgment 
creditors.
Judgment creditors are involuntary creditors that need a court decision to collect. 
LoPucki does discuss collapsing these entities into a single liable subject but remains 
skeptical about the viability of that strategy.263 The way I am utilizing his judgment-
proofing concept here does deviate from the original. He used it as a description of 
arrangements in practice and argued that these arrangements should be disregarded; 
I use it in a sense that if an arrangement fits the description, that itself justifies the 
disregard. This jump needs to be justified, though. This verification is easy to derive 
from three major veil piercing cases: KKO 2015:17, KKO 2017:94 and  NJA 2014, 
p. 877. All of the arrangements in these cases fit the model, and in all of them, the 
corporate veil was pierced. This shows that veil piercing and judgment proofing 
overlap and judgment proofing does enable piercing.
In KKO 2015:17, the parent corporation founded a subsidiary corporation 
to sell data storage devices. The subsidiary neglected the payments and Teosto 
needed a judgment to collect the remunerations. There was no discussion 
as to whether benefits were transferred from the subsidiary to the parent. 
The two corporations were in a symbiotic relationship in which the parent 
financed the subsidiary and the subsidiary operated through the parent 
corporation’s website in a manner that did not allow the customer to discern 
262 LoPucki 1998 at 155.
263 LoPucki 1998 at 156–159.
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which entity she did business with. The subsidiary did not have any assets 
when the judgment was to be collected. The two entities’ businesses were not 
discernable.
In KKO 2017:94, one person owned two corporations. One owned 
the assets of a truck business. The other held the employees’ contracts. The 
workforce was then rented to the asset corporation at a value that did not 
allow the employee rental corporation to meet its obligation sustainably. 
The employee rental corporation did not do business with any other entity 
than the asset corporation. The relationship was obviously symbiotic and 
benefits were transferred with the rental agreement. The two corporations 
together had the characteristics of a unified business, as neither could have 
operated alone and utilized only the services of the other corporation in 
the arrangement. Perhaps the decision would have been different had the 
corporations made business with others too.
NJA 2014 p. 877 differs a bit from the basic structure of judgment 
proofing. On one hand, the entire corporation was founded solely to obtain 
a judgment and avoid the risk of trial costs, which are awarded by judgment. 
The arrangement involved only one corporation, however, and no benefits 
were ever realized. There was thus no need to transfer those benefits via 
typical methods. The benefit was the chance of obtaining a judgment 
without the risk of trial costs. The symbiotic relationship existed through 
the financing method. The shareholders inserted funds into the company 
to pay select obligations, namely the attorney’s fees necessary to continue 
the trial. This created a situation where the potential assets were freely 
available to the shareholders, whereas the potential losses were limited to 
the corporation.
This theory is capable of explaining piercing even when the corporation has 
actual business. The abuse of rights theory faces problems with the actual business, 
which resulted in a less than objective assessment of primary motives behind the 
arrangement and what portion of them were for legitimate business reasons. The 
judgment-proofing theory bypasses this with ease. It does not matter whether the 
disregarded entity has actual business if that business is practiced in a symbiotic 
relationship in which the assets and operations are divided between entities in a 
manner that realizes benefits in one and negative risks in the other. It is capable of 
discerning abuse even when the existence of a corporation does somewhat fulfill the 
intended purpose of the corporate institution.
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5.2.  Policy Enforcement
A relatively new theoretical approach to piercing, the policy enforcement approach, 
was introduced by Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts. In their opinion, all the 
piercing cases can be explained in an effort to accomplish one of three goals: (1) 
achieving the goals of a particular regulatory or statutory scheme; (2) avoiding fraud 
or misrepresentation by shareholders trying to obtain credit; and (3) promoting the 
bankruptcy value of eliminating favoritism among claimants to the cash flows of a 
firm.264 I will call this framework the policy enforcement approach. The following is 
borrowed from Macey and Mitts themselves.
First, courts pierce the corporate veil as a tool of statutory application in the 
sense that piercing the corporate veil is done in order to ensure that corporate actors 
behave in conformity with a particular statutory scheme, such as social security or 
state unemployment compensation schemes. For example, as explained in detail 
below, sometimes the court will ignore the corporate form in order to accomplish 
the specific legislative goal of a government benefit program that distinguishes 
between owners and employees. Failing to pierce the veil would undercut the goal 
of the statutory regime by effectively granting someone a partial exemption from the 
regulatory burdens imposed by the statute.
Second, courts also pierce to remedy what appears to be fraudulent conduct that 
does not satisfy the strict elements of common law fraud; specifically, they pierce 
for “constructive fraud” in the contractual context. Simply put, if a court becomes 
convinced that a shareholder or other equity investor has, by words or actions, led a 
contract counterparty to believe that an obligation is a personal liability rather than 
(or in addition to) a corporate debt, then they will sometimes use a piercing theory 
rather than a fraud theory to impose liability on the individual shareholder.
The third ground on which courts pierce the corporate veil is the promotion 
of what Macey and Mitts term accepted “bankruptcy values.” In particular, courts 
will disregard the corporate form in order to prevent fraudulent conveyances and 
preferential transfers.
Macey and Mitts have arrived at this view through machine learning analysis of 
United States case law. The approach might not cover other jurisdictions without 
further coordination and development. On the other hand, their framework is 
case law practice–oriented. The theory is also easy to place within the abuse of 
rights framework as further justification for resolving the conflict of norms. One 
key aspect of that theory was the policy goals behind the conflicting rules and 
whether those goals are achieved in the in casu use of the corporation. What the 
policy enforcement approach adds to this is recognition of the typical policy goals 
present in piercing situations. If we look at Finnish case law, we can easily detect 
264 Macey – Mitts 2014.
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all three of these. In KKO 2015:17, the decision could be explained as reaching 
the goals of a particular regulatory or statutory scheme.265 In that case, that scheme 
was the remunerations for private copying. In KKO 2017:94 and KKO 1996:2, 
the decisions had at least some elements of avoiding favoritism among bankruptcy 
claimants.266 Finland lacks case law in which piercing was attempted in a contractual 
context, but the older case KKO 1958 II 43 disregarded the separate personality 
of a corporation based on misrepresentation.267 The decision did not utilize the 
piercing doctrine, however.
6.  A Hierarchical Theory
6.1.  Multiple Explaining Theories Instead of One?
Another option worth considering is a hierarchical structure. This structure would 
separate the typical piercing situations into three categories, two of which are 
directly deductible from the KKO 2015:17 decision piercing test. The test allows 
piercing if a legal obligation has been evaded or if creditors were damaged. Thus, 
the first category is the evasion of a legal obligation. On the other hand the creditor 
damage situations need to be divided into two separate categories. Voluntary and 
involuntary creditors are in a much different position based on their capability to 
affect the credit relationship and its terms.268 This leaves us with three categories: 
1) evasion of law, 2) damage to voluntary creditors, and 3) damage to involuntary 
creditors.
These distinct categories are derived from the piercing practice and depict the 
distinct veil piercing situations. If we have three distinct piercing situations, could 
we have three distinct theories to explain them? At first glance, the conflict of norms 
and prohibition of abuse seem to match the evasion of law situations well, and the 
judgment proofing seems to match involuntary creditors extremely well, but the 
prohibition of abuse principle also matches the involuntary creditors.
The problems arise with voluntary creditors, though, as neither theory is capable of 
explaining the freedom of contract arguments inherent in this category. At the same 
time, the conflict of norms theory and the abuse of rights theory are both capable 
of explaining all three categories, although they face minor difficulties with contract 
creditors. It appears that the freedom of contract arguments inherent in this category 
265 Similarly, in the Norwegian decision, Hempel (2010) and United States v. Bestfoods (1998).
266 Similarly, the Swedish decision NJA 2014 s. 877.
267 The Danish decision UfR 1997 p. 1642 had some elements of this, as the non-contractual creditors 
were unable to discern the correct view of the entities’ finances. The decision is hard to categorize as a 
piercing decision and remains rather unique.
268 See at V.5.2. of this work.
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seem to exclude unacceptable consequences and at least somewhat legitimize any 
possible motive to benefit at the other’s expense. I have not yet encountered a theory 
that could explain veil piercing in the case of voluntary creditors.
With these limitations in mind, the discussion of hierarchical theory becomes 
a theoretical curiosity and an attempt at development. I am under no illusion as 
to the incomplete nature of the hierarchical structure, the overlapping explaining 
theories within it or the lack of a good theory explaining the possibility of piercing 
within the voluntary creditors category. As such, the value of this discussion is 
not much other than the presentation of the idea that there could be multiple 
explaining theories of veil piercing depending on the typical situations in which 
they arise.
Why I decided to call this a hierarchical theory is because the prohibition of abuse 
principle and conflict of norms are capable of justifying all of these categories. The 
problem with them is that they are not very precise. Judgment proofing is capable 
of very precise explanation in the category of involuntary creditors. The conflict 
of norms theory becomes somewhat ambiguous when dealing with creditors. The 
evading legal norms category matches the situation much better. Still, the conflict of 
norms theory needs some support in reaching an answer to the conflict. This is why I 
have placed the prohibition of abuse as the general explaining theory and the others 
as supplemental theories in this model. The idea is that the supplemental theories 
are compatible with the prohibition of abuse principle but more precisely apply it in 
piercing situations.
At this point, though, one could question whether they are theories at all. They 
could arguably be characterized as descriptions of typical piercing situations or legal 
paradigms. Whatever they are called, they are useful in explaining and resolving veil 
piercing cases. At some point, however, one needs to ask whether these situations or 
paradigms are different enough to create three separate piercing doctrines instead of 
one general doctrine. This would allow for creating more delicate piercing decisions 
than the ambiguous general doctrine adopted in KKO 2015:17. Now, such an idea 
has not reached case law, and much further development would be necessary to 
make such a separation of piercing. The focus of this work is the current doctrine, 
and therefore, I leave the possible division into three piercing doctrines for the 
future.
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?
Figure 3. Hierarchical structure and the three categories
6.2.  Paradigms or Supplementary Theories Applied
Each of the supplementary theories has its strengths and weaknesses. As I have 
demonstrated about judgment proofing, it matches a lot of piercing cases really 
well. I will not repeat the discussion here.269 On the other hand, if we encounter a 
situation in which a legal norm is evaded but not to the detriment of the creditors, the 
characterization falters. These situations are better explained through the conflict of 
norms characterization and are resolved through the realist interpretation of the norm. 
Through the use of a corporation, someone evades the application or applies a norm 
that should not apply. Then we either deny or apply the norm based on the realist 
interpretation of both the separate personality and whatever norm is being evaded.
The conflict of norms theory characterization falters a little when faced with 
the creditors. Especially with the contract creditors, one would have to explain 
the conflict of norms as a conflict between the pacta sund servanda principle and 
separate personality or limited liability, although the argument goes that veil 
piercing should not be allowed for voluntary creditors at all.270 Perhaps the lack of a 
proper theoretical foundation supports this. Still, the conflict of norms theory could 
also apply to the abuse of some contractual rights if these rights are used outside the 
parameters they were agreed upon.271 However, this would require a contract term 
entirely separate from the rest of the arrangement.
269 For the discussion, see II.5.1. of this work.
270 See V.5.2.2. of this work. I argue to abandon this opinion in V.5.2.4. of this work.
271 See KKO 1992:145 and II.3.3.2. of this work.
69
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
Per the involuntary creditors, the conflict of norms theory is compatible. For 
example, in the Verkkokauppa case, the involuntary creditors’ receivable was a direct 
consequence of neglecting a written law norm. This could easily be made a conflict 
of whether to uphold the remuneration norm or limited liability and separate 
personality. The debt created by the arrangement was rather unambiguous, and the 
subsidiary’s liability was clear, but the liability of the parent was unclear. The choice 
was whether to uphold the policy behind the remuneration norm or the formal 
interpretation of separate personality and limited liability norms.272 The same is 
true for the NJA 2014 p. 877 case, which was about limited liability and separate 
personality versus the purpose of the norm allocating the trial costs.
There are no difficulties even when the involuntary creditor’s position is based 
on tort. The liability is based on some liability norm, for example, the Tort Liability 
Act Chapter 2, Section 1 providing a general liability for negligence. In these cases, 
though, we might not have as clear a conflict as the tort liability norms are heavily 
based on causation and do not traditionally trespass the separate personality line. 
Still, the conflict remains the same: whether to uphold separate personality and 
limited liability or the damaged party’s right to compensation. Regardless of the 
situation, these conflicts are hard to resolve. At this point, we can utilize the help of 
judgment-proofing characterization.
The judgment-proofing paradigm does not match the voluntary creditors’ 
situations well. This is apparent from the definition of the paradigm. It is simply 
construed to match involuntary creditors and assumes the beneficial treatment of 
choice creditors in the arrangements. The assumption is that voluntary creditors 
can find out about the judgment-proofing arrangement and modify their terms 
accordingly. The theory’s application is more ambiguous when the initial relationship 
between the parties was a contract, but the position as a creditor is due to the 
neglect of contractual duties. Technically, these creditors are tort creditors and 
creditors through judgment. The KKO 2017:94 case also demonstrated undeniably 
that judgment-proofing arrangements can be used to the detriment of this type of 
creditor also. This issue of creditor type characterization is further discussed in V.5.2. 
of this work and will thus not be discussed here any further. 
It would seem that both supplementary theories overlap. The more limited is the 
judgment-proofing one, which is capable of explaining only the involuntary creditors 
category, but some ambiguity remains as to what constitutes an involuntary creditor. 
The conflict of norms seems capable of explaining them all, but not perfectly. For 
272 As pointed out by Taina Pihlajarinne, Katri Havu and Juha Vesala, the parent’s liability could have 
made an issue of interpreting the legal norm, naming the ones responsible for paying the remuneration. 
Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 600. See also C724/17 and KKO 2019:90 where the competition 
law concept of enterprise was interpreted broadly to include corporation that received the business activ-
ities of a voluntarily dissolved corporation.
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the time being, the hierarchical theory should be abandoned, as it is not capable of 
effectively discerning the situations. Perhaps later we will have better legal paradigms 
for piercing situations, and then we can return to this idea. Currently, it is too messy, 
as the different pieces overlap with one another too much. One useful finding from 
this examination could be derived, though. The judgment-proofing paradigm can 
supplement the more abstract theories justifying veil piercing to make it more 
capable of resolving issues. This will show up more thoroughly in V.6.4. of this work.
III ANALOGY
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1.  Introduction
In earlier literature, veil piercing has been secluded to different areas of the law. 
Piercing in enforcement, bankruptcy and taxation is based on general competence 
norms provided in their respective statutes. These norms have their limitations as 
they are designed to counter specific types of behavior. The most obvious limitation 
is of course the formal limitations of these norms to specific legal procedures such 
as taxation and enforcement. Additionally, as per design, they might emphasize 
different elements, for example elements of ownership and owner’s rights in 
artificial property arrangements or wording of evaded tax laws. It is apparent that 
these specific elements can come up in a corporate arrangement, though corporate 
arrangements are by no means exhausted by these. The flexibility of corporate 
personhood allows for very large selection of abusive arrangements and the specific 
norm context of these arrangements is left to the arrangement’s creator’s choice. The 
analogous doctrines target abuses of specific predetermined norms. There is limited 
application for the more specific case law around the analogous doctrines and the 
utility as sources of analogy stems more from the general structure of these evasion 
norms targeting abuse. The evasion norms share commonalities in principle and 
sometimes they even address elements of corporate arrangements, making them 
especially useful. I will provide an analysis into these doctrines to detect the usable 
material.
 A more general veil piercing doctrine can be found in case law, though, especially 
the KKO 2015:17 decision, but it does not suffer from the limitations of the secluded 
doctrines, as a price for that doctrine remains rather ambiguous. The examination 
in this chapter starts with the assumption that these specific veil piercing doctrines 
can be used as points of analogy for clarifying the general veil piercing doctrine. 
The Verkkokauppa decision did cite artificial property arrangements, environmental 
damage liability and tax avoidance as examples and sources of analogy. Additionally, 
the Supreme Court cited pay security case law, using it as an example of piercing 
the veil. I will examine all the mentioned sources here to discover what help they 
offer in developing the piercing doctrine. These secular provisions reflect the 
common criterion upon which veil piercing doctrine can be built.273 They are 
accepted statutory doctrines that target abuse and extend liability or allow setting 
aside the legal form and basing the decision on the facts of the case. Sometimes, the 
specifics of the legal environment in which the norms operate have their effects on 
veil piercing consideration, and these are discussed when they arise.  For example, 
taxation emphasizes business reason, and artificial property arrangements highlight 
control inherent in ownership.
273 Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 302 and 410.
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Veil piercing targets such acts that do not fall under other instruments provided 
by law.274 This makes it important to examine the other legal instruments addressing 
similar situations of corporate behavior. These legal instruments do not necessarily 
limit the application of veil piercing. Simply, when a liability doctrine based on law is 
applicable, there should be no need to rely on the controversial doctrine of piercing 
the veil.275 The legal doctrines have their uses, conditions and defined limitations. 
Often, veil piercing ends up targeting arrangements where the actions are measured 
with these limitations in mind. The aim is to abuse or circumvent the system — 
to escape the scope of liability-inducing provisions. They seek to absolve liability 
when the absolution is not possible by law. These provisions can target corporate 
arrangements similar to veil piercing, although their respective uses are not limited 
to that. In their respective scope of application, some of these liability forms can be 
used to disregard the corporate form, whereas the others act as alternatives to veil 
piercing.
It is entirely possible, though, that the arrangement is made so that it limits the 
liability to some extent by abuse. It is perfectly imaginable that the arrangement allows 
for some compensation with other liability doctrines and the remaining damage by 
piercing. Demanding the entirety of the damage by piercing would not be excluded 
either, though this would seem a poor strategic choice, as piercing is unlikely, 
ambiguous and loosely based on case law.276 The situation could be compared to the 
relationship between compensation for damages and condiction. Both have different 
requirements for application and thus target different sorts of conduct, though the 
end result is similar. Correspondingly, piercing and the analogous doctrines target 
different sorts of conduct and have different requirements even if the end result is 
similar. 
The opinion that veil piercing would not apply in situations where some other 
liability norm applies could be supported by resorting to the defined results 
of veil piercing. These are usually defined as personal liability from corporate 
obligations without a norm in legislation allowing for the liability.277 This 
definition was also adopted in KKO 2015:17. The Supreme Court stated that 
disregarding the separate personality of a corporation requires a liability norm 
in law or the situation referred to as veil piercing. This could be interpreted 
such that only the damage that cannot be compensated by the legislated 
norms could be claimed by piercing. Though it can also be interpreted to 
274 This stems from the observation made by the Supreme Court in KKO 2015:17 at 29. Liability 
requires a liability norm in law or the situation referred to as veil piercing.
275 See af Schultén 1984 at 81.
276 Similarly see Werlauf 1991 at 276–277 and Hagstrøm 1993 at 253.
277 See KKO 2015:17 at 29.
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mean that veil piercing doctrine has no basis in law. This is a less expansive 
interpretation. This would also mean that the definition reveals nothing 
about the relationship between veil piercing doctrine and liability norms in 
legislation.
As veil piercing is a doctrine protecting creditors and satisfying their claim, some 
other creditor protection norms providing assets for their satisfaction are examined. 
The purpose is to determine how they serve to limit the need for veil piercing. A 
secondary purpose can also be given. The interpretation of certain terms should 
be consistent, at least within the same area of law. In the context of property law, 
company law and creditor protection, the concepts should be given the same content 
if possible. For these purposes, the study will examine the debtor’s dishonesty, 
forfeiture, unlawful distribution of assets and asset recovery.
Thei significance of these doctrines is based on different laws on the developments 
of veil piercing via analogy or limitation is shortly examined here, whereas the proper 
development of piercing doctrine with the help of these doctrines is done in chapter 
III. The purpose of this section is not to develop the mentioned doctrines.
2.  Veil Piercing and Various Legal Instruments Protecting 
Creditors – Limiting The Scope of Piercing the Veil
2.1.  Artificial Property Arrangements
2.1.1.  General
Artificial property arrangements refer to situations where the legal form does 
not match the factual contents of the arrangement. The actual owner in form 
has transferred the ownership to someone else but in fact still acts as the owner 
of the property. The ownership has been transferred to a person that is not liable 
for the debts, but this person does not represent an economic interest other than 
the debtor.278 The bailiff279 can then set aside the owner in form and attach the 
property to pay the debts of the debtor. Enforcement Code 4:14 and Bankruptcy 
Act 5:11 both allow the disregard of this sort of arrangements. The provision in the 
Bankruptcy Act is copied from that of the Enforcement Code, and the provisions 
are meant to be identical in their application.280
Artificial property arrangements utilize perfectly legal institutions. The ends they 
pursue with these devices are not acceptable, however. The devices are meant for 
278 See HE 275/1998 vp. at 14.
279 Or estate administrator in bankruptcy.
280 See HE 26/2003 vp. at 79.
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certain uses and should not be used to defeat the purposes of the law.281 They are 
mostly meant to serve purposes of business and market economy and should not be 
used to evade obligations.282 In essence, these purpose-defeating arrangements are 
inappropriate risk management.283
Enforcement Code 4:14 states that a plea that property belongs to a third 
party does not prevent the attachment of the property if
1) it is observed that the position of the third party is based on a financial or 
other arrangement that has been given a legal form that does not correspond 
to the actual nature or purpose of the matter, taking into consideration the 
powers available to the debtor comparable to the authority as owner, measures 
comparable to those of an owner, the benefits received by the debtor from the 
arrangement and the other corresponding factors, and
2) such a legal form is apparently being used to avoid enforcement or to retain 
the property beyond the reach of the creditors, and 
3) the applicant’s receivable shall probably not otherwise be collected from 
the debtor within a reasonable time.
The provision gives significance to both objective and subjective elements. Other 
than the actual requirements for ignoring the arrangements, the provision states 
that it should be used only if the receivable would not otherwise be collected. The 
provision is always secondary to less derogative methods.
2.1.2.  Objective and Subjective Elements
Objective elements include control over the property. The debtor, being able to 
control the property as if still in ownership of it, supports finding the arrangement 
artificial. The arrangement aims to separate the elements of ownership so that a 
third party holds only the protection against creditors while the debtor still retains 
control and possession. The assessment is about determining when the ownership is 
real.284 It becomes imperative to examine whether the third party dispenses of the 
property without a will of her own and only according to the instructions of the 
debtor.285 Open and honest co-operation with the authorities creates an assumption 
of the proper nature of the arrangement.286 Using only the legal powers according to 
281 See Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 147.
282 See Marttila 2006 at 770.
283 Marttila 2006 at 770.
284 See Marttila 2006 at 772 and KKO 2004:96 at 9–10.
285 See Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 153 and Marttila 2006 at 777. In addition, see KKO 2005:97 where, 
after selling a house, the debtor had continued to specify how it was used and what construction projects 
were undertaken. The Supreme Court deemed that the debtor had control as if he were the owner.
286 See KKO 2005:95, KKO 2005:98 and KKO 2011:49 and Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 155.
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the provisions of the law is control as Enforcement Code 4:14 requires, though the 
control can also be factual.
Other than control, if the debtor performs actions that are usually within the 
interest of the owner alone, these actions support finding the arrangement as artificial. 
These include value-enhancing actions, insurance, repairs and so on.287 These actions 
are seen as secondary to control in case law: if the third party holds normal control 
over the property, actions that are normally in the interest of the owner alone are 
not enough to deem the arrangement artificial.288 If the debtor derives benefits from 
the property owned by a third party, the finding of artificiality is supported. Benefits 
include free use of a bank account and other property.289
Finally, other findings that are similar to those examined above can be taken 
into account when assessing artificiality. This includes all objectively detectable 
contradictions between the legal form and the actual nature or purpose of the 
arrangement, such as funding, bearing negative risk and the relationship between 
the debtor and the third party involved.290
The subjective requirement in the provision is that the legal form is apparently 
used to avoid enforcement or to retain the property beyond the reach of the 
creditors. For the arrangement to be artificial, it needs only to fulfill the objective 
requirements. The attachment also needs to be intended to achieve results that are 
detrimental to the creditors. As intentions are notoriously difficult to prove, some 
objective factors must be used to deduce the intentions. If the arrangement is created 
at a time when the debtor is likely to incur lots of debt or the debts already surpass 
the assets, it is likely that the arrangement was created to retain property.291 Hiding 
the arrangement in the proceedings also supports the finding of such intention.292 
A lack of proper reasoning for the arrangement supports finding the subjective 
element; the arrangement cannot be reasonably explained with factors other than 
avoiding the enforcement or retaining property.293
287 See KKO 2005:97 where the debtor funded extensive construction projects on his spouse’s summer 
house.
288 KKO 2011:49 where the debtor had rented an apartment, and after a falling out with the owner 
of the apartment, the debtor found a new owner for it. The debtor’s influence was not seen as sufficient 
for finding the arrangement artificial, since the new owner was found to have normal control over the 
property.
289 See Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 153. Also KKO 2005:97.
290 See HE 275/1998 vp at 14 and KKO 2011:49 at 11.
291 HE 275/1998 vp at 14.
292 HE 275/1998 vp at 14.
293 See Tikka 1972 at 2. Also Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 157–160.
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2.1.3.  Artificial Property Arrangements and Veil Piercing
Artificial arrangements can include a corporation, and the section can be used to 
pierce the veil during the enforcement procedure.294 The corporation is either the 
third party or the debtor. The corporation as a third party is problematic for the 
secondary nature of collecting from the artificial property arrangement if the debtor 
owns the corporation. Then the shares can be attached, and other measures are 
available to prevent the debtor from destroying the share value should they hold 
a position within the company. Should those measures be obviously insufficient, 
295 veil piercing is possible by applying Enforcement Code 4:14. Shares of a private 
company are hard to sell: there are few buyers, and this usually means a discount in 
price. Additionally, Enforcement Codes 4:38 and 4:37, which prohibit the debtor 
from using their control over the company in a manner detrimental to the creditors, 
do not limit the debtor’s competence in doing so. This provides the debtor with 
a window of opportunity to make additional arrangements. It is thus often more 
effective to get direct access to the corporate property through the artificial property 
arrangements section, even if this potentially leads to time-consuming litigation.
The biggest difference between veil piercing and setting aside artificial 
arrangements is about the emphasis on the assessment of artificiality. Veil piercing 
aims to determine whether the use of the corporate form is artificial and can be 
set aside to hold the actual actor liable. Artificial property arrangements are about 
property and ownership. The aim is to assess whether the ownership arrangement 
is artificial and whether it can be set aside to have the property cover the liabilities 
294 See also Lindfors 2008 at 318. She is of the opinion that the doctrines have the same moral justi-
fication, but the ambiguous nature of piercing prevents it from being used as a point of analogy in the 
development of the artificial property arrangements section. Two things have changed since Lindfors 
gave her opinion: The veil piercing doctrine has become less ambiguous as of KKO 2015:17. Second, the 
artificial arrangements section has become less ambiguous itself, allowing its use as a point of analogy.
295 However, one can claim that the measures are always insufficient. Even if the property of the cor-
poration is deemed liable for the debt, or alternatively, if the shares are attached, the debtor can still hold 
a position within the corporation. Although the Enforcement Code 4:38 prohibits the debtor from dis-
pensing, it does not limit the competence the debtor as the representative of the company. The debtor 
is still able to make legal actions, although they are not binding toward the creditors. Yet this does not 
matter for the debtor, as they are still able to hide the property. Items can be sold and the money can be 
made to disappear. This does lead to criminal liability, though, as property is lost to the detriment of 
the creditors. Excluding possible jail time or fines, the debtor’s overall liability does not rise. The tort 
compensation is limited to the amount of the damage, and the damage is the sum of the original debt. The 
actions themselves, as the corporate representative, might be cause for tort liability and might act as an 
independent basis for liability, they cannot add up to the compensation amount. As soon as the original 
debt is paid, there is no damage. Consequently, the debtor must then be a customer at the enforcement 
proceedings for at least 15 years (possibly 25 if extended). Therefore, the cost of hiding the corporate 
property is high, including the original liability, criminal liability, possible jail time and having to pay most 
of the income to creditors for possibly even a quarter century (or hide them). If the corporation had sig-
nificant enough funds and the debtor is able to utilize them in secrecy from the creditors and enforcement 
officials, hiding the funds could prove reasonable.
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of the de facto owner—the person who, according to the facts of the case, holds the 
significant elements of ownership. Veil piercing means holding additional person(s) 
liable for an obligation of another. Artificial arrangements are about using one’s 
property to satisfy an obligation of another. In one, the assessment of artificiality is 
about a person, and in the other, it is about property.296 
This difference in the viewpoint is not that significant for the analogy. As I have 
argued before in this work, every veil piercing decision is made in casu, and the nature 
of the norms involved in the abuse of rights situation or the conflicting norms lend 
their attributes to the assessment. Artificial property arrangements nature centering 
around property is only necessary due to the enforcement procedure being about 
property. On another occasion, the assessment of whether to pierce the veil could 
reflect the personal actions and causality between them and damage. The end result 
is the same: one person is deprived of a benefit, whereas another retains it. It would 
thus seem that this sort of difference is only inherent in the doctrines reflecting the 
prohibition of the abuse of rights and serves not to diminish the analogic support 
they offer one another.
In the KKO 2004:52 decision, the Supreme Court discussed the relationship 
between veil piercing and artificial arrangements. The choice of the corporate 
form is protected by the freedom of business provided in the constitution. 
Formal validity of the choice does not exclude it being an artificial property 
arrangement, although ignoring it is possible only exceptionally. The use of 
the corporate form can be an artificial property arrangement if the choice 
to use the form cannot be explained with economic reasons, but only if the 
avoidance of enforcement makes it the reasonable choice.297 Oddly enough, 
case KKO 2006:45 was about piercing in an offshore company. The decision 
seems to dictate that attachment is possible only if the veil is pierced and the 
ownership is deemed artificial.298 The section’s wording or preparatory works 
do not support this dual requirement. Attachment should be possible if 
either is present.299 Requiring both would lead to nonsense: the property can 
be attached if the formal owner is held liable for the obligations of the debtor 
and he is the actual owner of the property.
Veil piercing seems possible at least when there are no reasons for the corporation’s 
existence other than avoiding attachment. This would mean setting aside the whole 
296 See also Lindfors 2008 at 319 and Laine 2011 at 173.
297 See Laine 2011 at 173. This strong protection of the freedom of entrepreneurs to choose the form 
they operate under has been reasserted in later decisions in KKO 2004:96 and KKO 2006:45.
298 See KKO 2006:45 at 9.
299 For the same conclusion, see Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 163. The property of the corporation can 
be attached, but only the parts of it that are hidden by abusing the corporate form.
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corporation—combining the property of the corporation and the debtor. This 
deviates from the wording of the section, which emphasizes the direct relationship 
between the property and the debtor. The total combination of properties differs 
from holding specific property liable for the debt. It should remain possible to 
repossess some property from a corporation with an actual business without piercing 
the veil if said property is hidden in the business and it’s possession has no connection 
to the business.300 That is, if the presence of the property in the corporation has no 
economic purpose for the business itself and corporate ownership can be reasonably 
explained only by the avoided enforcement. There should be no need to set aside the 
whole corporation.
According to Linna, the application of 4:14 of the Enforcement Code allows 
the courts to consider some less juridical material in addition to the traditionally 
significant legal criteria. The interests, received benefits and bearing of negative 
risks all become meaningful in a legal assessment of the arrangements. What is 
required of ownership for it to prevent attachment? Why was ownership arranged 
the way it was? The assessment must widen to cover all the relevant legal actions and 
facts instead of focusing on a single legal relationship. Contractual considerations 
affect the ownership consideration in an extraordinary fashion. The extraordinary 
elements come to show that the arrangement is artificial.301
The inclusion of these non-traditional elements in the consideration is common 
for artificial arrangements and veil piercing. Both must consider the overall 
arrangement of the case and find the extraordinary material that separates the 
arrangement from ordinary trade or business. They must both utilize material facts 
to uncover the reasons behind the arrangement. The relationships between material 
facts and their interpretation eventually form legally significant evidence. Much 
of the argumentation around veil piercing presented in this work takes an isolated 
material fact and discuss its implications and eventually whether the fact supports 
or opposes veil piercing.
From this short examination, it is easy to see how artificial arrangements provide 
an excellent point for analogy with piercing. The KKO 2015:17 decision mentions 
it as one example of sections that allow piercing. The section enables piercing within 
the context of ownership, and the case law surrounding it has developed some criteria 
for the piercing doctrine. A more theoretical point of analogy is also available, as 
both doctrines focus on the disparity of form and substance and utilize overall 
assessment of the arrangement. Artificial property arrangements thus offer help 
in the interpretation of significant facts and forming the structure of the piercing 
assessment.
300 See Helsinki Appellatte Court 22.9.2017 no. 1134 and Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 162–163.
301 See Linna 1999 at 342–347.
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2.3.  Environmental Damage Liability
2.3.1.  Introduction
The Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage provides some tools for the 
veil piercing assessment. Section 7 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2 of the act directly 
addresses veil piercing. The scope of the application of the act is limited, however. It 
was created to ease the damaged parties’ access to compensation in environmental 
damage cases.302 Section 1 limits liability to environmental damage caused by 
activities carried out in a certain area and resulting from 1) pollution of the water, 
air or soil; 2) noise, vibration, radiation, light, heat or smell; or 3) another similar 
nuisance. It is further specified in the section that the keeper of a road, railway, 
airport or other comparable traffic area is also considered to be practicing the above 
activities. This is a significant limitation.
Section 6 of the act broadens the liability a bit. In some cases, the proper 
authorities or persons threatened by the damage take action to limit the 
damage or prevent it entirely. Alternatively, they may even remove the 
damage and restore the environment of the damaged site. If the expenses of 
those actions are reasonable compared to the threat of damage or the realized 
damage and the benefits those actions achieved for the operator, then the 
party causing the damage is liable for the expenses of these actions (section 
6). The compensation liability also includes any and all investigation costs 
necessary to complete the aforementioned actions.
Even if the act allows for piercing, it can only be applied to a narrow selection of 
situations within the scope of the act, but this only limits the application of the act 
itself; it does not prevent deriving material for the development of a general piercing 
doctrine.303 Section 7 and the case law surrounding it serve as a point for analogy.
Section 7
Even when the loss has not been caused deliberately or negligently, liability 
for compensation shall lie with a person
1) whose activity has caused the environmental damage (operator304);
2) who is comparable to the person carrying out the activity, as referred to in 
Subparagraph 1; and
3) to whom the activity that caused the environmental damage has been 
302 HE 165/1992 at 3.
303 See KKO 2015:17 at 21, referring to the Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage Section 
7 as one of the applicable comparison points. See also Sandvik 2011 at 853.
304 Added by the author.
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assigned, if the assignee knew or should have known, at the time of the 
assignment, about the loss or the nuisance referred to in Section 1 or the 
threat of the same.
In the assessment of the comparability referred to in Paragraph 1, 
Subparagraph 2, due consideration shall be given to the competence of the 
person concerned, the financial relationship with the person carrying out the 
activity and the profit sought from the activity.
For the sake of simplicity and scope of the study, the damage is assumed to be 
governed by the Act and causality is assumed to be established. With this assumption, 
it becomes moot whether the compensation is for the actual damage, preventive 
measures or reparative measures. The only question pondered is the liable person. 
The origin of the liability is not discussed. The assignee liability of Subparagraph 3 is 
not considered here. Subparagraph 1 places liability on the person who had formally 
undertaken the activity. This person’s name appears on the permits, and those physically 
operating the activity work for this person. Separate personality should exclude the 
parent corporation’s Subparagraph 1 liability for the subsidiary’s operations.305
Subparagraph 2 describes the formally non-liable party held liable by piercing 
the veil.306 A party comparable to the operator examines the relationship between 
the operator and another entity to determine whether the operator is indeed an 
independent party acting in its own interest.307 If it is not, then the veil can be pierced 
to hold the comparable entity liable. The relationship-justifying liability needs to 
exist while the damaging actions occur.308
2.3.2. A Comparable Party
The section employs an interesting choice of words: who is comparable. This choice 
directs the interpreter to investigate whether the party takes on responsibilities or 
withholds rights that would normally lie with the operator of the activity.309 The 
examination focuses on the relationship between the activity and the formally non-
liable party. However, Paragraph 2 of the section distracts from this and moves the 
focus toward facts about the relationship of the formal and actual operator of the 
activity. Mentioning competence and financial relationships makes them meaningful 
in the assessment. The wording allows examining the formally non-liable party’s 
305 See Hollo – Vihervuori 1995 at 239.
306 See Sandvik 2011 at 853 and Nyström 2015 at 9.
307 This division nicely matches the division of operational control and situational control introduced 
by Pöyhönen. The operator has the situational control, and the comparable party has the operational con-
trol. See Pöyhönen 1999 at 341 and 349–350 and Mielityinen 2006 at 466. See also chapter III.2.2.1. of 
this work at page 66.
308 See Hollo 2001 at 506–507.
309 The Finnish equivalent rinnastettavissa implies this even more strongly.
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competence to influence the formal operator as well as the damaging operation – it 
allows considering two different relations: 1) the non-liable party—practiced activity 
relation and 2) the non-liable party—formally liable party relation. One or the other 
will suffice for liability.310 Paragraph 2 mandates only that due consideration be 
given. This lets the interpreter assume that these factors are usually significant, but 
they are not compulsory requirements for liability. It is a list of examples meant to 
guide the court’s assessment of who is comparable to the operator. 
In case law, decisions seem to be based on the relationship between the non-
liable party and the activities. They focus on the interpretation of the Subparagraph 
1.311 The examination in these decisions does address both relationships, but the 
one between the parties is most often summarily dismissed by deeming that the 
situation described in Subparagraph 2 is not present.312 Somehow, however, case 
law has divided these and seems to treat them exclusively, restricting the piercing 
consideration to facts found in the inter-party relationship, even though showing the 
connection to the actual operation could help prove that the non-formal operator is 
a comparable party.
A very similar liability issue has arisen regarding bankruptcy estates’ liability 
over polluted environment it possesses.313 In a recent development, some 
environmental liabilities have been placed on entities who have not created 
the environmental damage but have only received the property on which the 
damage is situated in. In a particularly important decision, the receiving party 
was a bankruptcy estate.314 This has created a conflict of norms. On one side, the 
clean-up or investigative costs can be placed on the party who possesses polluted 
property, and on the other side the separate personality of the predecessor and 
the estate. The estate has two kinds of obligations: debts of the estate and debts 
of the debtor-predecessor. Debts of the estate must be paid before the debts 
of the debtor-predecessor receive any contributions. Placing liability of the 
environmental damage on the bankruptcy estate essentially switches the legal 
nature of the obligation. The damage was caused by the debtor and is thus worse 
than the estate’s debt. However, the authorities can place the liability on the 
estate as it possesses the polluted property, making it the debt of the estate.315
310 Similarly Hollo – Vihervuori 1995 at 239. They write that even a party that has shown no intention 
of participating in the operation could be held liable.
311 See KKO 1999:124, KKO 2001:61, KKO 2011:62 and KKO 2012:29.
312 The decision in KKO 2011:62 is a happy exception.
313 There was even a proposition for legislation that would have clarified the issue. The proposition 
failed, however. See HE 221/2018 vp and Linna 2019.
314 See KHO 2017:53. See also KHO 2016:44.
315 For a well-argumented formulation of this view, see Linna 2016, especially at 395–400. See also 
Karhu 2017 at 137–139 and Hupli 2018.
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This situation does resemble veil piercing as it deems a formally non-liable 
party liable. This liability is as direct as the operator liability in place by the 
Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 
2. Liability is placed based on the actual relationship the entity has with 
the damage-causing operation. All the legal prerequisites for the liability—
possession, in this case—are with that one entity. Before bankruptcy, they are 
with the person not yet declared bankrupt. After bankruptcy, they are with 
the estate. The clean-up or investigation duty can be ordered whenever, and 
the prerequisites are examined at that time.  When piercing the veil, the legal 
prerequisites have been manipulated to appear in another entity. Piercing is 
for situations in which the prerequisites are in reality with the entity, whereas 
formally, they were not. The liability of the possessor follows the holder of the 
legal prerequisites despite other limitations.
Piercing could apply, for example, when the parent company knows the 
risk of the operation causing pollution and founds a subsidiary to operate 
the plant. When the pollution risk is realized, the clean-up and investigation 
costs are ordered on the subsidiary, which then goes bankrupt, so the estate is 
ordered to clean up. This is not the only option, as the authorities could have 
opted to clean the pollution at their own expense and then claim liability in 
damages according to the Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage 
Section 6, and they could demand the subsidiary liable based on Section 7 
Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 1. Then it could claim the parent liable based on 
veil piercing according to Subparagraph 2.
The preparatory work for Subparagraph 2 of Section 7 offers little guidance. It 
notes that there may be in practice situations in which the environmental damage 
is caused in an activity that is practiced for the benefit of another. Then the other 
party, in reality but not formally, is the operator of the activity as intended by the 
act.316 Two observations can be made, though. First, the operation is practiced for 
the benefit of one besides the formal operating party. Thus, the need to perform the 
damage-causing operations arises from a separate entity, or the benefits of the actions 
likely to cause damage materialize in another entity. Second, the disparity between 
formal appearance and reality is significant. It is then meaningful to investigate 
whether the party takes on responsibilities or withholds rights that would normally 
lie with the operator of the activity. Departing from normally used and accepted 
practices supports liability, though should not suffice without additional factors.317
316 HE 165/1992 at 26.
317 Similarly KKO 1999:124 where the Supreme Court further argued against liability by noting that 
the relationship of the parties was not even claimed to be anything more than a normal contract for repair 
work. This can be interpreted to mean that departing from normal and accepted practices supports liability.
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A bit more is said about Paragraph 2 of Section 7. The preparatory works give 
significance to the ownership of the property where the damaging operations are 
performed, though financing operations alone is not enough of a basis for liability.318 
This forms an easy connection to veil piercing and straw men arrangements. Basic 
abuse of the corporate form provides one entity with liabilities and the other with 
everything that has economic value. Then the contracts and economic relationships 
between these corporations are manipulated. This abides by Paragraph 2’s seeking 
of profit. If the profits and liabilities manifest in separate entities, this supports 
piercing. The preparatory works for the act note this and link the meaning of 
separating ownership from operations to other economic relations between the 
parties.319 The preparatory works thus recognize the risk separation structure, which 
this study considers the main target of piercing. It mentions dependent entities that, 
in reality, act on behalf of each other.320 The economic arrangement needs to be 
assessed as a whole.321 Ownership should not be given too great an emphasis. Even 
the directors of a corporation could be held liable based on Subparagraph 2.322 In 
legal literature, it has been thought possible to place liability from environmental 
damage caused by one corporation on sibling corporations created by splitting the 
original corporation.323
The preparatory works hold the operator acting as an intermediary and 
its dependence on another entity as factors supporting liability.324 These 
are somewhat known concepts in law, though their content leads back to 
assessing economic relationships as well as the disparity of formal appearance 
and reality. Introducing these concepts and their examination would unlikely 
provide new tools for the piercing assessment.
318 HE 165/1992 at 27. Financer can retain some control rights given by the position’s leverage. In 
some cases, these rights allow for holding liability. See Hollo – Vihervuori 1995 at 240. See also Directive 
2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage art 2.6, which, in defining “op-
erator,” gives significance to “decisive economic power over the technical functioning” of the damaging 
activity.
319 HE 165/1992 at 26–27.
320 See HE 165/1992 at 27.
321 See KKO 2011:62 at 13–20, where the entirety of the contractual agreements and duties placed by 
contracts were vehemently examined to determine whether the formal party was independent and solely 
responsible for the damage.
322 See Hollo – Vihervuori 1995 at 238.
323 See Lampi-Fagerholm 2003 at 742.
324 See Lampi-Fagerholm 2003 at 742.
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Unfortunately, in case law, only minimal discussion on economic arrangements is 
found. Subparagraph 2 is mentioned but usually arbitrarily dismissed in case law.325 
In the KKO 2011:62 decision, it was discussed to some extent, but liability was 
eventually based on Subparagraph 1. Accounting for the comprehensive argument 
about the economic dependence of the operator and how the wording lends 
support to the piercing decision by the non-liable party’s direct control over the 
damaging actions, the liability should have been based on Subparagraph 2.326 The 
decision included many considerations useful in veil piercing: dependence, outward 
appearance, economic whole arguments, ownership, benefit allocation and, most 
importantly, validating contractual control as sufficient to fulfill the control 
requirement in veil piercing.
The decision found it significant that the operator of a gas station 
(Rantahuolto) had a franchise contract with Neste Oil. Rantahuolto was 
obligated to sell only Neste products, use Neste identifiers in the marketing, 
and it was contractually restricted from any competing activity and had no 
option to transfer the contract to a third party. The profits and losses of the 
business befell Rantahuolto alone, as the contracts only limited the terms 
of the business. The terms were restrictive, which led the Supreme Court 
to deduce that the business of Rantahuolto was, in essence, the business of 
Neste.327 The business formed an operative whole, and the contracting parties 
were beneficiaries its parts. In addition, Neste has retained ownership of the 
gasoline pumps and some other equipment. Eventually, liability was found by 
determining which party oversaw the damage-causing parts of the equipment, 
i.e., controlled the operation. Neste was held liable.
In other cases, the Supreme Court of Finland has emphasized the nature of the 
actions and whether they correspond with the activities of the non-liable party. The 
decisions are primarily about public entities with certain responsibilities per law. It 
is then assessed whether these actions should be included in the legal responsibility. 
In case KKO 1999:124, a communal entity was responsible for arranging hospital 
services in an area. It then contracted to repair the buildings it owned. The contractor 
needed to use sand blowers in the repairs, which ended up causing damage. The 
325 In one appellate court case (THO 15.2.2013 S 12/815 384), however, liability was based on compa-
rability. The decision is apparently ill-based and goes against prior case law. An excellent commentary on 
the decision shows how the party held liable was in no way comparable to the contractor whose conduct 
caused the damage. Really, liability should have been based on Subparagraph 1, as the decision relies on 
whether the liable party held control over the damage-causing activity in a significant manner. See Rikkilä 
2014 at 12.
326 For the same conclusion, see Sandvik 2011 at 855.
327 Neste was the franchise holder.
86
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
communal entity was not held liable since the repair work was not part of its own 
operations. Sand blowing had no connection to hospital work. The case would 
probably have been decided differently had the damage been caused by, for example, 
radiation or chemicals from hospital equipment.328 Further case law has accepted 
this view. A sufficient link between the operations of the formally liable and formally 
non-liable entities is required to deem the non-liable party the operator.329
2.3.3.  Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage  
in Relation to Veil Piercing
The sufficient link norm should be linked to the interpretation of the first 
subparagraph. This does not make it useless for piercing, though. In the KKO 2015:17 
decision, the Supreme Court adopted a rather similar view, attempting to determine 
whether Verkkokauppa had moved some functions of its core operations to a wholly-
owned subsidiary, Arctecho. The similarity with the case law surrounding the Act 
on Compensation for Environmental Damage is apparent. Both seem to examine 
whether the non-liable entity has 1) isolated some function from its own operations by 
2) transferring it to another entity. The first observation should be further elaborated, 
as in KKO 2015:17, the function was established through the regular practice of the 
business, whereas in the environmental damage precedent cases, it was derived from 
the legal duties of the entity. In appellate court cases and legal opinions, the function 
has not always been a legal duty, but commercial operations have sufficed.330 From 
this, it could be deduced that piercing is more readily accepted when one entity 
moves a part of its operations into another entity and retains control over it.
Three of the compared jurisdictions know about this sort of “environmental 
piercing.” The Hempel (2010) decision about the extension to the polluter 
pays principle by veil piercing in Norway. Finland has adopted it in legislation. 
In the United States, the interpretation of CERCLA has provided a rich case 
law in piercing for clean-up cost liability.331 To a lesser extent, piercing has also 
been discussed in this context in Sweden, and some cases could have involved 
piercing claims but were instead resolved with the interpretation of the term 
operator.332
To summarize, the general veil piercing doctrine can adopt certain things from 
environmental damage compensation piercing. Case law on Section 7 of the act is 
328 See KKO 2001:61 where the Supreme Court enforced the KKO 1999:124 decision but held that 
repairing a road was closely related to the municipality’s legal duty to operate roads.
329 See KKO 2001:61, KKO 2011:62 and KKO 2012:29. See also Määttä 2005 at 322.
330 See THO 12.4.2001 S 00/97 and Kumpula 2002 at 5.
331 See, for example, Figueroa 2012 at 732–734 and United States v. Bestfoods (1998).
332 See Larsson 1995 and MÖD 2013:28.
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applicable. From case law and the wording of the section, it could be derived that 
1) the court can examine the non-liable entity’s control over both the formally 
liable party and the operation causing damage itself; 2) the economic arrangement 
needs to be assessed as a whole; 3) contractual control is sufficient to fulfill the 
control requirement in veil piercing; and 4) piercing is more readily accepted 
when one entity moves a part of its operations into another entity and retains 
control over it.
2.4.  Tax Avoidance
2.4.1.  Disparity of Substance and Form
In the KKO 2015:17 decision, the Supreme Court of Finland referred to the Law 
on Taxation Procedure Section 28 as an example of a norm allowing piercing.333 
It was used as an example of a norm that allows disregarding the given legal form 
if it does not match the reality of the situation. Tax authorities have been given 
intrusive instruments to assess tax avoidance situations as they are guardians of 
significant public interests. It is important to note that the tax avoidance section 
can be applied to a situation other than the use of corporate entities, but abuse 
of the corporate form is definitively included. The tax avoidance norm allows 
piercing the veil and also enables a multitude of other results. Any legal action can 
be targeted by it. The tax avoidance norm will be examined here only in regards to 
piercing the veil.
The Law on Taxation Procedure Section 28 prohibits tax avoidance, which is 
defined as giving a judicial form to some circumstances or actions that, in reality, 
do not match the nature or purpose of the arrangement. If the tax authority does 
find this, then a tax is assigned as if the correct legal form were used. The taxpayer 
is given a chance to prove that the form does, in fact, match the reality of the case. 
Alternatively, they could prove that the arrangement was not undertaken to pay less 
tax but for a valid business reason. If the taxpayer succeeds, the given form is used 
to assign the tax, and the norm applies only to this assignment. The section requires 
disparity between substance and the given form as well as the intent to avoid paying 
taxes. The reality is understood as the economic nature of the arrangement.334
There is currently an ongoing tax reform in development based on the Council 
Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices 
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. The directive 
333 KKO 2015:17 at 21.
334 See Knuutinen 2006 at 790.
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leaves the national method’s implementation to the Member States.335 The 
main tools of the directive target re-attributing income, hybrid mismatches, 
taxing asset relocations and interest deductions. In addition, the directive 
does have a general anti-abuse rule. This rule is to be applied to arrangements 
that are not genuine. When evaluating whether an arrangement should be 
regarded as non-genuine, it could be possible for Member States to consider 
all valid economic reasons, including financial activities.336 The evaluation 
needs to account for all the facts and circumstances of the arrangement. 
The arrangement shall be regarded as non-genuine to the extent that they 
are not put into place for valid commercial reasons, which reflect economic 
reality. The wording of the directive matches the domestic general norm on 
tax avoidance, and it seems unlikely that the implementation of the directive 
would lead to changes in the domestic norm.
By default, the civil law characterization of the arrangement is used as the basis of 
taxation.337 From available legitimate options, the taxpayer has the right to choose 
the one with the least tax consequences. The tax avoidance norm allows the disregard 
for this chosen form in certain situations and substitutes it with a form that better 
matches the economic reality of the situation.338 Should the arrangement prove 
questionable even in relation to civil law norms, such questionability can support 
the disregard for the arrangement in taxation.339 The civil law characterization of 
the arrangement is not deemed invalid, though. The effects of the disregard are 
limited to taxation only.340 This is a common feature in reparative legal instruments, 
especially in those that reflect the prohibition of the abuse of rights.341
Tax benefits are an essential part of business arrangements. If the accrued 
benefits are such that the legal system was not intended to create them, then the 
arrangement can be deemed tax avoidance.342 The tax avoidance norm should not 
be used to build a taxation system that is tighter or more comprehensive than the 
one the legislator intended, nor can its scope of application be increased at the tax 
335 See (EU) 2016/1164 at (3). But the directive sets a common minimum level of protection.
336 See (EU) 2016/1164 at (11).
337 For a more accurate description, see Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 343. See also Tikka 1972 at 215–216.
338 Tikka 1972 at 216–218. See also Knuutinen 2009 at 204. The economic reality is only an indicator 
pointing out the correct legal form. The tax decision is not made based directly on the economic situation.
339 See KHO 2014:66 and Lindgren 2016 at 138–140 and 146.
340 See Tikka 1972 at 215–216.
Similarly, the effects of disregarding the artificial property arrangements are limited to enforcement pro-
ceedings only. No effects on the civil law arrangement have occurred. See also Articial Property Arrange-
ments 12.10.2016 no. 1015 S 15/1470, HE 275/1998 at 7 and Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 147–148.
341 See also Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 364 and KHO 2013:194. The abuse of rights doctrine partially 
overlaps with tax evasion norms.
342 Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 349. See also Knuutinen 2009 at 192–193 and those discussed therein.
89
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
authority’s discretion.343 The norm can thus be used to enforce the legislative intent. 
This excludes applying the norm to arrangements that the legislator has accepted 
either expressly or silently.344 
The avoidance provision should not limit the taxpayer’s right to choose the 
legal form to achieve desired results should they be achievable in multiple ways, 
even if the chosen form leads to less taxation than other available forms. Lately, 
though, the tax authority has sought to limit the right to choose a less tax-
heavy form.345 However, the most aggressive expansive interpretation of the 
section has been stopped by the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland.346
2.4.2.  Legitimate Business Reason
These unintended tax benefits unintended by the legal system can be justified 
by showing that the arrangement had acceptable purposes besides said benefits. 
Legitimate benefits to running the business would constitute such a justification. 
Then, the application of the tax avoidance section becomes a balancing act, where 
the tax benefits and legitimate business reasons are weighed against each other. The 
tax authority needs to show the unusual nature of the arrangement and the tax 
benefits it creates to indicate tax avoidance, whereas the taxpayer can then counter 
by showing the legitimate business reasons.347 Should the tax benefits outweigh 
the business reasons, the arrangement becomes tax avoidance.348 The existence of 
business reasons does not prevent application if they are minor compared to the 
tax benefits.349 Especially if the practiced business undergoes no real changes while 
accruing tax benefits, the arrangement is easily tax avoidance.350 In other words, 
343 KHO 2008:6, Knuutinen 2012 at 132–133, Juusela 2014 and Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 349. See 
also Tikka 1972 at 208, recognizing the connection of preventing tax avoidance and the issue of how 
much freedom the tax authority should have when interpreting the general tax avoidance norm.
See also Raitasuo 2018 at 372–373 and 377–380. He makes a compelling argument that the avoidance 
norm is in fact under a lot of ideological pressure from lobbyist groups seeking to affect the interpretation.
344 KHO 2008:6, Knuutinen 2012 at 132–133, Juusela 2014 and Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 349.
345 See Shumskaya – Tuominen 2017 at 89 and Juusela 2014 at 57–61.
346 See Shumskaya – Tuominen 2017 at 104–105 and KHO 2008:6.
347 See Mehtonen 2005 at 147–148. But see the value added tax cases C-138/86 and C-139/86 Direct 
Cosmetics Ltd and Laughtons Photographs Ltd., suggesting that even if business reasons are present, the 
arrangments can be tax avoidance. This could mean that the avoidance of value added tax does not neces-
sarily require a subjective intent to avoid the tax. See Streng 2019 at 43–44.
348 It is possible, but not necessary, to use numeric values derived from accounting in this weighing. 
They should not be given decisive meaning, though.
349 See KHO 2014:66 and Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 351. See also Tikka 1972 at 217, who is of the 
opinion that tax avoidance norms mainly cover those cases where no purpose other than tax avoidance 
can be shown.
350 See Ryynänen 2000 at 117–118. See also KHO 1982 B II 571, where tax avoidance was found since 
the CEO’s position had not really changed after arrangements in the methods of compensation. See also 
Knuutinen 2009 at 197.
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if the business arrangement is operated just the same as before the arrangement 
was undertaken, the only change being the tax treatment, the arrangement is tax 
avoidance. This is a clear similarity with the Environmental Damage Liability Act. 
This would provide even more support to piercing when an existing business is 
divided into new entities without changing the operation in any real manner, i.e., 
only in form.
An interesting disparity arises, as both veil piercing doctrine and the tax avoidance 
section examine legitimate business reasons. Taxation reasons can constitute a 
legitimate business reason for a corporation arrangement targeted by veil piercing. 
The question is whether the valid business reason remains even if the tax benefit is 
denied. The solution could be based on the probability of the benefit. If the benefit 
was thought to be almost certain and held little to no controversy, then the reason 
would no doubt be legitimate. If, however, the tax benefit itself is a gamble and the 
taxpayer should have known it would likely be denied later, then the tax reason 
would not constitute a legitimate business reason to prevent piercing.
In case law and legal literature, it has appeared that the arrangement can be 
deemed tax avoidance only partially.351 Insofar as the business arrangement has a 
legitimate business purpose, it has been accepted. Yet the parts that had no such 
purpose were disregarded. The arrangements can be disregarded partially. Case 
law has also accepted the courts’ discretion over the consequence. In a few cases 
where tax avoidance was found, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland did 
order taxation according to the true form of the arrangement but with lesser tax 
consequences.352 It is important to note, though, that the tax avoidance norm was 
applied to these cases, but the tax consequences were determined by applying the 
hidden dividend distribution norm. 
Completely disregarding a corporation is currently a rare occasion in taxation.353 
In cases where this has been done based on the tax avoidance provision, the courts 
have emphasized certain facts, for example, few stockholders, low capital, no 
employees besides the stockholders, allocation of benefits from corporate operations 
and low number of assignments.354 Also, the allocation of business risk355 and 
control356 have been deemed significant in proving the legitimacy of the business. 
Simplifying corporate group structure and thus cutting costs can be an acceptable 
business reason.357 Other practical considerations are laid out in a memo regarding 
351 Ryynänen 2000 at 119–121. See also KHO 1996 B 534 and KHO 1997:77. 
352 Ryynänen 2000 at 116–119. See also KHO 1989 B 550, KHO 3.10.1997 t. 2458.
353 See the tax authority’s guidelines on the application of tax avoidance sections 2016 at 7.2. See also 
Tikka 1972 at 266–271.
354 Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 358–360 and the court cases cited there.
355 KHO 103/2010 not published (as cited by Knuutinen 2012 at 139–141).
356 KHO 2016:71.
357 KHO 2016:72 and Helsinki administrative court 2009 09/1311/6.
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one tax avoidance norm,358 which mentions using special purpose entities, shutting 
down operations soon after funds have been transferred away from the entity359 and 
selling operations soon after the arrangement is completed.360 
The typical tax avoidance situations, according to Matti Myrsky and Timo 
Räbinä, are 1) the disparity of legal form and economic content; 2) consecutive 
or to-and-fro legal actions (chaining); 3) lack of interest situations; and 4) 
joint interest. Corporate separation settles with the first item on the list. This 
does not mean that the other items are insignificant. Chaining legal actions 
can be found in piercing case law also. A corporation could have moved some 
functions it used to perform itself and immediately bought those services 
from the other entity. Lack of interest situations appear, for example, when a 
straw man is used. Joint interest by default exists between the corporation and 
its owners, and the group it might belong to and thus this criterion cannot be 
effectively used to discern legitimate and illegitimate corporate use. However, 
should the corporation do business only with interested parties, some 
suspicion is well-founded. This sort of behavior should always cast doubt and 
support veil piercing. The significance of these should not be overestimated, 
as establishing a legitimate business reason should suffice to counter these.
2.4.3.  Tax Avoidance Norm’s Relation to Veil Piercing
It is easy to detect similarities between the tax avoidance norm and veil piercing. 
The artificiality requirement of veil piercing corresponds well with the disparity of 
substance and form found in tax avoidance.
The second similarity is the business reason consideration. In both doctrines, a 
legitimate business reason prevents the disregard for legal form. There is no reason 
the concept of legitimate business reason should be understood fundamentally 
differently in each doctrine. Two exclusions need to be made, however. First, in veil 
piercing, obtaining an acceptable tax benefit is a legitimate business reason.361 In tax 
avoidance, it cannot be, as the norm targets behavior that seeks to abuse tax norms. 
If obtaining tax benefits would justify the arrangement, then the tax avoidance norm 
would have no function whatsoever. Second, in tax avoidance, the reallocation and 
limitation of the corporation’s risk does constitute a legitimate business reason. 
If risk is understood as costs only (negative risk), in veil piercing situations, its 
358 Valtiovarainvaliokunnan mietintö VaVK 49/1995 vp
359 KHO 3.10.1997 t. 2458.
360 The memo also mentions chaining legal action in corporate rearrangement schemes. This criteri-
on has been discredited in legal literature. See Mehtonen 2005 at 144–145, who states that it is almost 
inevitable that rearranging corporate relations within group structures requires several consecutive legal 
actions. These actions cannot be assessed separately from the totality of the arrangement.
361 See KKO 2015:17.
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allocation does not speak of the legitimacy of the arrangement. Veil piercing targets 
arrangements where the allocation of negative and positive risks are manipulated 
to the detriment of the creditors. Risk can be understood as both the risk of costs 
and the chance of profits, but in veil piercing, these two should be kept separate 
in examination. To put this more clearly, tax avoidance aims to prevent the abuse 
of tax norms, and thus, tax benefits do not constitute a legitimate business reason 
when considering the tax avoidance norm. Veil piercing aims to prevent the abuse 
of corporate form and limited liability, and thus, the reallocation of risk does not 
constitute a legitimate business reason when considering piercing. Aside from these 
two limitations, the legitimate business reason practice developed in tax avoidance 
case law and can be used in veil piercing also.
The Supreme Court seems to have adopted the tax avoidance norm’s burden of 
proof structure for veil piercing.362 The tax authority needs to show disparity of 
substance and form, which the taxpayer can then disprove by showing legitimate 
business reasons. The structure is not expressed directly in the KKO 2015:17 
decision, but the argument of the court seems to follow this pattern. First, the facts 
that constitute artificial and reprehensible use are examined. This seems to shift the 
burden of proof, as the Supreme Court next assesses whether the defendant provided 
sufficient legitimate business reasons for dividing the business into two entities. The 
defendant was unsuccessful in this, and the veil was pierced. A similar structure can 
be found in the artificial property arrangements section in the Enforcement Code. 
The structure should be accepted as the standard for veil piercing.
As for the scope of application, veil piercing and tax avoidance partially overlap. 
The tax avoidance norm can be used as justification for piercing the veil for the 
benefit of the tax authority. There should be no obstacles to utilizing the veil piercing 
doctrine within the tax avoidance norm to support the disregard for the company 
in taxation. If the strict requirements of piercing the veil are fulfilled, the disparity 
of the legal form and reality of the situation are likely present. It cannot be used to 
substitute the tax avoidance norm. An entirely separate issue is whether the veil could 
be pierced to benefit the tax authority as a creditor should the taxpayer neglect the 
duty to pay. The tax avoidance norm, whether applied to the case or not, does not 
preclude this, as it applies only to assignment of the tax. There is no reason to treat 
the tax authority differently from other creditors in this regard. The veil could be 
pierced for its benefit, though the doctrine of legitimate expectations should prevent 
the tax authority from reassessing the situation. If the corporate arrangement was 
assessed in the assignment of the tax, the taxpayer should be allowed to trust this 
assessment, and the tax authority should not be granted piercing relief based on the 
same arrangement it already deemed legitimate.
362 But the structure could also be explained with the principle of preponderance-of-the-evidence. 
About this principle, see Saranpää 2010.
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2.5.  Pay Security
Section 17 of the Pay Security Act determines which parties are liable for repaying 
the amounts covered as pay security.
(1) The employer, a responsible partner in a limited partnership and a partner 
in a general partnership and another party responsible for the payment of 
employees’ claims shall repay the amounts paid as wage guarantee to the 
State, including interest under Section 4(1) of the Interest Act (633/1982) 
calculated from the date of the decision.
The section defines from whom the State can collect the amount it has paid as pay 
security. A responsible partner in a limited partnership and a partner in a general 
partnership, by law, are responsible for the liabilities of the partnership. The section 
only makes implicit that the employees do not need to collect the unpaid wages 
from these parties. They can instead rely on the pay security system and leave the risk 
of collection and insolvency to the State.
Considering veil piercing, the interest focuses on “another party responsible for 
the payment of employees’ claims.” The preparatory work of the section states that 
the expression covers situations in which the employer has made arrangements that 
fulfill the requirements of piercing the veil.363 Unfortunately, the preparatory work 
or the wording of the section give no hints whatsoever as to what makes veil piercing 
acceptable. Veil piercing remains a preliminary question for the application of the 
section on a formally non-liable party. It follows the piercing doctrine developed in 
case law. There are piercing cases from this exact situation, though the doctrine laid 
out in the KKO 2015:17 decision applies as well.
In the decision in KKO 1996:2, the Supreme Court held a formally separate 
corporation liable for wages covered by the pay security system based on piercing 
the veil. The case examined actual control over corporate actions, straw men 
arrangement and how the operation appeared to an outside party. Similar pay 
security cases can be found within appellate court case law.364 KKO 2017:94365 is 
a more recent case in the pay security context. In it, piercing was accepted, and the 
decision discussed systematic neglect of obligations and the symbiotic relationship 
between the corporations. Genuine and legitimate business reasons were also of 
high significance. These pay security cases emphasize which corporation benefitted 
363 See HE 104/1998 at 17 and HE 219/2009 at 6. The earlier preparatory works explicitly mention 
the KKO 1996:2 decision and three appellate court cases justifying piercing. Other than that, the infor-
mation in these two preparatory works is identical.
364 Appellate Court of Turku 28.11.1986 no. 974, Appellate Court of Turku 21.4.1989 no. 326 and Ap-
pellate Court of Turku 8.12.1989 no. 1121. See also Leppänen 1991 s. 295–309 and KM 1992:32 s. 372.
365 See also Appellate Court of Turku 29.6.2016 no. 711.
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from the employees’ work, ownership, actual control, the reality of the business 
relationship between the companies and the location of offices. Additionally, they 
held meaning as to whether an outside party could discern the involved corporations 
from each other.
These cases have apparent similarities with the KKO 2015:17 case. The objective 
facts in the evaluation match. Another similarity is that both the pay security 
decisions and the KKO 2015:17 decision have significant community interest 
behind them. The KKO 2015:17 case involved an EU-level regulation demanding 
the national legislation to guarantee the payment of remunerations. Pay security 
cases involve the security provided for workers and the prevention of system abuse. 
Another commonality is that the creditors are involuntary in both. In none of the 
cases has the creditor had the chance to affect whether a credit relationship will be 
formed or the terms of it. The Supreme Court in KKO 2017:94 even emphasized the 
pay security system’s inherent vulnerability to abuse. Based on these similarities, the 
wage security piercing case law is fully utilizable for the development of the piercing 
doctrine. There is no apparent reason to develop piercing doctrine separately in the 
pay security environment.366
2.6.  Criminal Liability and Forfeiture
2.6.1.  Criminal Liability and Forfeiture or Piercing the Veil?
Often, the behavior that could be remedied with veil piercing nears criminal 
conduct, namely debtor’s dishonesty. There is only a thin line between the two. 
In this section, I proceed to examine the scope of criminal liability, namely what 
kind of conduct it remedies and whether it leaves any room at all for veil piercing. 
For this purpose I will analyze debtor’s dishonesty. Another relevant factor with 
criminal liability is the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. Along with having to pay 
compensation for damages caused by the crime, this doctrine is meant to prevent 
benefitting from the crime in any way. From this, it follows that if the conduct is 
found to be criminal, there is less likely a need for piercing the veil, as creditors can 
demand compensation for damages. The forfeiture can also be extended to persons 
not guilty of the crime based solely on their relationship with the guilty party and 
the unexplained wealth they possess. This extension reflects the doctrine of the 
prohibition of abuse of rights and has some similarities with veil piercing and is 
thus worth looking into.
366 Cf. Koskinen 2018. He sees at least the employment law doctrine of piercing as separate from the 
rest. He does not provide much argumentation to support this opinion, though. This work sees piercing 
as a conflict of norms where one of the norms is abused. Naturally, the nature of the norms involved guide 
the piercing decision, creating different patterns in each field of law. This could explain the observation of 
Koskinen.
95
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
Due to the strong moral condemnation of criminal acts, the legislation allows 
much more intrusive methods for the prevention, investigation and remedying 
of such acts. It is of significant advantage to a creditor trying to get payment if a 
criminal investigation is launched. With veil piercing, we are interested in situations 
where someone formally not liable is held liable for the obligations of another. Two 
sections of criminal law fulfill this requirement. Chapter 9, Section 2 places criminal 
liability on the legal person for crimes committed in its operation. Criminal liability 
of a corporation follows from the formal relationship it has with the natural person 
actually performing the criminal act (CC 9:2 and 3).
The setting is flipped in CC 5:8, which allows holding natural persons liable for 
crimes committed in the operations of a legal person. CC 5:8 extends the criminal 
liability for the debtor corporation’s actions to those holding formal positions on the 
board and the CEO. It also allows holding a person liable if they, in reality, control 
the corporation but hold no formal position in it. No clear definition exists as to 
when someone in reality holds control, although making decisions and contacting 
clients have been deemed significant.367
In the literature, Reima Kukkonen does provide a much more detailed description. 
He names share ownership, participation in profits, and the ruining effect of the 
corporation’s bankruptcy on the person’s finances as significant factors. He continues 
that the concrete actions of the person also need to be taken into account, for example, 
participation in meetings, communication with financers and co-operating businesses 
as well as giving orders outside the formal procedures in a corporation. When assessing 
the evidence, the business partners’ perceptions of the controlling person can be 
significant, as well as the allocation of profits to the claimed controller or their close 
parties.368 Finally, resigning the formal position shortly before the crime combined 
with the new holder’s lack of competence on that position hint toward the resigned 
person holding control.369 I will discuss these themes further in V.3.4.2. of this work.
Liability is placed on the person(s) who should have acted within the organization, 
i.e., who had the duty to act. The assessment as to who this is is an overall assessment 
based on the formal position, assignment of tasks and competence to act on behalf of 
the organization.370 This makes disregarding the separate personality shield justified 
by law, and no piercing is then required. Criminal liability then allows the forfeiture 
of the proceeds of a crime and liability for damages caused by the crime. Thus, the 
separate personality is bypassed, and compensation for creditors is enabled.
The following part of this work begins with the examination of the debtor’s 
dishonesty. This is followed by a brief look into forfeiture.
367 See KKO 2001:86. About control in a corporation, see V.3. of this work.
368 Kukkonen 2018 at 35.
369 See HE 44/2002 vp at 163–164.
370 See Frände 2012 at 270–271.
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2.6.2. Debtor’s Dishonesty
2.6.2.1. General on Debtor’s Dishonesty 
Whether by forfeiture or extended forfeiture, a crime is still necessary to access assets 
of a person who was formally not liable. The attempt here is to limit the scope of 
piercing the veil, and the examination mainly focuses on the debtor’s dishonesty as it 
targets similar activity as piercing—conduct that potentially damages creditors and 
benefits the debtor/controller. 
Debtor’s fraud (CC 39:2) is not considered relevant as it affects situations in which 
the debtor is misleading or withholds some meaningful information. Although 
debtor’s fraud considers arrangements where property has been transferred to a 
formal third party, it does not criminalize the transfer of such arrangements. The 
protected interest behind debtor’s fraud is, instead, the adequate information of 
insolvency proceedings. Not revealing potential veil piercing relationships between 
corporations would not fulfill debtor’s fraud, but not disclosing transactions 
between close corporations would. The common view in criminal law has been 
that the debtor’s dishonesty targets arrangements where assets actually leave the 
ownership of the debtor, whereas debtor’s fraud can target arrangements where 
assets leave the debtor’s ownership only in form.371 These in-form arrangements are 
then dissolved with other remedies. Veil piercing is not a remedy for this sort of 
dissolution. Veil piercing targets arrangements that are valid in a civil law sense. In 
these arrangements, piercing allows for holding additional persons liable despite the 
transfer being genuine where the conduct is dishonest and has caused damage.
Kukkonen has examined the relationships among artificial property arrangements, 
debtor’s fraud and debtor’s dishonesty. He arrived at the conclusion that the nature 
of artificial property arrangements creates problems in the traditional division, 
mainly because both could be applicable sometimes if the artificial arrangement is 
made to include an entity from a foreign country.372 This observation is valid here as 
well, as piercing targets artificial corporate arrangements. Both debtor’s dishonesty 
and debtor’s fraud could thus sometimes apply to the same legal actions that allow 
veil piercing. Still, applying debtor’s fraud would require withholding information 
in an insolvency procedure.
The Criminal Code Chapter 39, Section 1 incriminates the debtor’s dishonest 
conduct. According to it:
A debtor who
(1) destroys373 his or her property,
371 See Heinonen 1966 at 295–296, Koponen 2001 and Kukkonen 2014 at 833–838 and 846–850.
372 See Kukkonen 2014 at 848–850.
373 The term “destroy” is used in the translated version provided in Finlex. The term does not entirely 
match the Finnish term used in the section. The term needs to describe actions that are meant to remove 
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(2) gives away or otherwise surrenders his or her property without acceptable
reason,
(3) transfers his or her property abroad in order to place it beyond the reach 
of his or her creditors, or
(4) increases his or her liabilities without basis and thus causes his or her 
insolvency or essentially worsens his or her state of insolvency shall be 
sentenced for dishonesty by a debtor to a fine or imprisonment for a maximum 
of two years.
Criminal liability, according to this section, needs three elements: an action, 
insolvency and causality. A fourth requirement is the debtor status, though that 
seems obvious. The relevant actions are described in sections one through four. 
These actions, in turn, need to cause the insolvency (or essentially worsen it). The 
action need not be the only reason for insolvency, but it needs to fundamentally 
affect the outcome.374 If, however, the insolvency is due to an unforeseeable event, 
the debtor’s action does not incur criminal liability.375
This liability in itself does not extend the sphere of persons liable for corporate 
obligations. It offers no additional funds for the satisfaction of creditors. It is an 
additional person who is liable on the basis of her criminal actions. Criminal liability 
allows the creditors or bankruptcy estate to claim damages. The liable person is not 
obligated to compensate more than the damage caused.
The line between the legitimate attempt to save the business and dishonest 
conduct is unclear. The first three parts of the section evidently do not constitute a 
legitimate attempt to save the business. Incurring additional liabilities, on the other 
hand, could possibly be intended to save the business. Still, it needs to be determined 
what actions are such attempts.
According to Ari-Matti Nuutila and Kaarlo Hakamies, with dishonesty by a 
debtor, the solution can be found by thoroughly assessing the actions taken and their 
effects on the crisis of the business. If the incurred liabilities have no effect whatsoever 
in making insolvency less likely, then they are clearly not legitimate attempts. This 
includes actions that prolong an unprofitable business, support unremunerative 
production or are meant to acquire assets that have no benefit for the business. At 
the extreme, any unfavorable commitment with absolutely no basis on the business, 
 
property from the creditors’ reach. Physical destruction is one method of this and concealment would be 
another. See HE 66/1998 at 161.
374 HE 53/2003 vp s. 39.
375 See Koponen 2007 at 123. For criminal liability not to apply, the debtor needs to argue that there 
was no possible way to prevent or mitigate the event that enabled the otherwise acceptable transaction to 
cause the insolvency.
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such as guaranteeing loans, obviously has no basis.376 In another instance, Hakamies 
further elaborates that the key element is to determine the critical point, after which 
practicing unprofitable business so clearly hurts the creditors that it must be ended. 
After this point, incurring any additional liabilities would constitute dishonesty by 
a debtor. The actions are not within the acceptable negative business risk, but the 
intentional damaging of the creditors.377
Harri Vento uses a similar concept of acceptable business risk. Acceptable risk 
is one that is in the interest of society. In a normal course of business, some risk is 
always involved, and it is perfectly acceptable to include the same level of business 
risk even in a crisis. If the level of risk does not change with the actions taken, the risk 
is always acceptable. An acceptable risk level is when the expected return surpasses 
the additional negative risk to the creditors. As the violation of creditors’ rights 
becomes more apparent, it gets harder to deem the risk acceptable. The assessment 
of risk becomes a weighing of interests between the additional negative risk to the 
creditors and the returns sought.378 Some guidance to the assessment can be derived 
from the duty of care standard of Company Act 1:8.379 
The actions described there are typically such that are used to transfer property 
outside the creditors’ reach. Destroying, surrendering and transferring abroad 
could be categorized simply as siphoning funds. Increasing liabilities does not fall 
under this category directly. The benefits obtained by neglecting obligations can be 
siphoned away, though.
2.6.2.2. Debtor’s Dishonesty and Piercing the Veil
2.6.2.2.1. Burden of Proof
The differences between criminal liability and veil piercing can be placed at two 
levels: One is concrete normative prohibitions, that is, which actions are actually 
sanctioned by each of the doctrines. The other level is the more general level of legal 
principles. Criminal law itself is very peculiar in its principles. Compared to other 
fields of law, the differences are apparent. For the questions asked in this work, the 
most significant difference would be the level of proof requirement.
In criminal cases, the prosecutor needs to prove the case beyond reasonable 
doubt, not only that the perpetrator did the criminal action but also the intention 
or excessive negative risk. If the Criminal Code provision has multiple requirements, 
each must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to do so with any of these 
 
376 See Nuutila – Hakamies 2004 at 27: Velallisen epärehellisyys: Tekotavat: Velvoitteiden lisääminen. 
See also Kukkonen 2018 at 100.
377 Hakamies 2011 at 190.
378 See Vento 1994 at 236–240 and 244.
379 Similarly Vento 1994 at 237–238.
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leads to dismissal of the charge. This is only reasonable since criminal liability is the 
most extreme measure offered by the legal system.
Let us take the debtor’s dishonesty as an example. The three required elements 
are action, insolvency and causality. The prosecution needs to prove all these 
beyond reasonable doubt. It will not matter if the action and insolvency 
are proven 100% if the causality is only 50%. Although the totality of the 
proof is 250/300, there could still be reasonable doubt. The certainty of one 
requirement is not allowed to compensate for the lack of evidence for the 
other. They are all examined strictly separate.
If we compare this to veil piercing, we notice some key differences. The veil piercing 
claim is a civil claim. The level of proof required is lower as the provisions of the Code 
of Judicial Procedure apply. Instead of beyond reasonable doubt, the claimant needs 
to give plausible evidence of the facts. Generally, this is thought to mean that, more 
likely than not, the case exists, translating to 51% proof. This is reasonable since the 
claimant’s possibilities to acquire evidence are much narrower than those of officials 
in criminal procedure. If we apply this to a piercing case, the claimant needs to prove 
that the use of corporate form, control, reprehensibility, artificiality, damage and 
causality more likely than not exist in the case. In addition, within the sphere of 
property law, separation in the evaluation of these factors need not necessarily be 
absolute. Failing to prove one factor completely can be compensated by the strong 
evidence of another. It is in the nature of an overall assessment to make this sort of 
compensation.
As an example, the control is proven 100%, artificiality 60%, reprehensibility 
40%, damage 100% and causality 60%. The totality of the proof is 360/500. 
Although the totality cannot be used as such to determine the outcome, 
strong evidence given in support of one of the factors can compensate for 
some of the evidence lacking in another.
It is important to note that control, damage and causality are much easier to prove 
and are commonly present in a piercing situation. Thus, they should not be allowed 
to compensate the lack of artificiality or reprehensibility extensively.
2.6.2.2.2.  Manipulating the Debtor Status and Other Requirements  
of Debtor’s Dishonesty
Criminal Code Chapter 39, Section 11 explicitly states that only the debtor can be 
held liable for the crime. Only actions made as the debtor can fulfill the requirements 
of dishonesty by a debtor. Yet it remains important to ask the question: When is the 
corporation a debtor?  The creation of an obligation or a debt makes for the debtor 
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status. The problem is that this time of creation can be manipulated to a great extent. 
Take the KKO 2015:17 case for instance. Verkkokauppa had continuously neglected 
the payment of remunerations, but it was considered the debtor until Teosto 
demanded payment. Arctecho claimed it had no obligation to pay remuneration 
since its operations were abroad. After this claim had been proven false, the debtor 
status was undisputed and clear. It is possible to manipulate the emergence of the 
debtor status as well as the insolvency status required by the debtor’s dishonesty.
The traditional use of veil piercing in criminal law has been determining some 
status necessary for the application of a criminal provision. For example, the KKO 
2018:20 decision took veil piercing as a preliminary question when determining 
how the accounting should have been done.380 If they would have pierced the veil, 
this would have meant that the accounting should have been made to include the 
total enterprise instead of being entity-specific. As the accounting was entity-specific, 
piercing would have meant that accounting fraud sanctions were applicable. So in 
some cases, veil piercing could act as a remedy for this sort of status manipulation to 
avoid some relevant status.
In debtor’s dishonesty, this gives the controller an opportunity to manipulate 
who exactly owns the property.381 If the controller has transferred some assets 
to herself from the corporation, veil piercing could be used to determine 
that they are, in fact, the same person in regards to the ownership. This, in 
turn, would mean that the assets never left the debtor in the sense that the 
debtor’s dishonesty requires. This would then make the transfer punishable 
only through debtor’s fraud if the debtor does not reveal the transfer. This 
would solely benefit the controller, though, and that person has usually 
chosen to operate in corporate form. This sort of self-piercing should be 
denied.382 Kukkonen describes another example: When one person controls 
several corporations, that person could manipulate one of them to have a tort 
claim against another based on a crime the controller herself committed as 
the representative of the liable corporation. The separate personality in these 
situations could be denied and the tort claim rejected.383
If the business can reasonably expect a crushing liability in the future, veil piercing 
could apply. If the operator of the business knows that such a liability is certain or 
very likely and continues the business, veil piercing is a possible remedy, especially 
so if the operator makes no further investments in the business or does not prepare 
380 Similarly in KKO 2010:85. See also Kukkonen 2014 at 835–836 and Kärki 2018b.
381 See Kukkonen 2018 at 39–40.
382 See V.8.3.2. of this work.
383 Kukkonen 2018 at 368.
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for the liability in any way. The operator knowingly accumulates as much benefit 
as possible before the obligation manifests. This avoids criminal liability, but veil 
piercing should apply. Though Criminal Code 39:1 does incriminate increasing 
liabilities without a basis, this sort of behavior does not necessarily fall into this 
category. The benefits can be siphoned all the while, tending to existing liabilities 
without incurring additional liabilities.384
If the obligation is likely enough, then it needs to be accounted for when utilizing 
the solvency test (Company Act 13:2). The reasonably unexpected but still unknown 
creditor can easily be damaged in other ways should the arrangement be designed 
for this. The issue is whether the obligation is likely enough to affect the outcome of 
the solvency test. When a business is split into multiple entities, it can be assumed 
that the arrangement is perpetual. This creates a discrepancy between the solvency 
test and piercing. The solvency test needs to account for only a relatively short time 
period when assessing the likelihood of an obligation. The corporate arrangement 
can be made to circumvent this obligation since the controller of the corporation 
can be certain that the obligation will manifest sometime during the corporate 
existence. The certainty of this obligation does not necessarily affect the solvency 
test at all if the obligation is unlikely to manifest soon.
The assessment becomes dependent on the probability of the liability. This, in 
turn, makes it a question of business risk. To what extent is an unprofitable business 
operation allowed to take on a negative risk in pursuit of profit?385 The realization 
of a business’s negative risk should not incur criminal liability. On the other hand, 
running the business by placing negative risks on the creditors should not be allowed 
either. Veil piercing would target arrangements where the business’s negative risk 
is made to materialize outside the sphere of persons benefitting from the business 
and holding the assets. The similarity to debtor’s dishonesty and incurring excessive 
liabilities ends there. Piercing does not require insolvency, or the intentional causing 
of insolvency. Piercing is not tied to transfers of assets, although siphoning would 
support piercing.
The application of dishonesty by a debtor requires transactions. The debtor needs 
to either actively lose some assets he already has or incur additional liabilities. If the 
debtor does not cast away the funds but first structures the operation so that the 
gains flow into one entity and liabilities into another, there is no debtor’s action. 
Alternatively, the operation itself could be deemed a crime from the start if the due 
payments are systematically neglected from the beginning.386 As debtor’s dishonesty 
requires intent to cause the insolvency, if more time passes from the action to the 
manifestations of the insolvency, it becomes increasingly difficult to show this 
384 See, for example, the Swedish case NJA 2014 s. 877.
385 Similarly Hakamies 2011 at 190.
386 Similarly Tapani 2014 at 762 and those cited therein.
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intention.387 When liabilities are neglected, there is a clear duty to act, but it is 
ignored. This action is the basis for criminal liability. Channeling the gains into 
another entity involves no such action; it only means that the debtor had no assets 
to begin with. Therefore, there is no way for criminal liability to attach since the 
debtor did not need to destroy, surrender or transfer property or incur additional 
liabilities. If the benefits of the operation are siphoned in this manner, though, there 
are no accumulated assets to cover future liabilities. There is nothing to prevent this 
sort of limitation. Debtor’s dishonesty would apply only when future liabilities were 
known well enough that they needed to be accounted for. Arguably, this leaves a 
large window for manipulation. Similarly, veil piercing gives significance to whether 
the arrangement was made to avoid specific and reasonably obvious liabilities.388
2.6.2.2.3. Chaining Bankruptcies
Chaining bankruptcies as a certain pattern of the debtor’s dishonesty should be 
noted here. Despite the heading being piercing the corporate veil, in some cases, 
CC 39:1 applies to these arrangements. Chaining bankruptcies refers to business 
activities where one company accumulates debt and liabilities until it can no longer 
operate or until the controller feels the need to “cleanse” the operation of liabilities. 
During the operation of the business, any gains are allocated to one company, 
whereas the liabilities stay with the other company. This can be achieved by renting 
a means of production from the benefitting company to the other or some other 
undervalued transaction.389 This creates a symbiotic relationship between the two, 
where the benefitting company cannot operate and be profitable without the other 
company operating unprofitably.390
These arrangements can operate seemingly within the limitations of law but can 
still end up incurring the criminal liability for the debtor’s dishonesty. By default, 
making a bad—even unprofitable—contract is not criminal. Markku Salminen lists 
some key factors about when criminal liability can attach to chained bankruptcies 
and actors behind them.
1. The arrangement is executed on purpose and to the detriment of the 
creditors.
2. The business is run as a single economic unit where negative risks and profits 
are systematically separated.
3. The other company starts out and is continuously unprofitable.
387 Hakamies 2011 at 179.
388 See V.4.3.3.1. and V.6.2.4 of this work.
389 See, for example, Kukkonen 2018 at 68–70.
390 See Salminen 1998 at 203–208. About the symbiotic relationship, see II.5.1. of this work.
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4. The contracts between the companies are designed to transfer funds to the 
detriment of the tax receiver, pay security or other creditors.391
It is easy to see comprehensive similarities between the list Salminen provides and 
the veil piercing requirements set forth in the Verkkokauppa case. Parts 2–4 describe 
the improper behavior requirement, part 1 corresponds to the damage requirement 
and part 2 can be read to include using formally separate corporate entities and thus 
corresponding with the requirement of control and abuse of separate personality. 
Currently, most chaining bankruptcies and other debtor’s dishonesty cases 
utilizing formally separate entities could be targeted with Criminal Code 9:2, 
which allows placing criminal liability on the one who, in reality, controls the 
corporation. The section was adopted into criminal law in 2001, three years after 
Salminen gave the above-mentioned opinion. This makes veil piercing obsolete 
when criminal liability is established. The veil is pierced by allowing the disregard 
for the separate personality with Criminal Code 9:2 and showing reprehensibility 
by showing the criminal conduct. Damage is optional, though the creditor can 
recover it in full if a crime is present. If criminal liability for some reason does not 
attach, then the creditor could claim damages for exactly the same situation. The 
problem is that in a civil law damages claim, Criminal Code 9:2 does not apply, 
so the liability cannot be extended to separate persons based only on control. The 
creditor can only make a claim against the corporation. Veil piercing could change 
this by allowing an extension to the controller and possibly other entities of the 
corporate arrangement. Depending on why the criminal charges were dismissed, an 
investigation and charges can be utilized in showing of reprehensibility as required 
by piercing. Reprehensibility could be claimed especially if the dismissal was only 
due to procedural rules.
2.6.3.  Forfeiture
2.6.3.1.  Basic Forfeiture
For the subject of this study, only the forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime is relevant 
as, in a corporate context, the crimes are white-collar and are committed to obtain 
economic gains. Thus, two sections of the Criminal Code are relevant here: Chapter 
10, Sections 2 and 3. The analysis starts with Section 2 as it relates to the basic 
situation of proceeds confiscation. It is not relevant to examine the estimation of 
the proceeds in this study. Section 3 will be examined as it relates to cases in which a 
more comprehensive forfeiture is possible.
391 See Salminen 1998 at 204.
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The Finnish Criminal Code allows the court to confiscate any proceeds of 
criminal activity.392 Traditionally, this has meant items – either the proceeds of 
the crime or the tools used to perform the crime. The purpose of forfeiture is to 
prevent further criminal activity and is not considered a punishment.393 If the same 
person is held liable for both forfeiture and damages, the damages take precedence. 
If the liability for damages exceeds the amount gained by the perpetrator, then no 
forfeiture is ordered.394
The proceeds of crime shall be ordered forfeit to the State (CC 10:2.1). The 
forfeiture shall be ordered on the perpetrator, a participant or a person on whose 
behalf or for whose benefit the offense was committed (CC10:2.3). Forfeiture can 
be ordered even on a person who is not aware of the crime if they are beneficiaries of 
it.395 When ordering forfeiture based on this provision, only the direct proceeds of 
the crime can be confiscated.396 If the proceeds have been transferred, forfeiture still 
applies. Forfeiture can be demanded in a trial separate from criminal proceedings 
and even without prosecution.397
Forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime has three requirements: 1) fulfillment of 
criminal provision elements; 2) economic gains; and 3) causal relation between the 
two.398 Proceeds of a crime means any economic gain as a result of the crime; it can 
be saved expenses or transferred funds. Yields of these can be ordered forfeit too. It is 
meant to cover any beneficial outcome.399 The Criminal Code enables the forfeiture 
of any economic benefit directly related to a crime,400 but any rights not protected 
by the legal system are not the proceeds of a crime.401 In debtor’s crimes, proceeds 
of the crime equal the amount of transferred or hidden assets.402 Although isolating 
392 The forfeiture provisions were recently amended to implement Directive 2014/42/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Freezing and Confiscation of Instrumentalities and Proceeds 
of Crime in the European Union. The amendments came into force 1.9.2016.
393 See HE 80/2000 at 15.
394 See Rautio 2007 at 33.
395 Kukkonen 2016b at 897.
396 See Rautio 2006 at 300 and Viljanen 2007 at 174.
397 HE 4/2016 at 29 and Kukkonen 2016a at 723.
398 Korkka 2015 at 19.
399 Excluding such economic rights, the legal system does not enforce, e.g., gambling debt. See Kuk-
konen 2016a at 727.
400 HE 80/2000 vp. at 21 and HE 4/2016 vp. at 31.
401 Kukkonen 2016a at 727. Forfeiture is possible even when the proceeds are obtained through ran-
dom occurrence or chance.
402 Cf. HE 53/2002 vp. at 18 and Kukkonen 2016a at 729. These sources opine that the amount of 
unpaid debt is the amount of criminal proceeds, but this is unacceptable. The amount of unpaid debt is 
no doubt the damage the creditor suffers. This surely also equals the total economic benefit the debtor 
obtains. It does not directly translate to the amount of the economic benefit the debtor obtained with the 
criminal act. The circumstances can very well be such that the debtor has used the loan to further a legiti-
mate business. At some point, all available assets are transferred from the business to the debtor’s spouse, 
rendering the business bankrupt. This act is dishonesty by a debtor. The economic benefit obtained from 
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the business’s negative risk to another entity is beneficial in an economic sense, it can 
hardly be given monetary value. The economic value that forfeiture could tackle is 
the assets transferred between the entities. Additionally, the causal link between the 
benefits of risk separation and the crime is difficult to establish. Criminal law does 
not prevent founding separate entities to carry business risks if the transfers of assets 
between them are done within the confines of the law. 
From CC 5:8 and 9:2, it follows that criminal liability and therefore also 
forfeiture can be ordered on a corporation or the person who controls it if the crime 
has been committed within its operations. In a corporate context, the crime is often 
committed on behalf of the corporation by the operative management.403 Even if the 
criminal liability cannot be attached to the corporation, the benefits it has received 
from the crime can be ordered forfeit.
2.6.3.2. Extended Forfeiture
CC 10:3 allows the extended forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. Extended forfeiture 
means ordering forfeit of all assets that originate from criminal activity. Extension 
requires a “trigger crime” that, in its essence, can produce economic benefits.404 
Attempted crime is enough, though.405 There is an exhaustive list of these trigger 
crimes in CC 10:3.1. These include money laundering, narcotic crimes, bribery, 
organized crime, etc. In addition to these specific crimes, any crime in which the 
maximum sentence is at least four years allows for the extension. In the corporate 
context, the interest naturally shifts to fiscal crime and the veil piercing focus further 
moves the conversation toward crimes of the debtor. Dishonesty by the debtor thus 
applies if it is aggravated (CC 39:1a). The same goes for fraud by a debtor (CC 
39:3), accounting offense (CC 30:9a) and tax fraud (CC 29:2); only the aggravated 
form fulfills the requirements of the extension. All of these have exactly four years’ 
imprisonment as the maximum sentence.
When this sort of trigger crime is present, the forfeiture can target any assets 
originating from crime (CC 10:3.2). The assets do not need to be related to the 
trigger crime.406 They just need to be related to crime in general. The court has 
this crime is not the total unpaid debt, only the amount of assets transferred to the detriment of the credi-
tors. The debtor/perpetrator is still liable for the damage caused to the creditors. This can be argued to be 
the full amount of the debt if the business could have eventually paid the debt had it kept on operating. 
The damage could be calculated otherwise. For example, the transfer added to the likely sum the business 
could have produced before it would have failed.
403 See Viljanen 2002 at 6.
404 These crimes only need to be such that they can produce significant economic benefits. The realiza-
tion of significant gains is not actually required from the crime, on the basis of which forfeiture is ordered. 
Any gains will suffice. See HE 80/2000 vp. at 24
405 See Viljanen 2002 at 12.
406 CC 10:2 and regular non-extended forfeiture applies to assets obtained with the trigger crime. See 
also Viljanen 2002 at 13.
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discretion as to whether to order extended forfeiture, even in situations where the 
requirements are fulfilled. In the use of this discretion, the court especially needs 
to account for whether the assets originate from criminal activities that cannot be 
considered minor, whether ordering the forfeiture is necessary to prevent further 
criminal acts and whether the possessor of these assets receives a significant part 
of their income from criminal activities (CC 10:3.2). The use of discretion is not 
limited to these things, and the court is allowed to consider other factors and the 
totality of the arrangement.407 In fact, the totality of the arrangement is a necessary 
consideration as, especially in prolonged economic crimes, the roles and actions 
of the involved parties are altered, and allocation of benefits might also be altered 
during the crime period.408
Case law is minimal, but the Supreme Court of Finland has based the emphasis 
on seeking economic benefit, being part of a criminal organization and systematic 
operation for criminal proceeds.409 These need not be interpreted as absolute 
requirements for extended forfeiture, though. Especially requiring being part of 
a criminal organization would effectively exclude debtor’s crimes from extended 
forfeiture.
2.6.3.3.  Forfeiture, Abuse of Rights and Veil Piercing
Most interestingly, the criminal code has a provision reflecting the doctrine of abuse 
of rights. CC 10:2.4 allows ordering forfeiture on persons to whom the proceeds or 
other property have been transferred. Forfeiture is possible if the person receiving 
the proceeds knew or had a sufficient reason to suspect that the transfer was 
orchestrated in order to avoid forfeiture or liability for damages. Thus, there are two 
requirements: 1) the transfer was intended to avoid forfeiture or paying damages 
and 2) the transferee knew of this intention. The intent to avoid can be that of the 
transferor or the receiver.410 In the corporate context, the corporation has knowledge 
of this intention if the person representing the corporation at the time the proceeds 
were transferred knows of the intention.411 For forfeiture to apply, the receiver must 
be aware that the assets received originated from a crime.412 Using middle men does 
not affect the application as the provision does not require the direct transfer from 
the perpetrator to the third party.413 The forfeiture order follows the transferred 
assets and not the person holding them. If the perpetrator never held the assets, the 
407 See HE 4/2016 vp. at 41
408 See Rautio 2006 at 305.
409 KKO 2006:51. The decision was a vote decision. See also Viljanen 2007 at 233–234 and Kukkonen 
2016b at 901.
410 See HE 4/2016 at 34–35.
411 Kukkonen 2016b at 899.
412 See HE 4/2016 at 34–35.
413 Kukkonen 2016b at 899. See also Viljanen 2002 at 15.
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transfer requirement does not apply, and the assets can be ordered forfeit on the 
basis that the crime was originally committed to the benefit of this person.414
This provision holds liable someone who is not formally liable or even involved in 
the crime. This approach is similar to veil piercing. The difference is that the liability 
is absolutely limited to what was obtained in the transaction.415 Liability follows 
the transferred property, whereas in piercing, the liability is personal. The provision 
relies on the subjective criterion of intention. If the intention was to avoid forfeiture, 
the court can disregard the transfer. In the end, this is nothing but a shortcut. If 
the court does not use this criterion, then during the enforcement proceedings, the 
Asset Recovery Act or artificial property arrangement provision can be utilized for 
the same results.416
A similar norm exists with extended forfeiture. It is not limited to the person 
committing the crime, but it can target close persons of the perpetrator if there is 
sufficient reason to assume that the assets were transferred to avoid forfeiture (CC 
10:3.4). A close person is defined the same as in the Act on the Recovery of Assets 
to Bankruptcy Estates Section 3; it covers spouses, children, parents, etc. But, more 
importantly in the corporate context, a close person is a legal person: 1) with which 
the perpetrator alone or with another close person has substantive common interest 
based on share ownership or a similar economic factor; 2) whose operations the 
debtor substantially controls by holding a commanding position; 3) who is a close 
person to a close person of the debtor.
Additionally, extended forfeiture targeting a close person requires that the assets 
have been transferred to that person in order to avoid forfeiture or liability for 
damages (CC 10:3.5). This is significant because it enables applying forfeiture to 
persons who are not related to the crime. It allows ordering forfeit of any unexplained 
assets that people close to the perpetrator have. It only requires that there is sufficient 
reason to assume that the transfer was in fact made in order to avoid forfeiture. Yet 
even when a close person receives a transfer of the proceeds but the transferee has 
then lost or spent these proceeds, forfeiture cannot be ordered.417 Close persons are 
thus not held personally liable, i.e., they are not liable for the value of the assets. The 
liability follows the assets—a key difference to piercing the veil.
According to Kukkonen, extended forfeiture should not be applied to a 
corporation operating legally, even when crimes are committed to its benefit. 
Standard forfeiture does apply, and with it comes the requirement of a causal 
link between the criminal act and the proceeds of the crime. Extended forfeiture 
414 See Viljanen 2002 at 14.
415 It is in no part a punishment and thus cannot exceed the benefit amount. Forfeiture is intended to 
prevent the criminal from benefitting. But it has some preventive effects as it removes potential gains from 
the calculation on whether to commit a crime. See Hakamies 2008 at 54.
416 Similarly HE 4/2016 vp. at 35 and Kukkonen 2016b at 899.
417 See Viljanen 2002 at 16 and Rautio 2007 at 37 and 50.
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should be ordered on a corporation mainly when the corporation acts as a 
front for criminal operations.418 The corporation’s nature as a front for criminal 
activities is assessed considering the unexplained assets of the corporation, legal 
rights it possesses and connections between these assets and the rights of the 
perpetrator.419 Case law has emphasized the cautious use of the extended forfeiture 
in the corporate context.420
Although these norms aim to prevent avoiding forfeiture and somewhat reflect 
the abuse of rights norm, veil piercing cannot obtain much from forfeiture via 
analogy. It is undeniably a doctrine that allows the liability of another person. Like 
artificial property arrangements, it follows the property, whereas piercing follows 
persons. Another difference is the forfeiture requirement of unexplained assets or 
assets deriving from criminal activities. It does not target abuse of legal instruments 
but prevents certain uses of them. Liability is in no way a result of the disparity of 
used legal form and reality. It does not target artificiality nor reprehensibility. 
These norms prove to be nothing more than yet another remedy for the dishonest 
transfer of assets. One could think of it as a more extensive asset recovery in criminal 
matters. Still, it serves to limit the need for piercing the veil. Assessment of the 
intention will also prove useful in the veil piercing context, as veil piercing requires 
reprehensible behavior, and intent to avoid obligations fulfills this requirement 
admirably.
2.7.  Other Related Legal Doctrines
2.7.1.  Unlawful Distribution of Assets
Company Act limits the amount of asset distribution the company can lawfully 
make. Only profits and reserves can be distributed as dividends (Company Act 13:1). 
Aside from dividends, a reduction in share capital and acquisition of a company’s 
own shares are also allowed methods of distribution. Assets can also be distributed 
if the corporation is dissolved (Company Act 13:1). Any other transactions that 
reduce the assets of the company or increase its liabilities without a sound business 
reason shall constitute an unlawful distribution of assets (Company Act 13:1). 
Assets shall not be distributed if it is known or should be known at the time of 
the distribution decision that the company is insolvent or that the distribution will 
cause the insolvency of the company (Company Act 13:2). Basically, a corporation 
cannot distribute assets in any way unless it is profitable, is dissolved, or if the 
418 See Kukkonen 2016b at 901–902. Similarly see HE 80/2000 vp. at 15 and 24–25, requiring that the 
corporation be attained solely or almost solely to hide the criminal origins of assets or to keep the proceeds 
of a crime out of the reach of forfeiture.
419 See HE 85/2000 vp. at 25.
420 See HE 80/2000 vp. at 15, KKO 2009:1 and Kukkonen 2016b at 901.
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transaction has a business reason justifying it. The assets need not be distributed to 
shareholders—any transaction can be unlawful distribution.421
If an obligation is likely enough, then it needs to be accounted for when 
utilizing the solvency test. The management needs to investigate the relevant 
and predictable factors that will affect the solvency of the corporation, even 
if those factors are uncertain.422 The test, unfortunately, is rather ambiguous 
and open to interpretation. The definite time period and the relevance of 
information are not defined and tend to differ depending on the performer 
and situation.423 The solvency test offers some limitation to abusive corporate 
arrangements but proves insufficient in risk separation situations. The abused 
corporation is founded to carry the negative risk. It is part of the inherent 
business risk, and even ventures with high negative risks are perfectly 
legitimate. Only if the realization of said risk is probable enough, the solvency 
test prevents asset distribution. Risk separation structures are such that the 
actors know that the negative risk is likely or even certain to occur, but when 
it will materialize remains uncertain.
Any transaction the corporation makes can be unlawful distribution unless it 
has a sound business reason, which means that the transaction needs to advance 
the corporate purpose as defined either in Company Act 1:5424 or the Articles of 
Association. Benefitting the parent corporation or the corporate group is not a sound 
business reason.425 Similar to tax avoidance, the sound business reason material from 
unlawful distribution analysis no doubt needs to be considered with veil piercing also.
If the assets have been unlawfully distributed, they need to be returned if the 
recipient knew or should have known that the distribution was in violation of the 
Company Act or the Articles of Association (Company Act 13:4). Alternatively, 
the board members that decided on the distribution are liable for the damage their 
decision caused to the corporation. These provide the corporation with some funds, 
but it might not be enough to cover the actual claim. If the business is divided into 
separate entities, then the unlawful distribution and refund obligation only make it 
harder to transfer assets from one entity to another. The transactions need to be at 
market value or, at minimum, close to it.426 However, even when the transactions 
421 Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 2010b at 31 and HE 109/2005 at 124. For a good list of exam-
ple situations, see Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017b at 1099–1102.
422 See Ruohonen 2012 at 199. 
423 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 311.
424 See Mähönen 2006 at 22. 
425 Rasinaho 2013 at 552. Similarly, see HE 109/2005 vp at 123–124 and Immonen – Villa 2015 at 
135–137. Transfers to other members of the group are either loan, dividends or capital investments.
426 See Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 2010b at 29–30. Similarly Immonen – Villa 2015 at 75.
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eventually prove unprofitable, distribution is not unlawful if the transaction had a 
business motive behind it.427 Unlawful distribution further limits the need to rely on 
piercing in cases of asset transfers.
This does prevent extracting value from one corporation into another quite 
effectively.428 Separate personality enables arrangements where the value never 
appears in the supporting corporation. Even at market value, transactions do not 
mean that the support corporation is profitable. It can be operated at zero-sum 
principle or even at a loss.429 The value created by the support corporation appears 
directly in the asset corporation without needing to transfer it, making the unlawful 
distribution norm insufficient from the creditors’ viewpoint. Veil piercing, however, 
can address these situations. Unlawful distribution is not suitable for situations 
in which the negative business risk is illegitimately placed on third parties. These 
arrangements do not transfer anything from the support corporation to the asset 
corporation. Instead, the realization of the negative risk is arranged into an entity 
other than the¨one holding the assets, resulting in losses for the creditors.
2.7.2.  Liability for Damages
Since one of the key requirements of piercing the corporate veil is causing damage to 
creditors, it is natural that liability for damages should be assessed here. The liability 
for damages can be based on Company Act or the Tort Liability Act. It is debatable 
whether the Tort Liability Act applies to damage caused by corporate organs at all.430 
This question is beyond this study, and only the liability in damages per Company 
Act 22:1 is examined here.
The basic situation we are interested in with veil piercing is when the corporation 
is found liable but is unable to satisfy the claim, and the creditor suffers damage that 
equals the amount left unsatisfied by the corporation. Then veil piercing is used to 
extend liability to persons other than the corporation. The initial liability for the 
damage is contractual or based on the Tort Liability Act, and the one held liable 
is the corporation. This liability is taken as a given in this study, and its basis is not 
analyzed further. We are interested only in the extension of liability to other persons. 
Due to the scope of the study, a general introduction to the subject is enough.431
427 Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 2010b at 29 and similarly Immonen – Villa 2015 at 69–70 and 
74.
428 Or at least it makes the system comprehensive. In practice, unlawful distribution and the manage-
ment’s damage liability are often overlooked. See Tuokko 2016 at 819.
429 Cf. KKO 2003:33. If the corporation’s purpose is to provide the shareholders some benefit, i.e., 
housing, then the corporation is obligated to collect enough revenue from the shareholders to cover its 
expenses. The precedent should not be extended to business corporations. See Villa 2003 at 7.
430 On this question, see Nyström 2015.
431 For a more comprehensive discussion on the liability of damages in the corporate context, see, for 
example, Immonen – Villa 2015 at 179–189, Savela 2015 at 11–150 or Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasin-
aho 2010b at 748–772.
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Company Act does provide for liability of corporate organs when the damage 
was caused by activities of the corporation. The organs acted in their formal capacity 
within the corporation, so their decisions were those of the corporation. The 
requirements for such liability are rather strict, however.
Management of the corporation can be held liable according to Company Act 
22:1.
(1) A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of the Supervisory Board 
and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in Chapter 1, Section 8, has in 
office deliberately or negligently caused to the company.
(2) A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of the Supervisory Board 
and the Managing Director shall likewise be liable in damages for the loss 
that he or she, in violation of other provisions of this Act or the Articles of 
Association, has in office deliberately or negligently caused to the company, a 
shareholder or a third party.
This allows holding the directors, managing director and even members of the 
supervisory board liable for damages they have caused deliberately or by acting 
negligently.432 They are liable for damage caused to the company, shareholders and 
third parties. Liability toward the corporation is more comprehensive, as it can 
materialize even from violations of the duty of care in addition to violations of the 
Company Act or the Articles of Association. Basically, there are two general bases 
for liability: 1) violation of the duty of care433 and 2) violation of the Company Act 
provisions or Articles of Association.434
We are interested in both. If the management has caused damage directly to third 
parties with its violations, veil piercing is not needed if they are found liable this way. 
Proving liability in damages is simpler. If they have caused damage to the company, 
it can lead to bankruptcy. Then the creditors can hold the management liable via the 
bankruptcy estate, as the estate gains the same rights as the corporation had before 
it.435
Liability for damages caused to third parties can result only from violations of the 
Company Act or Articles of Association. This is a significant limitation to liability. 
If the management follows these rules, they are not liable. From the creditor’s point 
of view, we are interested in the Company Act provisions protecting creditors. 
432 Violations of the Company Act Provision or Articles of Association are presumed negligent, and 
the management must prove otherwise to avoid liability (Company Act 22:1.3).
433 For an analysis on this, see Immonen – Villa 2015 at 181–184.
434 For an analysis on these, see Immonen – Villa 2015 at 185 and Savela 2015 at 144–147.
435 But the estates are a bit passive in exercising this right. See Tuokko 2016 at 824. For a general discus-
sion on the bankruptcy estates’ right to derivative suit, see Tuokko 2016, Savela 2015 at 148–150. 
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The focus is on Company Act 13:1, which explains how corporate funds can be 
distributed. Beyond this provision, most creditor protection provisions protect the 
capital and assets the company already has. It is possible to have provisions in the 
Articles of Association that incur different kinds of duties such as paying dividends 
to third parties. Neglecting these duties results in liability as well.436 Liability for 
damages is firmly anchored in actions and duties to act. 
Veil piercing and liability for damages. Veil piercing should be possible even 
when the management’s liability exists. This in itself does not eliminate the need 
for piercing the veil. The management can be straw men, which do not necessarily 
have any assets or they might disappear. In these situations, veil piercing could be 
one method for the creditors to secure a payment. In these cases, depending on 
the nature of the corporate actions, criminal liability for dishonesty of the debtors 
placed on the actual—albeit not formal—controller of the corporation could apply 
(Criminal Code 39:1 and 5:8). But if the creditor’s damage has been caused by 
methods other than the distribution of assets, hiding assets, or incurring additional 
liabilities without a basis, criminal liability is not available.
Due to the clear requirements of liability in damages, circumventing its application 
to the detriment of a third-party creditor is rather easy. Only the corporation can 
demand compensation for the management’s breach of the duty of care, though 
shareholders can sue on behalf of the corporation. Damage suffered by a third party 
will be compensated only if it has been caused by a violation of the Company Act or 
the Articles of Association. A further limitation to this is that the norm violated needs 
to be one that has been created to protect the party demanding compensation.437 
Unless the Articles of Association have explicit statements providing third parties 
with some rights, violating them does not damage these parties.438 In Company 
Act, there are some provisions to protect the creditors, mainly those that prohibit 
the distribution of funds if they render the company insolvent or if a transaction 
has no business purpose and disclosure norms.439 Breaking any other provision 
can hardly cause damage to a third party. In conclusion, the liability in damages 
enforces the creditor protection norms of the Company Act. It offers compensation 
from corporate actions that already violate a norm. As limited liability and separate 
personality are allowed by the Company Act, even abusing them falls beyond the 
application of liability in the damages sections of the Company Act.
Perhaps the Tort Liability Act could cover this sort of third-party damage. Though 
according to Chapter 5, Section 1 of said Act, however, purely economic loss can 
be ordered compensated only if there are “especially weighty reasons.” Potentially, 
436 See Kärki 2017 at 170–172. Cf. Savela 2015 at 148.
437 See Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2010b at 761.
438 See also Kärki 2017 at 170–172.
439 Similarly Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017a at 607.
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the interpretation of these reasons would come to resemble the current veil piercing 
test. Some opinions even see veil piercing as unnecessary altogether and replaceable 
by expansive interpretation of the principles of tort law.440 On the other hand, an 
expansive interpretation of some key concepts in the conflicting norms could also 
replace piercing. For example, the KKO 2015:17 case could have been solved by 
interpreting the concept of a party responsible for paying the remunerations.441 
Justification of such an expansive interpretation would no doubt have come to 
greatly resemble the veil piercing considerations.
It will be interesting to witness the development of case law and implementation 
around Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge 
of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of 
procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and 
amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132. In Article 19, the Member States are 
obligated to maintain regulations where management is required to account 
for the creditor, equity holders and stakeholder interests in its decision-making 
if the corporation is likely to become insolvent. They are also mandated to 
take steps to avoid insolvency and deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that 
threatens the viability of the business. For the most part, debtor’s dishonesty, 
asset recovery, asset distribution and liability for damages cover most, if not 
all, of the requirements of this article. Still, the article could mostly offer 
additional support for the reprehensibility requirement of veil piercing, for 
it offers a clear condemnation of benefitting oneself at the expense of others.
Another limitation compared to veil piercing is the persons liable for damages. 
Only the management, board members, managing director or shareholder can be 
held liable. In some jurisdictions, veil piercing is commonly substituted with a de 
facto director doctrine.442 It allows treating someone as a director who is not formally 
a director and applying liability in damages as well as the duty of care standard. Still, 
if the damage is not caused by the management’s decision but just the separation 
of corporations has left the creditors unsatisfied, there is no action on which to 
base the liability. Veil piercing can target the arrangements where the potential for 
damages is built into the structure of the arrangement so that it needs no decision 
or action from the management to materialize. For example, separating the business 
440 See the argument in Hagstrøm 1993 at 251. He chooses to discard the view.
441 See Havu – Pihlajarinne – Vesala 2015 at 600. See also C724/17 and KKO 2019:90 where the 
competition law concept of enterprise was interpreted broadly to include corporation that received the 
business activities of a voluntarily dissolved corporation.
442 For example, Belgium. See Vandekerckhove 2007 at 31–32.
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into two corporations, one holding assets and one performing a high tort chance 
operation. The corporation carrying a negative business risk can perform in every 
way in accordance with the law until the risk realizes and it is unable to cover the 
damages. Veil piercing could apply, but liability in damages cannot.443
2.7.4.  Company Law Offense
Company Act includes a provision criminalizing certain violations (Company 
Act 25:1). If a person intentionally performs a violation, she can be issued a fine 
or a maximum of one year imprisonment. If another criminal provision provides a 
more severe penalty for the conduct, it should be assessed per that provision. The 
conduct prohibited by the provision includes public trading of a private company, 
violation of the drafting of the statement of an auditor and circumventing voting 
restrictions. Most significantly for this study, Subparagraph 4 prohibits conduct that 
“violates the protection of the shareholders or the creditors by distributing the assets 
of the company in contravention of the provisions of this Act.” This criminalizes 
intentional unlawful distribution.
Whereas it is admirable that unlawful distribution is so strongly condemned, this 
criminalization does not prevent additional types of conduct. Unlawful distribution 
is already governed by the refund obligation and liability in damages. It is uncertain 
whether Subparagraph 4 has any application at all, as debtor’s dishonesty also 
applies in similar situations.444 For these reasons, company law offense is not further 
considered in this work.
2.7.3.  Asset Recovery
Asset recovery is the method of creditor equality and the preventive tool for 
detrimental transactions. It is governed by the Act on the Recovery of Assets to 
a Bankruptcy Estate. If the debtor makes any transaction that improperly favors 
one creditor over another, removes property from the ownership of the debtor or 
contracts further debt to the detriment of all the creditors, asset recovery allows 
the reversal of that transaction (Asset Recovery Act Section 5). This is the general 
recovery norm, and there are several recovery norms that target specific types of 
transactions, i.e., gifts, debt payments, giving collateral or oversized compensation 
(Asset Recovery Act 6–14 §). Reversal has several conditions that must be met. The 
transaction needs to have been made while the debtor was insolvent or while the 
transaction led to insolvency. If the transaction was a gift, it should be made while 
overindebted or lead to overindebtedness instead of insolvency. The other party to 
443 A similar isolation problem exists with supply chains. Separate personality is used to hide things 
down the supply chain to keep the visible part of the business clean of unwanted issues. See Salminen 
2017.
444 About the question see Savela 2009.
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the transaction knew or should have known about the insolvency or the significance 
the transaction had on the financial standing of the debtor as well as the facts that 
made the transaction improper. In addition, the transaction needs to have been 
made in proximity to the insolvency proceedings. The time frame ranges from three 
months to five years. The further the transaction was made from the bankruptcy, the 
harder it is to show the improper nature of the transaction or the financial state of 
the debtor at the time.
Asset recovery differs from veil piercing in several key aspects. Like the unlawful 
distribution of assets, it is restricted to transactions where assets are transferred 
away from the debtor’s estate. It does entail every possible transaction, even those 
where the debtor remains passive. Still, it requires the assets to leave one entity’s 
estate and enter another. Like unlawful distribution, asset recovery is not suitable for 
situations in which the negative business risk is placed on third parties illegitimately. 
These arrangements do not necessarily need to transfer anything from the support 
corporation to the asset corporation, at least not in a manner that would fall under 
the application of asset recovery. Instead, the realization of the negative risk is 
arranged into an entity other than the assets, resulting in losses for the creditors. The 
entity carrying the negative risk need not make any transfer of assets to the entity 
carrying the assets. Their relationship can be formed in an at-market-value business 
relationship, turning the transactions into legitimate business transactions that are 
hardly improper. At the least, it significantly limits the transactions that can be 
reversed. At-market-value does not mean that the corporation turns a profit or has 
enough assets to cover the realization of the negative business risk.
A more interesting point of comparison between asset recovery and piercing would 
be the close party concept. The Asset Recovery Act Section 3 deems a corporation a 
close party to the debtor based on essential joint economic interest or competence 
in the corporation. Close party status is based on either share ownership or some 
factor that is comparable to share ownership and creates an essential joint economic 
interest. In preparatory works and literature, this comparable situation has been 
interpreted to mean a right to the profits of the corporation.445 The right to payment 
based on the level of the profits could also create such joint interest.446 Potential use 
for the analysis of this would have been the allocation of benefits criterion explicated 
in KKO 2017:94 and discussed in V.6.4. of this work. Alternatively, it could have 
been used to develop the views on a business operation run in symbiosis between 
several entities. If we accept such a narrow interpretation of the criterion, it does 
not seem especially useful for these purposes. Some weak support could be derived, 
445 See HE 102/1990 at 45, Ovaska 1991 at 155 and Tuomisto 2012 at 26.
446 HE 102/1990 at 45, Leppänen 1992 at 121, Immonen 1994 at 52 and especially Tuomisto 2012 
at 26–30. See also Ovaska 1991 at 155, who sees it necessary for additional elements to be present for 
closeness to be established. He does not specify what sorts of elements.
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though, mostly through the observation that similar issues have emerged in another 
context.
Urpo Kangas does present the opinion that control rights combined with 
aligned economic interests allow holding the parties as close regardless of 
the formal legal status that exists.447 This characterization would seemingly 
mean a greater resemblance between veil piercing and closeness, in the sense 
that they allow disregarding the formal outlook. In my opinion, though, this 
only amounts to another repetition of the “principle of substance over form”. 
Leppänen concludes that comparability to share ownership exists when 
one corporation practices its business through another one that it controls 
through finance or other contracts.448 
A more interesting criterion would be the closeness based on the control position 
in a collective. Persons who hold essential control over the corporation based on 
leadership are close parties. This criterion could prove useful when assessing control 
in veil piercing situations. It does emphasize control, in fact, as opposed to the 
formal view of position.449 Any person with control could be a close party. Control 
is essential when the controller can affect any contract made with herself.450 This 
issue is further discussed in relation to veil piercing in chapter V.3.4. of this work.
447 See Kangas 1994 at 277 and 280.
448 See Leppänen 1991 at 279 footnote 29. Similarly, see Ovaska 1991 at 155. He also gives significance 
to the financial relationship and the control it brings over the corporation.
449 See Tuomisto 1997 and Tuomisto 2012 at 35. He is of the opinion that no form of control is suffi-
cient, but it needs to be based on a formal position within the organization. Other forms of control could 
instead be interpreted through the comparable to share ownership criterion. A bit differently, see HE 
102/1990 at 45–46 and Kangas 1994 at 280–281, where no requirement of a formal position is laid out. 
This difference does not reduce the usefulness of this section when developing the control requirement in 
veil piercing. Therefore, I will not discuss the correct interpretation any further here.
450 See Immonen 1943 at 53.
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3.  Conclusions
3.1.  Short List of Elements
The examined doctrines need to be divided into two categories. First, there are the 
doctrines that allow for veil piercing and act as points of analogy for developing 
the veil piercing doctrine. These include artificial property arrangements, tax 
avoidance, environmental damage liability and pay security. The second category 
includes creditor protection doctrines that serve similar purposes to veil piercing, 
thus serving to limit the need for it. Some interpretative support could be derived 
from them, although these doctrines are essentially different from veil piercing. 
Support derived from these doctrines needs to be evaluated more thoroughly to 
determine whether it is compatible with piercing. These doctrines include debtor’s 
dishonesty, forfeiture, unlawful distribution, liability for damages and asset recovery. 
The questions are: what can be adopted from these doctrines, and how does the 
second category diminish the need for piercing the veil? The similar features of these 
doctrines are displayed in the table below.
?
Figure 4. The analogous doctrines’ elements and veil piercing
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?
Figure 5. The limiting doctrines’ elements and veil piercing
From this list of elements, some observations can be made. Most creditor 
protection instruments require insolvency. Veil piercing does not, though it is 
commonly thought that piercing liability should be secondary in nature. It should 
be possible only when it has been established that the primary liable party is unable 
to satisfy the claim. The courts in the KKO 2015:17 procedure did not adopt this 
position, though it could be argued that Arctecho’s inability to satisfy the claim was 
apparent, as it had seized operations soon after the claim was made. The courts did 
not address the question directly, though. In addition, the creditors usually have no 
interest in a piercing claim should the debtor be able to satisfy the claim.
The intent to abuse appears in several doctrines in addition to veil piercing, and 
these doctrines can be used to develop veil piercing in this regard. Many of the legal 
creditor protection doctrines seem to require a transaction—a transfer of assets. They 
follow the assets the debtor has accrued and attempts to transfer outside the reach of 
creditors. These doctrines set effective limitations on the transfers. The protection 
they offer is comprehensive. Veil piercing case law shows that piercing does not target 
transfers of assets.451 Rather, it targets situations in which the corporate separateness is 
used to accrue illegitimate benefits or separate the negative risks from those benefits. 
This goal is attainable without relying on transactions or, at the least, without 
making transactions limited by the described legal tools. This difference needs to be 
considered when developing the piercing doctrine later in this work.
451 KKO 1996:2, KKO 1997:17 and KKO 2015:17. Also THO 29.6.2016 no. 711, THO 26.10.2016 
no. 1070.
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The business reason is a common factor in most of the examined doctrines. 
Without an exception, business reasons are used to prevent liability. Legitimate 
business reasons prove that the arrangement does, in fact, match the reality of the 
case. If the asset transfers have a business purpose, e.g., they further the profit-making 
purpose of the corporation,452 they are neither unlawful distribution or detrimental 
to the creditors in a criminal law sense, but in taxation, the tax benefits alone do not 
constitute a business purpose even if they increase corporate profits. The term’s given 
content differs a bit from doctrine to doctrine. Veil piercing based on the KKO 
2015:17 decision adopts the term, though it leaves open the exact meaning of it.
Damaging creditors would seem the most basic requirement in the application 
of creditor protection norms. Figures 4 and 5 do confirm this. The exceptions are 
tax avoidance, forfeiture and unlawful distribution. Tax avoidance is not a creditor 
protection norm as it aims to the correct assignment of tax. Forfeiture is an attached 
consequence of criminal activity that allows the seizure of any criminal proceeds. 
It does not require damaging some other party, though another damaged party is 
usually present. Unlawful distribution can damage creditor’s, but damage is not 
needed to make the distribution unlawful. The veil piercing doctrine laid out in the 
KKO 2015:17 decision explicitly requires damaging creditors or evading a norm. 
These doctrines could offer support in determining what constitutes damaging 
creditors.
Reprehensibility is one of the requirements of veil piercing per the KKO 2015:17 
decision. It does not commonly appear in creditor protection norms. Only pay 
security and asset recovery have it. Pay security has it only because it utilizes the 
piercing doctrine as it is in case law. There is no legislation about pay security that 
would use the reprehensibility requirement. Asset recovery does use the similar 
term “improper,” which could provide some useful material for the interpretation of 
reprehensibility. A closer inspection later in this work, however, will reveal that the 
intent to abuse criterion and reprehensibility are largely compatible.453
Artificiality is another requirement of piercing. The tables show that the analogous 
doctrines unanimously give it some significance. The next item in the table, substance 
over form, is pretty much the same as artificiality. These items appear separately in the 
table to accommodate the wordings of all the relevant provisions, but these elements 
are so alike that they will be treated as a single element from this point in this work. 
Artificiality is when the legal form (form) does not match the economic reality of 
the case (substance). These doctrines then allow for treating the arrangement based 
on the economic substance of the case, hence substance over form. No doubt, the 
artificiality in veil piercing can derive material from these doctrines.
452 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 349 and 375.
453 See V.4.3.3. of this work.
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Kukkonen has used three criteria to determine the application of debtor’s 
fraud, debtor’s dishonesty, artificial arrangement and asset recovery. He 
inspects the nature of the arrangements and actions. If the actions are fake 
legal actions, the effects of such arrangement are void and cannot be upheld 
to the detriment of third parties. Even the creditors in insolvency proceedings 
can make this claim. Not disclosing fake legal actions fulfills the requirements 
of debtor’s fraud. If the legal actions are genuine, they can be targeted only 
with asset recovery, and the conduct can constitute debtor’s dishonesty. If the 
legal actions are artificial, then they can be disregarded in relation to some 
party by utilizing the abuse norms, though they are not deemed void nor are 
they illegal. The disregard only affects the process in which the abuse norm 
is invoked and could constitute debtor’s fraud.454 This division is applicable 
as such in veil piercing. The risk isolation structure targeted by veil piercing 
is neither fake legal action nor genuine. It is artificial in the same sense that 
Kukkonen defines artificiality. This would lead to the application of Criminal 
Code 39:2.1.3, withholding information on control the debtor holds over 
some property should the debtor neglect to disclose the arrangement in an 
insolvency proceeding.455 The fact that the information needs to be disclosed 
does not necessarily mean that the information leads to the disregard of the 
arrangement. The focus on this study is precisely on the requirements under 
which the artificial arrangement can be disregarded and the answer to that 
follows not from this division.
Control also is required for piercing the veil. Again, the analogous doctrines all 
adopt this in their application, though they do not place as strong of an emphasis 
on it as veil piercing. In addition, asset recovery and forfeiture do utilize the concept 
of control when determining whether a legal person is a close party to the debtor. 
The control concepts these doctrines use can provide some interpretative material 
for piercing.
The last item is departing from standard patterns. This examines whether the 
doctrines consider deviating from ordinary and accepted business practices and legal 
forms. Many of these doctrines interpret this deviation as a sign of artificiality and 
are supportive of piercing. It is worth considering whether this sort of behavior is 
meaningful in veil piercing also.
454 See Kukkonen 2011 at 147–153.
455 See Kukkonen 2011 at 151.
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3.2.  Limiting the Application of Veil Piercing
Two elements from the list were intentionally left for last. Risk separation (or 
isolation of negative risk) and requiring a transfer of assets seem to be the dividing 
factor between creditor protection rules in legislation and legal norms allowing veil 
piercing.
Veil piercing should not be used to further limit the transfers of assets. This is 
an area of business the legislator has thoroughly attended to. Business practitioners 
should be allowed to trust the legal situation and plan their actions accordingly. 
Transfers of assets do not correlate with the requirements of veil piercing as they 
were laid out in KKO 2015:17. Transfers do not utilize corporate group relations, 
intercorporate relations or shareholder’s control. Additionally, as with tax avoidance 
norms, veil piercing should not be used to create more comprehensive restrictions 
on asset transfers.456 Veil piercing could apply to situations in which these norms are 
circumvented by isolating the negative business risk. Either assets can be transferred 
legally for a time or no transfers are needed at all for the benefits to materialize 
outside the creditors’ reach. The transfer of assets, especially if used systematically 
to empty the corporation, can indirectly hint toward reprehensibility. The corporate 
controller aims to minimize the exposure of assets to negative risk at the expense of 
the creditors. Then the application of unlawful distribution norms, asset recovery 
or debtor’s dishonesty would not prevent the application of piercing as well. In fact, 
applying these doctrines would hint toward the systematic behavior and support the 
finding of reprehensibility in a piercing decision.
This brings us to risk separation. Figures 4 and 5 show a clear pattern. The doctrines 
that allow veil piercing unanimously consider separating negative risk for losses from 
positive chance for profit when disregarding given legal forms. These doctrines can 
assess whether using separate entities was inappropriate risk management. The more 
transaction-oriented doctrines in Figure 5 assess whether the transaction changed 
the creditor’s risk position and not whether the arrangement itself was undertaken 
to isolate the negative risk.
The exclusion of transactions and the existing doctrines’ embracing of risk 
separation means that veil piercing’s scope should be construed around risk. With 
piercing claims, the court should examine the damage creditors have suffered 
and the actions that led to it. If the creditors were damaged because the debtor 
transferred assets outside their reach, veil piercing should not apply. If the damage 
results from isolation of negative risk from positive risk into another entity, and later 
the realization of said negative risk, then veil piercing will apply. It is entirely possible 
that some damage is the result of transfers and some is due to the separation or that 
456 For similar warnings in the US, see Bainbridge 2000 at 56–57, although he argues to abolish veil 
piercing and use asset transfer restrictions and tort instead.
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the isolation of risks is partly done via transfer. In these cases, the transfers are part of 
the pattern that supports veil piercing. In these cases, veil piercing should be allowed 
alongside the legislated creditor protection doctrines that target transfers. The 
amounts not recoverable from transfer-oriented doctrines would equal the amount 
of damage done by isolation.
A few more words are needed on the relationship between debtor’s dishonesty 
and veil piercing. Debtor’s dishonesty can apply in risk separation situations also. The 
isolation of negative risk can be achieved using a single limited liability corporation 
in a situation where the corporate controller continues business operations even 
when she knows the risk for losses is clearly greater than with standard business. 
If there is no chance the controller would incur the damages the realization of the 
negative risk would cause, veil piercing could apply alongside debtor’s dishonesty. 
This would mean strong disincentives to operate an especially high-risk business if it 
is not given sufficient assets and any accrued assets are systematically siphoned away. 
The benefits do not necessarily exist, as they could materialize if the gamble is won. 
Then the negative risk is carried by third parties and the chance for profits by the 
controller. Veil piercing could apply to these situations if the controller manages to 
manipulate the requirements of debtor’s dishonesty so that it will not apply to the 
conduct. Veil piercing and debtor’s dishonesty can target the same conduct.
If criminal liability for some reason does not attach, then the creditor could claim 
damages for the exact same situation. The problem is that, in civil law, damages 
claim Criminal Code 9:2 does not apply, so the liability cannot be extended to 
separate persons based only on control. The creditor can only make a claim against 
the corporation. Veil piercing could change this by allowing the extension to the 
controller and possibly other entities of the corporate arrangement. Depending 
on the reason criminal charges were dismissed, the existence of investigation and 
charges can be utilized in the showing of reprehensibility as required by piercing. 
Reprehensibility could be claimed especially if the dismissal was only due to 
procedural rules.
?Figure 6. Business risk, piercing the veil and the crime of debtor’s dishonesty visualized
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In practice, criminal investigation allows access to information that would 
not normally be available to creditors. Even if the criminal charges are dropped, 
the plaintiff is left with a more comprehensive information set. On the offset, 
however, criminal investigation and prosecution are independent of the creditor, 
and the creditor cannot affect the procedure that much. Debtor’s dishonesty and 
liability in damages that follow from criminal conduct are statutory tools with 
unambiguous application. This makes them more predictable, and hence, it is safer 
to seek satisfaction using them. Criminal liability utilizes a stricter burden of proof 
requirement, though. Veil piercing should be secondary to debtor’s dishonesty for 
only practical reasons, simply because the presence of criminal liability makes it 
obsolete to pierce the veil. In theory, there are no reasons to favor one or the other. 
This leaves the choice to the creditor.
IV PRACTICAL CHOICE OF REMEDY
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1.   Introduction
Situations around corporations and creditors are often complex and often facilitate 
opportunistic actions that complicate things even further. To combat opportunism, 
several liability doctrines exist. Earlier in this work, I have examined some liability 
doctrines in a brief manner. This section takes those doctrines and some others into 
account in an attempt to show just how complex and even random the piercing 
situations can be. The available evidence can enable the utilization of several of these 
doctrines, and the same pieces of evidence can be useful in multiple doctrines. I will 
examine the Supreme Court decision in the KKO 2015:17 case and seek alternative 
methods to achieve the same result of creditor compensation. Then I will perform 
the same examination with the arrangement from KKO 2017:94. It should be noted 
that, for this section, I will use the totality of the public court materials from these 
cases and not only the published precedent.
 Would tort liability, debtor’s dishonesty, forfeiture, asset recovery or unlawful 
distribution provide a sufficient answer? Could the creditor’s claims have been 
satisfied without relying on the controversial veil piercing doctrine? Each of these 
remedies does address certain conduct by examining their strengths and weaknesses. 
The analysis in this section serves to examine the scope of application for veil piercing 
in relation to these other remedies. By doing this, the piercing doctrine should 
become more concrete and accurate as I show the inadequacies of the statutory 
remedies in certain situations. Through this, I attempt to map an unregulated 
grey area of opportunism where the statutory remedies do not apply but where 
intervention still is necessary.
This examination also serves another function. The practicing lawyers often need 
to make a choice between these remedies. The choice can be far from easy. In this 
section, I will analyze the potential choices. The facts of the cases are taken as a given, 
and I will discuss the application of the potential remedies based on the facts.
2.  The Verkkokauppa Case – KKO 2015:17
2.1.  A Short Description of the Case
I will begin by describing the facts and the story of the KKO 2015:17 decision, 
as I did in I.2. of this work. I leave it up to the reader to choose whether another 
read-through is necessary. The repeated parts are indented. For the coherence of the 
analysis, though, the description is necessary here.
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The case was about a Finnish corporation named Verkkokauppa.com Oy and 
its Estonian subsidiary, Arctecho Oü.457 The court found that Verkkokauppa 
had practiced part of its business through Arctecho and thus had avoided 
paying remuneration for private copying. The court inspected the ownership 
and control structure of the corporations and deduced that the central interest 
in the division of business was avoiding said legal obligation. Verkkokauppa 
was held liable for the neglected remunerations along with Arctecho.
Arctecho had sold storage devices exclusively to Finnish consumers via 
verkkokauppa.com. On this website, the user selected a product category 
called “direct deliveries.”  Selecting this category transferred the user to a page 
that informed that she could order products directly from the warehouse 
of verkkokauppa.ee from Estonia without having to pay the remunerations. 
After making a purchase, the client received a confirmation email from an 
employee of Verkkokauppa, and the contact information given was that of 
Verkkokauppa. The confirmation email made no mention whatsoever of 
Arctecho or verkkokauppa.ee. 
Of the of Arctecho stock, 51% was owned by S, 29% by Verkkokauppa, 
and the rest by two board members of Verkkokauppa until 30 June 2009. 
After said date, the whole stock was owned by Verkkokauppa. S also held the 
positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors. At the same time, S 
was a member of Arctecho’s board of directors, which only had two positions. 
S had the right to represent both of the corporations alone.
Teosto, the Finnish agency for the collection of remunerations for 
copyright usage, argued that Arctecho had been founded only to avoid the 
legal obligation of paying remunerations.  Verkkokauppa should be held 
liable for the neglected remunerations as the real operator of the business. 
Verkkokauppa denied liability and claimed that Arctecho was an independent 
limited liability company situated in Estonia and, as such, its liabilities could 
not belong to a Finnish corporation.
In its defense, Verkkokauppa claimed various other reasons for situating 
Arctecho in Estonia, such as taxation and general level of costs. However, 
Arctecho was shut down right after the remunerations were demanded, 
despite the fact that it could have continued the business and just added 
the remuneration to the selling price of the products, as is customary. The 
Supreme Court found that the sole or the primary purpose of the corporation 
was to avoid the remunerations.
The fact that Arctecho itself had acquired some products it was selling 
from manufacturers and that it contracted the product logistics was not 
457 The fact that the subsidiary was foreign holds no meaning for the future interpretation of the veil 
piercing requirements. See Savela 2015 at 409 and 412.
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enough to prove that Arctecho was an independent actor. In addition, from 
the customer’s viewpoint, Arctecho’s operations appeared as Verkkokauppa’s 
business. The Supreme Court found Arctecho to be completely dependent on 
Verkkokauppa. Verkkokauppa had, in fact, conducted part of its core business 
via Arctecho in order to achieve advantage by avoiding legal obligations. 
Considering ownership and control relationships, the Supreme Court 
deduced that the key objective for founding a limited liability company in 
Estonia and operating the business from there was in fact avoiding the legal 
obligations. The conduct of Verkkokauppa was found reprehensible enough 
to set aside Arctecho’s position as a corporation separate from its owners, and 
Verkkokauppa was held liable for the neglected remunerations.
It was clear from the start that Arctecho was founded under the assumption that 
the remuneration duty did not apply to it. The defendants even claim that they asked 
Teosto about this, and in their opinion, Teosto had affirmed the non-existence of 
the remuneration duty. Teosto denies giving such an answer. In all simplicity, if such 
an answer existed, then Teosto was certainly aware of the damaging actions and 
had accepted them. On that occasion, no damage could be claimed. The evidence 
the defendants brought about Teosto’s answer was not convincing, and the courts 
denied this argument.458
This case was interesting from a tort perspective, as the parties discussed the 
nature of the remunerations. The prevailing opinion was that the remunerations are 
a natural compensation for damage caused by illegally copying artists’ works.459 As 
such, they are tort claims under Brussels I Article 5. This question was discussed 
because Arctecho claimed the Finnish courts had no jurisdiction and the correct 
forum was Estonian. The claim was dismissed as the characterization of tort 
established the Finnish court’s jurisdiction.
Even if the remunerations are, in essence, compensation for damage, they 
are not directly claimable in accordance with the Tort Liability Act. The ruling 
was in accordance with Brussels I Article 5 and was solely meant to establish the 
jurisdiction. When jurisdiction was established, the Finnish court could decide on 
Arctecho’s duty to pay these remunerations. The duty to pay was in turn decided 
by determining the importer of the products in accordance with Section 26a of 
the Finnish Copyright Act. All the court instances deemed Arctecho the importer 
and thus held it liable for the neglected remunerations. Unfortunately, during the 
trial, Arctecho had terminated its operations and could not pay the remunerations. 
458 See especially the appellate court decision’s differing opinion by Judge Palmela at 11 and 12.
459 The opposing opinion was that the remunerations are just normal credit and claiming them is nor-
mal debt collection.
128
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
Fortunately, Teosto had claimed both Verkkokauppa.com Oy460 and Arctecho Oü 
liable from the beginning. I will not discuss Arctecho’s liability further. Instead, 
I will focus on the liability of Verkkokauppa and potentially S. Going forward, I 
will not address all the facts of the case. I only pick relevant ones from the written 
materials and base my analysis on them.
2.2.  Liability for Damages
2.2.1.  Limitations to the Application of the Tort Liability Act
The Tort Liability Act Chapter 2, Section 1 reads, “A person who deliberately or 
negligently causes injury or damage to another shall be liable for damages, unless 
otherwise follows from the provisions of this Act….” The damage thus needs to be 
caused deliberately or negligently and in causal relation to the action. In a corporate 
group context, the liability dilutes very likely. The default situation is that the 
company is liable for damages caused in its operations based on the Tort Liability 
Act. Within the company, liability is determined according to Company Act. Here, 
however, we are not interested in the default situation. We seek to hold someone else 
liable because the default liable party cannot pay the remunerations. Potential liable 
parties include Verkkokauppa, S as he was the control holder in Verkkokauppa, and 
the board of directors of Arctecho. Regarding Verkkokauppa and S, the argument 
is that they have used their control in Arctecho to ensure that remunerations were 
not paid, thus causing the damage. As for the management of Arctecho, Company 
Act Chapter 22, Section 1 determines the liability for damages. The management is 
liable for damage caused to the company if the management has violated its duty of 
care, a Company Act provision or the bylaws.
Currently, a strong division exists between Company Act liability for damages 
and the Tort Liability Act. The argument goes that when another law governs the 
liability for damages, the Tort Liability Act does not apply.461 The liability system in 
Company Act is exclusive and cannot be complemented by the Tort Liability Act.462 
However, the decision in KKO 1983 II 157 takes the stance that if one person acts 
in several different capacities and causes the damage, the systems could be used as 
alternatives to each other.463 It remains debatable as to whether this can be applied 
in a corporate context.464 Company Act also governs the liability of the shareholders 
460 Then Arctecho Oy, the Estonian subsidiary, had the same name aside from the different corporate 
identifier “Oü.”
461 This is even expressed in the Tort Liability Act Chapter 1, Section 1. About the interpretation, see 
Nyström 2015 at 636–640.
462 See Saarnilehto 2007 at 30 and Nyström 2015 at 636–637.
463 See also Nyström 2015 at 638.
464 See Nyström 2015.
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for damage they caused in that capacity (Company Act 22:2). It could thus be 
argued that we cannot apply the Tort Liability Act to the conduct of Verkkokauppa 
or the management of Arctecho as the Company Act liability system takes priority.
We could argue, however, that Verkkokauppa or S acted in a different capacity 
in Arctecho’s operation. Besides their positions as shareholders and in the case of S 
as a board member, did they act like the ones causing the damage? If they acted to 
cause the damage in a capacity that was not their capacity in the corporation, the 
corporation is not liable,465 but they would still have caused the damage. It is easily 
established that S was the one actually making the decisions and held de facto control 
over the conduct either directly or through Verkkokauppa. Could they then be held 
liable for using this control? This interpretation could be possible but is a large step 
away from the requirements of the causal relationship between the actions and the 
damage.
Unfortunately, the material of the case does not mention acts of control that could 
be considered to enable liability for torts. The material does not mention a direct or 
implied order to neglect the remunerations given by Verkkokauppa or S to Arctecho 
in their capacities as controllers. The Supreme Court held apparent in the decision 
that the corporate group structure was designed to neglect the remunerations. 
The materials do not even give reasons to believe that Verkkokauppa or S acted in 
capacities other than shareholder and board member, respectively. It would also 
be extremely problematic to base the hypothetical other capacity to the exercise of 
control, as it would be impossible to differentiate at which capacity they acted when 
controlling Arctecho: as the corporation-related shareholder and manager positions 
or as persons outside the corporation capable of influencing the corporation.
Should we still wish to apply the Tort Liability Act to this conduct, we would have 
to show that the decision made in Arctecho was actually made by Verkkokauppa 
or S and that Arctecho was but a straw man acting according to the directions of 
Verkkokauppa. This would not change the formal actor, however. We would need 
justification for going over the formal actor. Applying tort liability in this case would 
require extending its usual interpretation to resemble veil piercing. 
2.2.2.  Especially Weighty Reasons as a Requirement for Compensating 
Economic Loss
Another issue arises from the Tort Liability Act Chapter 5, Section 1. According 
to it, economic loss that is not connected to personal injury or damage to property 
shall be compensated only where the injury or damage has been caused by an act 
punishable by law in the exercise of public authority or in other cases where there 
are especially weighty reasons. It is obvious that there has not been personal injury 
or damage to property in the inspected case. Compensating such pure economic 
465 See Karhu – Ståhlberg 2013 at 111.
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loss needs some justification. Of the options, only the especially weighty reasons 
seem plausible. This provision of law is especially hard to interpret. In the literature, 
violating fair business practices has been cited as justification,466 although in one 
Supreme Court case, even violations of the Fair Business Practices Act were not 
enough to allow the compensation of economic loss.467 Ari Savela sees the nature of 
the damaging action being as something that can only lead to economic loss. In these 
cases, the tort system’s coherence requires finding the especially weighty reasons.468 
Within the context here, only economic loss can result from the use of the corporate 
form. This would somewhat support the presence of especially weighty reasons 
in the grey area between piercing and tort. Still, the causality requirement of tort 
would need to be somewhat loosely interpreted even then.
In the literature, even abuse of rights has been thought to constitute especially 
weighty reasons.469 This opinion has an interesting connection to the KKO 
2015:17 decision since veil piercing was formulated based on the abuse of corporate 
form. Violating some internationally established norms could also allow the 
compensation.470 Pihlajarinne, Havu and Vesala have argued that veil piercing was 
adopted in KKO 2015:17 because Finnish courts had the obligation to achieve 
the results laid down in EU legislation,471 e.g., not doing this would have led to a 
violation of an international norm. The case is full of similarities to tort liability, 
but at all points, it seems that deviation from a standard interpretation would be 
necessary to establish liability. A similar issue was raised in C-724/17 and KKO 
2019:90. The Finnish Supreme Court asked the European Court of justice for 
resolution, whether requiring artificiality and reprehensibility to establish liability 
would obstruct the fulfillment of desired results of EU legislation. Artificiality and 
reprehensibility criteria appear also in veil piercing test and thus it would have been 
clarifying to receive this resolution. Unfortunately for this research, the case was 
resolved with other means and neither court addressed this question.
2.2.3.  Possibility of Applying Tort Liability in KKO 2015:17?
I find some support for the idea that veil piercing was adopted in the decision 
because applying tort liability would have required too many concessions to the 
tort doctrine. Basing the liability on tort doctrine would have required the court 
to interpret causality more loosely, greatly extend the especially weighty reasons 
beyond their established interpretation, or alternatively, consider the founding of 
466 See Ståhlberg – Karhu 2013 at 326–328.
467 See KKO 1991:32.
468 Savela 2015 at 390–392 and the cases cited therein.
469 See Ylöstalo 1975 at 242–243.
470 Karhu – Ståhlberg 2013 at 329.
471 See Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 602. Similarly, see Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 
2018a at 19–20.
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a corporation as the damaging action. All would have undesirable consequences, 
as they would make the tort doctrine less consistent and predictable. By adopting 
piercing, at least the tort doctrine remained intact.
Let us inspect two concessions to causality that applying tort doctrine to the case 
would have required: 1) loosening the requirement of causality or 2) deriving the 
causality from founding the corporation.472 Both of these would require ignoring 
the formal actor. If we loosen the requirements of causality, we still would interpret 
the decision not to pay remunerations as the primary cause of the damage. However, 
the events and influences leading to this decision would be given greater emphasis. 
This would allow looking into the reasons for founding Arctecho and the primus 
motor behind the decision to found a subsidiary to sell products without paying 
the remunerations. This would utilize the connection between influence over the 
decision and the damage, regardless of the formal decision being made by others. 
This would resemble the piercing doctrine decided by the Supreme Court.
If we hypothetically place a different action as the basis of causality, we arrive in 
a bit of a different evaluation. The action that should be looked for is the founding 
of Arctecho. When Verkkokauppa founded Arctecho, it set in motion the chain of 
events that eventually led to the damage, whereas founding the corporation made it 
impossible to claim the damages from a solvent company. Thus, the damaging action 
was founding Arctecho. The damage is not the neglected payments but in the loss 
of the creditor’s claim. If we use this formulation of tort in piercing situations, we 
actually arrive with two damage concepts: first, Arctecho is liable for the damage it 
caused by neglecting the remunerations, and second, Verkkokauppa is liable for the 
damage caused by founding a corporation incapable of compensating the damage 
its operations caused. Verkkokauppa would most likely not be liable under non-
stretched tort doctrine.
If someone attempted to base a tort claim on founding a corporation, it would 
be rather easy to dismiss. Every decision to found a corporation is a risk limitation; 
this risk limitation is generally accepted in society and is thought of as beneficial 
and protected under freedom of trade. Under these circumstances, it would be 
laborious at best to establish negligence and especially weighty reasons required for 
compensating economic loss. That is, how far did the conduct derive from normal 
parent corporation guidance in a corporate group? Likely not at all.
2.2.4.  The Introduced Piercing Doctrine Resembles Tort
The Supreme Court did arrive at a piercing doctrine that greatly resembles tort liability, 
though. The key elements of tort liability are still there. There needs to be an action 
472 Note that I am analyzing only the KKO 2015:17 case here. In general inspection, the corporation 
does not need to be founded for unacceptable purpose, but, besides it, causality could be derived from any 
moment where the operation of an existing corporation was altered to enable the abuse.
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that is condemnable and results in damage to others—action, negligence, damage and 
causality are still there. They are all limited, however, and one requirement is added: 
the use of corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or shareholder’s 
control is the first limitation. The act part of tort doctrine is thus made much more 
narrow. It is limited to apply only to the use of the corporate form. Similarly, it limits 
the causal relationship part. The damage or evasion of a legal duty needs to causally 
link to the use of the corporate form. Finally, piercing required the use to be artificial 
and reprehensible. Deliberate or negligent behavior in tort law includes an element 
of reprehensibility and moral condemnation. They include an ex post opinion that 
someone should have acted in a different manner. Similarly, the reprehensibility 
requirement of veil piercing addresses the choice ex post and expresses a moral 
condemnation, that the behavior was not acceptable. The piercing doctrine adds the 
requirement of artificiality. This requirement is unknown to tort liability.
These similarities are striking. It seems that the veil piercing doctrine is modeled 
after tort liability and was born out of the need to extend the causal link to lengths 
that would have threatened the consistency of existing tort doctrine. Veil piercing 
could be thought of as a narrow exception to the general doctrine of torts, which 
would allow the use of the familiar concepts of causality and damage.
One addition must be made, however. If we adopt elements from tort, then 
the aforementioned question about what the causal link is needs to be answered. 
The formulation of the piercing doctrine guides us here. Piercing is possible when 
someone uses corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or shareholder’s 
control. The actions are determined and limited to these. This loose wording allows 
different interpretations. The damage can be from the creation of the arrangement, 
e.g., founding the corporation group structure prevented collection of the debt and 
thus caused damage. It can also be from the influence over the decision-making, e.g., 
one person could manipulate the contractual relationships of two corporations, and 
this manipulation caused one corporation to lose its assets.
Inspecting causality in piercing doctrine seems redundant, though. As mentioned, 
every founding of a corporation is a limitation of liability. If the negative risks are 
realized, then one benefits from the limitation of liability and another person is worse 
off. If the corporation fails, then the founder benefits from the limitation of liability 
and the creditors suffer some damage. Thus, the causality between the founding of 
the corporation and the damage is automatically present when a corporation fails. The 
same is true when someone uses a corporate arrangement. Being able to manipulate 
corporate actions without the action of founding them still bestows the benefits of 
separate personality and limited liability on the controller. Causality between the 
use and damage is an inevitable consequence of the nature of limited liability. No 
effort should be necessary to show the causality in a piercing case.
It is worth noting that KKO 2017:94 disfigures the comparison to tort a bit. 
In tort liability, the one performing the action would be liable. However, in said 
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decision, liability was not placed on the one exercising influence but rather on the 
party who benefitted from the actions. This is a clear deviation from tort. Piercing 
disregards condemnable arrangements, whereas tort doctrine seeks to compensate 
damage caused by condemnable arrangements.
2.3.  Company Act Liability for Damages
2.3.1.  Narrowing the Selection
Company Act 22:1 lays out the situations in which the management can be held liable. 
Liability follows from violations of the Company Act provisions, bylaws or duty of 
care. Almost identically, Company Act 22:3 governs the liability of a shareholder for 
violations of Company Act or bylaws.473 Verkkokauppa and S were both shareholders 
of Arctecho, and S was, along with another person, on Arctecho’s board of directors. 
Therefore, Company Act liability doctrines could potentially be applied here. Liability 
of the CEO or the chairperson of the board is not discussed here.
If we try to hold Verkkokauppa or S liable with the Company Act Chapter 22 
provisions, we encounter a problem. These sections require that the actions were in 
violation of the Company Act or the bylaws. The actions in the case were in violation 
of copyright law but not the Company Act. These liability provisions would prove 
inapplicable. Company Act liability provisions are problematic for other reasons, 
also. These sections are meant to cover damage to the corporation itself and third 
parties only if the Company Act or bylaws were violated. In practice, the Company 
Act provisions, a violation of which could lead to the damage of any third party, 
are limited to asset distribution and other creditor protection norms.474 Violating 
the bylaws can cause damage to a third party only when the bylaws have a clause 
that grants that party direct benefits.475 The management can also be liable for 
breaches of duty of care (Company Act 22:1.1). This liability is only for damages 
caused to the company. Plausibly applicable sections would thus be in violation of 
creditor protection norms, namely unlawful distribution (Company Act 13:1.3) 
and violation of duty of care.  
2.3.2.  Unlawful Distribution
Company Act 13:1.3 set out a norm that prohibits any transactions that reduce the 
assets of the company or increase its liabilities without a sound business reason. Any 
such transaction constitutes an unlawful distribution. If the recipient knew that the 
473 For more of these doctrines, see Savela 2015 at 11 onwards and 201–214. 
474 Savela 2015 at 143–150. He inspects each situation separately and only arrives at the affirmative 
conclusion in regard to the creditors.
475 About these sorts of clauses, see Kärki 2017 at 168–173.
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transactions were in violation of Company Act or the bylaws, they must refund the 
assets received (Company Act 13:4). The Company Act is not entirely explicit as to 
what constitutes unlawful distribution. Essentially, assets can be distributed from 
the corporation without receiving anything in return, only according to the rules in 
Company Act 13:1.1.476
Sound business reason can be understood to mean that the transaction needs to 
somehow further the purpose of the corporation,477 which, by default, is to create 
profit for the shareholders (Company Act 1:5). Thus, any motive counter to this 
purpose makes the transaction an unlawful distribution unless the bylaws contain 
a provision allowing such a transaction. The preparatory materials of the company 
give some guidance as to what unlawful distribution is. This includes gratuitous 
transactions and transactions where the compensation does not match the actual 
value of the assets leaving the corporation. For example, an overly high or low interest 
rate on a loan is an unlawful distribution.478 This effectively means that corporations 
have a duty to price their transactions at market value. However, the business reasons 
behind the underpriced transactions can be a bit more indirect. For example, an 
advertisement campaign and discount prices are a tool for attaining market share 
and thus constitute a sound business reason to justify the discount. It is arguable 
that the benefit of the corporate group also constitutes a business reason, at least to 
some extent.479
Did anything in the Verkkokauppa case suggest unlawful distribution? First of all, 
I must note that the analysis of the Finnish distribution and management liability 
system in the Verkkokauppa case would have been moot as Estonian law would 
have governed those claims. It is, thus, only theoretical interest in the relationships 
between different liability doctrines that are served through this examination. 
The analysis is therefore operated under the (false) assumption that Finnish law 
would have governed Arctecho’s operations. While this would not have benefitted 
the lawyers in the actual case, this change allows for deducing whether piercing or 
more traditional liability approaches are appropriate in an all-Finnish case. The 
examination only lends the facts of the corporate relationship, not the applicable 
laws.
The relationship between Verkkokauppa and Arctecho was organized as a 
contractual relationship. Arctecho purchased a lot of products and services from 
476 Exlcluding corporate gifts (Company Act 13:8).
477 See HE 109/2005 vp at 124.
478 HE 109/2005 vp at 124.
479 See KKO 2015:105. This sort of indirect corporate benefit through the corporate groups’ well-be-
ing is discussed in the context of group subsidies. See, for example, Nyström 2013, Villa 2016 and Vahtera 
2016. 
The issue is far from resolved, though, and further analysis on the subject would be interesting but falls 
outside the themes of this work.
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Verkkokauppa, and its funding was arranged in large part by loans from Verkkokauppa. 
Clearly, these transactions were happening between the two corporations. The case 
materials do not express any values for these transactions, and it remains undesirably 
laborious to seek those values and assess whether they matched the market value. 
This would require a thorough examination of the corporation’s accounts, as well as 
knowledge of the financial and data storage device markets during 2005–2009. For 
the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to note the existence of these transactions. 
Thus, some fertile ground for the unlawful distribution speculation is to be found.
To chase this line of argumentation further, we would have to prove that the 
transactions in reality were made below market value and were to the benefit of 
Verkkokauppa and at the expense of Arctecho. If this were established, Verkkokauppa 
would be duty-bound to refund the assets it received unlawfully. Insofar as these 
assets cannot be recovered through refund duty, the management of Arctecho would 
be liable for the damage caused by the unlawful distribution. The question is about 
whether they allowed the company to distribute assets at below-market value, thus 
violating Company Act provisions on asset distribution. The defendants did claim 
that the transactions were made according to at-arm’s-length terms.480 I will not go 
into detail who could be liable within the management, as the materials of the case 
do not provide information on this regard.
It is important to note that the refund obligation as well as the liability in damages 
would only cover the difference between the market value and the actual value 
of the transaction. This is because the loans and purchases no doubt had business 
purposes behind them – making Arctecho’s business possible. The transactions were 
unlawful distribution only for the parts that did not have a business purpose. When 
these transactions are made at market value, they have a business purpose, but when 
deviation from that value exists, there is damage to a party of the transaction and a 
benefit for the other.
Another hindrance with unlawful distribution is that only the corporation itself 
can claim these damages and refund obligation. Unlawful distribution does not 
directly hurt the creditors, though it makes it less likely that they receive their dues 
simply because the debtor corporation is worse off. Thus, for the creditor’s claim to 
damage, the corporation unlawfully distributing funds should first be proven unable 
to fulfill the creditors’ claims. Essentially, this means bankruptcy. In the examined 
case, this would have been a rather arduous procedure. Teosto would have had to 
first confirm Arctecho’s duty to pay remunerations through a court procedure, after 
which they would claim payment from Arctecho only to notice that it has seized 
operations. Then they would have had to make an application to an Estonian court 
to have Arctecho declared bankrupt. The bankruptcy estate could then claim some 
assets back from these transactions. They would naturally apply Estonian law to the 
480 See the District Court decision in KKO 2015:17 at 25–26.
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claims, and thus the refund obligation and liability in damages could be determined 
in a different manner, but the wording of the Estonian commercial code §1671 
could allow for a claim in damages similar to that in Finland. Estonia does not have 
a provision that would prohibit unlawful distribution similar to Finland. This would 
certainly have been a laborious and uncertain route to pursue the remunerations. 
Surprisingly, veil piercing does not seem too complicated in comparison.
2.4.  Debtor’s Dishonesty, Damages and Forfeiture  
of the Proceeds of the Crime
Here again, I must note that the analysis of the Finnish dishonesty by a debtor provision 
would not apply. The potential crimes would have been committed in Estonia and 
would thus be governed under Estonian law. I will not analyze the choice of law and 
jurisdiction in this work, as those questions are not of interest in the development 
of the veil piercing doctrine. It is thus only a theoretical interest in the relationships 
between different liability doctrines that are served through this examination. The 
analysis is thus operated under the (false) assumption that Finnish law would have 
governed Arctecho’s operations. While this would not have benefitted the lawyers 
in the actual case, this change allows for partially deducing whether piercing or more 
traditional liability approaches are appropriate in an all-Finnish case.
The examination only lends the facts of the corporate relationship, not the 
applicable laws. It is productive to lend the facts and impose a select alteration. 
This allows us to use the familiar facts and explore possibilities based on them. The 
alternative would have been either to seek another case or to invent one. The two 
major piercing cases are KKO 2015:17 and KKO 2017:94, and both are under 
analysis. There is simply no piercing case concrete enough to replace KKO 2015:17. 
Inventing one also seems worse than using an alternative law to the existing case. In 
an invented case, every fact would be made up, possibly leading to an arbitrary choice 
of facts and opening the work up to a critique of selecting the facts on an ideological 
basis or to favor an outcome of personal desire. The choice of law does not matter 
in a hypothetical analysis. Thus, the question answered here is what to note when 
making the choice between these doctrines in the future. It is most definitely not 
about how the actual situation described in KKO 2015:17 could have been resolved.
Debtor’s dishonesty, similar to unlawful distribution, requires transferring, giving 
away or destroying property, or alternatively, the baseless addition of liabilities. This 
action, then, needs to cause or worsen the insolvency of the debtor. Again, we have 
the same evidence on the transaction between the two corporations. Arctecho 
operated with funds it received from loans granted by Verkkokauppa, and Arctecho 
purchased the products mostly from Verkkokauppa. Should these transactions have 
been priced under market value, then these actions would constitute giving away 
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property without an acceptable reason. It was entirely possible and acceptable to 
operate Arctecho without the need to distribute assets and transfer the profits away 
as loan payments. If we could also determine that Arctecho was insolvent or became 
insolvent due to this, then the actions would constitute debtor’s dishonesty. We do 
not have any evidence of this. On the contrary, on the materials, the defendants 
argue that Arctecho was shut down in large part due to the cost risk created by 
Teosto’s claim. While this is not concrete proof of solvency, it certainly hints that 
the business was otherwise operational.
Yet one could argue that Arctecho should have been considered insolvent from 
the beginning. This would require an ius infinitum argument. Everyone must be 
aware of the content of the law, and ignorance is no excuse. Therefore, Arctecho and 
the management had to be aware of the remuneration duty, and by neglecting it, they 
added corporate liabilities without a basis. If these neglected liabilities are taken into 
account, it is arguable that Arctecho was insolvent at the time these remunerations 
were demanded at the latest. If we affirm that the management had to be aware of the 
remuneration duty, then the insolvency may have started even earlier. A third option 
for the beginning of the insolvency would be the date that the judgment on Teosto’s 
claim became final.
Determining between these dates becomes an effort to ascertain how obvious the 
remuneration duty was. Verkkokauppa and Arctecho did deny their remuneration 
duty in court and made a lot of effort to contest the duty. The most complicated legal 
issues were the correct forum and Verkkokauppa’s liability from piercing. Arctecho’s 
duty to pay remunerations was a much more simple issue, and arguably, it was 
simple enough that denying it was clearly without a basis in law. Should Arctecho 
and its representatives have known that contesting the duty was moot? The duty 
to pay remunerations is based on EU regulation, which requires the member states 
to ensure that the artists receive the remunerations. The EU Court’s case law had 
an earlier decision deeming it impossible that a seller does not pay remunerations 
to any member state.481 It arguably could not have been obvious to Arctecho that 
an arrangement where no one pays the remunerations is impossible. The question 
was argued in the EUC and was only resolved after the Arctecho arrangement 
was dissolved. At the time, the legal issue was unclear. The argumentation that the 
purchasers were the importers of the products was also obviously contra legem. This 
interpretation would have invoked an exception to the remuneration duty. Denying 
the remuneration duty was plausible at that time.
Instead of providing some route toward satisfaction of the creditors, debtor’s 
dishonesty seems to only take the existing approach of unlawful distribution and adds 
481 EUC 16.6.2011, C-462/09 (Opus) at 10,12 and 38–40. Additionally, KKO 2016:65 established 
the management’s duty to be aware of the core legal issues of the company even when a division of duties 
exists.
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another requirement to the mix. Establishing debtor’s dishonesty in this case would 
require proving the same aspects as unlawful distribution and then one would still 
need to prove that the corporation was insolvent during the distribution or became 
insolvent due to it. The heightened burden of proof in the criminal procedure creates 
yet another disadvantage to this approach. As an advantage though, the prosecutor 
would be on the case, and the cost risk of trial would be lower.
If a crime has caused damage, then that damage can be claimed in full. If the 
damages are not claimed, then the prosecutor needs to demand forfeiture of 
the proceeds of the crime. Could Teosto claim the full amount of the neglected 
remunerations as damage? The amount of unpaid debt no doubt is the damage 
the creditor suffers. If the transactions caused the insolvency of Arctecho, then a 
causal relation between the damaging act exists, and the full unpaid amount could 
be claimed. The transactions caused insolvency and then insolvency caused damage 
to creditors, as the company could no longer operate and receive cash flow to pay 
creditors, although a contrary argument could be presented about limiting the 
liability to transferred amounts when the debtor’s cash flow was uncertain.482 If the 
company was legitimately nearing insolvency and thus unlikely to ever be able to pay 
the credit, then the criminal transactions might not be in causal relation to the total 
unpaid debts that could be claimed in bankruptcy. Instead, the damage would only 
be the amount these transactions caused, e.g., the transactions that had no benefit 
for the business or those that deviated from the market value to the detriment of the 
debtor.
Although dishonesty by a debtor could, in theory, apply to a situation with these 
facts, it does have several key complications. First, will the prosecutor take the case? 
Second, there is a heightened burden of proof in a criminal case. Third, the amount 
of damage is contestable. Fourth, debtor’s dishonesty is reliant on transactions or 
the increase of liabilities, the same as unlawful distribution. If these are overcome 
however, the criminal procedure does have its benefits. Firstly, the police will 
conduct an investigation and do the relevant fact-finding. Second, if the damage was 
caused by a crime, economic losses are claimable without having to prove especially 
weighty reasons.
2.5.  Asset Recovery
Asset recovery is a doctrine that is meant to prevent the debtor from making 
transactions that damage the creditors or that favor one creditor over the others. 
The Act on the Recovery of Assets to Bankruptcy Estates sets the rules of asset 
recovery. Asset recovery enables the reversal of transactions made by the debtor 
482 Cf. Kukkonen 2016a at 729.
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during a set period before bankruptcy or another insolvency proceeding. From this 
short description, we find three key limitations to its application: the time period 
limitation, requirement of an insolvency proceeding and transaction orientation. 
Similar to the previously discussed doctrines, asset recovery is applicable solely to 
transactions. 
Depending on the type of transaction, a different section of the Act on the 
Recovery of Assets applies. In KKO 2015:17, the intercorporate relations were forged 
contractually. The contracts were loans and sales of product. The Asset Recovery Act 
Section 10 would allow reversing any payment on a loan made three months before 
bankruptcy if the payment was made with an unusual method before the expiration 
date or if it was disproportionally large compared to the debtor’s assets. There are no 
indicators in the material about any of these elements. Section 5 of the act allows the 
reversal of any legal action that has favored one creditor over others, has transferred 
assets away from the debtor to the detriment of the creditors, or has added liabilities 
to the detriment of the creditors. The application of Section 5 requires the debtor 
to have been insolvent during the time the legal action was made. This raises the 
same problem as discussed before in the context of dishonesty by a debtor. When 
should Arctecho have been considered insolvent—from the start, from the claim for 
remunerations or from the finality of the remuneration judgment? This assessment 
of insolvency would bring a lot of uncertainty to the asset recovery claim. If the 
contested claim for remunerations is taken into account as a debt of Arctecho, then 
insolvency was no doubt present, but the question of when it needed to be taken 
into account remains open to interpretation.
In addition, the other party in the transaction needs to have been aware of the 
insolvency. This is not an issue since Paragraph 2 of Section 5 allows for assuming 
this knowledge when the other party is considered a close party to the debtor. 
Section 3 of the act determines who can be considered a close party. The relevant 
part of Section 3 is the second paragraph, stating that any enterprise, corporation, 
foundation or other society is considered a close party to the debtor if they are 
fundamentally united in interests or if one holds substantial influence over the other. 
Their businesses were entangled, and Verkkokauppa shared the financial interests of 
Arctecho through sales and loans. Verkkokauppa and S were both shareholders of 
Arctecho, and S, in turn, owned Verkkokauppa. S held board memberships in both 
corporations. Arctecho and Verkkokauppa were no doubt close parties through 
either factor.
The close party status allows different, more creditor-friendly treatments and 
enables reversing transactions made more than five years before the insolvency 
proceeding application was submitted. Other than that, it allows utilizing the 
assumption of gratuitous transaction in Section 8. Any transfer of assets from the 
debtor to the close party that was made without counter value or the value the debtor 
receives is disproportionately small compared to the given assets and is assumed a 
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gift. Gifts, in turn, are reversible by Section 6 of the act. This returns us to the same 
analysis as the unlawful distribution and dishonesty by the debtor if the contractual 
relations between Verkkokauppa and Arctecho were made at market value. If they 
were not, we have yet another doctrine capable of remedying those undervalued 
transfers of assets.
Still, it is important to note, that Arctecho never went bankrupt. Teosto would 
have faced the same hardships with asset recovery as it would have with a liability 
in damages claim based on Company Act 22:1. I will not repeat the analysis here 
and refer the reader to section IV.2.3. of this work. Additionally, the bankruptcy 
proceedings and asset recovery would have been conducted according to Estonian 
law.
3.  KKO 2017:94 and Appellate Court of Turku 
26.10.2016 no. 1070
3.1.  General Notes on the Method of Analysis of These Two Cases
The cases KKO 2017:94 and Appellate Court of Turku 26.10.2016 no. 1070 (THO 
1070) were about the same corporate arrangement. In the KKO 2017:94 case, the 
piercing claim was made by the pay security and on the THO case by a group of 
employees. The defendants were the same two companies in both cases, and the same 
facts were present in both. One person owned the shares of a corporation practicing 
logistics business, and that same person was the chairperson of the corporation’s 
board of directors. Initially, the business was practiced through one corporation, 
which employed several persons as truck drivers. The business consisted mainly 
of delivery contracts with Itella/Posti Oy. The shareholder decided to make a risk 
limitation arrangement. He founded another corporation, owned solely by him, and 
he occupied the chairperson position on its board. The new corporation was a staff 
rental business (staff corporation). All the existing truck drivers’ employee contracts 
were transferred to the new corporation. All the assets and delivery contracts were 
left in the old corporation (asset corporation). Both operated from the same address.
The shareholder and a witness in court elaborated on the purposes behind the 
arrangement thusly: The main motive was to simplify the corporation’s operations 
since the primary client sometimes required the service of drivers without the 
trucks. The arrangement was also meant to isolate the risk of diminished demand 
for the company services. In that case, the arrangement would allow renting staff 
services to others. They expressly denied any financial troubles as a motive behind 
the arrangement. According to them, the pricing of staff rental contracts between the 
two companies allowed the staff corporation to pay all the wages and other legally 
mandated fees as well as taxes. In a report conducted by the bankruptcy estate, the 
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shareholder listed the primary purpose behind founding the staff corporation as a 
means of outsourcing the employee contracts into a separate corporation to allow 
the asset corporation to better compete in the logistics market.
Following some disputes with the employees and the logistics workers’ union 
AKT, Itella eventually terminated the delivery contracts. These contracts constituted 
around 90% of the business. Unable to replace the lost business, the asset corporation 
seized renting the staff services from the staff corporation. The staff corporation 
ended up in bankruptcy soon after because the asset corporation was its only client. 
The management claimed that other contacts were sought, albeit unsuccessfully. The 
bankruptcy estate serviced an investigation into the debtor’s finances, which revealed 
that the corporation had operated at a loss every year. The losses were between 48 
000 euros and 120 000 euros annually. It had also neglected to pay value-added tax 
and employee fees, totaling 140 000 euros.
In KKO 2017:94, the authority responsible for pay security (ELY) paid the 
unpaid wages of the employees of the now-bankrupt staff corporation. It demanded 
the asset corporation to refund the unpaid wages of employees based on piercing 
the corporate veil. Piercing in a pay security context derives support from the 
Pay Security Act Section 17 and the legislative works behind that section. Thus, 
it seems that piercing is more easily accepted in pay security cases.483 Veil piercing 
in general, however, can adopt interpretation and support from these pay security 
piercing cases.484 Since veil piercing in pay security is founded in the section and pay 
security as a creditor is unable to even invoke the other doctrines discussed here, the 
discussion from here on out focuses on the employee creditors’ position.
In the THO 1070 case, the employees claimed some unpaid wages. Although they 
did demand piercing, they won the case on other grounds in the appellate court.485 
The employees thought the intercorporate relation was so commingled that the 
asset corporation should also be responsible for the unpaid wages. The employment 
contracts were unilaterally transferred, the entire benefit of the employees’ work 
befell the asset corporation and the corporations’ operations clearly were operated 
in unison, neglecting the individual corporate benefit. The district court pierced the 
veil on these grounds.
The discussion from here on out is from the viewpoint of the employee creditors in 
the case. In theory, they could be replaced by any bankruptcy creditor. The aim is thus 
to look at the possibilities the bankruptcy creditors have toward holding additional 
parties liable, namely, which doctrines would allow holding the beneficiary of the 
described corporate arrangement liable. This includes the doctrines that return 
assets to the bankruptcy estate, as well as those that benefit one creditor directly.
483 See Kärki 2018a.
484 As done in both KKO 2015:17 and KKO 2018:20.
485 Although not in any of the doctrines discussed here.
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3.2.  Liability for Damages
Any person causing damage to another is liable to compensate that damage. The 
requirements for compensation are an act or omission, damage, negligent behavior 
and causality between the damage and the act. In the materials of the case, no 
elements appear that would allow for utilizing the tort doctrine. Even if there were 
some, applying tort liability would be difficult for the same reasons described earlier 
when discussing KKO 2015:17. 
It is also hard to isolate which act the damage is based on. Again, was it some 
concrete decision during the operation of the company or was it the founding of the 
intercorporate arrangement itself ? From among the corporate operations, we could 
point to the contractual relationship between the two corporations and claim the 
damaging act to be the undervaluation of those. At that point, one should use the 
unlawful distribution clause and follow it up with the management liability claim 
according to Company Act 22:1.
We could alternatively choose the formation of the arrangement as the damaging 
act. The damage is simple enough to determine, as is the causality. Clearly founding 
a limited liability company limits the liability should some risk be realized. 
The problem is that founding a corporation to limit liability is exactly how the 
corporation is meant to be used. Establishing negligence or deliberate behavior 
is redundant; one can found a corporation only deliberately. The situation comes 
down to assessing whether especially weighty reasons exist to compensate economic 
loss. There is no need to repeat what was previously said on the subject in IV.2.2. 
Finding the especially weighty reasons would be extremely difficult. Applying tort 
law in the situation would have required concessions to the causality requirement or 
would establish causality from the founding of a corporation. In either choice, some 
justification needs to be provided for disregarding the formal actor.
In this case, a key deviation from KKO 2015:17 is present. Liability in damages 
places liability on the one causing the damage, e.g., the one performing the damaging 
act. In this case, the beneficiary of the arrangement was the one held liable. One 
person controlled both corporations and was able to determine how they acted. He 
was also the initiator behind founding the arrangement. If liability for damages could 
be based on the founding of a corporation, then it follows that the founder is liable, 
as he committed the damaging action. As said, the courts deviated from this in a 
dismissive manner, not even discussing the possibility of holding the founder liable. 
This would suggest a key difference between veil piercing and liability in damages. 
Veil piercing as a remedy disregards a damaging arrangement, whereas liability in 
damages compensates a harmful action. The difference appears in the nature of the 
remedy—disregarding the damaging arrangement versus compensating the damage 
one has caused. This would suggest that veil piercing is not a tort doctrine and 
would support the finding that veil piercing reflects the abuse of rights doctrine. As 
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a remedy, veil piercing has more in common with restoration as understood within 
contract law and asset recovery law. The parties affected by a nullified contract or 
unacceptable legal action are restored as close as possible to the status quo that 
existed before the legal action.
3.3.  Company Act Liability for Damages
Company Act 22:1 seems applicable in this case also. One person acted as the 
entire management in both corporations. He was obligated by the Company Act 
regulation as well as the duty of care. Were these violated at any point? Potentially 
and likely they were. The staff company operated at a loss through the entirety of its 
existence, which suggests that the pricing set between the corporations was not at 
market value. If the pricing was not at market value, then every transaction between 
the asset corporation and the staff corporation would constitute a distribution of 
assets. These distributions would have been unlawful, as they do not provide assets 
for the shareholders but for the other corporation (Company Act 13:1).486 Naturally, 
if the transactions had a business reason, then they were not unlawful distribution. 
No evidence of any of these aspects is present in the documents.
However, the logistics services market is extremely competitive, so it is possible 
that the staff renting services were at market value as set by the competition. It 
would be extremely difficult to determine what the correct market price was, but it 
is clear that the asset corporation was able to turn a profit in the highly competitive 
market. The management’s claims about the staff corporation being able to meet 
its obligations could be true. All the materials reveal is that the corporation was 
operated at a loss. It is clear, then, that the pricing did not allow the corporation 
to turn a profit or even cover its expenses. Additional funding was needed to pay 
the wages. There is no information in the materials as to where that funding came 
from. With this fact, the case is similar to NJA 2014 s. 877. The corporation in 
that arrangement was founded to manage a court case. The corporation received 
exactly the amount of funds needed to pay for its expenses relating to the case, but 
not enough to cover the legal expenses of the opposing party in case the trial was 
lost. The running expenses were covered by external sources of funding, but the 
corporation could be abandoned should the looming risk of greater expenses ever 
materialize. If the funds to pay wages in the KKO 2017:94 case came from the asset 
corporation, the situation is exactly alike and supports piercing.
One additional problem still appears with the market value consideration. The 
corporation’s ability to turn a profit with their pricing does not tell anything about 
the market value. Market value is simply the price at which independent market 
486 Unless the shareholders unanimously agreed to the procedure.
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actors agree to buy and sell the services. It is thus entirely possible that the staff 
company in the case simply could not compete and was destined to fail eventually.
Another problem with applying unlawful distribution is that market value 
assumes unrelated at-arm’s-length parties that form the price through negotiation. 
In this case, the two corporations were closely linked through ownership and the 
owner was able to manipulate the contractual relations between these corporations. 
Obviously, the opportunity to deviate from market value was present. Yet it could be 
argued that the asset corporation likely would not have terminated the contractual 
relationship had the staff corporation hiked its rates. The two were not competitive 
in that matter, as both could rely on the continuation of the patronage. Normal risks 
and incentive to compete with pricing simply did not exist in the situation. Even 
if the market value is determined by adjusting for these factors, it does not create 
the obligation to generate profit in both companies. Bad business is not forbidden. 
This setting does raise the question, though, as to how it is even possible to assess 
violations of the duty of care of the management here.
As the same person managed both corporations and was responsible for their 
contractual relationships, it seems likely that he would have been able to determine 
the division of benefits between the corporations. Thus, he would have known 
that the contract would be unprofitable for the staff corporation. This, in turn, 
would demand an explanation and justification per the business judgment rule. 
If he acted as per the purpose of separating benefits and risks, then making these 
contracts would always constitute a violation of the duty of care. Although running 
a business is complex and, even if one can unanimously determine the contractual 
terms and price, many other things could affect the profitability of the business. 
Being able to manipulate the contracts only shows that the opportunity was present 
and that liability would require some proof of the intentions and purposes behind 
the management’s actions. Naturally, the purpose of the arrangement was not that 
obvious and needed to be determined in the court proceeding itself. The director/
shareholder naturally denied this purpose through the entirety of the trial. It would 
seem, though, that liability in damages based on the violation of the duty of care 
could have served as an alternative to the piercing claim, although that claim, unlike 
piercing, could have only been made by the bankruptcy estate or a creditor on its 
behalf and for the benefit of the estate. The liable party would also deviate from the 
piercing claim as would the amount of claimable damages.
Additionally, no prohibition exists to operate the business at a loss. To avoid 
bankruptcy, the losses need to be covered somehow, by either price hikes or 
capital injections. Bankruptcies are a normal part of the market economy—the 
more efficient enterprise is able to price out the others. As such, we cannot really 
discern any information on the market value pricing from the profitability of a 
single corporation. However, neglecting to set the prices high enough to generate 
profit for the shareholders might constitute a violation of the duty of care set for 
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directors.487 In that case, the court would have to determine whether the business 
judgment rule’s requirements on the decision procedure were met. The documents 
provide no material to assess the decision-making.
For the Company Act 22:1 liability for damages to materialize, one would need 
to prove unlawful distribution or violation of the duty of care. Regardless of the 
route chosen, the end result is a compensation for the company, divided per capita 
between the creditors through the bankruptcy estate. This would thus constitute 
a collective benefit instead of the individual benefit potentially achievable via 
piercing. As Company Act 22:1 is a damage compensation norm, it would not allow 
for recovering the full claim of the creditor. Instead, only the damage caused by the 
management is compensated. This issue was already discussed in chapter 1.2.3., so I 
will not repeat the arguments here.
3.4.  Debtor’s Dishonesty
The alternative elements of debtor’s dishonesty that are potentially applicable in 
this case are that it “gives away or otherwise surrenders his or her property without 
acceptable reason” and “increases his or her liabilities without basis.” Unlawful 
distribution was discussed in the previous section. The same difficulties as with 
the unlawful distribution part exist here. What is the market value and were there 
deviations from it? As noted earlier, no evidence of this sort of behavior is provided. 
Naturally, giving away or surrendering property can be done in ways other than 
unlawful distribution, though nothing in the case hints toward this.
As for the increase in liabilities without a basis, an argument exists that neglecting 
the taxes and employer fees would increase the liabilities. It no doubt creates liabilities 
and eventually leads to the inability to fulfill obligations in a timely manner. However, 
as those fees are derived from the business and its core functions, accumulating 
such liabilities are hardly without a basis. They are an automatic consequence of 
conducting the business. Neglecting to pay these fees is not increasing liabilities 
but simply neglecting them. The neglected amounts are temporarily available to the 
corporation before the authorities demand payment. How these “forcibly borrowed” 
resources are used can be criminal. Simply neglecting payments is also criminal, 
but not as a debtor’s dishonesty. There are no indicators in the case material of any 
criminal uses. On the other hand, the shareholder of the corporations had claimed 
that the neglected payments accumulated after the contract with Itella fell apart. 
If this is the case, then a genuine crisis and eventually bankruptcy was the cause 
of neglect. It seems plausible that in such a situation, the corporation was simply 
unable to pay since no resources existed.
487 See also KKO 2003:33 and V.6.2. of this work.
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Debtor’s dishonesty also requires insolvency. The transfers of property need to 
cause or essentially worsen the insolvency. The staff corporation was operated at a 
loss, though it was able to operate. There are no indications that the company could 
not meet its obligations as they become due. The employees’ claims in the THO 
1070 case were contested and uncertain. The pay security authority’s claim only 
covered the last three months before bankruptcy. It is also doubtful in this regard 
that the conduct described would meet the elements of debtor’s dishonesty.
3.5.  Asset Recovery
The Asset Recovery Act Section 10 would allow for reversing any payment on a 
loan made three months before bankruptcy if the payment was made with an 
unusual method or before the expiration date or if it was disproportionally large 
when compared to the assets of the debtor. There are no indicators in the material on 
any of these elements. Section 5 of the act allows reversing any legal action that has 
favored one creditor over others, has transferred assets away from the debtor to the 
detriment of the creditors or has added liabilities to the detriment of the creditors. 
The application of Section 5 requires the debtor to have been insolvent during the 
time the legal action was made. This raises the same problem as discussed before in 
the context of dishonesty by a debtor.
The Asset Recovery Act Section 3 names the following as close parties to each 
other: all corporations with which a person through shareholding or other economic 
relation has a significant unison of interests, as well as any close party of the person. 
Since both the asset corporation and the staff corporation were fully owned by a 
single person, that person was a close party to both corporations. This connection 
through the owner makes the two corporations close parties.
The close party status allows different, more creditor-friendly treatments. It enables 
reversing transactions made over five years before the insolvency proceedings began. 
Other than that, it allows utilizing the assumption of a gratuitous transaction from 
Section 8. Any transfer of assets from the debtor to the close party that was made 
without counter value or the value the debtor receives is disproportionately small 
compared to the given assets and is assumed a gift. Gifts, in turn, are reversible by 
Section 6 of the act. This returns us to the same analysis as the unlawful distribution 
and dishonesty by the debtor were the contractual relations between the asset and 
staff corporations made at market value. As discussed above, this evaluation is not 
possible within this research. As for other transactions between these companies, 
there is no evidence of any. Thus, the application of asset recovery would need to rely 
on the pricing of the employee rental contracts.
The same disadvantages exist as with the debtor’s dishonesty and Company 
Act liability for damages. The resulting compensation or return of assets befall the 
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bankruptcy estate and, through it, to the creditors collectively. It does not serve the 
individual interest of the creditor itself, at least not in full.
4.  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have examined the existing significant piercing cases to determine 
whether a satisfactory result could have been obtained through less controversial 
legal doctrines. The answer is a sound negative. Existing legal doctrines of liability in 
damages, criminal liability and asset recovery target different sorts of conduct and 
offer a different remedy to the situation. The findings somewhat repeat what was 
discovered in chapter III that sought to derive some analogy from these doctrines 
to develop the veil piercing doctrine. Some key differences exist, making it apparent 
that the doctrines are norms directed toward different sorts of conduct.
Tort liability seeks to compensate the damage one has caused by acting in a 
condemnable manner. The nature of condemnable actions makes this doctrine ill-
suited for corporate arrangement situations. Founding a corporate arrangement is 
always according to the wording of the law, and the limitation of liability is always 
inherent in founding the corporation. This, combined with the especially weighty 
reasons required to compensate economic loss, make it undesirable to apply 
liability in damages to damages caused by founding a corporate arrangement. Such 
application would simply require many concessions to the doctrine of liability for 
damages. If the result were to be this controversial, it is better to make the exception 
as narrow as possible, thus creating a veil piercing doctrine that resembles liability in 
damages.
Company Act liability in damages, debtor’s dishonesty and asset recovery all 
seem to boil down to the same question of whether the transactions between the 
companies had a business purpose and whether they were made at market value. 
They are tightly tied to transactions and their fairness. Creating the corporate 
arrangement predates the corporate transactions, however. The arrangement can be 
crafted to create a situation violating the creditors’ right entirely without making 
these unfair transactions. This takes traditional approaches to creditor protection 
and renders them powerless.
The examined doctrines greatly differ in the type of remedy they offer. With tort 
liability, one seeks to determine the amount of damage caused and compensates that 
amount. The person liable is the one causing the damage, not the one benefiting 
from the action. Debtor’s dishonesty allows claiming damages, and thus, the remedy 
is the same in criminal liability situations. The one who committed the crime is held 
liable. Similarly, Company Act liability holds liable the one who, in their role within 
the corporation, does not fulfill their duties, which causes damage to the company. 
It is also important to note an additional limitation: that the parties able to claim 
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Company Act liability are the corporation itself and the bankruptcy estate.488 
Similarly, asset recovery is a remedy available for the bankruptcy estate and creditors 
in an insolvency proceeding. Debtor’s dishonesty, on the other hand, requires the 
involvement of the police and prosecution. Veil piercing is a civil law claim and 
can be made by anyone who has suffered any damage from the arrangement. Veil 
piercing is like liability in damages as it is claimant-specific, e.g., the one suffering 
the damage can make the claim and gets awarded the remedy. Where piercing differs 
from liability in damages is the liable party. In this regard, veil piercing seems to 
resemble restoration. The arrangement is “cancelled” or disregarded, and the parties 
are granted rights as they would have been without the unfair arrangement.
From this analysis, we can deduce two definite limitations for veil piercing. The 
first elimination will be the transactions. There are several provisions in law meant 
to safeguard the assets and limit their transfer. Veil piercing needs not be one of 
those doctrines, and case law is unanimous on this thus far. Naturally, the transfers 
are likely to matter, as I will discuss in V.6.2 and V.6.5. of this work. They are used to 
siphon the corporation, and sometimes this is relevant in piercing.
The second piece of interest we find regards the tort doctrine. Depending on the 
case, the tort doctrine could apply if concessions were made, or it may not apply at 
all. Veil piercing cases have derived from tort doctrine mostly in regards to causality, 
though. There has been no explicit requirement to show the connection of cause 
and consequence; adopting one would not be of major importance, as case law has 
shown that damage in piercing situations is caused by using the corporate form. 
Limited liability, in turn, means that every time a corporate form is used and some 
relevant negative risk realizes, the incorporators likely benefit at the expense of some 
party. This is the accepted main function of the corporation. As such, we cannot 
place this sort of causality into the center of piercing doctrine. That would mean the 
end of limited liability. I will not kill limited liability here but will deduce a piercing 
doctrine that is capable of actually discerning the relevant conduct.
Although the discussion here has been brief, I feel it necessary to crystallize these 
findings even further:
1. Veil piercing does not target transactions.
2. Veil piercing requires a special kind of loose causality between corporate 
use and damage that is almost always present, and thus, no high significance 
should be given to it.
488 Usually like this, though the law allows shareholders and creditors to make the claim. These situ-
ations are rare since it is unlikely that these parties are damaged through the actions sanctioned in the 
Company Act 22:1 liability norm.
V DEVELOPING THE DOCTRINE  
OF PIERCING THE VEIL
150
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
1.  Introduction
Over the last few chapters, I have gone through issues that might seem auxiliary 
to the actual piercing test. At the least they were not about the test and its actual 
requirements. Those pages were not wasted, however. I have discovered a background 
theory that has actual implications in the interpretation of the test. Within them, 
I have shown several points of analogy that can be used to help interpret the 
ambiguous test laid out in KKO 2015:17. I have even discovered that veil piercing 
has distinct limitations in its application sphere. From this point onward, I will move 
the discussion toward the actual veil piercing test.
In this chapter, the veil piercing doctrine is further developed based on the 
Verkkokauppa decision and the three-prong test it laid out. The test was rather 
ambiguous and does not offer much guidance as it stands. Still, as laid out before 
in this work, the test in this form has a lot of theoretical and analogous support. 
Further analysis will show that the ambiguities can be reduced by analysis. In this 
scenario, it would be unjustified to alter the test for the abovementioned reasons, as 
well as the fact that after KKO 2015:17, the test has been used in several Supreme 
Court decisions.489
To recap, the test is as follows: 
1. The use of corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or 
shareholder’s control
2. in a way that is artificial and reprehensible
3. causing damage to the corporation’s creditors or evasion of a legal duty.
The first part of the test was dubbed the requirement of using the corporate form, 
the second as the requirement of improper behavior and the third as evading an 
obligation requirement. The third requirement is divided into two subcategories: 
evading a provision and causing damage to a creditor. These three categories derive 
support from objective facts. I borrowed terminology from Linna and Leppänen 
in I.3.2. of this work and dubbed these the supportive factors. It should be noted 
that these category names are rather arbitrary, and their functions are limited to 
simplifying the language used when referring to them. They have no interpretative 
significance.
This test will be developed by examining earlier case law on veil piercing, analogy 
to the doctrines analyzed in the previous chapter and opinions in the legal literature. 
The attempt is to further specify how these requirements should be interpreted. 
Similarly, attention is brought to deviations from earlier opinions and decisions. 
489 See KKO 2017:94, KKO 2018:20 and KKO 2018:11.
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And finally, recommendations are laid out as to how future decisions should react 
to piercing claims.
All this is supported with comparative analysis. The comparison is performed 
mostly in the indents of this chapter based on issues. Especially useful and compatible 
ideas are discussed in the main text, however. I will discuss the comparative elements 
during the analysis of the domestic relevant factors, which makes the comparison 
more easy to digest. The comparative elements seem to appear in three forms: 1) this 
issue is assessed the same or in a similar fashion; 2) this issue is assessed differently; or 
3) this issue is not addressed at all. It would follow logically that situation 1 does not 
give rise to a lot of analysis. In situation 2, some pondering is necessary to reveal why 
things are different and whether the foreign interpretation should be considered 
in Finland as well. In hindsight, the third situation was most fruitful. Mostly, the 
influence is toward Finland as our fledgling doctrine has not yet encountered the 
numerous dilemmas piercing case law has seen abroad. These situations are addressed 
with a question: what should we do if this issue does appear in Finland?
The examination will begin with some notes on the use of corporate group 
structure, intercorporate relationships or shareholder’s control in section V.2. 
Section V.3 addresses the question of control requirement. The examination will 
proceed to impropriety requirement in section V.4. The requirement of evading an 
obligation is discussed in section V.5. In section V.6., the supportive factors are laid 
out and inspected. 
2.  Use of Corporate Group, Intercorporate 
Relationships or Shareholder´s Control
The first prong of the test accurately describes the key element behind veil piercing. 
The corporate form enables the separation of liabilities and other negative risks 
from benefits. In itself, this is a completely legitimate procedure. In fact, it is a key 
component of the corporate institution. These elements enable those with profitable 
ideas to found a business and fund it without the fear of personal bankruptcy. It 
encourages risk-taking while isolating or limiting the negative risk taken at the 
same time. It is relatively easy to find whether the corporate group, intercorporate 
relationships or shareholder’s control have been used to isolate liability. Every instance 
of founding a corporation is a liability isolation. This is accepted as beneficial to the 
society. Veil piercing is the remedy when this element, the isolation of negative risks 
of the corporate form, is abused.
Corporate group use means using the corporate group structure to separate the 
obligations and assets into different entities. A corporate group is formed when 
one corporation controls another. The controlling corporation is the parent and 
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the controlled corporation is the subsidiary. The corporate group is an accepted 
institution in Finland; a corporation can own the stock of another corporation. 
The Company Act and the Accounting Act provide us with some guidelines 
in assessing the significance of ownership for control. Company Act 8:12 states: 
“If a limited liability company exercises control over another domestic or foreign 
corporation or foundation, as referred to in Chapter 1, Section 5, of the Accounting 
Act, the limited liability company shall be the parent company and the other 
corporation or foundation a subsidiary. The parent company and its subsidiaries 
form a group. A limited liability company exercises control over another corporation 
or foundation also in the event that the limited liability company, together with one 
or several of its subsidiaries, or a subsidiary or several subsidiaries together exercise 
control over that corporation or foundation, as referred to in Chapter 1, Section 5, 
of the Accounting Act.”
Accounting Act 1:5 defines the situations in which one entity obliged to keep 
accounts holds control over another or a comparable foreign entity (target company 
or subsidiary490). Control exists if 1) the entity has more than half of the votes in 
the target company and this majority is based on ownership, membership, articles 
of association or other instrument constituting the legal relationships around the 
company;491 2) the entity has the right to appoint or dismiss the majority of the 
members of the board of directors in the target company or has the same appointment 
right in a corporate organ with the right to appoint the directors; or 3) the entity, in 
reality, controls the target company.
Corporate group structure always includes control. The group forms a network 
in which separate entities act coherently. The group can easily be made such that all 
the entities in it act according to the instructions of one entity, person or specific 
persons. Although inherently harmless, the possibilities for abuse are obvious. The 
legislation does include many provisions limiting these possibilities, but as the KKO 
2015:17 case has proven, the provisions do not cover all the possible abuses.
The analogous doctrines do not limit their application to corporate schemes, 
though these schemes are definitely covered by them. This could be explained 
with their purposes. They exist to combat avoidance of tax, avoidance of 
attachment and avoidance of environmental liability with indifference toward 
how this is achieved. Veil piercing targets the avoidance of obligations achieved 
by utilizing the corporate form. Compared to the others, it specifically targets 
how avoidance is performed while being indifferent to what is avoided.
490 See HE 106/2005 at 98.
491 This definition includes the contracts the shareholders have made among themselves not involving 
the company at all, as long as such a contract entitles the entity with votes.
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Intercorporate relationship use means using two corporations not in a corporate 
group to achieve similar results as described with corporate groups. What is different 
is the lack of the parent corporation and formal control, although the corporations 
can be under the same controller if she is a real person. This person founds two 
corporations and owns the shares and exercises control over both of them. A 
corporate group relationship exists only if the shareholder is a limited liability 
company.
Some element of common interest between the corporations in the arrangement is 
not explicitly required. Finding such an element would definitely support piercing.492 
Alternatively, some systematic behavior where the corporate arrangement is created 
to achieve the results detrimental to creditors should allow piercing. Piercing should 
not be used to limit taking advantage of market opportunities, even if they prove 
damaging to the creditors of one market actor. The intercorporate arrangement 
either needs to be created to cause the damage, or the corporations in an established 
arrangement need to serve some other common interest. Without requiring 
such interest, there is no way to discern legitimate corporate use in the market 
from illegitimate use allowing piercing. The common interest in intercorporate 
relationships should be interpreted as part of the improper use requirement, and it 
is further analyzed later.
It is thought that the shareholders hold the ultimate control in a corporation 
as they appoint the directors.493 They can even appoint themselves as directors, in 
which case their control over the corporation is thorough. Directors, in turn, decide 
what actions the corporation takes. Shareholders are not liable for the obligations 
of the corporation, but they can indirectly decide what obligations the corporation 
accumulates. Due to their position, shareholders can extract benefits from their 
corporation. Again, possibilities for abuse seem obvious. The determining factor is 
not control itself, but how it is used.
These three are not analyzed further since they are rather obvious. Using corporate 
group structure or intercorporate relations to the detriment of the creditors simply 
means that multiple corporations are involved, and their relationship somehow 
deviates from how the corporate form is meant to be used. The structure is used. The 
ambiguities with veil piercing lie not with whether the structure exists but with how 
it is used. The use determines whether the veil can be pierced. The corporate group 
and intercorporate relationships can be interpreted formally, as they are not decisive. 
The wording accommodates all uses of the corporate form.
492 See V.6.4. of this work.
493 See Pönkä 2008 at 739, Mähönen – Villa 2010 at 7 and Berle - Means 1933 at 70.
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3.  Control 
3.1.  Introduction
Shareholder’s control, as mentioned in the Verkkokauppa decision, is not as simple 
as using the corporate group or intercorporate relationship. First, some party other 
than the shareholder can hold decisive control over the corporation. Second, it is not 
established how much comprehensive control the shareholder needs for piercing 
to apply. Veil piercing is only concerned with situations in which the corporate 
form is used to evade the application of provisions of law or to separate obligations 
from assets or benefits into different entities. The decision in KKO 2015:17 named 
three attributes of the corporation that could be targeted with piercing, all of 
which require control over the corporation. Of these, shareholder’s control, by 
definition, includes control. With the other two, control is a prerequisite for use. 
Without controlling the entities involved, one can hardly use corporate group or 
intercorporate relationships to evade a provision or to damage creditors. Sometimes, 
a lesser degree of control or even a corporate connection is sufficient to extract 
some illegitimate benefit. Then one must be able to control the circumstances to a 
degree in order to succeed. Some influence over the decisions of the parties to the 
arrangement would seem crucial.
Some help could be derived from a reciprocal model of tort liability introduced by 
Pöyhönen, especially the concepts of operational and situational control describing 
control over the caused damage. The person with operational control is able to 
determine whether the operations are practiced and how. A person with situational 
control is able to affect the actual chain of events; this person can directly influence 
whether the damage will occur. Liability should match the level of control the 
person had, either operational or situational, and the fair assessment of whether the 
person could have prevented the damage.494 It seems clear that veil piercing targets 
situations in which the operational control is used. Use of the corporate form is 
about deciding the arrangement, whether the operations are undertaken and how 
they are performed. If situational control is found, this could constitute an entirely 
different liability basis. Alternatively, finding some situational control could be used 
to support a veil piercing claim when that control is not enough to constitute tort 
liability.
Although the Supreme Court in the KKO 2015:17 decision does not directly 
refer to control as a requirement for piercing, it remains imperative. Every veil 
piercing decision refers to control and holds it as significant. Enforcement Code 
4:11 and the Bankruptcy Act 5:11 both give significance to control when assessing 
 
494 See Pöyhönen 1999 at 349–350 and Mielityinen 2006 at 466.
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the overall arrangement, and so does the Environmental Damage Act Section 7. Is it 
even possible to pierce the veil without the presence of control?
In the KKO 2015:17 decision, the Supreme Court gave significance to the 
dependence of Arctecho.495 Control and ownership were two factors used to show 
that Arctecho was, in fact, not independent—the other factors being the timing 
of Arctecho’s businesses termination and the outward appearance of the business. 
Together, these considerations allowed the court to deem Arctecho’s existence as 
artificial and the business conducted as part of Verkkokauppa’s core operations.496
The debate in the literature has been about what level of control is enough for 
veil piercing. If there is no control relationship, the entities are able to make their 
own decisions and dispose of their own assets as they please as long as the decision 
procedure in Company Act is followed. They are not “used” in the sense of the word. 
Even if the initiative to found such a business originated from another corporation 
and the idea that its business would be more viable if certain provisions did not 
limit the operations, the arrangement is not abuse: it is business planning within 
the legal framework. The controllers of the original business can control the new 
operations without it being abuse. They can even operate it through a subsidiary. 
The line between abuse and legitimacy lies elsewhere, not in control.497 However, 
control is significant in determining who performs the abuses. Veil piercing seeks to 
extend the liability to additional persons, and control is necessary for the extension. 
Control is a necessary requirement of piercing the veil.498
Veil piercing targets arrangements in which the corporate form itself is abused. In 
its essence, abuse requires the ability to control something. After all, it means using 
something in an improper manner. Using requires power over something, the ability 
to decide how that something is utilized. One cannot abuse a privilege without 
having it first. The same goes for corporate form: one cannot abuse it without having 
it and controlling it.
Control is therefore always significant in piercing as it is the objective basic 
requirement for piercing the veil.499 The degree of control can vary greatly. The entity 
can be controlled by the ownership of shares and directorial competence. On the 
other hand, control can be based more loosely on a contract or even mere trust. The 
 
495 See KKO 2015:17 at 32.
496 In a similar fashion, control has been seen significant in KKO 1996:2 and KKO 1997:17.
Even in earlier case law, the dependence of a subsidiary was significant. See KKO 1929 II 638, KKO 1929 
II 639 and KKO 1929 II 640. See also Swedish case law NJA 1947 s. 647.
497 See Savela 2015 at 413.
498 Of this, there is a consensus in the legal literature. See Leppänen 1991 at 300–301, Toiviainen 1995 
at 279–280, Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292, Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 407, Savela 2015 at 413. See also 
Kaisanlahti 1996 at 233, who names (shareholder) control as a presupposition of his analysis.
499 See Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292, the reprehensible or disloyal use being the subjective basic re-
quirement.
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control thus needs not be defined as formal corporate law control, but actual control 
will suffice.500
The analogous doctrines in the legal system differentiate between control over 
the operations of another entity and control over the entity itself.501 The logical 
conclusion of these different lines of examination would be veil piercing and the 
expansive interpretation of the concept of an operator or some other concept, such 
as one obligated to pay remunerations.502 Control over the entity is the realm of veil 
piercing, whereas control over the operation is about identifying the real operator. 
The difference should not be given a decisive role. Either way, the formal actor is 
bypassed and liability is placed on the controller.
As examined with the Environmental Liability Act, these characterizations aim 
the examination toward different facts. Control over the operation focuses on the 
relationship between the operations and the formally non-liable party. Control 
over the entity focuses on the relationship between the formally liable and non-
liable corporations. Different factors arise as significant depending on the scope of 
examination. The KKO 2015:17 decision did not differentiate between the two. In 
it, both were examined and used to support each other. For example, the competence 
Verkkokauppa had in the organization of Arctecho was deemed significant. The 
Supreme Court examined Verkkokauppa’s relationship to the sales operation run 
by Arctecho and deemed that it was actually an inseparable part of Verkkokauppa’s 
operation. The sum effect of these factors deemed the arrangement artificial. An 
overall assessment of the situation would demand accepting both relations in the 
assessment.
With the Environmental Liability Act, the separate assessment results 
directly from the wording of Section 7. The separate consideration within 
artificial property arrangements results from the Supreme Court decision 
in KKO 2006:45. That decision somehow ended up separating piercing and 
artificial ownership of property, demanding that both need to be shown for 
the attachment. The wording of Enforcement Code 4:14 does not require 
this. Quite the opposite. It allows considering the totality of the arrangement 
and whether the given legal form matches the reality of the situation. It does 
not separate the assessment into two separate relations.503
500 See Leppänen 1991 at 330–331 and Toiviainen 1995 at 280. Relevant control can even be based on 
a leadership position within the company.
501 About artificial property arrangements, see KKO 2006:45. Also see Environmental Liability Act 
Section 7 and KKO 2012:29.
502 See Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 602.
503 Similarly Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 163. They discern two situations, one in which the corporation 
has no purpose other than owning the debtor’s property and one where it practices business. In the former 
situation, the veil can be pierced, and in the latter, the ownership of some piece of property can be deemed 
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Some guidance could be derived from these two doctrines, though. They both 
allow liability based on the relationship between the corporation and the operation, 
even when the corporation-operator relationship does not enable piercing. This 
approach could be especially useful in evasion situations. The court could examine 
the relationship between the conduct regulated by the evaded provision of the law 
and the formally non-liable party. This assessment could then result in an expansive 
interpretation of the evaded provision or piercing if supported by factors in the 
corporation-operator relationship. Even if these two relationships are considered 
separate, they do not exclude each other. The piercing assessment can and should 
utilize both in support of each other.
3.2.  Judicial Control
Now that I have established the significance of control and briefly discussed what sorts 
of actions the control needs to be over, it is time to review the methods of controlling 
a corporation. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means have divided control into five 
categories spread over two groups, judicial control and actual control.504 The judicial 
control categories are 1) control through almost complete ownership, 2) majority’s 
control and 3) control through a legal device. The actual control categories are 1) 
minority’s control and 2) management’s control. The analysis starts with the target 
of control. One could control the operation or the corporation itself depending 
on the situation. Honoring the categories provided by Berle and Means, the next 
sections address these forms of control and their relationships to veil piercing.
Shareholding is one of the main characteristics of a corporation. The owners of a 
corporation do not directly own the company, its business or its property. They own 
the shares. The nature of shares specifies the owners’ relationship with the company. 
Each share provides its holder with an interest in the company. In their default form, 
shares entitle the holder to partake in the dividends and to cast one vote per share in 
the general meeting. The bylaws can alter the default rule, and the company can have 
many classes of shares. The different classes have different interests in the company. 
One class can control more votes in the general meeting; the other can entitle the 
holder to a larger part of dividends or to a guaranteed dividend. The creation of 
hybrid forms of stock is limited only by Company Act and human imagination.505
artificial. Their opinion could be interpreted as seeing these situations as alternatives to each other, one 
focusing on the relationship between the corporation and the debtor and the other between the debtor 
and the property. However, they are not both required for attachment (Cf. KKO 2006:45), nor are there 
limitations on how to find the artificiality.
504 See Berle – Means 1933 at 70 onwards.
505 About hybrid forms of stock and mezzanine financing, see Villa 1997 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 
236–240.
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When discussing veil piercing, we are concerned only with certain characteristics of 
the share–control rights. The concept of control rights means any power conferred by 
the share to its holder, which entitles the holder to decide what actions the corporation 
performs. The default control right is the vote. Company Act 1:6 specifies that “[t]he 
shareholders shall exercise their power of decision at the general meeting. Decisions 
shall be made by the majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this act 
or in the articles of association.” From this, it follows that the shareholder controlling 
the majority vote controls the decisions made by the general meeting. The power of 
the majority is not absolute, though, as there are several exceptions to the rule of 
majority designed to protect the minority shareholder or public interest. 
Controlling the vote of the general meeting does not mean controlling the 
corporation, at least not directly. Company Act has divided power between corporate 
organs. The Company Act sets three mandatory organs: the general meeting, 
auditors and the board of directors. In addition to these organs, the corporation can 
appoint a managing director and a supervisory board.506 Each of the organs has its 
own powers specified in Company Act. Company Act 6:1 states that “[t]he board 
of directors shall see to the administration of the company and the appropriate 
organization of its operations (general competence).” The board of directors is the 
organ with most power over specific corporate actions. Because of their position, the 
directors are better equipped to control the corporation’s activities than the seldom-
held general meeting. They hold actual decision-making power in all matters that are 
not in the power of the general meeting.
Company Act 5:3 lists the matters that the general meeting must decide.507 These 
include the adoption of financial statements, the use of the profit, the discharge of 
director’s liability, the appointment of directors and the other matters to be decided 
by the general meeting according to the Articles of Association.
The general meeting appoints the board of directors and decides whether they are 
discharged of liability. This power is why shareholders are seen as having control over 
a corporation.508 Majority control is based on the ability to decide matters in the 
general meeting. One who holds the majority vote can simply claim directorship. 
Then the same person holds both the general competence and the majority vote. 
Some classes of shares can even include the right to appoint one or more directors 
to the board. This itself is a control right implying control over the corporation. The 
directors can always be dismissed if they do not run the corporation the way the 
shareholders want it to be run. The appointment right does not give the shareholder 
control over what decisions the corporation actually takes. 
506 The supervisory board holds no power to make operational decisions and, as such, does not hold 
control over the corporation. See Kukkonen 2018 at 32.
507 See also Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017a at 396–399.
508 See Pönkä 2008 at 739 and Timonen 1997 at 240.
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Control over a decision is always tied to the separate issue to be decided since 
provisions protecting minority shareholders and creditors limit the majority’s 
power.509 Some decisions do require a qualified majority (Company Act 5:27), or 
even the acceptance of the minority shareholders can be required (Company Act 
5:29). The existence of control can never be found on holding the majority vote 
alone.510
The Company Act and the Accounting Act provide definitions of control that 
are used to define when companies form a corporate group. The same factors are 
significant for control as required by veil piercing. These acts consider appointment 
rights and votes, which are undeniable signs of control. The definitions also note 
votes and rights held through intermediaries and thus prevent escaping the definition 
via intermediaries.
The Company Act and the Accounting Act provide us with some guidelines to 
assess the significance of ownership for control. Company Act 8:12 states: If a limited 
liability company exercises control over another domestic or foreign corporation 
or foundation as referred to in Chapter 1, Section 5, of the Accounting Act, the 
limited liability company shall be the parent company and the other corporation or 
foundation a subsidiary. The parent company and its subsidiaries form a group. A 
limited liability company exercises control over another corporation or foundation 
also in the event that the limited liability company, together with one or several 
of its subsidiaries, or a subsidiary or several subsidiaries together exercise control 
over that corporation or foundation, as referred to in Chapter 1, Section 5, of the 
Accounting Act.
Accounting Act 1:5 defines situations in which one entity keeping accounts holds 
control over another or a comparable foreign entity (target company or subsidiary511). 
Control exists if 1) the entity has more than half of the votes in the target company 
and this majority is based on ownership, membership, articles of association or other 
instrument constituting the legal relationships around the company;512 2) the entity 
has the right to appoint or dismiss the majority of the members of the board of 
directors in the target company or has the same appointment right in a corporate 
organ with the right to appoint the directors; or 3) the entity, in reality, controls 
the target company. The Securities Markets Act 1:5 adopts a similar definition for 
control as the right to appoint or dismiss a majority of directors in the board. Both 
 
 
509 See Pönkä 2008 at 739.
510 See Pönkä 2008 at 739. About the limitations the Company Act places on the general meetings 
competence, see Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017a at 399–401.
511 See HE 106/2005 vp at 98.
512 This definition includes the contracts the shareholders have made among themselves not involving 
the company at all, as long as such a contract entitles the entity with votes.
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the Accounting Act and the Securities Markets Act recognize that control can be 
acquired via contract.513
Control through a legal device means achieving formal control through contract 
or a hybrid form of share ownership. One party owns the shares or holds a directorial 
position in the company and thus has control over the corporation. By contract, the 
controller can agree to use their control as specified in the contract or according to 
the wishes of the other party. The party formally holding the control relinquishes it 
in favor of another. As a result, the other party holds the control. The corporation 
can also give a person the power of attorney.514
The legal device is not always so straightforward. Transfer of control can be 
hidden within a complex web of contractual obligations, conditions and special 
circumstances. The Company Act even allows the issuance of shares without any 
control rights, and creditors can contractually obtain control. All the elements 
normally attributed to share ownership are contractually transferrable. The creditor 
can contractually modify her position to resemble that of the shareholder. The 
creditor endeavors to secure payment of the credit by obtaining control and can end 
up with the rights of both the creditor and the controller. The assessment needs to 
account for all the contractual relationships between the parties.515
3.3.  Actual Control
Actual control refers to situations in which someone holds control over the 
corporation without actually holding formal control over it. Berle and Gardiner 
categorized minority control and management control as forms of actual control. 
There is no need to deviate from this, although one form of control, de facto control, 
must be added.
The management of the company can achieve actual control over the corporation 
if the ownership is so diversified that no group of shareholders is controlling it.516 
The general competence of the directors is actually formal control. Only when the 
ownership is so diversified that the directors are, in fact, the only controllers of the 
 
513 See Pönkä 2008 at 740. He gives an example where the majority owners of A inc. make a contract 
with B inc. for the transfer of voting rights to B inc. (or contractually agree to vote according to the will of 
B inc.). Then it is B inc. who holds control of A inc.
514 About the representation of the company, see Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017a at 626. See also 
the piercing case KKO 1996:2.
515 See Villa 1997 at 360–364. In the extreme forms, the shareholder can have none of the usual rights 
attributed to share ownership. Noteworthy contract terms include, at the least, swap, option rights and 
connecting the interest to corporate profit.
516 See Pönkä 2008 at 740.
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corporation, they hold actual control. Fortunately,517 the Company Act has several 
provisions limiting the management’s possibilities to control the company. They are 
under legal obligation to manage the corporation with care and to the benefit of the 
company (Company Act 1:8). Also, by statute, they are liable for damages they cause 
by decisions violating the provisions of the Company Act or the bylaws (Company 
Act 22:1). 
Minority control is tricky as it can occur only in a corporation with a widely 
diversified ownership.518 Minority control is a shareholder’s ability to decide the 
outcome of the general meeting as if they held the majority vote. In corporations with 
diversified ownership, this power is likely achieved with a rather small ownership. In 
large corporations, often less than half of the shares are represented in the general 
meeting, allowing even a minority shareholder to control the general meeting 
decision. The required ownership percentage, and thus control, may be based on the 
participation in the general meeting during the previous years.519
Control in fact means control through trust—the non-enforceable expectation 
that someone else will act as they say they will. One person issues commands and 
trusts that they are executed accordingly. Control is the probability that persons act 
according to specified instructions.520 Control of the company lies with the person 
according to whose orders or wishes the company’s formal controllers are used to 
act.521 There is not necessarily any legal relationship between the actors. The close 
relationship of the formal actor and the real controller supports finding control 
through trust.522 Intermediaries and straw men cannot be accepted as a method to 
escape liability.
517 See Pönkä 2008 at 741. Pönkä expresses worry over the tendency that directors hold more power in 
a corporation. In his opinion, control should be paired with residual risk. The author agrees. Veil piercing 
for directorial liability could, in fact, discourage the directors from seizing control and encourage them to 
consult the shareholders more often.
518 The preparatory works for the Asset Recovery Act also mention the possibility that when the share 
ownership is diversified, minority holding could create an essential symbiosis of benefits between the 
shareholder and the corporation. See HE 102/1990 vp at 45.
519 See Pönkä 2008 at 740.
520 See Weber 1947 at 28. “Der soziologische Begriff der »Herrschaft« muß daher ein präziserer sein 
und kann nur die Chance bedeuten: für einen Befehl Fügsamkeit zu finden.”
521 For example, a consultant or CEO who no longer holds the formal position is a good example of a 
person who might be capable of exercising this sort of control. See Tuomisto 2012 at 34.
522 See KKO 1996:2 where the son of the real controller acted as a straw man heading the corporation. 
Between persons close to one another, trust is likely present and thus requires less evidence.
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3.4.  Control in Veil Piercing
3.4.1.  Judicial Control in Veil Piercing
3.4.1.1. Combinations of Formal Positions
Some degree of control over the corporation used to evade the liability is necessary 
for veil piercing liability to apply. The control need not be exclusive.523 Veil piercing 
should not be concerned with some specially constructed test for control, nor should 
differing standards be set. Adopting such measures would deviate the doctrine from 
traditional methods of assessing control and would perhaps serve to narrow the 
doctrine too much. Corporate law devices are perfectly adequate at determining 
whether control exists. Formal control is achieved through shareholding or a legal 
device, actual control through a formal position as a shareholder or manager and, 
alternatively, via mere trust or authority. Control has to be established case by case 
as the freedom of construing the bylaws and contractual freedom allow for near 
limitless differing solutions for establishing control. Thus, the courts should feel 
free to view the situation and detect the method of control present in that specific 
case. There is no need to scour the case facts for a specific control mechanism. The 
evaluation is kind of upside down. Determine whether control has been exercised 
and then specify the mechanism instead of looking for the existence of a specific 
mechanism.
Control alone is never sufficient for piercing, and the corporation as a juridical 
fiction is never independent in the sense of the word.524 Control could be 
characterized as a necessary precondition of veil piercing that is present in many other 
cases, even where piercing would be inappropriate.525  The control requirement can 
be interpreted rather formally.  In the end, veil piercing becomes justified by abuse of 
the corporate form, not control.526 It should not be given any stricter interpretation 
in veil piercing than in any other area of law. When piercing, only actual control 
matters and the formal outlook should not prove decisive. However, formal judicial 
control is a strong indication of actual control. It is the default presupposition that 
one holding formal control, in reality, controls the corporation. Formal control 
creates the assumption, and the one claiming otherwise must prove their claim.527
523 See KKO 2018:20.
524 Savela 2015 at 411, KKO 1997:17 and KKO 2008:20 at 79. Janne Ruohonen also emphasizes the 
dependence of the corporation when piercing. See Ruohonen 2015 at 4.
See also Huttunen 2007. He argues throughout the article that the owner of the stock is not considered 
the owner of the corporation’s property. This is definitely the rule, but it is not without exceptions. Hut-
tunen 1996 at 30–33 and the KKO 24.8.1989 no. 2240, S 86/993 analyzed therein are also of interest. 
They expressly deny piercing based on full ownership, control or using legal rights. In addition, see KKO 
1982 II 184, KKO 1983 II 185, KKO 1994:18 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292 and 299.
525 Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 23.
526 See Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292.
527 Similarly KKO 2011:49.
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Formal judicial control is easy enough to find: if one person holds both the 
majority vote in the general meeting and control over the decisions made by the 
board of directors, control is clearly present.528 Control is most thorough when a 
single person owns all the shares and the same person acts as the only director of the 
company. Any variation toward a lesser degree of control accordingly makes piercing 
less justified.529 A majority vote alone should still be enough to find control, although 
the presence of other shareholders can then speak for the legitimate purpose of the 
corporation and thus prevent veil piercing.530 Diversified control helps to avoid veil 
piercing.531
In the KKO 2015:17 case, the Supreme Court held both ownership and formal 
positions in management as significant for piercing the veil.532 In the case, S was both 
the chairperson of the board of directors and managing director of Verkkokauppa 
while he also sat on Arctecho’s two-member board of directors. In addition, the 
Supreme Court remarked that Arctecho had been through its entire existence 
in the ownership of Verkkokauppa, S and two minority shareholders who were 
also members of Verkkokauppa’s board of directors. S was also the sole owner of 
Verkkokauppa. The Court determined that Arctecho had always been controlled by 
Verkkokauppa or S. The finding of control in the decision was entirely formal, and 
it considered that both the ownership and general competence held. The Supreme 
Court did not specify which held the control, but piercing was justified based on the 
finding that they held it together.
In the United States, control is often cited as a requirement of piercing. The 
prevailing view is that control alone is not enough to pierce the veil.533 This 
can be read from the wordings of the Court’s veil piercing test formulations 
that require defrauding creditors, injustices and other wrongdoings.534 
Despite this, some courts have imposed liability based mostly on control and 
contribution without proper distinction of abusive use and proper use.535
528 See Leppänen 1991 at 301. He sees a controlling position as sufficient to fulfill the control required 
by piercing. Formal judicial control is enough. Similarly in competition law context, see C-597/13 P at 
35–36.
529 See Leppänen 1991 at 301. Similarly in Sweden, see Stattin 2012 at 933.
530 See KKO 1997:17 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 301 and 407–408.
531 See Villa 1997 at 360.  See also KKO 2018:20 and Kärki 2018b.
532 See KKO 2015:17 at 30. See also the KKO 2017:94 case where the same natural person owned all 
shares of both companies and held the managerial positions in both. 
533 For explicit statements, see Marr v. Postal Union Life Insurance Co. (1940) at 682 and Shafford v. 
Otto Sales Co., Inc. (1953). According to it, complete stock ownership and actual one-man control alone 
will not be sufficient. See also Bainbridge 2000 at 37–38 and Peterson 2017 at 71–73.
534 See also Gelb 1982 at 8, stating that domination alone speaks of no impropriety.
535 See Janos v. Murduck (1996). For the deserved criticism of the case, see Matheson – Eby 2000 at 
179–181.
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In Sweden, decisive influence is required for veil piercing. The NJA 
2014 s. 877 decision found decisive influence, i.e., the ability to control the 
corporation based on 50% ownership of shares and the position as the sole 
member of the board. The other person held liable in the case also owned 
50% of the shares and had the power of attorney to represent the company. 
He also was included in the decision-making regarding the trial that would 
eventually create the credit relationship. The third piece of evidence of 
control this person had was the fact that companies in his sphere of influence 
had participated in forwarding funds to the debtor company. 
In the United Kingdom law, control is arguably one requirement of veil 
piercing liability.536 Similarly to Finland, control is often found through 
formal positions. Shareholding and directorial positions are important and 
intermediaries in these positions can be disregarded.537 For example, it does 
not matter whether the real controller does not formally hold these positions 
or if her spouse, employee or another corporation under her control instead 
holds them. In Re F.G. Films (1953), the president of an American corporation 
held 90% of the shares in a film corporation and was one of its three directors. 
The corporation under his presidency financed the operation entirely the film 
corporation did. This combination allowed the court to decide that the real 
operator was the American corporation. The case was not a piercing case in 
the strictest sense as it was resolved with the interpretation of the statutory 
concept of “undertake.”
The special case of corporations wholly owned by one person still needs 
addressing.538 Owning all the shares in a corporation provides rather comprehensive 
control unless another person is named in the board of directors. The owner can 
usually dictate the conduct without restrictions other than the law.539 In the absence 
of division of control, the control requirement is met by whole ownership, though 
veil piercing cannot automatically apply. Veil piercing does have other requirements 
that must be met, and nothing in the nature of wholly owned corporations 
automatically fulfills them. A wholly-owned corporation is not necessarily used 
artificially; it can have a genuine business purpose without being just a front for the 
personal business of the owner. The use is not necessarily reprehensible, as these one-
536 See, for example, Tunstall v. Steigmann (1962) at 599.
537 See In Re Darby (1911), DHN Food Distributors v. Tower Hamlets (1976) and Prest v. Petrodel 
Resources Ltd (2013). See also Hannigan 2013 at 19.
538 Huttunen adds two other constructions besides whole ownership of shares to the definition of a 
one-person company: 1) other shareholders are straw men and 2) one shareholder owns a percentage that 
excludes all minority rights provided in the Company Act. See Huttunen 1963 at 3–4.
539 The Company Act according to the will of the owner and in their interests. See Huttunen 1963 at 
152.
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person corporations are accepted in the legal system. The use of these corporations 
needs to be assessed just the same as any other corporation. Control, though, is 
always present.540
Sometimes the Finnish literature and that abroad refer to independence 
of the corporation instead or in addition to the control considerations.541 
Independence of a corporation means it is able to control its own means of 
existence. Practically, it is problematic to speak of a corporation’s independence 
as it is always in some way dependent upon or under the control of some 
group of persons.542 Independence, just as control, should not be assessed 
in the strictest sense. Formal assessment should be enough. As a result, a 
wholly owned subsidiary or a one-person corporation is always dependent or 
under the control of someone. Veil piercing is simply easier to apply in these 
companies as they always fulfill the control requirement, and the controllers 
should carefully devise the corporation’s conduct as to not fulfill the other 
requirements. Legitimate lawful business is always protected.543
Company Act 5:2 reads that it may be provided in the Articles of Association 
that the general meeting decides matters that fall within the general competence 
of the managing director and the board of directors. Naturally, this could transfer 
the liability to the general meeting should they decide such matters. The Articles of 
Association are nevertheless nothing but clues to finding the existence of control. 
If accounting for the right of the shareholders to make a unanimous decision on a 
matter normally in the competence of the general meeting without actually holding 
the general meeting (Company Act 5:1), the powers of the general meeting are 
adequate for piercing, even without the general competence. Another question is 
whether the shareholders have actual control.
Control in a corporation is fully transferable by contract. If the shareholders have 
contractually transferred some or all control rights to another party, this party’s 
control over the corporation depends on the contents of the contract. Should the 
corporation give its power of attorney to some person, this transfers the directors’ 
general competence to another. For piercing purposes, this another is the controller 
 
540 Same in the US, see Oh 2013 at 124 and Sparkman 2016 at 375.
541 More on this at V.4.2. of this work.
542 See Savela 2015 at 411. See also Nerep 2015 at 28–29.
543 Should the corporation dabble in a business that works within the grey areas of the law where the 
application of provisions is uncertain, the author’s advice would be to diversify control, provide the cor-
poration with adequate capital compared to expected liability, and, should the interpretation of the pro-
vision prove unsuccessful, to not dismantle the corporation immediately.
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of the corporation.544 Even less thorough control rights derived from a contractual 
arrangement will suffice for piercing, though.545
3.4.1.2.  Overall Assessment of Control Rights
Veil piercing requires an overall assessment of the corporate arrangement. If veil 
piercing is accepted as a remedy to abusing formal separateness, another formal 
isolation should not prevent it. Veil piercing can be used to hold the actual controller 
liable, even when she has no formal position in the corporation.546 Additional support 
can be derived from the tax avoidance norms and artificial property arrangement 
norms. Both note the disparity between the given legal form and the economic 
reality of the arrangement. Especially artificial arrangements place significance on 
who really controls the property and acts as an owner would.
In the artificial property arrangement case KKO 2011:49, the tenant initiated 
the sale of the apartment he occupied. The apartment was owned by a corporation. 
The Supreme Court assessed whether this and some other rights given to the tenant 
constituted control comparable to the owner’s control. The assessment proceeded 
to view the individual rights the parties had and actions they had performed. The 
tenant had not provided funds for the purchase of the property. He had been 
evicted and the new owner held formal positions in the corporation controlling the 
apartment. This led the court to conclude that the ownership is likely genuine. It 
then examined whether the rights the tenant had would disprove this. The tenant 
had, in fact, given the buyer the opportunity to buy the corporation. Additionally, 
he had been given the option to buy the corporate stock within a year of the sale. The 
terms of the tenant agreement were ambiguous, and the tenant had agreed to cover 
the expenses related to the apartment for a defined time period. However, these were 
unusual arrangements, and the tenant definitely held some control but was unable to 
determine how the corporation would act.
This case goes to show that control rights should be assessed individually in order 
to get an accurate view of the totality of the parties’ control possibilities.547 In the case, 
formal control and the control rights it brings both manifested in the same party, 
making it easy to determine that the actual owner and the formal owner were the 
544 See KKO 1996:2. Similarly in an asset recovery context, see Tuomisto 2012 at 33.
545 See KKO 2011:62, where the contractual arrangement was analyzed to great length to discover who 
was the actual operator. The terms were incredibly restrictive, which led the Supreme Court to deduce 
that the business of Rantahuolto was, in essence, a business of Neste also. Contractual control rights were 
thought sufficient to disregard the formal operator. Eventually, though, the case was not resolved with 
piercing but by determining the party that, according to the contract, controlled the damage-inducing 
part of the business.
See Tuomisto 2012 at 27–28 for useful examples of relevant contractual rights. These include, for example, 
influence over the business model, marketing, design, purchases, accounting, and financial situation.
546 See Toiviainen 1995 at 281.
547 Similarly KKO 2011:62.
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same party. The rights the tenant was given gave some specific control rights, though 
they were not enough to trump the general competence the owner possessed. As the 
case was about ownership, had the tenant been given the veto right to prevent the 
sale of the property or immunity from eviction, the assessment of the rights would 
probably have reached a different result.
In the United States, alter ego and instrumentality doctrines are specific veil 
piercing tests utilized by the courts. These tests require high levels of control over 
the corporation. Only if the level of control exceeds that which is acceptable 
commercial practice, the control is excessive, though no clear threshold for 
excessiveness exists.548 The company is dominated. This domination is then 
brought up by describing the controlled corporation in imaginative metaphors 
such as mere instrumentality, alter ego, adjunct, agency, conduit, department, 
puppet, sham, shell, tool, etc.549 Even so, something more than control is 
required for piercing.550 What that something is remains to be determined case 
by case. The situation in this regard is the same as in Finland. Mere ownership 
or control is never enough to pierce the veil. Similar to Finland, the courts do 
take into account a multitude of powers held by the parties. They can account 
for the influence on nominations, finances, business policy, daily operations, 
accounting as well as directorial positions persons have.551 A parent placing its 
own personnel into the subsidiary’s management has been cited as a sign of 
domination.552 In Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., the court pierced 
the veil of the subsidiary to hold the parent liable, emphasizing, among other 
things, the fact that the two corporations had the same directors and officers 
and were controlled by the same shareholders, though the ultimate reason 
to pierce was the shareholder’s unjust enrichment.553 In Angelo Tomasso v. 
Armor Construction Paving, Inc. (1982), Armor was no doubt dominated 
by Lemieoux, though he was formally not affiliated with the corporation. 
Lemieoux placed three employees of his former corporation as directors and 
officers, prepared every document for them to sign, loaned them the funds 
548 See Cheng 2010 at 559–560 and Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd (1988), where the issue was 
discussed extensively.
549 Oh 2010 at 83 footnote 7. 
550 Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., Inc. (1953): “complete stock owner-ship and actual one-man control will 
not alone be sufficient to impose liability on the individual,” although a reform has been suggested that 
in corporate torts and statutory violations, control should be enough to pierce. See Mendelson 2002 at 
1247–1258.
551 See Millon 2007 at 1361–1362.
552 For example, Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein (1964) and Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway 
(1926).
553 Cheng 2010 at 563. Similarly in Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Co. (1974) at 722–723 
and 733.
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to pay for the initial stock capital of the corporation, was able to overturn 
the decision of the formal directors, had access to accounts, and received 
dubiously recorded payments from Armor weekly. The company could not 
make bids for paving contracts without financial backing by Lemieoux, and 
even the tools required for paving work were not owned by the company but 
rented from another company owned by Lemieoux. The court eventually 
denied piercing as Lemieoux’s actions were not found to be improper. The 
court did argue that, instead of requiring a formal position in the corporation 
as a director or shareholder, piercing liability can be placed on the control or 
influence exercised by the individual sought liable.554
An interesting borderline for sufficient control for considering someone a close 
party is drawn in the preparatory works for the Asset Recovery Act.555 Significance 
is given to whether the CEO or board member556 is able to influence the financial 
arrangements the corporation makes with the controller. This typically creates the 
chance for the controller to receive benefits that possibly damage the creditors.557 
This cannot be adopted for veil piercing without amendments. Two factors can 
be derived, though: ability to affect financial actions and ability to derive benefits 
for oneself. But the question remains as to what level of affecting is enough. The 
right of initiative seems insufficient. Indubitably, control is present when the party 
alone can make a decision that involves potential benefits to the party.558 This should 
prove enough for piercing, even if the person is not able to control all the actions 
the corporation performs. They are nevertheless able to control the actions that 
potentially damage creditors.
3.4.2.  Actual Control in Veil Piercing
Even though formal control is sufficient for piercing, it can be ignored if it is clear 
that another holds actual control.559 Actual control trumps formal control as 
questions about actual control arise only when it is not held by the formal controller. 
The separation of formal and actual control itself can be a device to escape liability 
554 Angelo Tomasso v. Armor Construction Paving, Inc. (1982). 
555 HE 102/1990 at 46.
556 Or someone else in a decisive position within the corporation.
557 HE 102/1990 at 46.
558 Similarly in HE 102/1990 at 46.
559 For support, see KKO 1996:2 and KKO 2011:49, Toiviainen 1995 at 280–281 and SOU 1987:59 
at 105.
Traditionally named justification for piercing is that the corporation is dependent on some other entity. 
See Leppänen 1991 at 302 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292.
Similarly in the asset recovery context, see Leppänen 1992 at 121, Kangas 1994 at 280–282 and Tuomisto 
2012 at 34. Tuomisto argues that someone holding a formal position of control in the corporation cannot 
be considered a close party if that person holds no actual control.
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or restrictions.560 Because the formal outlook does create the assumption of control, 
deviating from it must be well justified. Every corporation has a formal judicial 
controller, and the one claiming that actual control is held by someone else must 
prove their claim. The assessment of actual control needs to be based on observable 
facts and rights, not formal position.561
Kukkonen has explored the theme of actual control amicably in the context of 
criminal law and debtor’s crimes. I think these criteria can be used as they are in 
the piercing context as well. He names share ownership, participation in profits and 
the ruining effect the corporation’s bankruptcy would have on the person’s finances 
as significant. He continues that the concrete actions of the person also need to be 
taken into account, for example, participation in meetings, communication with 
financers and co-operating businesses as well as giving orders outside the formal 
chain of command in a corporation. When assessing the evidence, the perception 
of the business partners on the controlling person can be significant as well as the 
allocation of profits to the claimed controller or her close parties.562 Finally, resigning 
the formal position shortly before the crime combined with the new holder’s lack 
of competence on that position hint toward the resigned person holding control.563
In the English case Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013),564 the defendant 
did not formally own any of the corporations and the ownership of the 
corporations was never revealed in the case. In the past, the defendant had 
told that he owned the corporations, even though the means by which he 
owned them remained obscure. He held management control over the 
corporations, and the other members of the management were nominees 
consisting of relatives, employees and professional directors. The defendant 
was also able to use corporate funds without formalities for personal 
expenditure. The Supreme Court never assessed these factors in relation 
560 See, for example, KKO 1996:2.
561 See KKO 2006:45. The case was about artificial property arrangement where an offshore corpora-
tion owned some real estate and rented it to the debtor. The corporation’s shares were owned by another 
person. Within the circumstances of the case, the formal owner’s claim that he was the actual owner was 
not enough to prove ownership. Instead, the court examined objective and observable facts. The debtor 
had signed documents relating to the property, had taken care of matters relating to the property, decided 
the sum paid as rent and set it remarkably low. The Supreme Court deemed that the debtor was, in fact, 
the owner and pierced the veil in regard of the ownership. The debtor was held as the true owner of the 
corporate property without having formal control in the corporation. The position of the formal owner 
was dubitable in part because the shares were issued to the holder of the share certificates. This made the 
use of an intermediary, straw man or an agent easier. See also KKO 1996:2.
Similarly in Sweden, see Nerep 2015 at 30.
562 Kukkonen 2018 at 35.
563 See HE 44/2002 vp at 163–164.
564 See also, Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne (1933) at 955–956. As for similar statements in the United 
States, see the decision Tomasso v. Armor Construction Paving, Inc. (1982) discussed above.
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to veil piercing, though. In my opinion, the court accepted control based 
on these findings and proceeded to evaluate whether relevant wrongdoings 
had taken place. Control was thus established through managerial positions 
and share ownership combined with the ability to bypass formalities in 
fund use.
Actual control can also manifest through control of resources necessary for the 
operation. If another controls the resource, then the corporation is dependent. A 
corporation can be dependent on someone, for example, in finance, workforce or 
materials.565 In these situations, the other party can control whether the corporation 
receives these and, through that affect the corporate decisions. This can result in the 
resource holding party utilizing the leverage it has. It can threaten to withhold the 
resource unless the corporation performs certain actions. Controlling the resource is 
not enough in itself, even if the party is the sole provider in the market. This position 
only enables the party to influence the corporation in a way that could allow for 
piercing. This could be dubbed creditor control after the typical situation where the 
loan provider exercises pressure.
This sort of control has come up in piercing cases in the United States. In Krivo 
Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & ChemicalDistill. & Chem. Corp. 
(1973), National took a company called Brad’s under its wing after Brad’s had 
come under financial distress. It extended fiscal help and advisor services to 
Brad’s. This was not enough to pierce the veil, as Brad’s had continued its 
existence as an independent actor. In the case A. Gay Jenson Farms, Co v. 
Cargill, Inc.,566 the debtor company was deemed an agent of Cargill’s. The 
debtor company, Warren, and Cargill were in a contractual relationship, and 
both operated an elevator business, purchasing grain and other farm produce. 
Cargill financed Warren’s operations and, through Warren, contracted 
farmers to grow specific crops. Sufficient control was derived from  a plethora 
565 Similarly in the Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage. See HE 165/1992 at 26–27. 
The financer can retain some control rights with the leverage their position gives. In some cases, these 
rights can allow holding them liable. See Hollo – Vihervuori 1995 at 240. Similarly, in asset recovery 
context, see Ovaska 1991 at 155 and Tuomisto 2012 at 35.
566 Especially at 291–293. The financer’s control in this sort of situation was established in Helsinki 
Appellate Court S 95/1367 and Helsinki Appellate Court S 95/2046. The cases were eventually decided 
based on participation in profit as a criterion required by asset recovery. Thus, the decisions cannot be 
used to rule out liability based on creditor’s control or to favor it. Rather, it only shows a good example 
of the mechanism through which a creditor can attain some control over the debtor corporation. The 
control also holds some relevance in the determination of close party status. See also Tuomisto 1997 and 
Tuomisto 1999.
See also Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986 at 279–280 and 284–286) where the parent started 
exercising intrusive control over the finances and operations of the subsidiary.
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of factors not unique to the nature of the business but definitely affected 
by it: (1) Cargill’s constant recommendations to Warren by telephone; (2) 
Cargill’s right of first refusal on grain; (3) Warren’s inability to enter into 
mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay dividends without Cargill’s approval; 
(4) Cargill’s right of entry onto Warren’s premises to carry on periodic checks 
and audits; (5) Cargill’s correspondence and criticism regarding Warren’s 
finances, officers’ salaries and inventory; (6) Cargill’s determination that 
Warren needed “strong paternal guidance”; (7) provision of drafts and forms 
to Warren, upon which Cargill’s name was imprinted; (8) financing of all 
Warren’s purchases of grain and operating expenses; and (9) Cargill’s power 
to discontinue the financing of Warren’s operations. The court duly notes that 
some of these elements are found in ordinary debtor-creditor relationships, 
but these factors cannot be considered in isolation. This led the court to 
conclude that Cargill indeed controlled Warren and could be held liable as 
the principal in an agency relationship. The utilized doctrine was agency and 
not veil piercing, though. I do not recall anything that would prevent using 
the same considerations in a piercing case to establish control. It is also worth 
noting that the debtor-creditor relationship between Cargill and Warren 
went far beyond standard restrictions imposed on the debtor. It should be 
considered possible that a creditor controls the debtor corporation, but this 
case only shows the situation at the extreme. 
Minority control is seemingly enough to fulfill the first requirement of the 
piercing test. In the KKO 1997:17 decision, the existence of other shareholders 
limits veil piercing but does not necessarily prevent it. However, the parent held 
majority control. Minority control is not stable, as the required number of votes 
needed for a majority in a general meeting can vary from year to year. Yet controlling 
the corporation is a prerequisite for using it to evade a legal obligation or damage 
creditors. It seems that, at least, we must inspect who held control at the time the 
evasion was performed. Minority control seems flimsy as a basis for veil piercing. 
It appears random and dependent on factors outside the influence of the claimed 
minority holder-controller. However, should the plaintiff be able to show that the 
defendant could control the circumstances enabling the abuse, it would not matter 
what control types she possessed. Sole undisputed control over the actions that 
led to the damage should suffice instead of requiring the capacity to control the 
corporation in all matters at all times.567
There is an inherent randomness and unpredictability in minority control. This 
makes it dubious when piercing. Existence of the control type is altered based on 
the time and activity of other shareholders. Thus, one should require additional 
567 Similarly in the United States, see Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 16.
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factors when basing a piercing claim on minority control. What these factors are 
is a more complicated issue. The core element is that these factors should eliminate 
the randomness from the control factors. The simplest answer would be to show a 
repetitive pattern from year to year that the minority shareholder has continuously 
been able to control the corporate decision-making. Similarly, one could establish 
that the corporate decision-making has consistently served the opportunistic 
interests of the minority. Still, both are prone to the counterargument that the 
examined year was when this pattern was broken.
In Sweden, though, some significance has been placed on whether only a single 
person has economic interest in the entity even though it has multiple owners.568 
The idea is interesting, although case law seems to require that the determinative 
influence is required by Swedish piercing doctrine.569 Still, one person holding the 
sole economic interest would support the existence of determinative influence. 
This conforms with the idea that control in a corporation is based on the level 
of economic interest the party has. Shareholders as the ultimate economic risk 
bearers have the residual risk and thus have the largest control rights.570 If the 
actual risk allocation diverts from the formal list of shareholders, this factor would 
then suggest that the control rights are also, in reality, allocated according to that 
risk.
Gerhard af Schultén recognizes another influential factor with minority 
shareholders in his examination of the Nordic region’s piercing doctrines. He sees it 
as justifiable to separate situations in which the minority conforms to the majority’s 
will or remains passive and where the minority actively utilizes its rights in opposition 
to the majority. Active opposition makes it less likely that the corporation is solely 
dependent and under the dominance of the majority.571 The majority shareholder is 
less likely able to use the corporation to evade an obligation or merely to her own 
benefit. The existence of the minority does not prevent piercing, but it can prevent 
someone from controlling the corporation completely.572
Tammi-Salminen finds that the economic ownership argument often ends 
up supporting veil piercing. Economic ownership refers to the combination 
of share ownership and control over the corporate property it bestows. 
Economic ownership is present when the shareholders are able to use and 
control the corporation’s property as if it was their own because they control 
the corporation. The corporation owns the property, but command over it 
568 See NJA 1935 s. 81. See also Svensson 2010 at 259–261.
569 See NJA 2014 s. 877 and Nerep 2015 at 30.
570 See, for example, Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 215–216.
571 See af Schultén 1984 at 81.
572 Similarly, see Stattin 2008 at 438.
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results in the controller commanding the property. It is formally indirect 
control over the property but is, in fact, unrestricted and direct. In Tammi-
Salminen’s opinion, the corporate veil can then be pierced and the separateness 
of ownership disregarded, and legal assessment is made according to economic 
ownership.573
The economic ownership consideration is not veil piercing as it is 
traditionally understood. It is the reverse situation in which the corporation 
(or its property) is held liable for the obligation of its owner. This situation is 
sometimes referred to as reverse piercing.574 In case law, economic ownership 
has not been sufficient for liability.575 There needs to be another norm 
demanding liability.576
A committee memo from Sweden brings up an interesting problem that arises 
when someone votes and controls the general meeting by proxy. The memo 
concludes that the proxy holder then has actual control over the corporation and 
could be held liable with piercing if the other requirements are fulfilled.577 When 
thought out a bit further, holding the proxy liable as the one controlling the vote is 
a formal decision. The relationship between the proxy and the principal in the end 
determines the powers the proxy has. The principal is able to control how the proxy 
votes and can hold them liable should they fail to honor the principal’s instructions. 
The decision on whether the proxy holder has control should be decided according 
to the terms of the principal-proxy relationship. If the principal has not placed 
any restraints on the actions, actual control rests with the proxy holder, just as the 
memo concluded. If the damage behind the piercing claim was caused by exercising 
control according to the principal’s orders, then the control definitely was that of 
the principal.
The use of intermediaries or straw men is a form of control where the real operator 
has been hidden behind a formal operator. Someone acts as a front owning the 
shares but managing the ownership according to instructions from the real owner. 
In the end, these arrangements lead to a situation where formal control is held by 
one person, but this control is used per the wishes of another. The formal controller 
holds no actual control. Often, these sorts of arrangements are used to bypass certain 
 
573 See Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 296.
574 See Vandekerckhove 2007 at 15–16.
575 See KKO 1982 II 184 and KKO 1983 II 185. For a more comprehensive analysis on these two cases, 
see Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 299. See also KKO 1997:17 and Huttunen 2007.
576 On the other hand, the ratio of a norm could be enough. See Leppänen 1991 at 287.
577 SOU 1987:59 at 133. Similarly, in the asset recovery context, see Kangas 1994 at 281. He argues 
that control can be held through delegation.
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limitations the actual controller faces. These include nationality requirements,578 
bans on business operations and even concealing income. It is not ruled out that 
the arrangement could just as easily be used to cheat creditors. Evidence-wise, if a 
person resigns the formal position of control shortly before the contested action 
is performed, this creates some suspicion. When this is combined with the new 
holder’s lack of competence on that position, it hints at the resigned person holding 
control and the new person being a straw man.579
The relationship between the straw man and the real operator can be based on 
a legal device or mere trust. When piercing the veil, control is held by both formal 
control by the straw man and actual control by the real operator. The straw man does 
not actually have any control over what actions the corporation takes and cannot 
decide the corporate actions that eventually lead to a veil piercing claim. No one 
should be held liable for something one has no control over. When formal and actual 
control have been separated and the separation can be sufficiently proven, actual 
control should be decisive. The straw man can be disregarded.580 In the Swedish 
committee memo, it is thought that the one demanding piercing should not have to 
prove that the formal controller is a straw man. Proving that the actual controller’s 
actions and opinions have a determinative impact on the decision is enough.581 As 
this work sees actual control as the basis for veil piercing, there is no need to deviate 
from this opinion. Professional directors and family members as directors should 
raise suspicions.582
578 As was suspected during the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant investor search. The government gave 
the plant project a prerequisite that 60% of the ownership must come from the EU or ETA area. At the 
last moment before the expiration of the project, a small Croatian company, Migrit Solarna Energija, 
announced its participation. It was publicly suspected that the company was implausible as a participant 
in such a large project and was nothing but a front to conceal Russian investors behind it. In the end, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment argued that no sufficient proof was provided and 
that actual control in the company was held by citizens of the EU or ETA area, even though formal con-
trol was held by such individuals. The issue ended as Migrit withdrew from the project. See http://yle.
fi/uutiset/3-8118267, http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8169619 and http://tem.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/
ei-riittavaa-varmuutta-tosiasiallisesta-maaraysvallasta-migritissa.
The Hanhikivi decision was essentially a political one. A similar issue could potentially come up in court, 
though. The answer cannot be so straightforward. The political decision was simply to deem that the 
company did not fulfill the prerequisite. The courts need a framework to justify this. Piercing doctrine is 
one applicable choice.
579 See HE 44/2002 vp at 163–164 and Kukkonen 2018 at 35.
580 See KKO 1996:2 and KKO 2006:45.
See also af Schultén 1984 at 96. He seeks the lowest common denominator for piercing in Nordic law. 
He concludes that all Nordic countries allow the veil to be pierced, at least when the subsidiary can be 
characterized as the parent’s representative, a straw man.
581 SOU 1987:59 at 105–106 and KM 1992:32 at 367.
582 Similarly in the United Kingdom, see Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd at 12.
175
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
3.4.3.  Control as Interpreted in Two Significant Decisions  
of the Supreme Court of Finland 
3.4.3.1.  KKO 1996:2
The KKO 1996:2 decision dealt with the abuse of wage security.583 The Supreme Court 
ended up piercing the veil of chained corporations584 and found actual control to be 
sufficient for it. The case also involved a straw man. The arrangement was dismissible 
as it was made only to obtain wage security benefits. The result of the case was piercing 
the veil, and the companies’ separation was disregarded. The decision had its basis in a 
Pay Security Act Section 17, so the decision does utilize the piercing doctrine.
In the 1996:2 decision, the Supreme Court of Finland pierced the veil of a 
corporation for the wage debts the same business had before it was transferred to 
another company. Two companies, Stigell Ky and Tietotoimi Oy, had operated in 
the field of consulting and selling information technology. Stigell Ky owned 91% of 
the stock of Tietotoimi Oy. A and B were the general partners of Stigell Ky. When 
faced with the threat of bankruptcy, the businesses of these two companies were 
sold to a newly formed company, Stigell Oy. The new company was fully owned by 
C, the son of A. C was also the sole member of Stigell Oy’s board of directors. Most 
employees of Stigell Ky followed to the new company. The new company issued a 
mandate allowing A to act as the representative of the company in anything relating 
to its business. The three companies then issued a statement intended for clients, 
stating that the businesses of Stigell Ky and Tietotoimi Oy were sold to and then 
combined under Stigell Oy and that operations would continue mostly as before.
The Supreme Court held that, despite the made contracts, ownership and being 
the sole member of the board of directors, C held no real control over Stigell Oy. 
It was deduced that the new company, regardless of its formal separateness, was, 
in reality, controlled by the general partners of Stigell Ky, A and B. The described 
arrangement itself shows that the purpose of it was to continue the same business in 
a new company under the control of the same persons.
The creditor in the case was the government agency responsible for pay security. 
The agency had covered the unpaid wages of the employees of Stigell Ky in accordance 
with the Pay Security Act. The Supreme Court held that one of the evident reasons 
583 For similar cases, see Appellate Court of Turku 28.11.1986 no. 974, Appellate Court of Turku 
21.4.1989 no. 326 and Appellate Court of Turku 8.12.1989 no. 1121. For a comprehensive analysis on 
these cases, see Leppänen 1991 at 295–309, who argues for the possibility of direct piercing (see dichot-
omy direct-indirect piercing at I.4.2. of this work) based on these three cases from the Turku Court of 
Appeals. See also KM 1992:32 at 372.
Cf. Huttunen 1996 at 30. He denies these being piercing cases as they were decided on the basis of labor 
law provisions. It remains indiscernible, why applying labor pay security provisions would exclude the 
application of piercing doctrine. In case law, the piercing doctrine has been used several times to apply the 
repayment section of the Pay Security Act.
584 Two or more corporations transfer the business from one to another while leaving some or all obli-
gations in the previous company.
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behind the arrangement described before was to abuse the wage security system. The 
arrangement had enabled the use of state funding to cover unpaid wages of Stigell Ky. 
These funds, in part, enabled the continuation of the business under a new company. 
Stigell Oy was held liable for the amount paid via the wage security system.
The Supreme Court deemed that the new company was founded only to abuse 
wage security. This was deduced from the overall arrangement. What arose as 
significant was the mandate given, the identical businesses, the close relationship 
between the owners of the new company and the old companies and even the young 
age of the new company’s owner. 
The Stigell case goes to show that the corporation can be controlled without 
formal control over the corporation, or even a position on the board of directors. 
Control was found as a combination of a commanding presence and a legal device. 
Interestingly, the legal device had nothing to do with the shareholder’s power in 
a corporation. A was given a mandate providing an unlimited right to make 
commitments in the name of the company as long as it was related to its business. 
This itself is a significant form of control but does not allow the person to control 
the company, merely that the corporation would accept the decisions made by the 
holder. He did not have the general competence of the directors, nor the voting 
majority in the general meeting. Yet the Court found that the formal owner and 
director C held no real control over the corporation. Not even the sale of businesses, 
other contracts between the parties and the actual transfer of funds were enough to 
show that the arrangement was a legitimate business deal. C was nothing but a straw 
man, the front to the organization.585 Showing a formal arrangement between the 
straw man and the controllers was not necessary. It could very well be that there was 
a concealed legal device transferring the control more comprehensively, but finding 
it was unnecessary. The circumstances were enough to show the control.
3.4.3.2.  KKO 1997:17
The KKO 1997:17 case is often cited in veil piercing literature in Finland, and it 
has inspired theorizing about veil piercing. Jukka Mähönen and Seppo Villa have 
deduced the possibility of veil piercing and derived four meaningful circumstances 
for veil piercing: control, other shareholders, practicing the parents own business in 
the form of the subsidiary and the arrangements intended purpose was violating the 
rights of the subsidiary’s creditors. 586 The first two will be analyzed here, the rest in 
the chapter discussing improper behavior.
585 Interestingly, the company existed until 8 March 2017 when it was declared bankrupt from its own 
initiative. Until then, C was the owner and managing director.
586 Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 407–408.
See also Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 291 footnote 12. She deduces the possibility of piercing the veil, al-
though the requirements for it were not met in the case. She finds the piercing to require control and 
artificial division of business or the intent to damage creditors.
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The Supreme Court has explicitly denied piercing based solely on ownership In 
the KKO 1997:17 decision. In the case, a parent corporation was the creditor, and 
the subsidiary was the debtor. The parent had obtained a security for the debt from 
the subsidiary. The subsidiary went bankrupt and the parent demanded payment in 
the bankruptcy proceedings. Another creditor of the subsidiary claimed that the 
parent corporation was not entitled to payment from the security because it held 
63.4% of the bankrupted subsidiary’s stock. The argument was that since the parent 
controlled the subsidiary, it did, in fact, own the subsidiary’s property. This would 
have meant that the secured debt was held by the owner of the property acting as a 
security. Therefore, the parent could not claim payment from the security.
The Supreme Court declined this argument. It stated that the starting point is 
corporate separateness and separate property. A parent corporation’s control over 
the subsidiary is not enough for the parent to be considered the owner of the 
subsidiary’s property. The Court dismissed the claim.
Mähönen and Villa do not open the concept of control any further, although 
in the decision, the Supreme Court states that control alone would not suffice for 
liability. Mähönen and Villa have noted this in their analysis also but continue 
discussing only the required level of ownership. It would seem safe to conclude 
that they have made the same silent assumption that the Supreme Court made—
controlling 63.4% of the vote constitutes control.587 They do note that, at least in this 
case, this percentage was not enough for piercing. A more interesting question is that 
of ownership conditions. In the decision, the existence of other shareholders besides 
the controller is mentioned. Exactly how this affects veil piercing considerations is 
left unexplained.588 The effects might be so obvious that the Court felt it unnecessary 
to state them. Ownership means interest. Interest in something confers the holder 
some rights, including legal protection of said interest.
The existence of minority shareholders in the debtor corporation should not 
prevent veil piercing for the controller’s liability, at least automatically.589 If the 
corporation lacks the funds to satisfy the creditors’ claims, holding additional 
persons liable could hardly be detrimental to the minority shareholders of the 
debtor corporation.590 In the KKO 1997:17 case, the minority shareholders would 
not have faced any negative consequences. They would have only benefitted from 
them. Piercing was not denied to protect them, and their presence should have been 
irrelevant to piercing. 
587 Company Act 5:27 provides the threshold of a two-thirds vote to some more significant general 
meeting decisions. Thus, controlling this percentage gives control over most decisions. In the case, the 
minority held over one-third and thus provided more limitations to the majority owner’s power.
588 See also Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 408. They recognize that the existence of other shareholders 
apparently has meaning when piercing, but also that piercing does not require a 100% ownership.
589 Similarly in Sweden, see Stattin 2008 at 438.
590 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 249.
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In other situations, however, minority interest could affect the decision by 
opposing the finding of evasive purpose. A minority presence can be used to show 
that the arrangement was not solely for an illegitimate purpose. The minority’s 
presence can also dilute the control and, therefore, serve to oppose piercing. It 
speaks of a legitimate business purpose as investors are sought to partake in the 
enterprise.591 In an endeavor made solely in the interest of one attempting to transfer 
negative risk to an outside party, the presence of genuine minority interest would 
only be detrimental to that purpose.
It seems important to note that this is not necessarily the case in every veil 
piercing decision. Sometimes the claimants demand the so-called “reverse 
piercing,” meaning they seek to hold the company liable for obligations of the 
controller. This is often the case in the enforcement procedure utilizing the 
artificial property arrangement provision. In these reverse piercing situations, 
the minority shareholders’ interests would be violated should the company 
or a piece of its property be liable for the obligation. In these situations, the 
presence of other shareholders speaks against piercing.
In the US, the presence of other shareholders does not prevent veil piercing, 
at least in situations where the other shareholders remain passive. Then it is 
only the active shareholder controlling the corporation that can be held liable 
for corporate obligations.592 In that situation, though, the other shareholders 
have no interest at stake in the piercing trial, similarly to KKO 1997:17.
In the United Kingdom, the stance is very different. There, the presence 
of unconnected shareholders means that the veil cannot be pierced, for 
then the company cannot be identified with its controller.593 Unlike in the 
other jurisdictions discussed here, the issue is not viewed as per control but 
rather as per identity, as if deeming the entities to be the same person. The 
view is much more strict than in Finland and the United States. In Nicholas 
v. Nicholas (1984), the majority shareholder owned 71% of the shares. The 
court decided not to mandate the transfer of company-owned property to 
the majority shareholder’s wife but noted the result might have been different 
had it not been for the position of the minority shareholders. The court also 
made a difference between nominal and real minority shareholders. This gave 
the impression that only genuine minority interest would prevent piercing.
591 About this, see V.4.2. of this work.
592 See Cheng 2010 at 512.
593 See Trustor v. Smallbone (2001) at 14 and 20 and Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif (2009). See also Han-
nigan 2013 at 19.
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In case 1997:17, the claim did not violate the interests of the subsidiaries’ 
shareholders. Rather, it would have furthered their interests by providing the 
bankruptcy estate with more funds. In the case, others held 36.6% of the votes. The 
Court did not specify why the presence of other shareholders was significant. The 
author’s opinion is that their presence helped prove that the corporation was not 
founded solely on the parent’s interest as a device to cheat creditors. It speaks for the 
independence and legitimate business purpose of the subsidiary.
The decision can be interpreted that the control requirement was present, but the 
diversity of ownership prevented piercing. On the other hand, it can be that piercing 
was denied solely because of the other missing elements, artificial division and the 
intent to damage creditors.594 Maybe the presence of other shareholders supported 
the existence of a legitimate corporate purpose and spoke against the artificial and 
detrimental nature of the arrangement.595 Due to the general language used and lack 
of analysis in the decision, no concrete interpretations can be made. The decision 
only helps to identify factors significant for veil piercing but unfortunately remains 
silent on their specific interpretation.
3.5.  Conclusions on Control
The discussion in the preceding chapters has been about the use of corporate form 
and control in a corporation. It was determined that, using corporate group structure, 
intercorporate relations or shareholders control all means using the corporate form. 
In addition, all of these forms of use require controlling the corporation. Control 
was discovered to be a key element in piercing decisions, even if the used aspect 
is group structure or intercorporate relations. The next step was to determine who 
holds control in a corporation, whether by share ownership, management positions, 
contracts and actual control even without a formal relationship to the corporation. 
 
594 See Huhtamäki 1999 at 144 footnote 12. He highlights the economic entity as a justification for 
piercing. If the corporations in the KKO 1997:17 had formed a single economic unit, veil piercing would 
have been possible.
Cf. Huttunen 2007 at 138. He sees that, in the KKO 1997:17 decision, the Supreme Court expressly 
denied that share ownership could allow the court to consider the owner of shares as the owner of the 
corporation’s property. He concludes that the case offers no concrete material from which to deduce the 
possibility of piercing the veil.
Cf. Kolehmainen 2009 at 613. He interprets the case so that piercing was not accepted because the 63.4% 
vote was not a high enough level of control.
595 Though, for example, in a Swedish committee memo, veil piercing has been thought possible even 
when the company has many shareholders. See SOU 1987:59 at 103–104 and NJA 1947 s. 647. In Swed-
ish literature, this has been further analyzed to mean that piercing is possible when there are one or few 
shareholders. See Nial – Johansson 1998 at 228 and Nerep 2003 at 26.
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If the formal control position does not match the reality, then the one who actually 
holds control is relevant for veil piercing.
In veil piercing case law, a certain level of control has been deemed necessary for 
piercing to apply. In piercing case law, control has been founded on a combination of 
share ownership and management positions. In KKO 1996:2, a straw man was found 
and the control requirement for piercing was fulfilled by de facto control combined 
with some contractual rights the controller had been given. In KKO 1997:17, it 
was silently assumed that 66.7% ownership would constitute control. Control in 
a corporation is elusive, and the multiple methods of dividing or allocating that 
control makes the assessment case-specific.
One thing is absolutely certain, though: control alone never justifies piercing. I 
did address the totality of the elements of the piercing test and how they can be used 
to support each other when assessing the evidence. I must remind at this point that 
control is more easily shown than improper behavior. Due to control being ordinary 
in corporations and common in one-man corporations, it is likely that control is 
present and provable much more often than the other requirements. As such, it 
would seem distorted to use the control factor to compensate for the lack of evidence 
of the others. Still, strong evidence of one person dominating the corporation can, in 
some cases, show that it is more likely that the use was improper. One should exercise 
caution when compensating the impropriety requirement with control.
4.  Requirement of Improper Behavior
4.1.  Introduction
The requirement of improper behavior consists of two parts, both of which are derived 
from the KKO 2015:17 decision. These parts are artificial and reprehensible use of 
corporate form. In KKO 2015:17, the presence of both was required in order to pierce 
the veil. The construction in this work honors the distinction made. Artificial use in a 
non-reprehensible manner is not deserving of condemnation. One can use a corporation 
for whatever purpose one wishes: business or other. Artificiality just means that the 
corporation is not used how the legislator intended it to be used. Even if corporations 
are commonly used in one way, it does not mean that the use is not artificial. Only 
the legislator can modify what artificiality includes. A separate issue is that artificial 
use that causes damage to another likely fulfills the requirement of reprehensibility. 
Reprehensible use follows the formal, rules but the results do not seem acceptable. It 
is condemnable as such, even though the way the corporation is used falls within the 
wording of the norms while failing to uphold their spirit. Case law can deem the use 
acceptable or non-reprehensible but cannot make the use not artificial, though case law 
acceptance is enough to prevent veil piercing as reprehensibility is amiss.
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The division into artificiality and reprehensibility is not the only potential 
choice. In the United States, Cathy Krendl and James Krendl have suggested 
five forms of conduct that fulfill the impropriety requirement of veil piercing 
there: (1) violations of public policy, (2) misrepresentation, (3) lack of 
economic substance, (4) shareholder domination or direct participation in 
the wrongful conduct, and (5) evasion of legal obligations through the use 
of a corporate entity.596 The glaring difference in approach is that there is no 
requirement of artificiality in the piercing tests. They focus on domination 
over the corporation, i.e., the lack of independence of the corporation, and 
that, combined with one of the listed results, satisfies the piercing test. It 
would thus seem that the Finnish doctrine is more strict and predictable. As 
discussed in the previous section, control is part of the Finnish test but not as 
heavily as in the US, where excessive control combined with an inequitable 
result is often enough to justify veil piercing.
The US doctrines are capable of accounting for elements that are discussed 
under the artificiality part of the Finnish doctrine. These elements appear 
under the domination or the wrongful conduct part. In part, they create the 
inequitable situation. Another key difference is that the separation between 
reprehensibility and results in the Finnish doctrine does not exist in the US 
doctrine. Following the formulation by the Krendls’ evasion of an obligation 
or public policy are part of the impropriety whereas in the Finnish doctrine 
they are listed as the results of improper behavior. But, as we learned in II.3. of 
this work about the prohibition of abuse of rights, the inequitable result and 
intent to achieve them together would enable disregarding the arrangement. 
This leaves us in an interesting situation, where the background theory for the 
Finnish doctrine corresponds better with the US piercing doctrine than the 
actual piercing test in KKO 2015:17. As artificiality is an explicitly stated part 
of the piercing test, this makes the US doctrine less useful as a comparative 
target when discussing artificiality and reprehensibility.
Only when both artificiality and reprehensibility are present in the same case, 
the corporate veil can be pierced.597 The assessment thus has an objective criterion 
(artificiality) and a more moral criterion (reprehensibility). Usually, these two are 
inseparable. The morally condemnable use is rarely within the intended purpose 
of an institution. The relationship does not hold as strongly the other way around, 
596 See Krendl – Krendl 1972 at 29–43. See also Powel 1931 at §13. A similar but simpler test was 
proposed by Marcantel (2011 at 215–230). His test includes (1) an injustice requirement that can be 
achieved through a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or undercapitalization; (2) a unity requirement; 
(3) a causation requirement; and (4) an insolvency requirement.
597 Similarly Pönkä 2012 at 233–234 and Linna 2004 at 631–632.
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though. Use that is not within the intended purpose of the institution is not 
automatically condemnable. This, in turn, means that the reprehensibility criterion 
will most likely become decisive for veil piercing. The problem lies in how to identify 
the moral depreciation that plays a relevant role in a juridical decision. I have looked 
into this in II.3. of this work when discussing the prohibition of abuse of rights. The 
discussion in this chapter looks more closely into the practical aspects of showing 
reprehensibility. I will start with an analysis of the nature of artificiality. The attempt 
is to find a definition for artificiality and then determine what kind of corporate use 
is artificial. After that, the text delves into the jungle that is reprehensibility.
4.2. Artificial Manner
4.2.1.  Defining Artificiality
Artificiality is found when the corporate use does not match these intended uses. 
Artificiality has a well-defined structure in artificial property arrangements and in 
tax avoidance. These two doctrines serve as the starting point for the examination 
here, where the attempt is to define what artificial use is and how it can be detected 
and determined in legal decision-making.
On the international stage, Finland is rather unique in demanding artificiality 
as part of veil piercing. Perhaps this comes from the long tradition of tax evasion 
norms construed around the concept and their offspring, the artificial property 
arrangement norm in the Enforcement Code. Internationally, artificiality is 
only a side note of control598 or some supportive consideration. For example, 
the US piercing doctrines usually cite some injustice or inequitable result.599 
The UK piercing doctrine revolves around the evasion of existing obligations 
by using a corporation.600 There seem to be no additional requirements for 
how the corporation is used, but piercing based on injustices alone is rather 
vehemently opposed in England.601
In Sweden, one longstanding criterion in the veil piercing assessment is 
the dependence—osjälvständighet—of the corporation. This means that the 
corporate operation is indistinguishable from the shareholders’ own operation 
and thus fulfills the shareholders’ interests directly rather than through 
generating profit within the corporation.602 Krister Moberg has understood 
598 For example, the analysis on whether the corporation has seized to have a separate existence.
599 See Hamilton – Booth 2006 at 400 and Gallagher – Ziegler 1990 at 300–302.
600 See Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) at 35.
601 See Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991) and Mujih 2018. Cf. Gallagher – Ziegler 1990.
602 See NJA 1947 s. 647. In the literature, see Hellner 1964 at 166, SOU 1987:59 at 132, Moberg 1998 
at 76 and Stattin 2008 at 446–447. For a critical view, see Nerep 2015 at 28–29. 
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this to mean that the business purpose of the corporation is not independent 
of the shareholders’.603 This opinion was also expressed in the NJA 1992 s. 
375 decision, where the corporation’s business purpose was interpreted as 
an element against piercing liability. The betalningsansvarskommitté saw the 
criterion differently. It rejected the dependence assessment as a requisite of 
piercing and instead saw its meaning when assessing whether the results are 
unacceptable. The most convincing argument was the one-man company, in 
which the dependence would be a moot criterion.604 
The Swedish term does not exactly match the artificiality as laid out in 
the Finnish doctrine, but some similarities are apparent. The corporation 
as a separate legal person is the formal legal status of the arrangement. Still, 
the corporation is not independent in the sense that its business purpose is 
strictly to serve the interests of the shareholder not in the manner specified 
in Company Act, i.e., generating profits within the company. Arguably, 
through some strange mental acrobatics, this situation somewhat matches the 
concept of artificiality. The non-independent corporate use does not match 
the intended purpose of the corporation, which could be understood as 
independent business and profit generation within the corporate operations. 
Not much material in this matter is utilizable from Sweden, as the differences 
are apparent. On the appellate court level, Sweden has one case that directly 
mentions using the corporation for purposes other than those behind 
adopting limited liability.605 This matches the artificiality as understood in 
this work and mostly shows that the idea is not unheard of in Sweden, either.
In the United Kingdom, the courts rarely question veil piercing when a 
sham corporation is involved.606 The sham corporation itself is rather hard to 
define; it could be considered a corporation intended to give third parties or 
the court the appearance of creating legal rights and obligations between the 
parties that are different from the actual intended legal rights and obligations 
(if any). The problem with this definition is the strict adherence to the 
Salomon principle in the UK. Robert Miles and Eleanor Holland elaborate on 
this problem: “[I]t is meaningless in this context to talk of a ‘sham company’: 
it is vital to the success of a scheme that employs the corporate form that a real 
company is properly incorporated; otherwise, the scheming party would not 
be able to avail him- or herself of the principle of separate legal personality in 
order to achieve his or her purpose.”607 This means that when the corporation 
603 Moberg 1998 at 76–77.
604 See SOU 1987:59 at 132. See also Nerep 2015 at 28–29 accepting the committee’ arguments.
605 See Svea hovrätt, No. T 7360-14 as reported by Brandell 2018 at 7.
606 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1990).
607 Miles – Holland 2013 at 206 and the case law they cite in footnote 53. For additional criticism, see 
Moore 2006 at 195.
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is incorporated properly, it is real and not a sham. At first hand, the definition 
of sham could be interpreted to include some elements of artificiality, the 
disparity between formal appearance and reality being the commonality. 
Unfortunately, the strictly formal interpretation makes the concept moot on 
a comparative perspective.
The United Kingdom case law, though, has addressed similar issues. 
In Chandler v. Cape Plc (2012), the court did extensively look into the 
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. The court found that the 
subsidiary remained the owner of its own assets and handled its own sales 
and dealings with third parties. The case was eventually decided on grounds 
other than piercing, but the parent was held liable for safety hazards in the 
subsidiary’s operation. One factor that supported extending the liability was 
that the businesses of the parent and subsidiary were the same in a relevant 
respect. One should not draw conclusions too extensively from this, though, 
as extending the liability required three other factors related to the parent’s 
knowledge of safety hazards and the subsidiary’s right to rely on the parent to 
act based on its superior knowledge on the issue. The case remains interesting 
mostly because it gives significance to the similarity of the businesses of 
formally separate entities when extending liability beyond the formal outlook. 
Much of the same elements appeared in the KKO 2015:17 decision.
In the context of artificial property arrangements and tax avoidance, artificiality 
means the disparity of a given legal form and the economic reality of the situation. 
The arrangement is given some juridical form in order to create some legal effects 
beneficial to the creator, even though the arrangement in reality matches some other 
juridical form or matches no form. In the preparatory works for Enforcement Code 
4:14, a clear stance on artificiality is taken. Legal institutions are normally perfectly 
acceptable devices created to serve certain purposes. When these devices are used to 
circumvent obligations, they need to be met with different reactions and attitude.608 
The same argument could be applied to piercing. If a corporate arrangement’s 
economic reality does not match the form it has been given, it becomes possible 
by piercing to apply the actual matching form to the arrangement, even if it is 
detrimental to the arrangers.609
Artificiality is closely related to fake legal actions. Fake legal acts are not 
binding and are invalid by nature. Although the Contracts Act 34 § does 
specify that fake legal actions can be binding if the one receiving rights from 
said action was bona fide. These actions are made to avoid the applicability 
608 See HE 275/1998 vp. at 14.
609 See Savela 2015 at 405. Similarly, see Vahtera 2018 at 265.
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of some legal norm. For example, one person sells their house to another to 
prevent it from being auctioned away for the debts. What makes these fake is 
that there is no actual transaction happening. The parties never intended to 
perform the legal action. They only intended it to exist in form, not in reality. 
There was no real intent to cause the legal consequences. In an artificial 
arrangement, the intention does exist. A legal action is actually performed in 
form and in reality. The totality of the arrangement, however, remains such 
that the actual effects of the arrangement do not match the effects the form 
was meant to represent.
Kari S. Tikka has construed a remarkably clear formulation in order to 
determine the applicability of the general norm in tax avoidance situations. This 
formulation first determines artificiality. The legal form of an action or a situation 
is X, and the requirements for using X are met. If X does not match the actual 
nature or purpose of the arrangement, the general norm is applicable. X does not 
match the actual nature or purpose of the arrangement if the economic realities X 
usually refers to are amiss. Then the general norm is used as a remedy. In artificial 
situations, the one making the legal decision would be allowed to use the general 
norm to change the description of the legal form. The arrangement is treated as 
if the correct form were used and the actual form is replaced. When determining 
taxation, the arrangement is given a fictive form, per se, that matches its economic 
reality.610 In veil piercing, this is not enough. The arrangement does not necessarily 
have a correct form. There is no need to dismiss the formulation, though, as the 
rest of it is perfectly applicable.
Help could be derived from another excellent formulation. Pöyhönen defines an 
artificial arrangement as a permitted legal action that does not cause changes in the 
starting situation when examined from the viewpoint of property law.611 He proceeds 
to justify remedying these situations by allowing an expansive interpretation of the 
provision banning fake legal actions and interpreting it in light of the prohibition 
of the abuse of rights. The actions are not fake since the parties intended a legal 
consequence to be created. The consequence itself is not acceptable and should 
not enjoy legal protection.612 The view adopted by Pöyhönen relies on expansive 
interpretation since property law has no general norm allowing the disregard. Case 
law acceptance of piercing doctrine somewhat patches this deficiency when the 
corporate form is considered.
610 Tikka 1972 at 215. Similarly Knuutinen 2009 at 53–67 and 195.
See also Leppänen 1991 at 282 and Huhtamäki 1999 at 144, who both place significance on economic 
wholes. When two formally separate subjects in reality make up an economic whole, upholding the sep-
arateness does not seem justified.
611 Pöyhönen 2001 at 313.
612 See Pöyhönen 2001 at 313.
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The formulations of Tikka and Pöyhönen are similar. Both address formal 
changes when the reality does not change.613 What Pöyhönen adds is the legal 
principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights as a justification of intervention. Veil 
piercing has no general norm laid out in legislation. The formulations are easy to 
place on veil piercing. The formal requirements of corporate form are easily fulfilled. 
If the economic realities a corporation usually entail are not present, veil piercing 
could be applied. Veil piercing needs to derive justification from case law and legal 
principles, such as the prohibition of abuse of rights and fake legal actions. The 
disparity of legal form and economic reality form the basis for artificiality—the 
economic reality of the case does not match the legal form it is given.
Yet the view could be problematic. The tax avoidance norm usually addresses 
the disparity of income as understood by tax laws and income as understood by 
economic theory. The disparity is easy to detect as the economic income concept 
is clearly defined. When examining veil piercing, the addressed disparity is between 
the concepts of a corporation as it is present in the law and the economic content 
of a corporation. The corporation is entirely a legal fiction and does not have an 
independent economic reality. The economic properties of the corporation are 
those given to it in law. Even in the most aggravated corporate abuse situation, there 
is no disparity between the economic content of the corporation and the Company 
Act content of the concept. Instead, we need to look at the economic content the 
Company Act was meant to create or the economic content it usually has. If the 
economic reality does not match this content, the use is artificial. Following the 
division made by Reijo Knuutinen: the disparity is between the formulation of the 
text of the law and the ratio behind the law. The formulation fails to uphold the 
purpose behind it.614
In Sweden, the emphasis is on the abuse of the corporate form for purposes 
other than those that were intended to be achieved with limited liability.615 
“Den verksamhet som bedrivits har således inte varit någon sådan egentlig 
näringsverksamhet i omsättningens intresse som aktiebolaget som bolagsform 
är tänkt att möjliggöra.”616 Although it could be noted that this formulation 
says the same thing twice, it should be praised for its clarity. The formulation 
613 However, their meter for measuring the reality differs. The model of Karhu views it through con-
cepts of law, whereas Tikka observes the economic rationalities of business. The difference could be ex-
plained with the nature of tax law as dependent on those rationalities.
614 See Knuutinen 2009 at 53–61. See also pp. 134–136 of the same work about synthetic and con-
structive ownership.
615 See NJA 2014 s. 877 at 12. För att en ansvarsgenombrottssituation ska anses föreligga bör det krävas 
att det sätt på vilket ett bolags verksamhet har bedrivits framstår som ett tydligt fall av missbruk av bolags-
formen för andra ändamål än de som motiverat det begränsade ekonomiska ansvar som bolagsformen 
erbjuder.
616 NJA 2014 s. 877 at 14.
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says nothing of artificial use but contains the same definition of artificiality I 
arrived at in my analysis of the Finnish piercing doctrine. If the above analysis 
is accepted, then the Finnish and Swedish doctrines are the same in this 
aspect, albeit the Finnish Supreme Court, for some reason, has decided to 
make the situation more cryptic.
Veil piercing has occasionally been explained by combining economic 
ownership with formal ownership, and the property of the corporation is 
deemed to be the property of the shareholder.617 This view comes close to the 
beneficial owner concept618 used in taxation in common law countries. Both 
of these are constructions used to describe the economic reality, and as such, 
they can be placed in the aforementioned formulations. However, I will not 
use the beneficial owner concept further in this work.
4.2.2.  The Intended Purpose of the Corporation
What, then, is the intended purpose of the corporate institution? What is the 
economic reality the corporate form is supposed to represent? The answer could 
be derived from either the societal background for adopting the institution or the 
Company Act–defined purpose. The prior could be called the purpose and values 
the institution has been created to serve. The latter could be called the purpose of 
a single company. It is important to remember that corporate form, and therefore 
limited liability and separate personality, are nothing but tools to achieving these 
purposes.
Beginning with the societal values of the institution, Tammi-Salminen names 
the intended purpose of the corporation as the promotion of production, trade 
and lawful business. Veil piercing applies when the corporation has been used in 
a manner contradictory to its intended purpose and as a device to avoid liability. 
Even if the actions of the corporation do serve a business purpose, veil piercing is not 
excluded if the actions are not honest trade and the corporation has been used only 
to pursue self-interest at the expense of others.619 No doubt, production, trade and 
lawful business are the values usually promoted by corporate form. The corporation 
is not meant as a wealth protection device or as a device to enjoy some rights the 
legal system protects.620
617 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 296–297.
618 About the beneficial owner, see Knuutinen 2009 at 128–134.
619 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 290. Similarly in Sweden, see Andersson 2014 at 1. See also Stjernqvist 
1950 at 84, who called these corporate arrangements bristfälliga firmaunderlag, defective enterprises or 
enterprises with faulty foundations. Later decisions involving these arrangements were renamed as veil 
piercing decisions. The original name is somewhat fitting and tells that somehow, these corporations are 
not operating how a corporation should.
620 Similarly, see Pöyhönen 2000 at 176 and Tjio 2014 at 4.
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This connection is well established in the United States. Cheng crystallizes 
this view: “Limited liability itself emerged in the nineteenth century as an 
economic policy tool to promote industrialization. As the capital need of 
businesses grew, state legislatures were under pressure to introduce limited 
liability to help corporations attract investments from passive shareholders. 
Limited liability was first adopted in quick succession by the northeastern 
states, which faced regulatory competition with one another and did not 
want to lose businesses to other states.”621 Veil piercing can be understood 
as the tool for ensuring the fair use of the corporate form for this purpose.622 
Policy considerations in veil piercing cases are quite common.623 Having said 
this, the US courts seem to have no problem piercing the veil even if the 
corporations in question had an actual business as long as the piercing test is 
satisfied.624 Still, the actual business purpose behind a corporation’s actions 
speaks against piercing.625
The Swedish situation is discernable from the NJA 2014 s. 877 decision 
citing preparatory works to define the intended purpose of the corporations 
as “Aktiebolagsformen ger aktieägarna möjlighet att driva verksamhet utan 
att riskera mera än det ursprungligen satsade och tillskjutna kapitalet.”626 
Translated, this means that the company form gives the shareholders the 
possibility to operate a business with liability limited to the capital input. The 
corporation institution is meant to facilitate business.
In the UK, the courts are vehemently opposed to piercing the veil of any 
company with active business. These bona fide companies have business 
operations themselves and do not act as mere shells.627 This would suggest a 
similar view of the corporate purpose when piercing the veil in the UK, though 
express reference rarely appears. In Rainham Chemical Works v. Belvedere Fish 
Guano Co (1921), Lord Buckmaster stated as the objective of limited liability 
that enterprise and adventure be encouraged. He added that the corporation 
621 See Cheng 2010 at 522 and those cited therein.
622 Georgakopolous 2007 at abstract.
623 See, for example, the influential decision in Anderson v. Abbott (1944) at 363. See also First National 
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (1983) at part III, which discusses the nature of 
government instrumentalities. In the literature, see Halabi 2015 at 1011. See also the alleged first veil 
piercing case Bank of Deveaux v. United States (1809) and I. Maurice Wormser’s analysis on case law at the 
beginning of the 20th century (Wormser 1912).
624 See Cheng 2011 at 17.
625 Evans v. Multicon Construction Corp. (1991) at 735, stating that benefit gained by individual de-
fendants was a legitimate business purpose and therefore a factor against veil piercing. See also Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat (1999), in which the undercapitalization of a company was 
justified due to taxation reasons supporting the business.
626 Prop. 2004/05:85 at 196.
627 For a survey of UK decisions until 2010, see Cheng 2011 at 16. See also Lord Justice Dillon in 
Nicholas v. Nicholas (1984), citing business reasons as a preventive of piercing.
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should act as an independent trading unit and not solely on behalf of the 
people by whom it has been called into existence.628 Additionally, the UK 
courts are reluctant to include any sort of policy considerations in their 
argumentation,629 thus further obfuscating whether fulfilling the intended 
purpose of the corporate institution opposes piercing.
In the United Kingdom legal literature, Tan Cheng-Han has expressed 
an opinion remarkably similar to the one presented in this work. He, too, 
emphasizes the societal purpose behind the company and the policy goals the 
institution is meant to facilitate. The raison d’être was to allow companies to 
be used as vehicles for legitimate human enterprise and endeavor, particularly 
where large amounts of capital were required. Companies were never intended 
as vehicles that incorporators could use to take unfair advantage of third 
parties. This sort of use constitutes abuse of the corporate form. The scope 
of corporate separate personality must be consistent with the overall goals of 
corporate law, which are intended to benefit society and must therefore give 
way where it is clear that society’s interests will not be served.630 The opinion 
of Tan remains rare in English legal literature, and similar views have not been 
cited in case law. Still, it is heartening to note a familiar view, even if it is the 
minority at the moment.
This societal purpose view on corporate purpose somewhat conflicts with the 
other definition of corporate purpose. Company Act 1:5 reads that the purpose of 
a company is to generate profit for the shareholders.631 Company value transfers are 
legal (Company Act 13:1.3), and the management’s conduct is diligent (Company 
Act 1:8) if the actions are made to further this purpose. Any action that furthers the 
purpose of the corporation is a legitimate business purpose in the Company Act sense. 
The default situation set in Company Act is, thus, that any action that furthers the 
corporation’s ability to generate profit for the shareholders has a business purpose.632 
Thus, any action that either diminishes costs or enables profit has a business purpose.
Arguably, fulfilling this purpose also fulfills the societal purpose of promoting 
trade and production. In many situations, however, these two definitions could 
conflict, for example, when an existing business of a corporation is divided into two 
different entities to continue the business operations as a whole. In such a situation, 
628 At 475. The court did not pierce in the case, as the corporation was found to be an independent 
trading unit. See also Moore 2006 at 200–201 and Cheng 2011 at 23.
629 See Cheng 2011 at 14.
630 Tan 2015 at 22 and 29–31.
631 The manner in which profit generation is defined does not matter here. The result is the same 
whether we adopt shareholder value maximization, enlightened value maximization or triple bottom line 
approach.
632 See, for example, Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 375.
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the division does not further the societal purpose. The business operation of the 
original corporation already fulfilled this purpose. The division no doubt furthers 
the Company Act–defined purpose, though. If corporate purpose is defined in this 
fashion, it could in fact incentivize the corporate actors to make a risk separation 
arrangement, which in turn could be undesirable for the society. These arrangements 
no doubt generate benefits for the shareholders.
Pönkä discusses veil piercing and notes that the purpose of the active 
corporations does not always match the purposes of the Company Act.633 He 
does not suggest that veil piercing should be denied when the company use 
does not match the purposes of the Company Act. This observation springs 
the need to further elaborate that the acceptability of company use cannot 
be determined by how the companies are used. It is entirely possible that a 
common practice is abusive and should be neglected. If the practice has been 
evaluated against the norms of the legal system and is found acceptable, then 
this practice is naturally acceptable.
To avoid this sort of incentive, let us recall the argumentation in tax avoidance 
situations. The tax benefits of an arrangement that has been formulated to create 
these benefits do not legitimize the arrangement. Paying less tax is beneficial to the 
company and is therefore a legitimate business reason in the sense of Company 
Act. The tax avoidance norm, however, evaluates the abuse of tax norms, so the fact 
that the arrangement is beneficial for the business cannot serve to legitimize the 
arrangement. The same argumentation could be applied in arrangements where 
separate personality and limited liability are considered. When assessing whether 
using them constitutes abuse, the fact that the use is beneficial to the company 
cannot legitimize the arrangement, though in a definitive sense, the arrangement 
does have a business purpose.
Accepting this view would remove the undesired incentive to make risk separation 
arrangements for the sake of separation alone. In veil piercing, the Company Act–
defined purpose can no doubt be accepted. The purpose of the company is to generate 
profits for the shareholders. Fulfilling this purpose constitutes a business reason. This 
purpose in a default case also fulfills the societal purpose of the corporate institution. 
Veil piercing is an abuse norm, though. Thus, the business purpose created by abuse 
should not be considered a legitimizing business purpose. In order not to be considered 
artificial, the corporate arrangement needs to have a business purpose other than the 
separate personality, limited liability and the benefits they create for the shareholders. 
If such purpose exists, the use of the corporate institution also fulfills the societal 
purpose of the company, as it generates new business activity.
633 See Pönkä 2008 at 323.
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At this point, I should note that this interpretation is based on an analogous 
argument based on the tax evasion norm. With tax evasion, there is a specific section 
of written law that validates the view. Veil piercing, however, is not only based on 
mere case law, but adopting this sort of view also directly contradicts Company 
Act Chapter 1, Section 2 as well as freedom of trade. I wish to give more context 
to this interpretation so as to not have it defeated by a mere citation of Company 
Act or freedom of trade. The interpretation applies to veil piercing situations only. 
Even within the veil piercing situations, that view is used only to show one of the 
requirements of veil piercing, that of artificiality. In addition to artificiality, the one 
claiming veil piercing still needs to show reprehensibility. Artificial use does not 
constitute abuse, though combined with other elements it might. The contradictions 
with written law thus appear only in a limited context and as a small part of the 
complex assessment process.
Bainbridge also emphasizes the fraudulent conduct as a requirement for 
piercing: “There is nothing intrinsically fraudulent about deciding to 
incorporate or about dividing a single enterprise into multiple corporations, 
even when done solely to get the benefit of limited liability. Both possibilities 
are an unavoidable consequence of the statutory grant of limited liability to 
all corporations (emphasis here).”634 The conduct might be artificial when 
done solely to get the benefits of limited liability, but it is not fraudulent or 
reprehensible in itself.
This splits the artificiality assessment into two paths.635 One is where the actions 
of the corporation have no acceptable business purpose at all, meaning the corporate 
existence is completely artificial. This would include situations where the corporate 
existence serves only the non-legitimizing business purpose of evading an obligation, 
which makes veil piercing more likely. The same treatment should be extended to 
situations in which the perceived legitimate purpose is later denied, leaving the 
corporate existence wholly artificial. The second path is where the corporation 
practices actual business, and the operations have a legitimizing business purpose. 
In these cases, piercing could be used to target some specific evaded obligation or 
circumstance if it has no connection to the corporate operations. Alternatively, the 
legitimizing purpose can be so insignificant in comparison to the illegitimate motives 
of the arrangement that piercing could be accepted despite the redeeming qualities.
The solution for balancing the two could be sought from the tax avoidance norm. 
Artificiality becomes a balancing act where the illegitimate benefits and legitimate 
634 Bainbridge 2000 at 6. See also Gelb 1982 at 1–2 and the cases he cites: Gartner v. Snyder (1979) and 
Arnold v. Phillips (1941).
635 Similarly in artificial property arrangements, see Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 162–164.
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business reasons are weighed against each other. The claimant demanding piercing 
needs to show the unusual nature of the arrangement and its resulting illegitimate 
benefits to indicate artificiality, whereas the defendant can then counter by showing 
the legitimate business reasons.636 Should the illegitimate benefits outweigh the 
business reasons, the arrangement is deemed artificial.637 The existence of business 
reasons does not prevent artificiality if they are minor compared to the illegitimate 
benefits.638 Especially if the practiced business undergoes no real changes while 
accruing those benefits, the arrangement is easily artificial.639 In other words, if 
the business arrangement is operated just as it was before the arrangement was 
undertaken, and the only change is the separation of negative and positive risks—the 
chances for benefits and liabilities—due to separate personality, the arrangement is 
artificial.
The KKO 2015:17 case acts as an example. Arctecho had a business purpose, but 
the business was deemed reasonable only due to the avoidance of remunerations. 
Verkkokauppa had acted in its own interest at the expense of Teosto as a creditor.640 
The business was not honest trade, but rather it was abusing the separate personality 
to gain a competitive edge based on aggressive interpretation of the law. This created 
a negative risk that this aggressive interpretation would eventually be denied. This 
risk was isolated into a separate entity. In a purely business sense, the operations were 
sensible. In legal procedures, however, when the sensible business reason behind it 
was deemed dishonest, the whole division lost its legitimate basis.
In the KKO 2015:17 case, Verkkokauppa had taken one of its key business 
functions and transferred it to an Estonian subsidiary. During the proceedings, 
Verkkokauppa had elaborated that the transfer had been made because of the 
corporate-friendly atmosphere, less taxation and lower costs in Estonia. The Supreme 
Court deemed that these reasons did not match the reality, as Verkkokauppa failed 
to show the given reasons to be true. Failure resulted, in part, from the fact that 
the subsidiary was shut down soon after the remunerations were demanded. The 
existence of Arctecho was deemed reasonable only because, for a time, it allowed 
Verkkokauppa to not pay the remunerations.
It is interesting to think whether Verkkokauppa would have been held liable had 
it not shut Arctecho down after the remunerations were demanded. Verkkokauppa 
essentially made it impossible to collect the neglected payments. Had Arctecho 
636 For this opinion in tax avoidance, see Mehtonen 2005 at 147–148.
637 It is possible but not necessary to use numerical values derived from accounting in this weighing. 
They should not be given exclusive meaning, though, as veil piercing is an overall assessment.
638 For this opinion in tax avoidance, see KHO 2014:66 and Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 351.
639 For this opinion in tax avoidance, see Ryynänen 2000 at 117–118. See also KHO 1982 B II 571, 
where tax avoidance was found since the CEO’s position had not really changed after the arrangements in 
methods of compensation. Similar in property law, see Pöyhönen 2001 at 313.
640 Or the artists for whose benefit the remunerations are collected.
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continued to exist, there would have been an active business liable for the 
remunerations, and the business could have changed its operations to comply with 
its obligation to pay. This would have supported the argument that there were actual 
business reasons behind the division. Arctecho would still have been liable for the 
neglected payments, but Verkkokauppa probably would have avoided liability.
In KKO 2017:94, the Supreme Court of Finland also emphasized the lack of 
genuine business reasons behind the division of the business. The existing business 
had been divided into two corporations. Not only this, the business operation 
continued unchanged even after the transfer. The lack of business reasons for 
such division was interpreted to show that the intention behind the arrangement 
was to circumvent the effects of bankruptcy. This would tie the artificiality and 
reprehensibility arguments more closely together. Alternatively, it would emphasize 
the significance of business reasons other than liability limitation to a greater extent.
Piercing cases also pay attention to some typical factors usually present in a 
corporation, and the deviation from them supports piercing.641 These deviations 
potentially show that the corporation is not used according to the intended purpose 
of the institution, i.e., honest commerce. It should be remembered, though, that 
even if some use is commonplace, it does not mean that it is acceptable. In the KKO 
1999:162 decision, the Supreme Court further argued against liability by noting 
that the relationship of the parties was not even claimed to be anything more than 
a normal contract for repair work. This can be interpreted to mean that departing 
from normal and accepted practices supports liability. Similarly, in KKO 2006:45, 
The Supreme Court noted the unusual conditions of a rent agreement. The decision 
in KKO 2011:62 assessed whether the business risk was divided among the actors in 
an unusual manner. In KKO 2015:17, attention was given to whether the subsidiary 
contracted and operated independently from its controllers.
Similar considerations have arisen in England also. In Smith, Stone and 
Knight Ltd. v. City of Birmingham (1939), the court sought to determine 
whether the subsidiary was the parent’s agent. In this determination, it was 
important to detect whether the subsidiary had its own business or whether 
it only conducted the parent’s business. The relevant factors in answering 
this were allocation of profits, origin of capital, rights to the appointment 
of directors, the subsidiary’s autonomy and self-determination in decision-
making, as well as whether the subsidiary did anything for itself.642 The court 
determined the subsidiary an agent of the parent and held the parent liable. 
The decision did not involve similar consideration of whether there were 
other business reasons besides those of the parent. It also did not consider veil 
641 See Huttunen 1963 at 199.
642 See also Kershaw 2009 at 58–60.
194
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
piercing but only sought to answer a similar question. Similar considerations 
have appeared in later veil piercing case law. The decision does not offer much 
new or helpful interpretative influence for the Finnish doctrine, though, as 
the KKO 2015:17 decision already seems to make the analysis slightly more 
delicate. The main reason for describing this English decision here is thus the 
confirmation that similar issues have also appeared abroad.643
In the United Kingdom’s legal literature, Marc Moore has suggested placing 
emphasis on whether the controlled corporation promotes a genuine purpose of the 
business it is formally running. This genuine purpose may be defined as a strategy 
that determines the general direction of the business, the existence of which both 
precedes and also exists independently of the specific issue that gave rise to the 
dispute at hand.644 The reason I present this opinion is the recognition of the possible 
connection between the dispute at hand and the business sought. It is possible that 
the controlled corporation runs a genuine business, but the entire business is the 
cause of the damage. Then it is necessary to determine whether the business should 
be allowed to operate at all. If the entire business purpose is faulty and therefore 
operated through a controlled corporation, then it would be questionable to cite 
that business purpose as a legitimation of the arrangement. The legitimizing business 
purpose needs to arise independently of the conduct leading to the claim.
This opinion is easily compatible with the KKO 2015:17 decision in which 
the subsidiary was operating a business whose profitability was based on the lack 
of remunerations. The non-payment of these remunerations was the cause of the 
dispute at hand. Accordingly, the Finnish Supreme Court required a business 
purpose for running the operation through a subsidiary using something other than 
the savings from not paying the remunerations. 
4.2.3.  Conclusions on Artificiality
I have defined artificiality here based on the analogous doctrines of artificial property 
arrangements and tax avoidance. Artificial use is using the corporation in a manner 
that does not promote honest business and trade. According to Company Act the 
defined purpose of a corporation is to generate profits to the shareholders. Thus, 
anything beneficial to that group would constitute business purpose, preventing the 
founding of artificiality. When assessing whether using limited liability or separate 
personality constitutes abuse, the fact that the use is beneficial to the company 
cannot legitimize the arrangement, even though the arrangement does have a 
643 See also chapter V.4.2.1. of this work on the Swedish concept of osjälvständighet.
644 Moore 2006 at 199. For criticism, see Kershaw 2009 at 77. He is of the opinion that Moore’s formu-
lation of genuine business purpose does not capture the circumstances in which the courts have pierced 
the veil.
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business purpose when it is beneficial in a definitive sense. Showing artificiality 
thus essentially requires an evaluation of whether the corporation has any business 
activity. If the company has no business whatsoever, the use of such a corporation is 
always artificial. Similarly, if the business reason is founded solely on a model that is 
not lawful, then the use is artificial. In these two situations, should the corporation 
also have a business purpose, piercing becomes a balancing act as to whether the 
business purposes are significant enough compared to the artificial use. Alternatively, 
the situation could allow for piercing if the corporate use, under which the piercing 
claim is made, has no connection to the business itself.
4.3.  Reprehensible Manner
4.3.1.  Vague Condemnation or Something Objective?
Veil piercing requires reprehensibility, which is, in essence, a moral condemnation. 
As such, it is hard to clearly and objectively state that is acceptable in legal 
argumentation. Ultimately, this cannot be solved, as some degree of subjective view 
is always going to be present in a juridical decision.645 It is again time to recollect 
the definition for prohibition of the abuse of rights that I deduced in II.3.2.2. The 
effects of a legal action can be denied if those actions are taken with either unacceptable 
motives or the consequences prove unacceptable. Additionally, the denial requires that 
the use of the legal action does not match the intended purpose of the utilized legal 
norm, i.e., the use is artificial. When the corporate form is abused, the controller 
claims limited liability protection or separate personality, even though the purpose 
of neither is fulfilled.646 I discussed this artificiality part of the test in the previous 
chapter. Two patterns for assessing what is unacceptable emerge from this principle: 
the consequences and motives. These two are perhaps the key methods of showing 
the reprehensibility requirement. Most of the analysis here will center on these two 
factors. I have deduced four patterns of more objective evaluation for the piercing 
assessment:
Unlike some other sections of this work, a more comprehensive comparative 
look into this issue seems in order here. The purpose of this look is to show that 
the piercing test involves rather subjective elements in all the compared systems. An 
entirely objective piercing test might even be impossible to achieve.
In the United States, the courts applying the veil piercing doctrine have been 
criticized for using loose and unpredictable metaphors to hide some intuitive moral 
645 Some authors have thought it impossible to derive general rules for piercing the veil that are appli-
cable to all veil piercing situations. See Huttunen 1963 at 172 and Werlauff 1991 at 31.
646 See Hemmo 2003 at 57. Using the corporation for purposes not matching the normal or acceptable 
practices constitutes abuse and supports veil piercing.
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condemnation.647 The piercing tests applied there usually cite some injustice or 
inequitable result as the basis for veil piercing. Referring to abuse of the corporate 
form is rare, but it does appear.648 Still, it should be noted that it might be impossible 
to actually determine these concepts.649 Powell has attempted to categorize these 
considerations, but the results are still vague. His categories are (1) actual fraud; (2) 
violation of a statute; (3) stripping the subsidiary of its assets; (4) misrepresentation; 
(5) estoppel; (6) torts; and (7) other cases of wrong or injustice.650 Many of these 
forms of conduct are already regulated in law and, other than the last one, they are 
objective factors that are a result of the conduct.
In Powell’s test domination of a corporation, one of these results is enough to 
pierce the veil. The Finnish legal system has utilized criteria 2 and 4 as a basis for 
liability but only 2 in piercing cases as misrepresentation has its own doctrine.651 
Fraud is not discussed here, asset stripping is combatted with statutory tools 
and, to us, estoppel is a foreign concept in veil piercing. Tort creditors are treated 
more favorably when piercing, though something more than domination and tort 
damage is still required. Other wrongs and injustices do fit the wording in the KKO 
2015:17 piercing test. The Powell test does offer a more predictable standard for 
veil piercing, though the exceptions it makes to principles of limited liability and 
separate personality are quite extensive, and perhaps that is why they should be 
resisted. Some courts in the US refer to frauding creditors as a basis for piercing. An 
often-cited phrasing is that “some element of unfairness, something akin to fraud or 
deception, or the existence of a compelling public interest must be present in order 
to disregard the corporate fiction.”652 Fraud, in turn, may arise in a variety of different 
contexts, including lies or misrepresentations about the purpose of the entity, its 
capital, debts, assets, independence, the identity of its representatives, or regarding 
other representations made to third parties.653 Millon goes further and names fraud 
in the courts’ reasonings as a synonym of unfairness or injustice.654
The United States veil piercing case law does sometimes mention abuse or abusive 
behavior. No direct mentions of prohibition of the abuse of rights are made, though. 
Instead, some references to good faith and fairness appear. The desired conduct 
facilitated by veil piercing “comes down to a question of good faith and honesty in the 
use of corporate privilege for legitimate ends.”655 Alternatively, veil piercing applies 
647 See Millon 2007 at 18.
648 See, for example, Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc. (1988) at 1025.
649 See Millon 2007 at 24 and Bainbridge 2000 at abstract.
650 Powell 1931 at 6 §. See also Cheng 2010 at 505.
651 KKO 1958 II 43 and KKO 1991:186.
652 American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. (1970). Cited in, for example, 
Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source (1991).
653 Figueroa 2012 at 713–714.
654 See Millon 2010 at 22.
655 Ballantine 1925 at 19.
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“when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, 
protect fraud, or defend crime.”656 At first glance, the approach seems different, and 
undeniably, the US formulation is more specific. Still, the underlying idea, especially 
in the second citation, is similar to the prohibition of abuse of rights: one possibility 
or right provided in legislation (here legal entity) cannot be used to defeat certain 
other rights or possibilities protected by the legal system. In the literature, Macey 
and Mitts arrive at the conclusion that one of the appropriate reasons to pierce the 
veil is to achieve the purpose of a regulatory or statutory scheme.657 Although not 
expressly adopted, the US holds some similar elements to the abuse of rights view 
of piercing.
Citing some injustice or unacceptable result is not common in the United 
Kingdom. Some courts have pierced the veil when justice so requires, but these 
decisions are highly exceptional and often explainable through other legal 
constructions.658 In one case, the court even took into account the fact that the 
claimant could have sought the claim through bankruptcy, but the extensive cost 
of that route and the fact that the legal aid board funded the claimant supported 
veil piercing instead.659 Simultaneously, there are authoritative veil piercing cases 
where liability based on injustices is expressly denied.660 Edwin Mujih takes this 
to mean that justice considerations are making their way into the decisions about 
liability, but not those using the veil piercing doctrine.661 In Adams v. Cape Industries 
Plc (1990), Lord Justice Slade denied that a court could pierce the veil because it 
considers justice to require doing so.662 Adams is the leading case in this regard, and 
its argument was repeated in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013). This would make 
the UK doctrine more objective in its application.
The Swedish piercing doctrine is often argued to require some inappropriateness 
or unacceptable result: otillbörlighet. This criterion is rather cryptic and has no 
established definition. Its role and significance are likewise unclear and criticized.663 
Stattin presents three possible interpretations for the concept: the high negative 
risks of the operation, deviation from the ordinary operation of a company and 
656 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.  (1905).
657 Macey – Mitts 2014 at 115–123. For the same conclusion, see Sparkman 2016 at 423.
658 See Creasey v. Breachwood Motors (1939), Nyombi 2014 at 72–73 and Mujih 2018 at 390 and 393. 
See also Re H (Restraint Order: Realizable Property) (1996), where the court lifted the corporate veil 
merely to impose justice because the inability to lift the veil would have allowed the defendants to benefit 
from the tax evasion. In Re a Company (1985), the Court of Appeals stated that “the court will use its 
powers to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice.”
659 Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992).
660 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991), Chandler v. Cape Plc (2012) and Thompson v. The Renwick 
Group Plc (2014).
661 See Mujih 2018 at 393.
662 See also Miles – Holland 2013 at 201, discussing the negative effects of piercing based on equity.
663 See Prop. 1990/91:198 at 43.
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procedures that seem to evade some legal provision.664 His concepts somewhat match 
the ones presented here. A high negative risk operation resembles the criterion of 
the systematic and unconcerned operation for personal gain discussed in V.6.4. The 
other two seem more problematic, though. The deviation could be compatible with 
the artificiality criterion adopted in this work. According to the Finnish doctrine, 
evasion of a provision is one of the results justifying piercing, and it would seem 
strange to attempt to define reprehensibility through that. The Swedish system 
seems to offer little if any insight in this regard.
It would seem that every compared jurisdiction involves some vague considerations 
of moral condemnation, either in the form of condemnation, injustice, equity or 
inappropriate behavior. Every jurisdiction also contains attempts at explaining 
this criterion through objective means. I will undertake that endeavor here for the 
Finnish piercing doctrine. I fear that making the assessment objective is impossible, 
and we will have to do with some principal statement. The court in Pepper v. Litton 
(1939) gives this amazing statement: “He [the controller] cannot, by the use of the 
corporate device, avail himself of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race 
of creditors. He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position 
for his own preferment. He cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly 
through the corporation what he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for 
his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors, no 
matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he 
is to satisfy technical requirements.”665 It does not provide objective, predictable or 
practical guidelines, but in my opinion, it is able to crystallize what is reprehensible 
in corporate abuse.
4.3.2.  Unacceptable Consequences 
4.3.2.1.  Excessive or Undue Damage
Approaching unacceptable consequences inalienably involves some subjective view, 
as explained earlier. Still, the certainty and predictability of this could be improved 
through a more objective framework to guide that subjective condemnation. I would 
start building this framework based on the formulation provided by Pöyhönen: a 
person seeks to realize her right under circumstances in which the essential purpose 
of said right does not realize, while at the same time, the rights of some party affected by 
the realization would be excessively or unduly damaged.666 Using this definition first 
requires the use to be artificial. Unacceptable consequences are defined through the 
artificiality. The artificiality of the use makes the conduct less worthy of protection. 
This will tie the assessment of artificiality and reprehensibility together in a manner 
664 See Stattin 2008 at 449–450.
665 Pepper v. Litton (1939) at 311.
666 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87. For a similar definition, see Pönkä 2012 at 233–234.
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that prevents their assessment separately. Both are required to pierce and one cannot 
exist without the other.
When the corporate form is abused, the controller claims limited liability 
protection or separate personality, even though the purpose of neither is fulfilled.667 
This causes the creditor to be unable to get a payment for the debt. Following 
the definition Pöyhönen provided, abuse of the corporate form means using the 
corporate form to gain a benefit that cannot normally be acquired from the business 
while simultaneously causing excessive or undue damage to others.668 This is a rather 
abstract view still. It seems clear that we need to assess the excessive or undue criteria 
in relation to the artificiality. Either the damage amount is too much in relation to it 
or the damage is too unpredictable and unfounded in relation to it.
The analysis of these criteria in relation to artificiality should start from the 
corporate reality. Using the corporate form does create the benefit of limited 
liability, and it is one of the common reasons to choose the form. Something is 
needed to discern the abusive use of limitation from the non-abusive. The conduct 
is most obviously abuse when the sole purpose of using the corporate form is to 
acquire such a benefit.669 There is no trace of the purpose of honest commerce, and 
the corporation has no business of its own. When the corporation exists only for 
the limitation of liability that causes damage to creditors and the corporation does 
not practice business, it is abusive. In more abstract terms, the complete artificiality 
of the corporate existence without any business purpose other than limited liability 
will make the threshold of damage lower—lesser damage is then more likely excess 
or undue.
This view remains rather problematic. It emphasizes the artificiality part of the 
test, i.e., realizing one’s right under circumstances in which the essential purpose of 
said right does not realize. The interpretation of excessive or undue damage remains 
ambiguous, and the only concrete aspect of it is its relation to artificiality. One aspect 
of the intended purpose of the corporate form is in the division of business risk 
between stakeholders. If we rely too much on the simplified formula of “artificiality 
and damages equaling abuse,” we ignore this key aspect of corporate existence. If the 
intended use is to divide the burden of risk, at which point is the division abuse? An 
attractive solution would be to deem all damage excessive and undue if use of the 
corporate form does not match the intended purpose of the institution.
Assessment becomes more difficult when the corporation practices acceptable 
business operations alongside the illegitimate purpose. Then the corporation does 
667 See Hemmo 2003 at 57. Using the corporation for purposes not matching the normal or acceptable 
practices constitutes abuse and supports veil piercing.
668 See Pöyhönen 2000 at 86–87.
669 See KKO 2011:68 at 17. See also KKO 2015:17 where the Supreme Court gives emphasis on 
whether operating the business through a subsidiary had sensible business reasons other than the advan-
tage derived from neglecting remunerations.
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somewhat serve the intended purpose of the institution—the essential purpose is 
somewhat realized. This does not automatically exclude veil piercing. Providing that 
the operations are distinct and separable, veil piercing liability may still be applicable. 
The conduct might still be abuse, even if it is not entirely abuse. The effects of 
piercing can be limited to the illegitimate part of the business.670 For example, the 
assessment of the KKO 2015:17 decision would have been very different if Arctecho 
had amassed credit from suppliers or employees in addition to the neglected 
remunerations and those creditors had demanded piercing. It is entirely possible to 
act honestly toward one creditor and dishonestly toward another.
This sort of issue was assessed in the artificial property arrangements context in the 
Helsinki Appellate Court judgment 22.9.2017 no. 1134. In the case, a construction 
company had purchased a camper van. The company claimed it was used as a 
resting facility for the inspector, who was the debtor in the case. The company 
was owned by the spouse of the debtor. The bailiff claimed the van ownership was, 
in reality, an artificial arrangement to prevent attachment of the property to the 
debtor. The construction company was a legitimate business, but the court still 
allowed attachment of company property. The specific illegitimate arrangement was 
disregarded, though the entire company was not disregarded. Only the property 
with no connection to the business purpose could be attached in the case.
In the US, this idea is visible in the In re Turner (2005) decision. The court 
stated: “However, an entity or series of entities may not be created with no 
business purpose and personal assets transferred to them with no relationship 
to any business purpose, simply as a means of shielding them from creditors.” 
Business purpose acts as legitimizing factors and the property held by the 
corporation needs to have a connection to the business purpose.
The situation could be solved as in a tax evasion case, in which the legitimate 
business reasons are weighed against the tax benefits provided by the arrangements. 
Similarly, if the legitimate gains outweigh the illegitimate ones, piercing should be 
denied. The problem is the weighing. Some monetary values could be derived from 
accounting, though that is not mandatory. In tax evasion, if the legitimate gains are 
minor compared to the tax benefits, the arrangement is tax evasion. This provides 
a problematic threshold for the weighing. The legitimate gains do not need to be 
greater than the illegitimate ones; they only need to be sufficiently significant not to 
be considered minor. The level of the legitimate gains remains ambiguous, though 
case law thus far has only awarded piercing when there was no legitimate purpose at 
670 See Helsinki Appellatte Court 22.9.2017 no. 1134 and Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 162–163.
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all671 or when the illegitimate gain was one of the apparent reasons672 or the primary 
reason673 for the arrangement.
These thresholds could be given numerical values. The values are only tools to help 
better understand the matter, and no significance should be given to the numerical 
values deciding whether to pierce. Clearly, when there is no other reason for the 
arrangement, piercing can apply (0%). Some legitimate reasons do not prevent 
piercing (<30%). If the legitimate reasons form the main reason for the arrangement, 
piercing should be denied (>50%). The ambiguity remains in the 30–50% range.
Tammi-Salminen bases veil piercing on the abuse of the corporate form. 
The objectively discernable facts that support veil piercing674 combined with 
another legal norm demanding the disregard of the corporate form implicate 
that abuse is present. She views piercing as preventing the externalities caused 
by the abuse of corporate form.675 This model is simplified in detecting abuse. 
It offers a wide approach for detecting situations of abuse. Guidance as to 
when the abuse is serious enough to pierce the veil needs further thought, 
though. The approach suffers from the same ambiguities I have discussed in 
this chapter.
When assessing reprehensibility through unacceptable consequences, the personal 
opinion about the actions taken should not matter. The operations can constitute 
abuse even if the actor thinks the actions are legitimate and abides by the customs 
of decency.676 The actor can even think that their conduct is beneficial to all parties 
involved. In addition, veil piercing does not require that the actions were intended 
to achieve the detrimental results; the actualization of those results is enough.677 
Despite this, the reprehensibility of the corporate use is easier to show if intent or 
negligence is present. I will discuss this soon in V.4.3.3.
4.3.2.2.  Unacceptable Ramifications
Another way to approach the unacceptable consequences would be to assess the 
consequences of legitimizing the examined conduct through a judgment discarding 
liability. The Finnish legal system allows for the practical ramifications to affect 
the court’s decision when stronger sources of law prove indeterminate. Previous 
671 KKO 2015:17.
672 KKO 1996:2.
673 C-425/06 Part Service, applying the EU law prohibition of the abuse of rights in a tax law context.
674 I.e., lack of capital, dependent management.
675 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292–293.
676 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 293.
677 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 293 and Toiviainen 1995 at 284. Toiviainen writes that veil piercing does 
not require intent or negligence, nor does it require the intent to damage or benefit from the actions. 
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judgments can determine what kind of conduct is accepted in the society. Thus, no 
judgment should be made where the conduct would, in fact, be detrimental to the 
society; not piercing the veil could sometimes create detrimental influence. As cases 
are different from each other, the ramifications are highly case-specific. A common 
factor could be that the conduct, if legitimized, would allow practices where a third 
party is left to pay the expenses of the business.
This sort of argumentation has been brought up against veil piercing. 
Stephen Bainbridge has called for the abolishment of the doctrine based on 
his observation that “[t]he standards by which veil piercing is effected are 
vague, leaving judges great discretion. The result has been uncertainty and 
lack of predictability, increasing transaction costs for small businesses. At the 
same time, however, there is no evidence that veil piercing has been rigorously 
applied to effect socially beneficial policy outcomes. Judges typically seem to 
be concerned more with the facts and equities of the specific case at bar than 
with the implications of personal shareholder liability for society at large. Veil 
piercing thus has costs, but no social pay-off.”678 His position seems strange 
to me, as he requires evidence only of the social pay-offs and the existence 
of costs is accepted without reasoning. Still, the costs seem self-evident in 
theory, whereas the social pay-offs seem vague, case-specific and undefined. 
In essence, his argument is of practical ramifications, and his critique is that 
the courts do not take them into account enough. His opinion is that the 
practical and policy considerations favor denying veil piercing. Millon has 
presented a different kind of analysis that further specifies the social costs and 
arrives at the opposite conclusion. 679
Timo Kaisanlahti presents a practical argument based on one wage security case. 
He argues that if the veil had not been pierced, the business practitioners would 
have been given an incentive detrimental to the national economy. It would have 
become profitable to found sibling corporations, whose employees would then work 
formally for one corporation but, in reality, for the benefit of another. Should the 
employer go bankrupt, the employees and the corporation receiving the benefits 
could secure the employees’ livelihood by loaning them money until they receive 
payment from wage security.680 The only one losing in this arrangement is the State 
since it pays the wages. Allowing this behavior would constitute a state subsidy 
for business practitioners not discussed or approved in the parliament. The same 
678 Bainbridge 2000 at 3–4. Similarly calling for abolishment, Huss 2001 at 96. She views some aspects 
worth saving and codifying in legislation, though. 
679 See Millon 2007, especially at 1358–1360.
680 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 247.
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argumentation can be applied to the KKO 2015:17 case. If the court had allowed 
the conduct, it would have created an incentive to sell devices under a subsidiary’s 
name and neglect the remunerations, all the while siphoning the profits. This sort of 
incentive would be harmful, and a ramifications perspective in this manner can be 
used to show unacceptable consequences.
4.3.3.  Unacceptable Motives
4.3.3.1.  Intent to Damage and Personal Benefit
The second possibility in the prohibition of abuse principle was the unacceptable 
motives. In all simplicity, this means the motives behind why the corporate form 
was used the way it was. The moral condemnation is about the acceptability of those 
motives. This naturally requires assessing the result of the use of the corporate form. 
Deeming the motives unacceptable is an assessment of establishing what the arrangers 
attempted to achieve and whether that achievement is acceptable. The assessment 
is twofold. Now, logically, this creates many commonalities with unacceptable 
consequences. If we still need to show the unacceptability of the consequences, what 
additional value is there to establish the motivation? Alternatively, should a double 
criterion of motive and unacceptable consequence be required?
At this point, it is useful to concede the ambiguities of the unacceptable 
consequences criterion. It is not capable of producing very predictable or accurate 
results, as the unacceptability is hard to define. If the consequences are not obviously 
unacceptable, perhaps the motive to achieve something like that could complement 
the assessment. Regardless of these logical inconsistencies, veil piercing case law 
has rather successfully applied them in unison. In many decisions, the motives 
behind the arrangement have been deemed important. Without a formal address, 
these decisions have simultaneously discussed what constitutes unacceptable 
consequences. They could be shown without intention, but unacceptable intention 
cannot exist without the consequences. Unacceptable consequences alone are less 
prone to moral condemnation, which is the key element that discussing motives 
brings to the assessment.
The KKO 2015:17 decision does address this issue directly. The Supreme Court 
finds in its examination that the fundamental purpose of founding Artecho was to 
avoid paying remunerations.681 Still, it cannot be deduced that the intention was 
to illegitimately damage creditors or evade a legal norm. Undeniably, this was the 
consequence. The intention was to pay less by taking advantage of a legal loophole 
Verkkokauppa thought existed. This aggressive interpretation of the loophole was 
denied, though. An aggressive interpretation of the law, combined with a corporate 
arrangement that isolates the negative risk of that interpretation later being denied 
681 KKO 2015:17 at 31.
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to another entity, can be interpreted as an intent to harm if the interpretation of the 
statute was aggressive enough and likely to fail. The motive was deemed to be benefit 
at the expense of the remuneration creditors.
In KKO 2017:94, the assessment was similar. The Supreme Court found the 
corporate use to be artificial and lacking in business reasons. This hinted that the 
arrangement was undertaken as a method to avoid employee-related expenses in 
a potential insolvency situation and to isolate business assets into another entity 
outside the creditors’ reach.682 The motive was solely to limit liability at the expense 
of others and for personal benefit. 
A more direct approach was taken in the KKO 1996:2 decision. The Supreme 
Court explicitly states that the arrangement was made so that the business could 
benefit from the pay security legislation that was crafted for the protection of its 
employees. This was deduced from the circumstances of the arrangement, such as 
the sale of business to a close party; contractually transferring control of the business 
back to the original entrepreneur, the same employees were hired for the new 
business, and an announcement was made to customers stating that the business will 
continue mostly as it was. The intent was to benefit at the expense of the pay security 
authority by making it a creditor of an insolvent enterprise.
I would conclude that the controller’s motive to achieve personal benefits 
combined with the results described in the piercing test—damaging creditors or 
evading a provision—should be considered reprehensible by default.683 Motive 
should not be viewed as a necessity for piercing; it is but one way of showing the 
reprehensibility.684 Showing motives is extremely vexing, though, if not impossible. 
One’s subjective mindset at any given time can hardly be measured and observed, 
but certain objective traces ought to remain. Motives can be shown through 
elimination. If the arrangement can be explained as reasonable only or mainly with 
the avoidance of liability and at the same time the controller has not acted in good 
faith toward creditors and third parties, the controller’s intent to harm creditors can 
be derived.685 This seems to be the path the Supreme Court is on.
682 KKO 2017:94 at 21. See also KKO 2018:20, where the genuine nature of the business reasons 
behind the arrangement were especially significant.
683 See also Villa 1997 at 377. He accepts piercing when the corporate form has been used only to 
avoid shareholder’s liability or when the subsidiary has acted solely in the interests of the parent. He also 
mentions a category of other clear forms of abuse, which is left with no clarification.
See also Kolehmainen 2009 at 614. He deems it possible to show improper behavior by proving that the 
one held liable was aware that the arrangement violates the rights of others. His analysis is focused on 
piercing in preheritance situations, but the same idea remains valid even if removed from the context.
Also, note the Directive (EU) 2019/1023 article 19 laying out requirements for the management to ac-
count for the interests of creditors and other stakeholders.
684 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 408. They conclude that the intent to damage creditors cannot with 
certainty be seen as necessary for piercing. They do, however, recognize it as significant for piercing.
685 In a taxation context, see Tikka 1972 at 295. See also Knuutinen 2009 a 195–196.
205
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
At this point, it seems rather strict to deem the motive for limiting liability 
unacceptable. Every decision to found a corporation is always an intentional 
attempt to limit one’s own liability—and this means gaining a benefit. It also always 
logically follows that the limitation is at the expense of some other person. This is 
an abstract motive behind the arrangement. Based on the motives established in 
case law, it seems necessary to limit the motives to enable piercing. The motive needs 
to be tied to a specific, known and predictable enough result of damage and benefits 
even if the realization is not certain. The abstract motive does not enable piercing. 
The predictability of some liability is addressed in V.6.3.4. of this work discussing 
inadequate resourcing. 
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has emphasized the significance of 
legitimate business reasons in all the recent veil piercing decisions. Even if a specific, 
known and predictable liability is limited through corporate arrangements, having 
business reasons other than that limitation should prevent piercing, at the least 
when those reasons are significant enough compared to the illegitimate avoidance. 
Simplified to a high degree, the difference between abstract and specific motive is 
whether the arranger knows the circumstances he is taking advantage of well enough 
and whether the arrangement is only directed at that one advantage.
Supporting arguments for the significance of motives can be derived from 
Enforcement Code 4:14, artificial arrangements. The application of the provision 
in the Enforcement Code specifically requires that the arrangement was initiated 
with the intent to avoid attachment or to damage a creditor.686 Additionally, the 
preparatory works for the Enforcement Code mention the timing of property 
transfers as a telltale sign of intent to escape attachment. If the arrangement is 
formed close to the enforcement procedure, it is more likely artificial. The same 
is true if the arrangement is devised when the debtor is overly indebted or nears 
insolvency.687 However, if the arrangement has long been in the making and only the 
final steps are taken right before the proceedings, the timing should not be given as 
much significance. No doubt these are lessons that are applicable to the assessment 
of motives in the veil piercing context also.
686 Similar condemnation can be found in the Act on the Adjustment of the Debts of a Private Indi-
vidual Section 10 Subsection 4, where debt adjustment is denied if the debtor worsened their financial 
standing when the financial troubles were apparent or already manifested. See HE 180/1996 at 21–22, 
where it is further specified that Subsection 4 targets asset transfers or arrangements where the debtor 
retains a high standard of living by utilizing an intermediary or enriching a close party while simultane-
ously minimizing the payments the creditors receive. The intent to benefit at the expense of the creditors 
is condemned in this context also. This further validates the condemnation and makes its adoption in 
further doctrines, such as veil piercing, more justified.
687 See HE 275/1998 vp. at 14. See also HE 102/1990 vp. at 48, the preparatory work for the Asset 
Recovery Act, stating the same thing: when the legal action is taken close to insolvency, it is more likely 
made with harmful intentions.
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In Sweden, intention is relevant. The NJA 2014 s. 877 decision found that the 
purpose of the arrangement was just to circumvent the trial cost allocation 
rules. Piercing is possible when someone uses the corporate form to minimize 
compensation risk,688 although in a strict literal sense, this does not require 
the intent to do so; only using the form and ending up with minimized 
compensation risk, the literature has interpreted it in this sense.689 Similarly, 
in the old suggested piercing legislation, if the inability to meet obligations 
was due to the exercise of the shareholder’s influence, the shareholders would 
be held jointly liable.690 There are also cases where the courts did not require 
any subjective element to pierce the veil.691 If any conclusion can be drawn, it 
is that showing intent is not a requirement of veil piercing in Sweden692 but 
can certainly support the piercing claim. This is the same conclusion I have 
reached in my analysis of the Finnish piercing doctrine in this work, although 
in Finland, the intent seems to hold a more prominent position. In the 
Swedish literature, though, a differing opinion of this has appeared. Moberg 
finds no support for the subjective element as a requirement for piercing and 
deems the Swedish doctrine entirely objective. He goes on to explain the case 
law, citing disloyalty as a requirement for some form of causality instead.693 If 
this strict opinion of Moberg’s is accepted, the Finnish and Swedish doctrines 
deviate greatly from one another on this issue.
In the Swedish literature, there is often a mention of illojalitet or 
otillbörlighet, disloyalty or unfairness.694 This conduct could be defined as a 
planned attempt to minimize the assets available for creditors in insolvency 
and halt its capital accumulation.695 This definition comes close to the 
motive concept in the Finnish piercing doctrine. A more recent analysis on 
the concept found no applicable uses for the concept and instead blamed 
its existence on an insufficient understanding of creditor protection norms 
in Company Act.696 In case law, the concept of disloyalty is mentioned but 
not exactly prominent.697 One appellate court decision seems to suggest that 
if the creditors are under the impression that some third party will pay the 
debt if necessary, the conduct is disloyal if that third party does not intend 
688 RH 2011:24. See also SOU 1987:59 at 111.
689 See Andersson 2014 at 2.
690 SOU 1987:59 at 128.
691 See Västra Sverige Appellate Court T 272/89 and Skåne och Blekinge Appellate Court T 205/86. 
See also Nerep 2015 at 24 and Brandell 2018 at 12. 
692 Nerep 2015 at 31–32. Similarly in Denmark, see Werlauf 1991 at 126.
693 Moberg 1998 at 79.
694 See Nial 1985 at 218, Stattin 208 at 449–450 and Nerep 2015 at 30–33.
695 SOU 1987:59 at 13, Moberg  1998 at 78–80.
696 See Nerep at 30–32.
697 For analysis on the case law, see Moberg 1998 at 78–79.
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to do so.698 This construction is rather cryptic, though, and such cases are 
better resolved by examination when there is reason enough to have such an 
impression and place liability on the protected impression alone, which the 
Supreme Court eventually did.
In comparison to the United States, the intent to avoid paying creditors is 
one way to show the injustice requirement of veil piercing. The intention is 
perhaps not so dominant as in Finland, as other routes to injustice do exist.699 
The court in Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source (1991)700 does discuss 
intention as a way of showing the Van Dorn piercing test:701 “an intent to 
defraud creditors would surely play a part if established, the Illinois test 
does not require proof of such intent.” In other instances, piercing has been 
applied, based loosely on a few objective factors like not following corporate 
formalities and inadequate capitalization after which the court simply deduces 
something like the following: “Sole shareholder gave no explanation or 
justification for the existence of the corporation as the intermediary between 
the corporation and the creditor. The sole shareholder was obviously trying 
to limit his liability and the liability of the corporation by setting up a paper 
curtain constructed of nothing more than certificate of incorporation.”702 This 
clearly would indicate that the assumption of unacceptable intentions behind 
the arrangement had been reached, and in the absence of evidence toward the 
contrary, the court pierced the veil. The decision makes the assumption quite 
hastily based on a few facts, which the contract creditor would have become 
aware of had he investigated.703 Still, even if the decision revolved around 
these objective factors, they were used to establish the illegitimate intention 
in order to justify veil piercing—perhaps incorrectly since it can be argued 
that the creditor knowingly and voluntarily took the risk.
In more recent case law, the fraudulent intention or fraudulent purpose 
of operation has garnered more support as a factor justifying veil piercing.704 
Intention was expressly discussed, for example, in Stone v. Frederick Hobby 
698 See Appellate Court in NJA 1982 s. 244.
699 See part V.4.3. of this work and Powell 1936.
700 See also Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein (1964), where the purpose for dominating the sub-
sidiary was deemed decisive for veil piercing. See also Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc. (2006), in 
which the court required intent to avoid future debts as justification for piercing. Additionally Insituform 
Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC (2013).
701 An Illinois-specific piercing test that follows the instrumentality archetype. See Van Dorn Co. v. 
Future Chemical and Oil Corp. (1985).
702 See, for example, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan (1991) at 213.
703 Bainbridge 2000 at 52.
704 As evidenced by Sparkman’s (2016 at 417–423) analysis. See also the cases cited therein and Butler 
v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007). The piercing claim was denied in Janos v. Murduk (1996) when scienter 
was not proven.
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Associates II (2001).705 In it, the court based its decision on the construed 
intent of the individual defendants to use the limited liability company as a 
shield in order to avoid responsibility for contractual obligations owed to the 
plaintiffs. In numerous cases,706 the courts did conclude that wrongful intent 
or bad faith need not be shown to pierce the veil, but an inequitable result 
is enough—a breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of 
moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive 
others, violate confidence, or injure public interests.707 Liability could thus 
follow even without the inappropriate intention as long as some relevant 
injustice has been created.708 This does not rule out intention as justification 
for piercing.
In the literature, intention is rarely discussed. Millon does suggest, though, 
that shareholders be held liable for performing activities that are likely to 
harm others but deciding as a matter of policy to make no provision for 
compensation knowing that the corporation will be unable to satisfy a claim 
brought by an injured party and intending to hide behind the limited liability 
shield.709 
In the United Kingdom, the intentions behind the corporate arrangement 
have been taken as significant.710 In Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991), the 
court held that piercing is possible when the corporation is a sham.711 A sham 
means acts done executed by the parties to the “sham” which are intended by 
them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between 
the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights 
and obligations (if any) which the parties intended to create.712 The company 
need not be set up for the purpose of evasion (though that is often the case); 
it suffices if it is being used for evasion at the time of the transactions.713 This 
definition corresponds to the definition of fake legal actions in Finland. It 
places high significance on the parties’ intentions and the legal consequences 
705 See also Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007) at 1068 and 1071 as well as FILO America v. Olhoss 
Trading Co. LLC (2004) at 1269–1270 and Sparkman 2016 at 420.
706 See, for example, Martin v. Freeman (2012) at 14 and Castleberry v. Branscum (1986) at 272–273 
and those cited therein.
707 See Archer v. Griffith (1964) at 740, discussing constructive fraud. Connecting constructive fraud to 
veil piercing and intent to defraud, see Castleberry v. Branscum (1986) at 273.
708 This is an undesirable consequence, and improper purpose should be required. See Krendl – Krendl 
1978 at 18.
709 Millon 2007 at 1374.
710 In Re Darby (1911) at 95 and 100, Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd 
(1921) at 476, Gilford Motor Co Ltd v. Horne (1933) at 943 and 955–956, In Re F.G. Films (1953) and 
Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992) at 647. See even Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991).
711 See also Gilford Motor Co Ltd v. Horne (1933).
712 Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd (1967).
713 Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif (2009) at 164–165. See also Hannigan 2013 at 20 and those cited therein.
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they intended to create. That is problematic, though, as in existing piercing 
case law, the legal relationships have been deemed as “intended to be created 
as they were,” making the sham construction problematic.714 Although this is 
not capable of explaining the piercing cases as intended, it does highlight the 
deceptive intent of the controllers as justification.
Cheng has compared the US and UK doctrines of veil piercing and arrived 
at this conclusion: “If the question is whether the separate legal personality 
of a corporation should be set aside, it is difficult to avoid assessments of its 
economic substance and the propriety of the purpose for which the corporation 
is used (emphasis here).”715 Brenda Hannigan has performed an analysis of 
case law preceding the Prest decision. She also arrived at the conclusion that 
piercing is possible when there is a deliberate evasion of rights or frustration 
of remedies by an interposing company.716 Case law shows a similar deduction 
as the Finnish KKO 2015:17 decision: the corporate use was merely for that 
purpose and no other.717 Not all decisions share this view, though. Even further, 
fraudulent trading law lessens the significance of intention as a criterion in 
the UK piercing doctrine. These rules apply to any person who has knowingly 
carried on a business with “intent to defraud” or for a “fraudulent purpose.” 
The significance of purposes has risen recently, though.718 
In the literature, some guidelines to assess the unacceptable motives have been 
presented. Ari Huhtamäki has a strong opinion of offshore companies. The purpose 
of founding the corporation should be taken into account when piercing. He argues 
that if the founding of an offshore company cannot be explained to have a business 
purpose, it can almost be assumed that the purpose was to damage the creditors or 
other parties able to make a claim. This is especially so if the company takes part in 
risky entrepreneurial activity. He bases this assumption on the prohibitive stance 
that legislation and jurisprudence have taken against offshore companies in the areas 
of taxation and enforcement.719 This is too strong an assumption when veil piercing 
is considered. Veil piercing is a rather extreme remedy, a contra legem decision made 
in casu when the facts of the case demand it. It would be inappropriate to adopt 
assumptions based on such an assessment. The offshore location is a critical red flag, 
though, and should raise suspicion—not assuming abuse. Instead of assumption, 
714 Similarly Kershaw 2009 at 56–57.
715 Cheng 2011 at 56.
716 See Hannigan 2013 at 19 and Lord Sumption in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd at 35.
717 See Gilford Motor Company v. Horne (1933), Jones v. Lipman (1962) and Gencor ACP Ltd v. Dalby 
(2000).
718 See VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp (2012) at 80 and Prest v. Petrodel Resources 
(2013) at 18 and 89.
719 Huhtamäki 1999 at 151.
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this factor could be used when proving dishonest intention. Offshore companies 
are typically used as Huhtamäki elaborates. Assumption essentially means a burden 
of proof reversal in a trial. This work has adopted the view that veil piercing is 
assessed as creditor-specific. The intent to damage would thus be creditor-specific 
also. It is entirely possible that the offshore company was founded with the intent to 
avoid taxes or enforcement. This does not mean that the intention is to damage the 
employees, for example. For the burden of proof reversal, some connection between 
the use of an offshore company and the creditor claiming veil piercing seems 
necessary. It is clear that with offshore companies, it is easier to damage creditors, 
so the requirement for the additional connection should be more lax. The use of 
offshore companies is thus not far from showing the reversal in itself. It is almost an 
assumption in piercing cases.
Unacceptable motives could potentially be founded on neglecting actions in the 
duty of loyalty demands. The institution of corporations lays a special negative risk 
on the creditors. The controllers of the corporation are able to utilize limited liability 
to the detriment of the creditors. The prohibition of abuse of rights should place the 
duty of loyalty upon the controllers;720 as they are not in a direct relationship with 
the aggrieved parties, the duty of loyalty should be based on the indirect relation 
they have. As the controller of the corporation is able to decide on corporate actions, 
she  able to alter the relationship between the corporation and the creditor. The 
controller possesses power over the relationship, though she is not a party to it. The 
duty of loyalty must be derived from the controller’s power. They are not to use their 
control in such a way that it becomes impossible for a creditor to receive payment. 
Such behavior is disloyal and can fulfill the reprehensible manner requirement.721 
Basing unacceptable motives on this would require that the controller was aware 
or should have been aware of what the duty of loyalty demands, and she knowingly 
went against that.
4.3.3.2.  Systematic and Unconcerned Operations to Accumulate Personal Gain
The previously discussed unacceptable motive was about the direct intent to benefit 
at the expense of a specific, known and predictable creditor. Some condemnations 
720 The duty of loyalty is a separate legal principle. It is, however, closely related to the prohibition of 
abuse of rights. See Hemmo 2003 at 56. See also Pönkä 2012 at 234–235.
721 See Toiviainen 1995 at 280 footnote 73. He is of the opinion that piercing can result from abus-
ing limited liability so that the shareholder’s acts are against the law or disloyal. See also Pönkä 2012 at 
234–235 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 411–412.
In addition, see SOU 1987:59 at 111: “… bolag som spelar med öppna kort och ger presumptiva bor-
genärer ärligä beskedd om sin ekonomiska ställning, riskfyllda åtaganden, ägarförhållanden etc. inte med 
samma fog kan anklagas för att otillbörligt ha åsidosatts borgenärernas intressen.” See also Kaisanlahti 
1996 at 237. The corporation has the best knowledge of its economic standing and should thus be given 
the incentive to disclose that information to the contractual partner. The threat of veil piercing could be 
enough of an incentive.
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in written law offer support for holding the more generally minded practices as 
unacceptable. The argument is that systematic and unconcerned operation for 
personal gain can constitute an unacceptable motive, even when the target is not 
specific, known and predictable. Several laws condemn transactions performed 
within the sphere of economic unity to the detriment of third parties as well as 
abusive and unfair practices in business. These condemnations have been made to 
protect interests that were thought to be significant enough to limit the freedom 
of business and contract. For example, asset recovery protects the creditors’ 
equality in bankruptcy. Perhaps the KKO 2015:17 decision made it clear that such 
condemnation can be made to protect creditors from the abuse of corporate form. 
Typical reprehensible actions include, but are not limited to, systematically draining 
funds from a corporation to lessen the assets available to creditors in bankruptcy 
or dismantling; purposeful weakening of the corporation’s viability to conduct 
business; and having a detrimental influence on the corporation’s equity capital. 
These are forms of conduct that are typically efficiently remedied with statutory 
doctrines such as unlawful distribution (Company Act 13:1), liability in damages 
(Company Act 22:1), asset recovery and debtor’s dishonesty (CC 39:1).
In other statutes, certain types of entrepreneurial activities have faced moral 
condemnation. The preparatory works discussing the ban of business operations 
condemn conduct that is grossly improper toward creditors, for example, draining 
the corporation of funds, accruing more debt so as to diminish the creditor’s chance 
for satisfaction, continuing inviable business with borrowed funds mostly to obtain 
personal benefits or dividing operations into several formally separate entities.722 
These correspond a great deal with debtor’s dishonesty. Operating a high-risk 
business and the realization of the negative aspect of risk alone are not enough to 
receive a ban, but the conduct needs to be improper, i.e., not according to the law or 
fair business practice. This sort of business has been linked with business in leveraged 
finance.723 The conduct is to be appraised with overall assessment, and those who 
have operated systematically and are unconcerned of others to accumulate personal 
economic gain will be banned from business. Unfortunately, bans have rarely been 
sentenced without finding criminal liability,724 so there is little material from which 
to deduce how far the moral condemnation reaches beyond criminal conduct.
The same condemnation can be found in the Act on the Adjustment of the Debts 
of a Private Individual Section 10 Subsection 3. The debtor is denied debt adjustment 
if there are significant liabilities arising from the pursuit of a business where  1) the 
722 See HE 29/1985 vp. at 9–10.
723 See HE 183/1992 vp. at 50.
724 See Tolvanen 2008 at 486 and those cited therein. There are no Supreme Court decisions on the 
matter that do not involve criminal acts. See also Linna 2010 at 194, though she addresses only the un-
lawful conduct part of the provision, not the improper conduct toward creditors.
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creditors have been dealt with in a grossly improper manner; 2) essential statutory 
obligations have been neglected; or 3) the objectives have been primarily speculative. 
The preparatory works of the section define this sort of business as the sort that would 
justify the ban of business operations. This further solidifies the condemnation of the 
activities resulting in a ban, lending more support for the adoption in veil piercing.725 
These considerations can be crystallized: a systematically construed disparity in the 
allocation of negative and positive risks resulting in personal benefit at the expense of 
others should be enough to satisfy the reprehensibility requirement of piercing. This 
construing can be achieved in multiple ways, for example, neglecting mandatory 
payments, siphoning assets or performing highly speculative transactions.
In the United States, David Millon has suggested reforms to the piercing 
doctrine similar to the criterion of systematic operation as the issue discussed 
in this chapter. He would preclude piercing when the immediate cause of 
the corporation’s inability to satisfy a claim brought by a contract or tort 
creditor is not the result of events or circumstances brought about by the 
owners themselves either deliberately or recklessly. The primary method 
of manipulation recognized by Millon is the opportunistic and one-sided 
transfer of negative risks.726 This would preclude piercing when the inability 
to pay is due to an unforeseen sequence of events resulting from the business. 
Instead, if the inability is caused by the owner’s or controller’s manipulation of 
circumstances to their benefit, veil piercing would be acceptable. This criterion 
has elements of both intention and systematic and unconcerned operation 
for personal gain. Judge Borden found similar elements from Zaist v. Olson 
(1967)727: “Based on the facts that the individual controlled the corporation; 
that the corporation undertook no obligation of its own to the plaintiffs; was 
financially unable to pay the amount due on the transaction and reaped no 
benefit from it; and that the individual would be enriched by the amount by 
which the corporation defaulted; the court concluded that the control was 
used to perpetrate an unjust act in contravention of the plaintiffs’ rights; and 
that it caused the unjust loss complained of.” No proof of intent was required 
to pierce, but the systematically construed disparity in the allocation of risks 
was enough to constitute injustice and allowed piercing. 
725 HE 183/1992 vp. at 50 and HE 180/1996 at 34. Note, though, that the debt adjustment subsection 
is not limited to these actions. The subsection can be utilized to deny adjustment when asset transfers are 
reversible with the Asset Recovery Act.
726 Millon 2007, especially at 1340–1348.
727 He cites the Zaist v. Olson (1967) case in the dissenting opinion he delivered on Angelo Tomasso v. 
Armor Construction Paving, Inc. (1982).
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In KKO 2017:94, the Supreme Court gave significance to systematically 
neglecting payments as significant for piercing. Since its beginning, the corporation 
had neglected to pay taxes and employee fees. This conduct is likely criminal, but, as 
discussed in III.3.2., it also supports piercing. The practiced business only benefitted 
another corporation with the same owner, and the arrangement was deemed to be 
nothing but an attempt to isolate the negative risk resulting from high employee costs 
in an entity with no assets. The appellate court mentioned this systematic neglect in 
its decision, though it failed to address what significance this held. The Supreme 
Court did cite it in support of piercing, though it eventually resolved the case based 
on unacceptable motives. In my opinion, it helped to show the reprehensible nature 
of the business.728
Still, the purpose of this neglect should be accounted for. Not all neglect hints 
toward illegitimate purpose. For example, criminal liability for tax fraud is excluded 
if the payment of taxes was neglected because of insolvency. Similarly, payments 
made by an insolvent debtor are not criminal if they are legitimate attempts to save 
the business. Even otherwise, criminal actions that were made to save the business 
should be assessed as less reprehensible than criminal actions that seek to extract 
benefits from it. In the discussed case, the neglect was systematic, and some hints 
existed that the benefits were allocated to the other company.
I would argue that the veil piercing doctrine’s requirement of reprehensibility 
could be fulfilled by a systematic neglect of payments and other condemned business 
practices. Only one of the corporations involved needs to adopt these practices. If 
the corporation where the negative risk is isolated conducts itself in this manner, 
veil piercing could be used to remedy the damage caused by the combination 
of separating business into multiple entities and condemned business practices. 
The arrangement could even be deemed an attempt to isolate the effects of these 
condemned practices into an entity with no assets. It is even possible that criminal 
liability could materialize based on the same conduct. The division between piercing 
and criminal liability has been discussed earlier in this work at chapter III.3.2.
4.3.3.3.  Fraudulent Behavior and Misrepresentation
A look into the US raises another interesting consideration. The terms “fraud” and 
“misrepresentation” appear often in US piercing decisions as characterizations of 
impropriety. They are also common grounds for veil piercing.729 Fraud refers not 
to common law fraud but, more broadly, it includes behavior that misrepresents 
or misleads a creditor.730 Fraud and misrepresentation are intertwined and used 
728 Additional support is found in the Act on Compensation for Environmental Damage Section 7 
Paragraph 2. It explicitly mentions the comparable party’s goal of profit as a factor supporting piercing.
729 See Thompson 1991 at 1044–1045 and Oh 2010 at 133–134.
730 See Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 31.
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interchangeably. They may arise in a variety of different contexts, including lies 
or misrepresentations about the purpose of the entity, its capital, debts, assets, 
independence, the identity of its representatives, or other representations made to 
third parties.731 Misrepresentation is simply providing information that is not true 
or gives a false understanding of the corporation—of some aspect relevant to the 
creditor. Usually in the US, the misrepresentation in piercing cases is about the 
number of assets the company has.732 The debtor-to-be actively gives information 
or withholds information and, by this conduct, causes the contracting party to 
have a false understanding of the situation and to extend credit to it in a situation 
where the creditor would not necessarily have extended that credit had the correct 
information been present. This sort of behavior would be assessed under criminal 
fraud in Finland. The question remains, though, as to whether this exhausts the 
legal remedies. The criminal procedure requires higher levels of proof and favors the 
accused in other ways.
Misrepresentation is also condemned in Contracts Act 33, among others, along 
with the principle of loyalty. Clearly, the conduct is reprehensible. It seems that the 
Finnish system has not adopted these considerations into the piercing doctrine. 
Instead, misrepresentation seems to be a liability doctrine on its own. In KKO 
1991:186, the employer company was held liable for the pension foundation’s 
shortcomings because it had represented the foundation as part of its operation 
and implied that the pension system was conducted by the employer company.733 
Misrepresentation was present, and the case had all the elements of piercing in 
it, but the Supreme Court held the misrepresenting party liable, matching the 
misrepresentation. The misrepresented state of affairs was deemed the actual state 
of affairs, and the one misrepresenting was obligated to act accordingly. This seems 
appropriate. In the case, the employer misrepresented the legal obligations between 
the employees, the pension foundation and itself. The obligations were reset in the 
decision to match the given representation.
Also, the KKO 1994:36 decision is noteworthy here. In it, the supplier received 
an unconditional payment guarantee from A. It was meant to guarantee the 
debt the corporation might incur with the supplier. The business operation 
of the corporation was transferred to another corporation with the same 
name, but the supplies were continued without pause. The guarantee was 
deemed valid, regardless of how the operation was modified. The decision 
731 Figueroa 2012 at 713–714.
732 See Cheng 2011 at 30 and those cited therein.
733 See also KKO 1994:36. Similar borderline situations between piercing and misrepresentation have 
emerged in Sweden also. See NJA 1982 s. 244 and Nial – Johansson 1998 at 228. Göran Ramberg even 
goes as far as to suggest two different categories: veil piercing and assumption of liability. Ramberg 1990 
at 249–252.
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basically ignored the separate personality of the two corporations because 
they continued the same operation. The Supreme Court held the transfer of 
business operation to be just an internal arrangement of the enterprise, and 
as such, it would not extend its effects to the supplier. The supplier was no 
doubt a voluntary creditor who had even demanded guarantees for the credit 
risk. Still, it seems that the supplier was allowed to trust the impression it had 
when the co-operation with the new corporation continued as if nothing had 
changed.
A similar remedy would likely work in many cases where the assets of a corporation 
are misrepresented, as is the common justification for piercing in the US. The ones 
giving the misrepresenting statement would simply be held liable for the difference 
between the actual assets and the misrepresented ones. This would eliminate the 
usefulness of these criteria of reprehensibility when piercing and would make the 
comparison to the United States in this regard moot. Still, this would also serve 
to limit the application of piercing when misrepresentation liability would apply. I 
doubt the Supreme Court would eliminate this difference it has established, though 
the doctrines would have been interchangeable in the KKO 1991:186 case. Some 
choice thus remains in cases involving corporations and misrepresentation. They 
could be pursued with either doctrine.
4.3.4.  Conclusions on Reprehensibility
This section discussed the reprehensible manner requirement of veil piercing. I 
started the analysis from the background theory of the prohibition of the abuse of 
rights. I used its criteria as the two main categories for establishing reprehensibility: 
unacceptable consequences and unacceptable motives. Within these categories, I 
found several more specific patterns to establish these more abstract criteria. These 
patterns need not necessarily be used as subcategories of the general terms. The 
choice to discuss them like this is logical in this work, although arguably, all five 
patterns could be discussed as independent methods of establishing reprehensibility.
The unacceptable consequences section consisted of two subcategories. The first 
was the excessive or undue damage. This was understood in relation to artificiality. 
Excessive or undue damage criteria are more readily present with the fewer genuine 
business operations the corporation has. This would shape the piercing assessment 
to a similar balance of business purposes and illegitimate benefits as in the tax 
avoidance norm. This model, however, is impossible to make completely objective 
and concrete. The second category was the unacceptable ramifications view, which 
emphasized the incentives that a judgment accepting some form of corporate use 
would give to business operators. If the judgment legitimized some use obviously 
harmful to the society, then the consequences are unacceptable in accordance with 
the piercing test.
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The unacceptable motives section was divided into three subcategories. I first 
discussed the arranger’s intent to damage and benefit at someone else’s expense. This 
led to confusion with the core element of limited liability, which logically results in 
benefits if the negative risks realize. I solved this issue by emphasizing the difference 
between abstract motives to benefit and the specific, known and predictable motives 
to benefit. The second subcategory drew an analogy from the ban from business 
operations. The moral condemnation there is the systematic and unconcerned 
operation for personal gain. I crystallized this criterion into systematically construed 
disparity in the allocation of negative and positive risks resulting in personal benefit at the 
expense of others. This sort of behavior should be enough to deem the use reprehensible 
in a piercing context. The third issue I discussed was fraudulent behavior and 
misrepresentation. I concluded that these should be considered their own doctrine 
and not a part of the veil piercing test. In case of fraud or misrepresentation, the 
reasonable expectations of the party receiving the false or misleading information are 
protected, and the legal rights are affirmed to match the representation.
5.  Evading an Obligation
5.1.  Evading a Provision
The veil piercing test in KKO 2015:17 divided the description of the result from 
the use of corporate form into two possibilities. The decision named these results as 
examples, though these effectively cover all piercing situations I have encountered 
during this research. The possible results were either evading a provision of law or 
causing damage to a creditor. There is a thin line between the two in some cases, 
where the creditor status is based on a provision of law directly. For example, the 
remuneration duty in KKO 2015:17 and the recollection of pay security amounts 
in KKO 2017:94 could be categorized as both. They are utilizable separately or in 
combination. Their completely separate inspection is adopted here mostly due to 
the clarity of presentation. 
The difference between breaking the law and evading a provision is subtle. Breaking 
the law means committing an act that is forbidden by the law. Evading a provision 
of law is committing an act that is legal in itself;734 the act is such that the legal norm 
should accommodate it, but it does not match the usual or intended content of the 
arrangements covered by that norm. It is an act that has been made to avoid the 
legal consequences of another legal norm by making an artificial arrangement735 and 
734 Excluding fake legal actions. See Kangas 2005 at 158–159 for a brief history on the development of 
this opinion.
735 See Kangas 2005 at 158, Lindfors 2008 at 312.
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using legal forms in a manner they were not meant to be used to achieve results that 
are either impossible or forbidden in law.736 
One can attempt to modify the prerequisites in order to either allow or prevent 
the application of some written norm.737 This modification becomes evasion when 
the legal prerequisites are met in form, but the actions, in reality, do not match.738 
The realities normally behind the chosen form are not present, whereas the action 
still fulfills the formal requirements. A tension between form and reality exists as 
the achieved result is either forbidden or impossible in law.739 This tension is present 
in tax evasion and artificial arrangements also. Both address the disparity of the 
legal form and the economic reality of the case. It should be noted that evasion of a 
provision is highly case-specific, and no general rules or legal test to detect evasion 
can be crafted.740
If the evasion of a provision is defined in this manner, one can immediately see its 
similarity to veil piercing as it is represented in this work. We can recognize intent 
as it was discussed in V.4.3.1. and artificiality as discussed in V.4.2. No general 
discussion as to the nature of law evasion is necessary here. Instead, the analysis 
focuses on the specific facts and forms in situations where the company form is used 
to perform the evasion. It is an effort to rationalize the more common elements of 
using corporate form to evade legal norms.
In the corporate context, this would mean using separate personality and limited 
liability shields to obtain benefits normally not obtainable through corporate use. 
The reality remains the same, as the corporate founder can assume full control over 
the corporation. The founder can act as before, only now in the name of another. 
The actor, in reality, has not changed, only the actor in form. Then veil piercing 
allows a norm to be applied “through” the corporation when the situation is factually 
the same as it would be without the corporation, considering the purpose of the 
evaded norm.741 The tax evasion provision addresses the problem similarly. Evading 
a provision includes exhausting the purpose of the tax legislation. It entails accruing 
benefits that the legislation was not intended to cultivate while failing to follow the 
spirit and purpose of it.742
Evading a provision does not require the evader to benefit from the evasion. It 
736 See Tikka 1972 at 15, Kangas 2005 at 159 and Lindfors 2008 at 312.
Although the evasion might be unintended. In the modern flood of regulation, it is increasingly difficult 
to know the exact legal status of some action or the exact interpretation of some norm. See Mäkelä 2009 
at 194–200.
737 See Knuutinen 2009 at 134–136 and 196–198.
738 About the subject, see, for example, Tikka 1972 at 215–217, Knuutinen 2009 at 197.
739 See Kangas 2005 at 159–160 and Lindfors 2008 at 312–313. Also KKO 1945 I 21 and KKO 1946 
II 136.
740 See Laatikainen 1989 at 191–193 and Lindfors 2008 at 313.
741 See Huttunen 1963 at 199.
742 See Tikka 1972 at 128 and 147.
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is enough that a legal obligation is not fulfilled. One could argue, though, that the 
benefit is not doing the legally required actions. Time and effort are resources, just 
the same as assets.
When piercing the veil in evasion situations, the evaded provision modifies the 
considerations involved.743 Different factors become significant depending on the 
provision. The evasion-specific variables are usually found in the spirit of the evaded 
provision. The artificial arrangements provision emphasizes elements present in 
ownership, e.g., the legal powers available to the debtor that are comparable to the 
formal party as the owner, measures comparable to those of an owner and the benefits 
received by the debtor from the arrangement. Wage security cases uphold the spirit 
of wage security and may emphasize factors present in the employer-employee 
relationship. A consumer product liability case might emphasize the qualities of the 
product and information the parties had or should have had.744 Nevertheless, the 
basic requirements remain the same. A few examples would clarify this better.
In the KKO 2015:17 case, the evasion was founded on the idea that only a 
Finnish business was obliged to pay the remunerations for private copying. The act 
was selling products that mandate paying the remunerations. The purpose of the 
remunerations is to compensate artists for private copying of their work. In addition, 
the remunerations are based on EU legislation adding some extra pressure to ensure 
payment.745 These factors made their way into the Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
case. They were examined with the facts of the relationship between Arctecho 
and Verkkokauppa. It was found that the formal separation did not match reality. 
Application of the remuneration norm was awarded per the reality of the operations.
In the decision in KKO 1983 II 185, the Supreme Court refused to pierce the veil 
of a housing co-operative that had given property as collateral for the debts of its sole 
owner, a real estate developer. The plaintiff demanded asset recovery on the basis 
that the collateral had been given from the property of the debtor. The veil would 
have been pierced in regard to the ownership. The Supreme Court refused the claim. 
Leppänen has criticized this decision as too formal and argues that the spirit and 
purpose of asset recovery would have justified disregarding corporate separateness. 
The transaction was possible due to the developer’s control over the co-operative, 
and Leppänen argues that the actions had been made intentionally to damage the 
creditors.746 The whole purpose of asset recovery is to prevent the debtor from 
dishonest transactions to the creditors’ detriment when nearing insolvency. Later, 
743 See Leppänen 1991 at 284 and Kolehmainen 2009 at 603 and 609.
744 About piercing in product liability and veil piercing, see Ruuska 1987 at 504.
745 Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 601–602. Similarly, see Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 
2018a at 19–20.
746 See Leppänen 1991 at 287. For a more accurate analysis on the case, see Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 
299–301 and those cited therein. See also Huttunen 2007 denying any possibility of piercing in regard to 
ownership.
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these sorts of developer–versus–co-op situations have been deemed inappropriate, 
and extensive measures have been taken to prevent them.747 Arguably, the reality of 
the case matched the purpose of the Asset Recovery Act, and the factors related to 
asset recovery should have been considered.
Another example can be drawn from the legal literature. Antti Kolehmainen 
examines the preheritance statute’s effects on veil piercing consideration. The 
Finnish Code of Inheritance seeks to guarantee the children of the testator 
an equal position by considering preheritance gifts given unequally to the 
children before the death of the testator. If the gifts are given to a corporation 
controlled by one of the children, the gift is not an assumed preheritance. If 
the separate personality of the corporation is disregarded, the child has then 
received assets as preheritance and correspondingly receives less as heritance. 
Kolehmainen arrives at the conclusion that piercing is possible since the 
testator attempts to dictate the division of heritance beyond the set legal 
limits.748 Naturally, the examination of these cases needs to address factors 
related to preheritance, e.g., the purpose of the provision and the typical 
situations it is meant to address.
The landmark UK case Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd. was also an 
evasion situation. In it, the husband was deemed to have attempted to free 
himself of the duty to pay ancillary relief to his ex-wife. Similar cases exist 
in all the compared jurisdictions excluding Denmark.749 In Hempel, the 
Norwegian Supreme Court decided on the duty to pay costs relating to an 
investigation on the extent of pollution in the area. The case is quite unique 
in its connection to the polluter pays principle, and thus, no direct attempt 
to evade ever appeared in the conduct. Still, a legal duty effectively ended up 
with no solvent holder, and piercing considerations were utilized to extend the 
polluter pays principle to the parent company. In the NJA 2014 s. 877 case, 
there was also an obvious situation of evasion. In it, the corporate structure 
was used to extinguish the application of procedural norms on compensation 
of the winning party’s legal costs, though the case can also be considered to be 
about causing damage to a creditor.
Continuing with the UK, the courts have been reluctant to include policy 
considerations.750 It is still uncertain how the introduction of the evasion 
principle in the Prest v. Petrodel Industries Ltd (2013) affects this. Potentially, 
747 See Rudanko 1982 at 154–178.
748 See Kolehmainen 2009.
About piercing and the preheritance norm, see also Kangas 1993 at 226 and Lohi 1999 at 12.
749 Although in the sole Danish case UfR 1997 s. 1642, the debt was based on legal provision.
750 For a thorough analysis on this reluctance in case law, see Cheng 2011 at 21–24.
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it would allow for more policy considerations when determining the 
genuine actor.751 In an older case, Merchandise Transport v. British Transport 
Commission (1962), the court considered two companies to be the same 
person to uphold that the scheme of the law is complied with in the spirit 
as well as in the letter.752 In Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991), the Court 
considered it possible to disregard the separate personality only when the 
wording of a contract or statute is considered. In the United States, the courts 
often include these considerations.753 
The US piercing doctrine also recognizes evasion situations in piercing.754 In 
an older decision, State v. Swift & Co. (1945),755 the corporation was alleged to 
be a device to operate the business without a permit. In a public policy–related 
decision, Stark v. Flemming (1960), a farmer incorporated his farm to establish 
a favorable employment record for the last few years before retirement in order 
to receive heightened pension benefits. This was not viewed as an evasion of 
the applied statute, as it fell within the purpose of the statute, assuring adequate 
retirement income. In another case, a same-sex couple sought a claim against a 
corporation as its operation included discriminating practices and the effects of 
the practice were isolated to a separate entity.756 Piercing to ascertain jurisdiction 
has been invoked in abundance757 and has also been used to determine whether 
a parent corporation is bound by a subsidiary’s union contract.758 A similar veil 
piercing claim has been successful in Finland also, though only at the lowest 
court level.759 Bainbridge even encourages the courts to think more of policy in 
piercing decisions, although, in their opinion, this means stricter adherence to 
the economically beneficial rule of limited liability.760
A comparative look seems to support the view that veil piercing can be applied 
where the corporate form is used to achieve a result that is contrary to the purpose of 
the applied provision of law or allows escaping some obligation or limitation set by a 
751 Again, it should be noted that Lord Sumption does not consider this piercing.
752 At 201–201 and 206–207.
753 See Cheng 2011 at 22 and National Labor Relations Board v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage (1990). 
See also Stark v. Flemming (1960), Roccograndi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1962) 
and Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (1967) at 37.
754 See, for example, J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States (1910), United States v. Reading Co.(1912), Vet-
erans Service Club v. Sweeny (1952), United States of America v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985), Devan Lowe, 
Inc. v. Stephens (2002) and Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007). In the literature, see Krendl – Krendl 
1978 at 29–31.
755 See also Roccograndi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1962).
756 Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007).
757 See Swain – Aguilar 2004 and Sparkman 2016 at 437–440 and the cases they discuss.
758 United Paperworkers International Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc. (1977).
759 See Länsi-Uudenmaa District Court decision 11.5.2015 15/4546, dno L 14/2211.
760 See Bainbrigde 2000, especially section II.
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provision. It seems common in the compared jurisdictions to look into the purpose 
of the circumvented provision and deny arrangements that exhaust the purpose.
5.2.  Causing Damage to a Creditor
5.2.1.  What Damage Are We Concerned With?
Causing damage to a creditor essentially means that the creditor of a corporation 
lands in a worse position than before. We should not require concrete fiscal damage. 
Instead, it is enough that the creditor loses something beneficial, e.g., a collateral 
item or a privileged position. In the legal literature, even the equality of the creditors 
is thought to be an interest significant enough for piercing.761 If one creditor ends up 
in a better position due to the actions of the debtor, the others incur damage.
Pöyhönen argues that shifts in the risk position could constitute a justification 
for intervention. If the negative aspects of risk are shifted to one party, this 
increases their potential liabilities. The damage and liability have not yet 
realized, but should they realize, the results are then placed on the party 
carrying the risk.762 This sort of shifting of negative risk can even have a direct 
effect on property value. The share price of the corporation is immediately 
affected, decreasing its value as collateral. Potentially, this leads to existing 
creditors demanding additional collateral. Additionally, the company can pay 
less dividends. Thus, a unilateral shift of the risk should not be accepted, even 
if the arrangement allows for it.
If there is no sufficient reason to allow one creditor such a privileged position, 
equality demands that the creditor be denied that position.763 This is regardless of 
the amount of damage, as asset recovery does not require showing actual damage; it 
only mandates the action to be such that would typically damage creditors. It falls to 
the purpose of the evaded norm to determine whether this is enough of an interest to 
pierce. If the debtor attempts, for example, to evade the norms in the Asset Recovery 
Act, equality of the creditors would seem sufficient.764
761 See Leppänen 1991 at 287 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 301.
762 See also Pöyhönen 2000 at 89 and 93–94. Similarly, in the United States see United States of America 
v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985).
763 Leppänen 1991 at 287 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 301. See also Pöyhönen 2000 at 87–96 for a 
theoretical characterization of predicted violations of protected interests and intercepting these predicted 
events.
764 See Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 300–301. In a situation where the property has originated economi-
cally from the debtor and a corporation disposes of it to the benefit of the debtor, veil piercing is needed 
and should be used to allow the recovery of assets. See also Leppänen 1991 at 287 and Havansi 1979b at 
104 footnote 16.
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One interesting note about the KKO 2015:17 decision is that the veil piercing 
claim was made, but the amount claimed was calculated just like in a tort case. In 
court instances before the Supreme Court, the parties even argued whether the 
compensation was subject to mediation by using the Damage Compensation Act. 
It is important to note that the claimant also sought to affirm the claim against the 
formal liable party, and it is not discernible how the compensation amount should 
be calculated. The intuitive answer would be joint and several liability for the 
amount left unpaid. After all, the damage was caused by the joint operation of the 
two. Other answers are plausible, though they would require different theoretical 
characterizations of piercing liability. In this research, I have understood piercing 
as a personal liability for the obligations of another. From this, it follows that it is 
not tort liability, which would be limited to the amount of damage the liable party 
caused by their own actions. It is also not unjust enrichment, which would limit 
the amount to the benefit received. Still, it would seem proper to use the tort law 
principle of the prohibition of enrichment here. This would prevent the debtor 
from claiming anything beyond the damage suffered, thus limiting the amount of 
piercing liability to the amount of the original claim against the formally liable 
corporation.
In the United States, it is clear when the action of the dominant corporation 
renders the subservient corporation insolvent, then the requisite injury and 
causal connection are established.765 The action that needs to be in relation 
to the caused damage is causing the creditor’s claim to be unsatisfied. The 
remaining claim is the amount.
In the literature, the issue is thought to be more complex, as the prohibition 
of enrichment does not apply and punitive damages are possible. This has led 
to some discussion on the nature of piercing liability. According to Cheng, 
the punitive damage, compensation and deterrence all seem insufficient to 
characterize veil piercing liability. Still, the corporate veil doctrine does not 
impose penalties, nor does it directly take into account the shareholder’s 
gains from his improper conduct. The doctrine merely holds shareholders 
responsible for unpaid corporate liabilities. He proceeds to suggest that veil 
piercing liability should exist to prevent unjust enrichment. Still, determining 
the amount of enrichment is commonly prohibitively difficult, and Cheng 
ends up matching the compensation amount with the creditor’s loss.766 
765 Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986) at 287 and the case cited there Northern Illinois Gas 
Co. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp. (1980).
766 See Cheng 2010 at 528–540 and 582–585 as well as the case law cited in footnote 129. He also 
notes that this would lead to the undercompensation of creditors in some cases. See also Oh 2013, who 
suggests reforming the piercing doctrine under unjust enrichment and the remedy of constructive trust.
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The idea holds similarity with the Finnish literature also. Juha Karhu has 
suggested that the unjust enrichment doctrine could be modernized to 
combat inappropriate enrichment as well as the traditional enrichment 
without a basis.767
5.2.2. Voluntary Creditor
5.2.2.1.  Comparative Analysis and Analogous Doctrines
In the legal literature, it is commonly thought that two groups of creditors should 
be treated differently when piercing the veil. These groups are the voluntary and 
involuntary creditors.768 Voluntary creditors are those who knowingly credit 
the corporation. They could also be called contract creditors. The opinions in 
the Finnish legal literature emphasizing this view seem influenced by the Nordic 
region’s legal literature on veil piercing.769 The issue is solved similarly in the United 
States also. The only more peculiar view is from the United Kingdom where the 
formulation of the piercing doctrine into concealment and evasion principles seems 
to remove the significance of the voluntary nature of the creditor. I will now discuss 
these jurisdictions before continuing on into the Finnish system.
In the Nordic countries, the view of the more favorable treatment of involuntary 
creditors flourishes.770 For example, in Sweden, the assumption in contractual 
relations is that the contracting parties know their counterparties. If the contract 
is signed with a company, the counterparty should be assumed to know and to 
have accepted that the company is only the agent of another, and the operation 
is conducted for the benefit of another entity. On these occasions, the creditor 
protection norms in Company Act are enough to safeguard these creditors’ 
interests.771 Extending liability would only be possible when the contractual creditor 
was not aware that the operation was, in reality, driven by someone other than the 
formal contracting party.772 Johan Svensson goes as far as to suggest that, regardless 
of the formal party to legal actions within corporate operations, the person who 
actually runs the operation should be liable. He does not call this piercing the veil, 
though.773 There is no case law to support this.
767 See Karhu 2007.
768 Cf. Huttunen 1963 at 181. He argues that if the veil piercing justification he supports is adopted, the 
division is meaningless.
769 See Leppänen 1991 at 303–304, Kaisanlahti 1996 at 209–210, Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 
2018a at 18, Savela 2015 at 414 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 290–291.
770 See NJA 2014 s. 877 at 10 and NJA 1947 s. 647. In the literature, see, for example, Rodhe 1984 
at 485–487, Stattin 2008 at 442–443 and Andersson 2014. Similarly, in Denmark, see Werlauff 1991 at 
75–76 and 518–519 and Schwarz-Hansen 2001 at 440–442. For the Norwegian opinion, see, for exam-
ple, Hagström 1993 at 250. 
771 Adestam 2015 at 14–15.
772 See NJA 1928 s. 57 and Svensson 2010 at 241–248.
773 Svensson 2010 at 248.
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The NJA 2014 s. 877 decision also states the assumption that the contractual 
creditor is assumed to have accepted the Company Act norms.774 They are able to 
affect the terms and determine whether to become creditors at all and demand 
securities if necessary.775 This includes limited liability and separate personality. 
The decision does not exclude contractual creditors from claiming veil piercing, 
though it recognizes that these creditors are treated less favorably than involuntary 
creditors.776 On two decisions, contractual creditors have found success with claims 
under circumstances that resemble piercing. One decision was decided based on the 
law of commissioned corporations777 and the other based on the implicit assumption 
of liability.778 In NJA 1992 s. 375, the creditor was well aware of the risks involved in 
contracting with the corporation. The creditor had even demanded a letter of intent 
from the entity behind the corporation but failed to demand additional securities 
when necessary. This knowledge of the circumstances and neglected actions 
excluded veil piercing to the benefit of the creditor. The issue was only discussed 
in the judgment of the Court of First Instance and Appellate Court, though. In 
NJA 1993 s. 188, the court held a sister corporation bound by a no-competition 
clause contracted by another corporation in the same corporate group. It would 
seem, based on this tour of case law, that veil piercing is not excluded for voluntary 
creditors either, although the issue remains uncertain. 
A clear pattern exists, placing significance on the voluntary creditors’ knowledge 
of the corporate finances.779 Additionally, the courts should exclude veil piercing 
when the creditor was aware of the facts that would allow veil piercing later and still 
chose to become a creditor.780 Nerep even goes as far as to suggest that the contract 
creditors must always be aware of the limited liability in a corporation, and thus, 
veil piercing should only exceptionally be possible. However, he specifies these 
exceptional circumstances to be when the voluntary creditor’s position resembles an 
involuntary position.781
774 Similarly, see Nerep 2015 at 34 and SOU 1987:59 at 112.
775 See Nerep 2015 at 21 and 33–34.
776 Similarly, Sandström 2015 at 8. 
777 NJA 1975 s. 45. The term kommissionärbolag was laid out in tax legislation. The case was about 
whether the commission relationship existed despite the formal contract between the commissioned 
corporation and the commissioner corporation stating that it did not. If that relationship existed, the 
commissioner had total liability of all the debts of the commissioned corporation. See also Ramberg 1990 
at 249–252.
778 NJA 1982 s. 244
779 See also NJA 1992 s. 375 and SOU 1987:59 at 128.
780 Moberg 1998 at 81.
781 Nerep 2015 at 34.
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This view of a more beneficial treatment of involuntary creditors is also prevailing 
in the United States,782 although not beyond dispute.783 Dissenting opinions are 
rare, although some deny that contract creditors of a close corporation could protect 
themselves by bargaining.784 Then again, these creditors might cut transaction costs 
and do not individualize transactions based on the risk, even though they could.785 
But neglect should not allow more favorable treatment in piercing claims, as they 
should have used their chance to investigate and obtain some security.786 Still, 
prohibitive transaction costs to negotiate the protections that voluntary creditors 
could negotiate can be cited to allow the voluntary creditor to pierce.787 For example, 
in Consumer’s Co-Operative v. Olson (1988),788 the creditor continued to extend 
credit to a corporation defaulting on its payments to the creditors, even though 
the creditors’ own terms of credit stated that no additional credit can be extended 
until the account is brought current again. The creditor was aware of the troubles 
with solvency and should have reacted accordingly. Even though the United States 
literature overwhelmingly supports the more favorable treatment of involuntary 
creditors, a statistical study of piercing claims has shown no signs of such favoritism, 
especially after adjusting the categories to voluntary and involuntary creditors.789
The different approach in the United Kingdom makes the nature of the credit 
relationship less relevant or even irrelevant. If we accept the view in Prest v. Petrodel 
Resources Ltd that veil piercing only includes situations under the evasion principle, 
only evading existing obligations would allow piercing. Under this situation, the 
voluntary and involuntary creditors are in similar positions. Either there were no 
negotiations or the negotiations are over before the abusive corporate arrangement is 
created. Neither could have been aware of the arrangement. In concealment principle 
situations, the voluntary nature would not matter either, as those arrangements are 
meant to conceal the true facts of the case. If the concealment is successful, then even 
782 See U.S. v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985). (“Unless the [corporation] misrepresents its financial con-
dition to the creditor, the creditor should be bound by its decision to deal with the [corporation]; it 
should not be able to complain later that the [corporation] is unsound.”). See also Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Allied Chemical Corp. (1968), Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc. (1992) at 
549–551, Williams v. Midwest Employers Cas. Co. (2002), Southeast Texas Inns, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality 
Corp. (2006) at 679, and Northbound Group, Inc. v. Norvax, Inc. (2015) at 652–653. In the literature, see 
Bainbridge 2000 at 12–36, Easterbrook – Fischel 1991 at 55–59, Cheng 2010 at 514–515, Sparkman 2016 
at 434–437 and Peterson 2017.
783 Birbara v. Locke (1996) at 1238.
784 See, for example, Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp. (1968) and the plethora of cases cited 
by Cheng 2010 at 532, although Hackney – Benson at 860–864 argue that contract creditors of a close 
corporation cannot protect themselves by bargaining. In case law, see Consumer’s Co-Op v. Olson (1988).
785 See Landers 1976 at 530.
786 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc. (1986) at 100 and Consumer’s Co-Operative v. Olson (1988).
787 See Oh 2010 at 96 and GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014) at 469.
788 At 495–496.
789 See Oh 2010 at 140–143. More strongly in favor of different treatment, see Thompson 1991 at 1044.
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voluntary creditors are unable to perceive the true facts before the contract is forged. 
The decision Persad v. Singh (2017)790 describes the express knowledge the claimant 
had of the nature of the limited liability company. The court’s analysis of veil piercing 
took no note of this fact and focused instead on whether there was a legal obligation 
between the parties before signing the contract. It should also be noted that, by piercing 
the veil, the controller cannot be held party to a contract made by the corporation.791
The analogous doctrines do not recognize this distinction. It is not discussed 
in piercing case law either, although no piercing cases have come up where the veil 
would have been pierced in favor of a voluntary creditor. It is open to question 
whether this distinction plays any role in the Finnish legal system. In any case, one 
should avoid categorizing too strongly since in piercing decisions are made in casu. 
The negative risks and chances of affecting the formation of said risks are different 
with each claimant. Voluntary and involuntary characterizations are but one part of 
this assessment. Different creditors in the same characterization might have had very 
different positions to influence the arrangement.
5.2.2.2.  The Finnish Stance on Voluntary Creditors
The issue has not been addressed in Finnish case law. Although, there exists twin 
decisions; in one, the creditor was voluntary and in the other involuntary. The 
involuntary creditor was awarded piercing and the voluntary was not. These cases 
do not directly address this issue and cannot be used to deduce anything conclusive 
on the question.792 The involuntary creditor was in case KKO 2017:94 and was the 
government agency responsible for pay security. That agency is in a special position 
regarding piercing, as there is statutory support for it.793 In addition, the voluntary 
creditors in the other case eventually won their case based on other doctrines and 
piercing proved unnecessary. The result does follow the view that involuntary 
creditors should be treated more favorably, though one cannot rule out other 
doctrines or even coincidence as an explanation of the result.
Still, the KKO 2017:94 decision did emphasize that the pay security creditor was 
not a contractual creditor, had no control over the creation of the credit relationship 
and was the creditor directly based on law. The decision did not explicitly state that 
these elements favored piercing. These are, however, exactly the arguments that are 
usually cited when discussing the different treatment of voluntary and involuntary 
creditors. At the least, this is a concession by the Supreme Court of Finland that the 
voluntary and involuntary natures of the creditors are of significance. The decision 
also hints toward accepting the more favorable treatment of involuntary creditors. A 
790 at 781–782
791 See Okoli 2014, especially at 259, and the cases discussed therein.
792 See also Kärki 2018a.
793 See HE 104/1998 at 17, HE 219/2009 at 6, KKO 2017:94 at 18 and III.2.5. of this work.
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more direct stance appear in an appellate court decision, which interprets the KKO 
2015:17 decision to exclude piercing when the one claiming liability entered the 
arrangement voluntarily.794 I would reject a complete exclusion, though the appellate 
court decision does highlight the default interpretation on the issue.
Traditionally, the issue has been addressed remarkably similarly in Finland and 
the compared jurisdictions. The usual argument is that veil piercing should not be 
available for voluntary creditors, at least not as easily as with involuntary creditors.795 
They make a contract with a corporation, and they must then be aware of the limited 
liability shield, the separate personality, and have at least some information as to the 
financial standing of the corporation.796 These limitations are known, and no party 
to a contract should be allowed to make a claim based on a fact that they knew or 
should have known at the time the contract was made.797 A choice must be made as to 
whether the creditor demands arrangements to reduce their negative risk or whether 
they rely on the Company Act norms protecting the creditors.798 This determines 
the amount of negative and positive risk each of the contracting parties carries. They 
should not be allowed to pierce the veil since this would constitute renegotiating 
the deal and readjusting their risks. When contract creditors are aware of the risks of 
the credit, they are able to adjust the cost of the credit to match the negative risk.799 
Higher negative risk means higher costs. Limited liability and separate personality 
are factors that affect the level of negative risk, thus the contract creditor is able 
to add their weight to the interest and other contract terms they demand for the 
credit.800 A rationally operating contract creditor accounts for all the risk factors, 
including the corporation’s ability to perform disloyal actions.801 The veil should not 
794 Appellate court of Itä-Suomi 29.1.2016 no. 52, S 15/593.
795 See Leppänen 1991 at 303–304, Kaisanlahti 1996 at 209–210, Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 
2018a at 19–21, Savela 2015 at 414 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 290–291. See also KKO 1999:111, 
where the Supreme Court emphasized that the shareholder was not liable for the corporation’s contract 
breaches.
796 See Leppänen 1991 at 303–304 and Kaisanlahti 1996 at 192 and 209–210 and those cited therein.
797 Savela 2015 at 414.
798 Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 290–291. For a thorough explanation of the assessment process, see 
Schwarz-Hansen 2001 pp. 438–440.
799 See Villa 1997 at 360. See also Niemi-Kiesiläinen 1996 at 261. If the creditor carries the risk of 
default, they can add the cost of that risk to the price of the credit and thus transfer the risk to the debtor.
800 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 209–210. According to Kaisanlahti, failure to assess the negative risk or 
correctly adjust the cost to match the negative risk speaks only of the creditor’s incompetence and not the 
position of the contract creditors in general.
801 Such as additional indebtedness or draining funds. Kaisanlahti 1996 at 210.
The contract can be made to include terms limiting the corporation’s competence to contract more debt 
or reduce corporate assets. About such terms, their allowance and validity, see Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 
34–75, although the creditor can trust that the contract is executed as agreed. In other words, breaches 
of contract are considered unexpected and should not alter the legal position the creditor is in. See KKO 
2016:46, where the bankruptcy estate was bound by retention of ownership, although the debtor had 
used the already delivered material before paying for it and thus breached the contract.
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be pierced if the corporation has given its contractual partner correct and sufficient 
information on its financial standing before contracting.802
In reality, not all contract creditors have the opportunity to shield themselves 
from abuses of limited liability when contracting.803 Savela notes that this argument 
is only partly true. Every contract creditor has had the opportunity not to make 
the contract at all. If the argument about the insecurity of contract creditors is 
accepted, justification of the freedom of contract is open to question.804 Even if 
the use of a corporation was only an attempt to avoid the contractual obligations, 
the contracting party must still have known they were contracting with a limited 
liability corporation. Is the contract not a knowingly taken chance?
Solving this problem could begin with another opinion regarding extending 
contractual liability to non-signatory parties. Tammi-Salminen argues that 
contractual obligations can be binding toward a third party when the third party 
is an actual party to the contract but not formally a party to the contract. The third 
party belongs to the same interest holder as the contracting party. The obliged third 
party has, in part, participated in conduct that violates the decorum. Holding the 
third party liable becomes plausible, especially when the formal separateness was 
only a device of the third party to avoid being bound by contractual obligations. This 
constitutes abuse of the formally separate legal subject.805 I should further emphasize 
that abusing the corporate form as understood in this work includes other conduct 
patterns as well. The contractual situation and Tammi-Salminen’s opinion act as a 
starting point for the analysis here.
From these three criteria, contractual liability to a third party can be extended: 
1) the formal status as a third party does not match the reality of the case; 2) unison 
802 See SOU 1987:59 at 111 and 130. “… bolag som spelar med öppna kort och ger presumptiva bor-
genärer ärligä beskedd om sin ekonomiska ställning, riskfyllda åtaganden, ägarförhållanden etc. inte med 
samma fog kan anklagas för att otillbörligt ha åsidosatts borgenärernas intressen.” The wording is rather 
ambiguous and gives no clear definition of the duties. Kaisanlahti interprets that the given information 
level depends on the character and foreseeable negative risks of the business. Kaisanlahti 1996 at 237–
238. Although the argumentation is de lege ferenda or law and economics–based, it somewhat matches 
the duty of loyalty in force de lege lata.
803 Mähönen 2001 at 802–803.
804 Savela 2015 at 414 footnote 36.
805 Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 288–289. See also Rudanko 1982 at 32–41. From case law, Rudanko 
derives a principal statement that the Contracts Act Section 33 can be extended to cover the decisions of 
the company management and even the general meeting since they can limit the liability of the company 
actors. This prohibits a certain type of self-dealing, as the constructor is not allowed to be free from liabil-
ity for actions made in the co-op. The effects of the contract between the constructor and the buyers of a 
co-op’s stock should limit the competence of the company organs.
See also Laine 2011 at 166, Savela 2015 at 397 and KKO 2003:131. Regarding tort, it has sometimes 
been suggested that a legal relationship closely resembling a contract could be used as a basis for con-
tractual tort. It has not been accepted, however, that such a relationship could be between corporate 
management and creditors of the corporation. 
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of interests with the contractual party; and 3) participation in conduct that violates 
decent practice. This leads us to examine decent contract practice. Some conduct 
violating the decent contract practice would need to be present for veil piercing. This 
returns the assessment to the Contracts Act Sections 28–34. Then piercing would 
be possible if a third party has exercised coercion, fraudulent inducement, abused 
someone’s distress, misrepresented, made a fake legal action or induced circumstances 
that would be incompatible with honor and good faith. In a contractual relationship, 
veil piercing would be possible when the third person controls the contract party 
and uses it to isolate responsibility from actions in violation of the decent practice.
The contract parties have a duty of loyalty toward each other. This means 
that, to a certain extent, they need to account for the interests of the other party. 
Another general principle of contract law is the duty to provide the other party with 
information on facts that are likely to be decisive for the party’s commitment to 
the contract.806 Neglecting this duty can be interpreted as misrepresentation. When 
misrepresentation is present, holding the one owing the duty of information liable 
is justified, even in a contractual relationship.807 This is not veil piercing liability, 
though, but liability based on the general principles of contract law.808 The question 
should be whether a third party can have a duty to provide information. In principle, 
this duty could be thought to exist if the previously stated criteria one and two are 
present. That is when the formal status as a third party does not match the reality 
of the case and there is a unison of interests with the contractual party. Neglecting 
this duty could then fulfill the third criterion as a violation of decent practice. The 
situation nears misrepresentation or is incompatible with honor or good faith. 
However, a direct connection to honor and good faith is hard to construe. Instead, 
they could be substituted to some extent with the violation of good business 
practices. The evaluation needs to keep in mind that these common and acceptable 
practices do not justify any conduct, it needs to be case-specific, and even common 
arrangements can be inherently reprehensible. Additionally, good business practices 
as soft norms are vulnerable to evasion attempts just as legislation is.
In decision KKO 1997:146, duty of loyalty was extended beyond the formal 
parties to the contract. The controller of two companies was not allowed to 
use this control and formal separateness to the detriment of his creditor. The 
trial was about whether the collateral arrangement damaged the bank’s right 
to collateral since it held the shares of Housing Inc. as collateral for the debts of 
Construction Inc. A controlled Construction Inc., which in turn controlled 
806 See Hemmo – Hoppu 2006 at Sopimuksen keskeinen sisältö>Sopimuksen tulkinta>Sopimusten 
tulkintaperiaatteista>Lojaliteettiperiaate.
807 Kaisanlahti 1996 at 241.
808 See Telaranta 1960 at 325 and Savela 2015 at 402.
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Housing Inc.; Housing Inc. pledged the buildings it owned to A and his wife 
as collateral. The buildings formed the majority of the share’s value, thus the 
actions reduced the value of the collateral the bank held. The same value was 
given as collateral twice. The Supreme Court deemed the collateral given by 
Housing Inc. as invalid in relation to the bank.
The decision gave the contracting party the duty to take into account 
the interests of the other party formally outside the contract and its effects. 
Construction Inc. was not allowed to exercise its control in Housing Inc. in 
a manner that damaged the bank. It is a matter of perspective as to whether 
the duty extended to Housing Inc.809 The Supreme Court did not allow using 
a different entity to make a disloyal action but still held the actions as valid 
where they did not damage the other party. The actions made using different 
entities were valid to the point they started to damage the contract creditor. 
This decision also offers a lesson for veil piercing. Duty of loyalty can sometimes 
justify disregarding a legal action or an entity in the arrangement if the motive is 
to exhaust the right of the other contractual party. Violating other principles of 
contract law could also be potentially significant.
Adopting the situation from KKO 1997:146, the corporate arrangement is created 
to isolate the negative risk resulting from violating the decent contract practice. A 
controlled corporation is created as a party to the contract. Legal consequences 
of the violation of decent practice are carried by one entity while the benefits are 
arranged to materialize in another. If the contract is annulled, then the benefits have 
disappeared from the contracting corporation. Then, veil piercing for the benefit of 
a contract creditor would seem acceptable, at least in cases where the validity of the 
contract itself is questioned. This differs from the model Tammi-Salminen created, as 
veil piercing would be used to determine whether the party participated in violating 
conduct.
In some misrepresentation related cases, veil piercing is not necessary at all. 
The wrongs can then usually be corrected with the general principles of contract, 
corporate or tort law. Usually, the duty of loyalty and protection of due expectations 
serve as remedies for misrepresentation and allow for holding formally non-liable 
parties liable.
One gruesomely efficient example of this is the decision in KKO 1991:186.810 
The facts of the case included all the usual veil piercing elements. The corporation-
employer controlled a foundation responsible for the pensions of the employees. 
809 See Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 302–305.
810 Similarly in the US, see David v. Glemby Co. (1989), where the subtle representations of the parent 
that it would perform the subsidiary’s contractual duties, as well as some indirect performances of these 
contractual duties, were utilized in the piercing context. See also Sparkman 2016 at 382–383.
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The foundation was inadequately capitalized, and the pensions were effectively paid 
with corporate funds. The foundation was argued as a dependent and dominated 
affiliate of the corporation. The corporation’s management decided which payments 
the foundation made. In the end, the decision was really simple. The corporation 
had created the impression that the employees will receive the promised pensions. 
Creating the impression allowed holding the corporation liable for the pensions. The 
employees were allowed to trust the given impression, and their due expectations 
were protected. There was no need to pierce the veil. The case shows the strength 
of the default rules of limited liability and separate personality as well as the courts’ 
reluctance to rely on piercing when other, less controversial remedies are available.811
The same situation arose again in the KKO 1995:164 decision. The Supreme 
Court argued that, despite the separate personality, the foundation was financially 
dependent on the corporation and had no management independent of the 
corporation. Their relationship had been very tight, and the corporation had actually 
run the operations of the foundation. The Court held these as relevant circumstances 
contributing to the creation of the employees’ due expectation that the corporation 
was responsible for the pension system. These two cases show that veil piercing is 
often not necessary to protect contract creditors since the piercing elements can 
create due expectations if the operations of a dependent and inadequately funded 
affiliate are, in fact, run by the controller. Nevertheless, the underlying issue is the 
same: the need to hold additional entities liable.
One noteworthy situation to consider with contract creditors is the interpretation 
of Contracts Act Section 36: If a contract term is unfair or its application would lead 
to an unfair result, the term may be adjusted or set aside. In determining what is 
unfair, regard shall be given to the entire contents of the contract, the positions of the 
parties, the circumstances prevailing at and after the conclusion of the contract and 
to other factors. Sometimes, piercing considerations can arise in these circumstances 
and other factors. For example, in the Appellate Court of Turku 5.1.2016 15/948, 
the physical dependence of the sole shareholder was taken into account when 
addressing the adjustment of the contract the corporation had entered in. It should 
be noted that the sole purpose of the corporation was to arrange the physical care 
and assistance the shareholder required to survive.
811 See also Huttunen 1996 at 33–35. He sees the case to show the rejecting stance the Supreme Court 
has adopted toward piercing.
Similarly in Sweden, see NJA 1982 s. 244. Similarly in England, see Lord Neuberger in VTB Capital 
plc v. Nutritek International Corp (2012). He explained that, subject to some other rule (such as that of 
undisclosed principal), where B and C are the contracting parties and A is not, there is simply no justifi-
cation for holding A responsible for B’s contractual liabilities to C simply because A controls B and has 
made misrepresentations about B to induce C to enter into the contract. This could not be said to result 
in unfairness to C: the law provides redress for C against A in the form of a cause of action in negligent 
or fraudulent misrepresentation.
232
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
The KKO 1994:137 decision involved many facts that are significant in 
piercing also. The case was about the interpretation of an insurance contract 
clause. The plaintiff demanded piercing to its own benefit but was denied.812 
The alternate claim was to adjust the contract, which the court awarded. 
Among other things, the Supreme Court noted that, after the sale of assets, 
the operations in the factory continued as before, and there was a corporate 
group relationship between the new and old owners; the ownership to the 
contract object had only become indirect,813 and the same persons held 
control over it despite the change in ownership. Thus, it is possible to adjust 
the contract if there have been changes in the corporation’s circumstances 
after the contract. It is hard to conceive situations where this could actualize, 
though, since the facts of the KKO 1994:137 case were very specific.
5.2.3.  Involuntary Creditor
Involuntary creditors are those who had no choice over becoming creditors of the 
corporation; they did not knowingly enter into a relationship with the corporation 
but are in one without having chosen to be. Tort creditors are an example of this 
sort of creditor. Involuntary creditors are generally thought to be more deserving of 
protection by veil piercing than voluntary creditors.814 Parties that could not avoid 
becoming creditors of the company might occasionally need more comprehensive 
protection than the Company Act and related laws provide.815 Although I discussed 
the differences between voluntary and involuntary creditors at length in previous 
chapters, I will present some more involuntary creditor-specific issues here. I will 
aim for brevity, as these are rather tightly connected to the arguments presented 
about the voluntary creditors.
The Swedish piercing doctrine builds strongly on the position that the 
involuntary creditor is occasionally in need of stronger protection.816 The 
812 Although the minority opinion would have interpreted the clause to cover only those arrangements 
where control and possession change in a way that increases the negative risk born by the insurer. He 
would have ignored the formal ownership.
813 The parent-owned subsidiary and subsidiary owned the property.
814 See Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2018a at 19–21 and Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 303. Hans-
man-Kraakman have even suggested unlimited liability for corporate torts. See Hansmann – Kraakman 
1991. In a similar fashion, Mähönen has suggested that situations where veil piercing is needed should 
instead be solved by creating legislation to allow corporate group liability for obligations not arising from 
contracts. See OM 48/2016 at 38.
Similarly in the Nordic region. See Schwarz-Hansen 2001 at 440–442, NJA 2014 s. 877,  UfR 1997 s. 
1642 and Rt. 1996 s. 672.
815 See NJA 2014 s. 877, Huhtamäki 1999 at 146 and KKO 1958 II 43.
816 See NJA 2014 s. 877.
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preference has been discussed in the literature as well817 and is repeated in 
case law818.
In the US, this is the prevailing view also.819 The statistical research does 
show some evidence that tort piercing, in practice, is roughly equally as 
likely as contractual piercing.820 This deviation has inspired a plethora of 
explanations, including the availability of easier compensation sources for 
tort creditors, more settlement of claims, scarce resources and risk aversion 
of tort claimants as well as insurance.821 In tort cases, particular significance is 
placed on whether a corporation is undercapitalized, which involves an added 
public policy consideration of whether individuals may transfer a risk of loss 
to the public in the name of a corporation that is marginally financed.822 
The economic view of veil piercing provides additional support for the 
favorable treatment of involuntary creditors. Richard Posner conceptualized 
the voluntary creditor as capable of requiring compensation for increased 
negative risk. In his opinion, the negative risk includes the inability to 
pierce the corporate veil. Thus, the voluntary creditor would have received 
compensation for not being able to pierce.823 Jonathan Landers deduced from 
this that involuntary creditors have not received compensation and should be 
allowed to pierce.824 Additionally, the argument goes that when a company is 
not required to pay for the risks created by its actions, it will be more likely 
to engage in activities with social costs that exceed their social benefits. This 
is particularly true in the case of involuntary creditors such as certain tort 
creditors, trade creditors, and employees. These parties are not compensated 
for the increased risky behavior of the company.825 In involuntary cases, there 
is little or no element of consensual dealing, and the question is whether 
investors should be able to transfer a risk of loss or injury to members of the 
general public.826 
The UK is a significant exception to this view of veil piercing being more 
justified for the favor of the involuntary creditor. In Adams v. Cape Industries 
Plc. (1991), the court held that “we do not accept as a matter of law that 
817 See Andersson 2010 at 55–58, Nerep 2003 at 32–33 and Nerep 2015 at 33–34 and 38–39.
818 See Svea Appellate Court, T 1337-17.
819 See Georgakopolous 2007, especially at 4–7, Bainbridge 2000 at 12–36, Millon 2007 at 1328, Mar-
cantel 2011 at 199–200 and Peterson 2017 at 78–94, especially at 82 citing the bulk of case law. For 
authoritative case law, see Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat (1999).
820 See Georgakopolous 2007 at 4–10 and Oh 2010 at 141.
821 See Georgakopolous 2007, Georgakopolous 2010 and Millon 2010 at 24–26.
822 See Jablonsky v. Klemm (1985) at 566 and Axtman v. Chillemi (2007).
823 Posner 1975 at 511–515.
824 Landers 1976 at 534. See also Landers 1975.
825 See Easterbrook – Fischel 1991 at 104, Millon 2007 at 1355 and Peterson 2017 at 65.
826 Peterson 2017 at 80.
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the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company 
which is the member of a corporate group merely because the corporate 
structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in 
respect of particular future activities of the group (and correspondingly 
the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member of the 
group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, 
the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our 
corporate law.”827 Adams was a tort case, and the corporate group had even 
faced similar claims in the past—factors that would have supported piercing 
in Finland. The decision enforced the right to shield from future liabilities 
by using corporations.828 Earlier in the context of voluntary creditors, the 
significance of the dichotomy established in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd 
(2013) was thought to eliminate the need to discern between these types of 
creditors in the UK when piercing the veil. The evasion of existing liabilities 
was deemed affirmative for veil piercing. In this context, however, there seem 
to be no arguments for the different treatment of voluntary and involuntary 
creditors.829 Still, the difference has been cited in Chandler v. Cape (2012), 
where even the tort creditors could not seek compensation based on piercing. 
Rather, the court created a doctrine of assumption of liabilities in health 
and safety issues in the subsidiary. Surprisingly, this doctrine shared many 
elements with veil piercing, namely control and foreseeability of the tort 
damage.830 Similarly, Chrispas Nyombi has found that the courts tend to find 
new exceptions to the Salomon principle in tort cases without actually using 
the veil piercing doctrine.831 
The involuntary creditor cannot affect the actions the corporation takes, she 
is  dependent on public information only and cannot construct a contractual 
safeguard.832 Because the corporate controller can affect the actions and released 
information, she is in the best position to prevent the damage.833 Since the controller 
is also able to limit the funds available to cover the damage, this disproportionate 
allocation of control and information supports holding the controller liable.
Control is a necessary element in piercing the veil; thus, the allocation of control 
over the debt between parties should be given significance too. Voluntary creditors 
827 At 826. See also Trustor (2001) at 1184–1185.
828 The UK system was not always that reluctant toward the more favorable treatment of tort creditors. 
See Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd (1921) at 483–484.
829 See for example, Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992).
830 See also Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc (2014).
831 See Nyombi 2014.
832 Villa 2002 at 631.
833 See Villa 2002 at 631.
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can exercise control over the creation of the debt, and contractual duties give them 
some mechanisms even after that. Involuntary creditors, on the other hand, have 
no influence whatsoever. The debtor creates an arrangement, and the creditor is 
bound by it without any influence in forming the arrangement. They cannot secure 
themselves with the remedies of contractual law.
A quick look around the doctrines related to piercing shows us that they are 
indeed designed to guarantee the fair treatment of creditors and combat the disloyal 
arrangements. They target arrangements where only one party has control over the 
circumstances, albeit they do not explicitly recognize the division into voluntary 
and involuntary creditors. Environmental damage is easily caused outside the 
contract, and liability could be insulated with formally separate entities if not for 
the Environmental Liability Act Section 7.834 Artificial property arrangements 
are situations in which the debtor has disposed of the property formally but in a 
manner that she can still utilize it. The creditor is not able to affect the debtor’s 
decisions. Arrangements made solely to receive payment from wage security are not 
binding toward the State. The State can create the legal framework, but in the end, 
it has no control over how the employer and the employee devise their contractual 
relationships and whether that relationship aims to circumvent the legal framework. 
The same goes for taxation. Even in the KKO 2015:17 case, Teosto had no choice 
over whether to contract with Arctecho. The creditor position was created entirely 
by choosing to practice the business.835
An easily understandable situation would be one in which some person suffers 
an injury due to the actions of the corporation, yet the corporation has neglected to 
insure and it turns out to be an inadequately capitalized corporation with no funds 
to satisfy the claim. The corporation would gain an undue advantage if the corporate 
form could be used to perform operations without complying with the normal 
requirements of care. When making a decision, the controller has no economic 
interest or obligation to account for the potential negative risk since her liability is 
limited to the amount of her investment.836 This may lead to opportunistic behavior 
and excessive negative risk, for others bear the damage should it realize, and the 
controller alone reaps the potential rewards.837
834 See Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2018a at 19 and Leppä 2011 at 72–73.
835 The same applies with NJA 2014 s. 877 and KKO 2015:17 also.
836 Kaisanlahti 1996 at 216–217. When contemplating whether to pursue a course of action, a share-
holder remains indifferent to the damage because they cannot be held liable for it.
837 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 217 and 230–231. He provides a clear example of how unlimited liability 
would not remove the problem. If a partnership’s operations cause major damage and the partners have no 
assets, the chosen form of the enterprise does not matter to the injured: whether their liability is limited 
or unlimited, they will not be able to receive full compensation. Kaisanlahti summarizes the position 
of an involuntary creditor commendably. He recognizes that limited liability endangers the involuntary 
creditor’s position. This is a clear externality, though complete elimination of it is impossible. Removing 
limited liability is not the final solution since the shareholder’s wealth is limited. The most significant fac-
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It should be noted that founding a corporation to diminish the negative risks 
caused by potential tort liability is a legitimate use of a corporation. There need to 
be other factors present to justify piercing. The conduct might not be reprehensible 
or artificial, and control might be sufficiently divided, etc. Still, if the intent to create 
the arrangement is to transfer a reasonably well-known tort risk to the tort victim, 
the arrangement is easier to view as reprehensible.
The same is true for the United States. The evasion of tort liability in itself 
does not justify disregarding corporate separateness.838 The misconduct 
required to pierce the veil is always intentional, and veil piercing is never 
concerned with deterrence on probabilistic torts.839 This would suggest that 
the arranger needs to know of the specific tort with sufficient certainty and 
create the arrangement to evade that specific liability.840 The mere chance of 
some tort realizing at some point is not enough.
5.2.4  Abolishing the Labels Involuntary and Voluntary –  
Factual Assessment of Influence
I have already inspected the usual arguments surrounding the creditors’ nature as 
either a voluntary or involuntary creditor. Involuntary creditors are typically in a 
much weaker position than voluntary creditors, as they are not able to choose whether 
to become creditors or influence the terms of the credit. They are the weaker party by 
definition. The key difference is in their ability to influence the terms of credit and 
the ability to choose whether to enter the credit relationship at all. The lack of these 
supported the more favorable treatment of involuntary creditors. The existing view 
seems to use involuntary and voluntary as labels that determine the treatment of the 
creditor. I would instead suggest forgetting the labels and simply looking into the 
elements behind them—influence and choice. Following this, a voluntary creditor 
with weak influence and little choice should be treated as favorably as involuntary 
creditors.
tor is the business’ negative risk and assessing the level “insurance” this risk requires. This means adjusting 
the available assets to match the negative risk. Insurance can be in the form of available assets or actual 
insurance.
The economic analysis of involuntary creditors reveals that the parent corporation, not the damaged par-
ty, is in a more effective position to prevent the negative risk from realizing, and thus, liability would be 
justified from the ramifications perspective. See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 245–246. The parent corporation is 
able to obtain any and all information from the subsidiary, whereas the damaged party usually is able to 
get only the public information. The parent is also the cheapest insurer.
838 Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (1988). See also Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. 
Ter Maat (1999), stating that no special obligation exists for the corporation to capitalize adequately for 
tort liabilities. Similarly Cheng 2010 at 538 and Cheng 2011 at 34–35.
839 Cheng 2010 at 538.
840 Similarly Sparkman 2016 at 427.
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Naturally, there are different levels of weak positions among both categories.841 
It is entirely possible that a party in a weak contractual position is almost like an 
involuntary creditor, whereas involuntary creditors such as the tax authority or 
pay security have comprehensive tools and powers set in law. They have actually 
prepared for situations and are able to predict their status as a creditor, even though 
they cannot influence the terms of credit or prevent the creation of a credit relation. 
As large organizations, the tax authority, pay security or even Teosto are in a much 
better position than victims of accidents caused by corporate operations, but they 
are all still involuntary creditors. Each creditor position is a different combination 
of powers and negative risk, and the decision in the case should match the specific 
position of that creditor.842
The labels are useful as categories to systemize the discussion. The initial 
assessment of voluntary or involuntary could perhaps be used as a starting point 
of the discussion that then proceeds to examine the level of influence the creditor 
actually possessed.843 For example, the employees are voluntarily in a contractual 
relationship with the company, although in their case, mild coercion and threatening 
with termination can easily affect their ability to influence contractual terms and 
whether to sign the contract. In the literature, Johan Adestam has opined that, when 
voluntary creditors were not able to evaluate the circumstances and negative risks 
around the company, there might be a need for increased protection and chance of 
piercing.844
There is a long continuing tradition in the United States on this subject. The 
prevailing view in the legal literature argues against veil piercing in contract-
based situations on the argumentation that voluntary creditors are capable of 
negotiating.845 The spearhead of criticism against this view is that it may fail 
to recognize different types of contractual creditors. Cheng provides a good 
description of the main arguments. These analyses are most often made with the 
financial creditor in mind, not the trade creditor, subcontractor or employee. The 
financial creditors are sophisticated and possess considerable bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the debtor corporation. They are in a much better position to request the 
information and protection they desire and are better risk-bearers than shareholders 
due to their ability to diversify their investments. Individual financial creditors, 
841 About theory of risk position, see Pöyhönen 2000 at 177–184. Similarly in the US, see Peterson 
2017 at 64.
842 Naturally, the two extremes exist. Some creditors have no control whatsoever, and some are able to 
contract around limited liability should they so decide. These extremes should just not be used to deter-
mine every case.
843 Similarly in Sweden, see Stattin 2008 at 451. More cautiously, see Nerep 2015 at 40.
844 Adestam 2015 at 15.
845 This discussion is partly held in the context of justifications for limited liability as a default rule in 
regard to contract creditors. See Landers 1975, Posner 1975, Landers 1976 and Cheng 2011.
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trade creditors, employees, and perhaps even consumers, lack either the incentive or 
bargaining power, or both, to investigate credit risks and obtain the requisite level 
of protection. Trade creditors and employees often have high information costs and 
poor ability to diversify and are thus inefficient monitors and risk bearers compared 
to shareholders.846 Although he argues about the justification of limited liability, 
these descriptions crystallize the differences between classes of contract creditors 
also in the veil piercing context.
These factors could also be adapted to Finland and could be used to analyze how 
different voluntary creditors should be treated when veil piercing. Here is a short, 
non-exhaustive, list:
1. level of sophistication
2. bargaining power
3. access to information
4. capability to diversify
5. reliance on the debtor
The first criterion refers to the experience and skill the contract creditor has. 
For example, a bank or professional investor with a lot of knowledge on the 
market, economy and production has a high level of sophistication. An individual 
construction worker mortgaging their house to provide a loan to a corporation 
operated by a close party is less sophisticated. The more sophisticated creditor, 
among other advantages, knows what information is needed, how to analyze it and 
how to adjust the contract terms to reflect the risks. The second criterion, bargaining 
power, entails elements from all the other criteria and more. If there is a significant 
difference in the contracting parties’ sophistication, access to information and 
ability to diversify, then the party with more of them has more bargaining power. At 
its core, bargaining power could be understood as the capability to have your choice 
terms included in the contract. The concept is rather openly interpretable and is by 
no means exhausted by the mentioned criteria. The level of bargaining power can 
be influenced by a plethora of different factors, for example, argumentation skill, 
common history, psychological factors or amount of assets at one’s disposal.
The third category speaks for itself. Information is influential, and the party with 
more of it is capable of making a better decision, provided that the information is 
correctly assessed.847 This disparity is well recognized in law, and several disclosure 
846 Cheng 2011 at 118, 120–123 and 156–157. Similarly, Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 34, Barber 1981 at 
386, Gelb 1982 at 13, Cheng 2010 at 511–512 and Peterson 2017 at 64.
847 In Swedish decision NJA 1992 s. 375, the contractual creditor was aware of the facts that would 
allow veil piercing and was subsequently denied piercing because of that knowledge. See also Stattin 2008 
at 450–452.
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requirements adopted in law speak volumes of its importance. Fourthly, the ability to 
diversify should be taken into account. If the creditor, or future creditor, has multiple 
choices of parties to contract with or if they can contract with several and split the 
contributions, then that creditor is capable of diversifying against the risk. Especially 
if such a diversification has been made, the creditor has indeed assessed the risk level 
and has instead chosen to limit their exposure, just like investing in the stock market.
Finally, the creditor can be in a reliant relationship with the debtor. A prime 
example of this would be the employee creditor. Usually, though not always, the 
employees are reliant on the employer for income to finance sustenance and other 
necessities. If there are a few choices of employment, then the employee is even more 
reliant. There is no choice about whether or with whom to contract. These factors 
alone usually give the employer much bargaining power and quite easily lead to the 
employee not having any choice as to the terms of the contract.848
A contractual relationship can sometimes lead to claims and demands from 
either side. Breaches of contract can result in a claim for damages, the amount and 
certainty of which are later decided in a trial or some other procedure. This claim is 
a conditional debt and thus transferable. The creditor can sell this debt to another. 
It is entirely possible to sell the debt to a controlled corporation. Then the liabilities 
incurred by the pursuit of this claim and the risk of negative outcome are isolated 
to the corporation, whereas the possible profits come to the controller. Especially 
in trials where the losing party needs to compensate the trial costs of the winning 
party, this can result in unjustified consequences.849 Even though the creditor’s 
relationship to the debtor originated from the contract, she cannot be said to be 
a voluntary creditor in this matter.850 The creditor had no control over the transfer 
of the claim, nor could she ignore the lawsuit. She is an involuntary creditor of the 
corporation. Had the contract originally been with the corporation, however, she 
would no doubt have been a voluntary creditor.
Against this background, it is easy to note how the specific nature of the norm 
conflicting with limited liability alters the assessment. If the norm is meant to 
protect the state or actors with equal resources, reprehensibility should require a 
lot more exorbitant actions. If the conflicting norm is meant to protect some group 
that is considered the weaker party, reprehensibility seems easier to show.851 Thus, 
848 For a more in-depth analysis of these positions, see Cheng 2011 at 154–161.
849 For a case with a chain of events like this and the so-called trial company (processbolag), see NJA 
2014 s. 877. See also LoPucki 1998 about judgment-proofing in the United States.
850 Similarly, the process view of the contract abandons the traditional contract–no contract dichoto-
my when assessing liability. Instead, the decisive factor is the actions the parties have taken and the overall 
assessment of their position. About the process view of the contract, see Pöyhönen 1988 at 211–231, 
especially at 218.
851 See Pihlajarinne – Havu – Vesala 2015 at 601, who argue that the reprehensibility in Verkkokauppa 
case was in large part due to the purpose of the remuneration (compensating the artists for the unap-
proved copying of their work) and the individual artists as the aggrieved party.
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veil piercing is more common and plausible in such areas of the law governing 
consumers, employees, the environment and even remunerations to copyright 
holders.852 This list of protected parties could also include minority shareholders. 
Legal actions taken to circumvent minority protection protocols have been deemed 
abuse in case law.853
5.2.5.  Government Agencies and the State
The state and its agencies as creditors are more difficult to assess. The state can be 
party to a contract or the victim of a tort, in which case it should be treated like 
any other creditor of those groups. More problems arise when the state did not 
specifically intend to be the creditor of the corporation, and the claim is not in tort 
but results directly from the interpretation of a provision. The state passed on the 
legislation that obligated the corporation to do something. Ari Savela argues that the 
state, through legislation, has had the opportunity to create the safety mechanisms it 
desires. The corporation then had the opportunity to design its operations to abide 
by these rules, and thus, veil piercing should not be allowed for the benefit of the 
state.854 This view is rather formal. It would essentially extinguish the usefulness 
of the abuse of rights doctrine that is prevalent in veil piercing. The fact that the 
state had the opportunity to create some mechanism seems irrelevant for abuse 
consideration. When one abuses a norm for personal benefit at the expense of the 
state, it does not matter what the norm is. In this situation, the rule is perhaps used 
to achieve the opposite result of what it was intended to create—or some result that 
should be impossible according to the rules.
A different argument could be made. In the US decision United States of America 
v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985), the court argued: “[T]he Government did not 
voluntarily enter into the relationship with Farms. It did not have the option of 
granting or not granting the subsidies to the joint ventures. Under the Upland Cotton 
Program, it was obligated to subsidize applicants who purportedly qualified. . . . The 
fact that the Government did not rely on any misrepresentations regarding Farms’s 
financial condition or its relationship with Chemicals is thus wholly irrelevant to 
the question of whether Chemicals should be held liable for Farms’s misconduct. 
Unlike the ordinary contracting party, the Government was not dilatory in any duty 
852 The existing case law does not confirm this, though, aside from the Verkkokauppa case and remu-
nerations. These were wage security cases where piercing was applied not to protect the workers claims 
but those of the State, although this protection derived its legitimacy from the general abuse norm in the 
wage security act. Even if the decisions did not mention the norm, they abided by, copied and applied its 
wording. See, for example, KKO 1996:2.
About piercing in product liability, see Ruuska 1987.
853 See KKO 2011:68, although the minority opinion argues that the abuse of rights doctrine should 
not have been utilized in the case because there was no weaker party to protect.
854 Savela 2015 at 415. See also Airaksinen – Pulkkinen – Rasinaho 2018a at 19. They argue that the 
State has been able to safeguard its interests with legislation, at least in taxation.
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to investigate Farms’s finances, since it had no such duty.” The core idea here is the 
fact that government and authorities have none of the possibilities contract creditors 
have. They cannot choose whether to enter the relationship, they cannot affect the 
terms, and its assessment of the situation is limited to whether the corporation 
fulfills the formal requirements of whatever is applied. 
In KKO 2017:94, the pay security system was abused. This system is controlled by 
a government agency as the representative of the state. Still, the question of the state 
as a creditor cannot be answered with reference to this case. Pay security credit is in 
a special position in Finnish law, as it has written law support for veil piercing.855 It is 
thus a lower threshold for the courts to award veil piercing in pay security situations.
Of these two interpretative options, emphasis should be placed on the reasonable 
expectations the corporation has developed, according to which the business has 
been arranged. This, in turn, contradicts the intention assessment of veil piercing. 
Piercing should be available for the state if the intention was to obtain benefits at 
the expense of the state and then the business was arranged according to the rules to 
obtain this questionable benefit. I argue that the business cannot develop a reasonable 
expectation of protection when the entire purpose of the arrangement is abusive. The 
state does not have the influence of a voluntary creditor but has had some control 
over what the rules are. Should the conduct aim to circumvent or evade the set rules, 
the state should be allowed to pierce. I would disregard the argument that creating 
the legislation somehow means the ability to influence the credit relationship. This 
argument seems to be yet another extension of the formal interpretation of law—the 
assumption that whatever is not explicitly mentioned in the statute’s text is allowed, 
no matter how grossly it goes against the purposes behind the statute.
5.3.  Conclusions on Evading an Obligation
I found veil piercing to have two alternative evasion requirements: 1) the corporate 
form is used to evade a legal provision, or 2) it is used in a manner that causes damage 
to creditors. The corporation to either allow or prevent the application of some 
provision of law, thus creating a result that is either legally forbidden or impossible 
by law. This has a clear connection to the assessment of artificiality. The prerequisites 
of the provision are met, but the use does not match the situations the form has been 
designed to regulate. No general rules can be crafted to detect these situations, though 
the evaded provision always brings its own note to the assessment. For example, 
considering artificial ownership would require a look into the elements of ownership. 
In the KKO 2015:17 case, a similar emphasis existed: considering who is responsible 
for remunerations would require an examination of who sells data storage devices.
855 See HE 104/1998 at 17, HE 219/2009 at 6 and III.2.5. of this work.
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Causing damage to a creditor covers any detrimental result to the creditors as 
a justification for piercing. Still, this part of the piercing requirements is usually 
not disputed as it most often is obvious. In all simplicity, the piercing case does not 
appear in court, if no creditor has suffered a detriment and thus possess an interest 
to raise the claim. Even the changed division of negative risks could justify a claim. 
The nature of the creditor’s position could also affect whether the piercing claim 
should be accepted. This is based on the finding that if the creditor has been able 
to affect the terms of the relationship and decide whether to become a creditor, she 
should not be allowed to alter the deal ex post. The creditor has had the opportunity 
and even the duty to research the arrangement before becoming a creditor. Based 
on this influence, the creditors could be classified as voluntary and involuntary. 
These categories should not prove decisive, however. Even within these categories, 
the level of influence each creditor actually possesses differs a lot. The bank and the 
employee are both voluntary creditors, though their influence on the outcome of the 
contract creating the credit relationship is completely different. The more influence 
the creditor has had, the less likely that piercing should be in favor of that creditor.
One additional issue should still be addressed: since these two creditor types 
are quite different from one another, should there be a different liability test for 
both? Veil piercing in light of the current case law could be understood as a liability 
doctrine protecting involuntary creditors.856 The formulation of the veil piercing 
test in KKO 2015:17 does not make this sort of distinction between creditor types. 
Above, I have dissolved this categorical distinction into a more subtle fact-based 
analysis on the actual information the parties had and the influence they exercised 
over the creation of the debt. From this perspective, it would seem odd to exclude 
one group from piercing. Instead, the takeaway should be that,  the less voluntarily 
the creditor became a creditor, piercing is more readily available.857 How exactly this 
translates to the application of the piercing test remains to be determined in case law, 
should the courts choose to follow my recommendation here.
The same warnings as with control are in order here. I argued earlier that evidence 
of the different elements of the test can be used to compensate one another. Still, 
the elements of evasion and damage are almost always apparent and even obvious. 
It should thus only be used cautiously, if at all, when compensating the impropriety 
requirement. The capability to compensate the other requirements of the test seems 
most strongly linked to the involuntary versus voluntary viewpoint I have examined 
in this chapter. The creditor’s lack of influence would support giving that person 
additional protection through the piercing doctrine. Then the nature of the damage 
856 Current case law in Finland has not allowed piercing in favor of voluntary creditors outside the 
enforcement procedure.
857 Similarly in the United States, see Peterson 2017 at 83–84 referring to Penn National Gaming, Inc. 
v. Ratliff (2007).
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could compensate the otherwise lacking impropriety requirement. Alternatively, 
it could just be interpreted to support the existence of improper elements in the 
arrangement.
6.  The Supporting Factors – Objective Indicators 
Supporting Veil Piercing
6.1.  General Considerations
The supporting factors in veil piercing are objectively verifiable conditions that 
appear in corporate operations. The existence of these factors hints at possible abuses, 
but they are not enough to justify veil piercing in and of themselves.858 Mostly, these 
factors support finding the more general requirements of piercing. For example, a 
corporation intentionally and continuously operating on the edge of insolvency is 
more than likely being used in a reprehensible manner. A corporation in which the 
legal formalities are not followed is likely under the actual control of one or more 
individuals.
As said, these factors only support deeming the arrangement as an abusive one. 
The court bases its decision on the overall assessment of the facts present in the case. 
In this form of assessment, the decision is based on the entirety of the facts and 
legal relationships forming the rights and duties of the parties instead of the formal 
existence of some specifically defined legally relevant facts. The elements present 
in real life are considered important in showing the true nature of the case. The 
supporting factors are elements of this sort. They can be used to show the true nature 
of the corporate use, e.g., whether the corporation is controlled or used artificially 
or in a reprehensible manner. Sometimes, if the case lacks evidence to the contrary, 
these factors alone are enough to prove the more general requirements of piercing. 
Their significance is usually revealed only in relation to each other and to other 
facts present in a case. The overall assessment inspects the elements present and the 
patterns they create in relation to each other in determining the actual nature of the 
arrangement.
The factors cannot be given exact values or definitions. They are somewhat 
ambiguous; it is impossible to determine, for example, the exact level of adequate 
858 See also af Schultén 1984 at 96–97, who states that the level of integration and inadequate capital 
are not grounds for liability per se but significant factors that should be taken into account in the assess-
ment.
The division between supporting factors and the actual veil piercing test also abides by the Supreme 
Court’s standing in the Verkkokauppa decision. In it, the Supreme Court first formulated a general test 
for piercing but later assessed the facts of the case against that test. See KKO 2015:17 at 30–34.
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capitalization or exactly when someone can be confused about the corporate actor. One 
general rule can be provided, though. The further away the circumstances are from the 
usual and normal circumstances existing around corporations, the more justified veil 
piercing becomes.859 The extraordinary elements differentiate the arrangement from 
the accepted standard, and by examining the nature of these elements, we can discover 
significant facts either supporting or opposing piercing. This approach is adopted in 
artificial property arrangements860 and is applicable in veil piercing as well.
Another question is the causal relation with whatever caused the damage. 
In Finland, the question seems easy enough based on KKO 2015:17. Using 
the group structure, intercorporate relations or the shareholder’s control (or, 
more shortly, the use of corporate form) causes the damage that is claimable 
by piercing. This part of the piercing test is rather easy to show. After this, one 
can cite whatever additional factors to show that someone indeed used the 
corporation and that the use was artificial and reprehensible. In the US, these 
supportive factors are often regarded as justifications for piercing instead 
of showing some relevant aspect of the piercing test. This leads to strange 
inconsistencies with causality, as some of these supportive factors are in no 
way causally related to the actual damage caused.861 This creates unnecessary 
complexity as to the assessment of these factors. There is ultimately no direct 
link between the conduct sanctioned by veil piercing liability and the damage 
compensated by veil piercing. This quagmire can be avoided in Finland, and 
it is not even entirely based in the US. The courts should apply the totality of 
the circumstances test when piercing in order to assess all known and relevant 
information and perform an examination of an issue in light of all known 
and conceivable circumstances, excluding nothing and giving no one fact, 
action or condition a controlling influence upon the assessment. One should 
remember, though, that the US piercing cases often serve similar functions as 
the Asset Recovery Act, unlawful distribution and debtor’s dishonesty do in 
Finland and, in those cases, looking at the causality between improper action 
and the damage is logical.
The division between the test for veil piecing and supporting factors is partially 
copied from the United States.862 The structure is well developed and, in the author’s 
opinion, it suits veil piercing perfectly.863 It allows for structured analysis of the facts 
859 Leppänen 1991 at 303.
860 See Linna 1999 at 342–347.
861 About the causal relationship in piercing cases, see Sparkman 2016 at 446–465.
862 See Hamilton – Booth 2005 at 400–410 and Kärki 2015 at 747–755 for the US system. In US case 
law, see Jones & Trevor Marketing v. Lowry (2012) at 636–637.
863 About the compatibility of the system, see Kärki 2016.
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and their relevance, bringing some order and objectivity into the overall assessment. 
An almost identical division is used in Enforcement Code 4:14.864 In this chapter, 
some of the more common factors cited in piercing decisions are examined. Others 
have been considered in court decisions, and some have been influential in the legal 
literature. The factors can be divided into seven groups according to the facts and 
considerations they entail. I will now proceed to examine them in an attempt to 
make the veil piercing assessment more objective and predictable.
6.2.  Inadequate Resources
6.2.1.  On the Concept
Inadequate resources was one of the key factors in support of piercing in the KKO 
2017:94 decision. Traditionally, this criterion has been called undercapitalization, 
but on this occasion, I will stay true to the terminology of the Supreme Court. 
This choice also emphasizes the view that all the resources are significant instead of 
only the amount of capital. The conduct constituting inadequate resourcing in the 
case was threefold. One corporation held the assets and the other held the negative 
risks. The benefits of the corporation holding the negative risks were siphoned away 
through contract prices, leaving the corporation with no assets when the negative 
risks realized. I am deriving these factors as significant when assessing the adequacy 
of resources:
1. lack of resources
2. siphoning of assets
3. separation of benefits and liabilities.865
It is entirely possible to utilize all of these methods to benefit whichever entity the 
controller appoints. In some cases, all three are present, although any one in isolation 
is capable of constituting inadequate resourcing. The Finnish legal system is well 
equipped to deal with the siphoning of assets through transfers. This would suggest 
that piercing considerations focus more on the other two, although these transfers 
still support piercing. I will not analyze these much further here as they are rather 
self-explanatory. These are the methods that are utilizable to make the corporation 
inadequately resourced, and I will inspect when inadequate resourcing is present. 
The discussion will often cross these three categories, and one of them—separation 
of benefits and liabilities—is given its own chapter.
864 See Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 152. See also Chapter III.2.1. of this work.
865 Similarly in the United States, see Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 35–38.
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But first, there is a need to clearly distinguish three ways of understanding 
inadequate resourcing, or as it is traditionally called, undercapitalization. Company 
Act 1:3 sets a minimum level for stock capital in a corporation.866 A public company 
is required to have 80 000 euros of stock capital, and private corporations are required 
to have none. In a strictly formal sense, a corporation cannot be undercapitalized 
if these requirements are fulfilled. The statute-provided minimum capital is not 
that relevant for veil piercing. The minimum capital is set so low that it offers no 
protection for the creditors of a corporation.867 The amount is easy to maintain 
whether the corporation is legitimate or not. It simply lacks the impact to act as an 
indicator of abuse.
The piercing analysis is not concerned with the lack of minimum capital. 
Traditionally, it has been about undercapitalization or inadequate capitalization with 
which corporation operates.868 The concept used here—inadequate resources—takes 
the capital amounts as well as other resources into account. Resources are inadequate 
if there is less than what the practiced business requires. This sort of inadequacy 
supports piercing the veil.869
In the KKO 2017:94 decision, the Finnish Supreme Court addressed inadequate 
resourcing in veil piercing. In it, one person was able to determine the contracts 
between the two corporations he owned, along with the contracts made with 
counter values that did not allow the staff rental corporation to pay wages or expenses 
auxiliary to wages. Inadequate resources were present because one person controlled 
the contract between the corporations and determined the contract sums in a way 
866 Due to this, it is problematic to devise any other standard for capital levels. Savela 2015 at 412.
867 See also Villa 2002 at 629, Airaksinen 2013 at 445, Kärki 2018c and HE 238/2018. 
Similarly KM 1992:32 at 373, where the minimum capital requirement is seen to diminish the need for 
veil piercing with the more comprehensive protection it offers.
868 See Werlauff 1991 at 75–76 and 518–519. He makes the same distinction. He calls the lack of 
minimum capital absolute or formal undercapitalization (absolut, formel underkapitalisering) and capital 
inadequacy in comparison to expected liabilities relative undercapitalization (aktivitetsrelatetet). He also 
identifies a third category between these two: finance market–created lack of equity capital (markeds-
relatetet). This refers to a situation in which the corporation is unable to acquire credit from the market 
after which rationally operating shareholders should have provided more equity capital. Werlauff sees that 
relative undercapitalization is only a supportive factor for piercing, whereas absolute and market-created 
undercapitalization are enough to justify piercing. See also Stattin 2008 at 448 and Gelb 1982 at 3–4.
869 See Mähönen – Villa 2015 at 299.
See also NJA 1947 s. 647, NJA 1975 s. 45, NJA 2014 s. 877, Leppänen 1991 at 303, af Schultén 2003 at 
10 and Savela 2015 at 413.
In addition, see SOU 1987:59 at 129–137. The Swedish betalningsansvarkommittén published a memo-
randum where it considered inadequate capitalization as a necessary requirement for piercing, along with 
inappropriate use of control.
Cf. Huttunen 1963 at 156. He sees that inadequate capitalization does not justify piercing since the cred-
itor can always check registries to determine how much capital the corporation has. Undoubtedly, this is 
the case with contract creditors. This argument has lost some of its relevance since the 2006 Company 
Act reform.
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that resulted in the staff rental corporation operating at a loss or in a manner that 
does not allow it to sustainably meet its obligations. The stated fact of inadequate 
resourcing was then brought up when the Supreme Court gave justifications for 
finding the inappropriate purpose behind the arrangement. Thus, based on this case, 
inadequate resources seem to be only a factor supporting veil piercing, as it hints toward 
the reprehensibility and artificiality of the arrangement.870
Similarly, in the United States, undercapitalization or inadequate 
capitalization has been viewed in support of finding an improper motive 
behind the corporate use. In Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp. (1992), the court 
held that “[t]he reason, we think, is not because undercapitalization, in and 
of itself, is unlawful (though it may be for some purposes), but rather because 
the creation of an undercapitalized subsidiary justifies an inference that the 
parent is either deliberately or recklessly creating a business that will not be 
able to pay its bills or satisfy judgments against it.”871 There is another school 
of thought, though. Sometimes, undercapitalization alone—and not as an 
indication of improper motive—has been thought to justify piercing.872 
Regardless of the function, undercapitalization rationale tends to assert itself 
strongly when courts decide to pierce.873
In Sweden, the literature has attempted the same. The argument is that 
undercapitalization only supports finding dependence or disloyalty.874 It 
should be noted, though, that this argument is made against the background 
that the Swedish piercing doctrine is uncertain, and the discussion is about 
whether undercapitalization is an independent requirement of piercing.875 I 
have established here that it is not an independent requirement in Finland.
To (overly) simplify inadequate resourcing, control over the contracting 
corporations in the arrangement combined with one contracting corporation 
operating at a loss for the benefit of the other equaled inadequate resourcing in 
the KKO 2017:94 case. For future cases, the Supreme Court left some room 
for interpretation by characterizing the inadequate resourcing as operating the 
corporation in a manner that does not allow the corporation to sustainably meet its 
870 See also Kärki 2018a at 278–279.
871 See also Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 20–21 and Cheng 2010 at 568–569 and 575–576, asserting that 
the proper understanding of undercapitalization is an indication of impropriety. In support, Costello v. 
Fazio (1958).
872 For example, Anderson v. Abbot (1944) at 362–363.
873 See Oh 2010 at 138. Cf. Thompson 1991 at 1067.
874 See Moberg 1998 at 80.
875 SOU 1987:59 at 131.
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obligations.876 This means that it is not necessary to operate at a loss, but it needs to 
be reasonably foreseeable that the corporation is incapable of sustainably meeting 
its obligations.877 This should be due to the manner in which it operates, leading to 
a situation where the corporation does not possess the resources and is unable to 
gather those resources from its operations should the operations remain unaltered. 
The Finnish understanding is about resources during the operation, taking into 
account initial capital, cash flow, ability to generate profit and otherwise operate 
sustainably. Adequate resources seem to enable the perpetuity of the corporate existence 
and even the preparation for some distress.
6.2.2.  How Does Inadequate Resourcing Support Piercing?
Inadequate capitalization can hint at the controller’s reprehensible intention to let 
others carry the negative risks.878 The Supreme Court left room for interpretation 
for inadequate resourcing, allowing the inclusion of situations in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the corporation is incapable of sustainably meeting its 
obligations as well as those where the corporation was systematically made insolvent 
or carried the negative risks. This inability needs to be foreseeable enough, and this 
foreseeability needs to be understood in relation to the purpose of the arrangement. 
To recount from earlier findings in this research, reprehensibility in veil piercing 
is most commonly found by showing the inappropriate intent to cause damage or 
evade obligations. If the inability is foreseeable enough to incentivize the creation of 
the arrangement, it should be foreseeable enough to assess the inadequate resources. 
This means that the controller of the arrangement knows of a significant risk of costs 
or potential liability and chooses to pursue the actions despite knowing that the 
liable corporation is unable to meet the obligation should it occur. The corporate 
arrangement enables them to favor whomever they desire among claimants to the 
cash flows of a firm.879 Inadequate resourcing hints that the controllers have used 
this possibility. On the other hand, outside intention, inadequate resourcing could 
be combined with negligent management of the corporation to establish some 
reprehensible and condemnable disregard for third party rights.880
Stattin has made an important distinction. Inadequate resourcing is more important 
when a creditor makes a piercing claim. When the piercing claim is made to enforce 
876 Millon has suggested similar reforms to the US piercing doctrine. He systemizes this sort of behav-
ior under the term “financial responsibility.” See Millon 2007.
877 This comes close to the definition of insolvency. Still, that definition refers to obligations when they 
become due, whereas here we are concerned with obligations that are reasonably certain to arise but might 
not exist yet.
878 In the United States, inadequate capitalization alone has occasionally justified piercing. See Shapoff 
v. Scull (1990) at 1470: “The requirements of the [alter ego] doctrine may be met where, as here, the 
corporation is undercapitalized in light of its prospective liabilities.”
879 Macey – Mitts 2014 at 152–153.
880 Macey – Mitts 2014 at 127.
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a legal norm or uphold a policy goal, then inadequate resourcing is less significant. In 
the latter case, inadequate resourcing can still be used to show that the corporation 
was dependent.881 The Finnish piercing doctrine does not give as high a significance 
to the dependence criterion as the Swedish one does. Therefore, I would question 
whether inadequate resourcing has any significance when piercing due to the evasion 
of a provision. It might be possible to deduce something about the intentions behind 
the arrangement in limited situations or whether the use was artificial.
Perhaps this argument becomes clear only through examples in casu. Still, in 
case of fiscal damage to creditors, there is a direct connection between the 
lack of resources and the damage, which is not present in evasion situations. 
For example, when the corporate form is used to circumvent nationality 
requirements laid out in the law, the case is about upholding a policy. Veil 
piercing is used to determine whether the attributes—unwanted nationality—
of the corporate controllers can be considered those of the corporation, as the 
nature of the circumvented norm is not considered with the actual business. 
This situation has nothing to do with how many assets the corporation in 
question has. An example to the contrary would be circumventing the 
duty to hold co-operative negotiations with the employees. This is done by 
artificially dividing the business into multiple entities, the workforce of each 
being below the limit of 20, after which you must hold the negotiations. 
The piercing assessment is still about the evasion of a provision of law and 
considering one attribute of the other entities—the number of employees—as 
that of the entity who should hold the negotiations. In this case, though, that 
provision is business-related in nature, so it makes a difference if the entities 
are resourced highly enough to practice business as independent employers. 
If they are not, it is easier to determine that the entities are an intentional 
attempt to circumvent obligations laid out in the law.
An interesting question surfaces if the table is turned. Since providing inadequate 
resources speaks to impropriety, providing adequate resources does the opposite. If 
the corporation is adequately resourced, it can hardly be called improper use. The 
business is given viable funds, and creditors are secured to the amount of the funds. 
Even if the resources are eventually not enough to satisfy the creditors’ claims, the 
conduct can hardly be seen as improper if the resource level matched the expected 
negative risks of the business. Adequate resourcing suggests that the corporation 
has a real business purpose and that the controller did not intend to damage the 
creditors. However, impropriety can be shown through other criteria, and adequacy 
of resources should not rule out veil piercing. It simply speaks against piercing.
881 Stattin 2008 at 439 and 448–449.
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6.2.3.  Sustainable Resourcing
The decision in KKO 2017:94 adopted a concept of inadequate resources a bit 
different from the undercapitalization opinions existing in the literature. Still, these 
two are undoubtedly related. The decision does not look into the initial moment 
when the company was founded and assess whether the capital provided would be 
enough. Instead, the decision looks into the realized conduct. Did they conduct 
the arrangement in a manner that allowed the participating corporations to meet 
their obligations? If one corporation in the arrangement systematically operates in 
a manner that does not allow it to sustainably meet its obligations that are certain to 
arise and this is done to the benefit of another, inadequate resourcing is present. The 
benefits of the arrangement are realized early or continuously, and the obligations 
manifest later. I have divided this criterion into two parts: the first asks what level 
of resources is sustainable, and the second part asks what obligations are certain 
enough to be taken into account. I shall address the former first.
Continuing from the definition of inadequate resourcing, it would seem that 
determining sustainability is not about absolute amounts that need to be left in but, 
rather, some sort of prediction of business development and needs of the business. In 
its most simple form, this means ensuring that the corporate contracts are made in a 
manner that allows the corporation to meet its known expenses.882 Thus, inadequacy 
should never be determined by comparing the assets and liabilities at the time of 
the claim. This comparison would lead to finding inadequate resourcing in every 
bankruptcy and veil piercing case and would show significant hindsight bias favoring 
the creditors. 
Piercing claims usually appear in situations where the formally liable 
corporation is already insolvent. It is then deceptively easy to deduce that 
it must not have had enough resources since it ended in insolvency.883 The 
problem is that the persons capable of deciding the amount of resources the 
corporation receives did not have this information. If we accept the view 
that inadequate resources hint toward inappropriate intentions behind 
the corporate arrangement, how could these intentions be affected by the 
information the decisive persons did not have? The assessment thus needs 
to be made on the basis of the information these persons had at the time the 
decision was made and what was reasonably predictable then.884
Naturally, if the operation is systematic and goes on for a while, this is 
easily established. If the controllers seek to continue a clearly inadequately 
882 Similarly, see Vahtera 2018 at 268–269.
883 Similarly, see Bainbridge 2000 at 53 and Nerep 2015 at 27.
884 Similarly in the US, see Cheng 2010 at 578–579. This view is also compatible with the business 
judgment rule used to address the management’s liability.
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resourced operation, this knowledge should be taken into account. Then we 
could dub this the decision to continue with inadequate resourcing, even if 
this information did not exist when it was initially decided to commence the 
operation.
Interestingly, the inadequate resourcing definition from KKO 2017:94 is in line 
with the KKO 2003:33 decision, in which the Supreme Court of Finland held 
that a housing corporation needed to collect large enough maintenance charge 
payments from the resident-shareholders to cover the liabilities of the corporation. 
Both decisions seem to enforce some standard of sustainable resourcing to enable the 
perpetuity of the corporate existence and even the preparation for some distress. If these 
charges are set too low, the difference can be considered an unlawful distribution. The 
difference here is that the distribution is not necessarily made, as in transferring value. 
Instead, the inadequate resourcing can also transfer the two sides of risk. Still, both 
place negative consequences on the shareholders or the controllers of the arrangement 
based on their failure to maintain assets in the corporation to the satisfaction of the 
creditors. Both concern a situation in which the same person or a group controls 
the entities involved. In KKO 2003:33, the shareholders themselves were the 
benefactors, and in KKO 2017:94, a single shareholder controlled both corporations. 
The controller(s) manipulated the pricing in these transactions to benefit an entity of 
their choice at the expense of the corporation’s ability to meet its obligations.
The application of KKO 2003:33 on corporations other than housing 
corporations has been rejected.885 The KKO 2017:94 decision seems to extend the 
norm from KKO 2003:33 to other corporations, albeit with more limited direct 
consequences and more subtle meaning. Inadequate resources alone does not lead 
to liability but only supports liability by veil piercing, whereas in KKO 2003:33, 
the difference was directly claimable.886 Perhaps the symbiotic contracting practice 
in KKO 2017:94 could have been interpreted in light of KKO 2003:33 as unlawful 
distribution had the bankruptcy estate made the claim. Instead, the pay security 
authority made the claim. It would seem that KKO 2017:94 does place new 
requirements of capital, pricing or other resource allocation on the corporations. It 
should be noted, though, that this requirement is tied to the piercing assessment and 
not corporate operations in general, at least currently. Therefore, neglecting this only 
leads to increased piercing risk, and liability requires fulfilling the other elements of 
the piercing test also.
885 Villa 2003 at 7 and Rasinaho 2016 at 215 and 228.
886 A fact set very similar to KKO 2003:33 has appeared on a veil piercing case in the US. In it, the veil 
was not pierced as the limitation of liability in the arrangement was deemed to be well within the public 
policy. The dissenting opinion adopted a similar stance to that in KKO 2003:33. See Bartle v. Homeown-
er’s Cooperative (1955).
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Returning to the definition of inadequate resourcing, I have deduced the 
following: if a corporation is systematically operated in a manner that does not allow 
it to sustainably meet its obligations that are reasonably certain to arise, inadequate 
resourcing is present. In KKO 2003:33, the expenses were very easy to verify from its 
own accounting and were, thus, very easy to predict as certain to arise. In addition, 
the housing corporation continued to charge inadequate payments for a long time, 
slowly accumulating debt. If one attempts to assess the predictable expenses and 
obligations a business might occur, the possibilities are much more numerous. The 
most obvious are taxes and fees mandated by law.
Taking the pattern of neglecting known expenses is compatible with the view 
I follow in this research that inadequate resourcing speaks of the unacceptable 
motives behind the corporate arrangement. It is important to determine whether 
the inadequate resourcing was an improper attempt to limit one’s liability while still 
retaining the profits from the operations or whether it was an attempt at some other 
reprehensible purpose. The easiest defense against claims of resourcing as part of 
impropriety is showing the proper reasons behind the lack of resources. The limitation 
is most likely legitimate if the inadequacy is due to the unfortunate running of the 
business, if the possible profits have been used (at least in part) to support and develop 
the business, if the owner has not taken an overly large salary from the corporation, or 
if the owner has provided the business with additional funds or has otherwise acted 
in good faith to keep the business alive.887 If, however, the owner has derived large 
personal benefits, squandered the profits, lost or hidden funds, and if the inadequacy 
is due to this sort of behavior, the limitation of liability would seem improper. 
The comparative outlook does offer a lot of different interpretation options 
here. In the United States, some courts have sought to utilize the industry 
average capital in determining the amount of resources the company should 
be given.888 Other cases have taken this industry standard and have had an 
expert examine its adequacy.889 Yet operating a business with high amounts of 
debt is so common that no modern startup business could be called adequately 
capitalized.890 The comparison to what the standard is would likely give an 
unsatisfactory answer to a question about what the standard should be.
887 Providing the corporation with equity capital is an assurance of the shareholder’s commitment to 
the corporation. It is a sign of bona fide. Kaisanlahti 1996 at 240.
888 See In Re Lumber Inc. (1954). Similarly about insurance, see Millon 20017 at 1376. For criticism 
on the view, see Cheng 2010 at 573, who is of the opinion that such a test is prone to manipulation, and 
the industry standard itself might be inadequate. As an answer to this criticism, see Marcantel 2011 at 
222–223.
889 See Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc. (1986) and United States v. WRW Corp. (1993) at 25.
890 See Matheson – Eby 2000 at 177, Nerep 2003 at 20–21 and Millon 2006 at 28. Similarly in Finland, 
see Kyläkallio – Iirola – Kyläkallio 2017a at 13.
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One prominent proposal for refashioning the piercing test in certain 
limited liability entities in the United States sees this sort of siphoning of 
funds combined with insolvency as sufficient to pierce the veil.891 If a legitimate 
corporation believed liability existed, it would begin holding reserves, either 
through its income in the ordinary course or by sheltering existing retained 
earnings to ultimately pay what could become the judgment.892 An illegitimate 
corporation would seek the exact opposite route of exhausting any existing 
and future reserves.
The examined decisions seem to emphasize the continuous siphoning and 
eventual inability to meet the obligations. Siphoning of assets would suggest 
unsustainability, even when the corporation had adequate assets at the beginning.893 
The Finnish cases so far seem to represent the siphoning category, and no discussion 
on the initial level of capital was conducted. It is also worth noting that the initially 
inadequate assets could increase during the operation, making it an unreliable 
factor.894 The most clearly unsustainable resourcing situation happens when the 
corporation has minimal initial resources, and any assets the operation manages to 
secure are siphoned away.895
Still, the almost prohibitive difficulty of determining the correct level of capital 
remains.896 Instead, when defining sustainable resources, we seem to be reliant 
on siphoning and systematically accumulating liabilities over the timespan of the 
arrangement. This view is prone to hindsight, but it is also quite compatible with 
the idea that inadequate resourcing supports the finding of unacceptable motives. 
If the siphoning and accumulation were systematically done over the period of the 
arrangement, this speaks to the motivation behind the corporate use. This is also in 
less contradiction with the purposes of limited liability. The systematic accumulation 
of liabilities and siphoning are rarely, if ever, within the concepts of honest business 
and trade. Instead, they show an attempt at personal gain at the expense of others.
6.2.4.  What Obligations are Certain Enough?
When determining what obligations are certain enough, current case law offers no 
support, and the compared jurisdictions are not much more helpful. What is clear 
is that those obligations that are certain to arise should be included. Any deviation 
891 See Matheson – Eby 2000 at 181–193. This refashioning would mold the test to greatly resemble 
asset recovery and unlawful distribution as they exist in Finland.
892 Marcantel 2011 at 220. Similarly, see Oh 2010 at 138 and Cheng 2010 at 581–582.
893 See also Gelb 1982 at 14–15 and the dissenting opinion of Judge Keating in Walkovsky v. Carlton 
(1966) at 422–423. See also Oh 2013 at 125 and Pierson v. Jones (1981) at 1087.
894 Gelb 1982 at 17–18 and Oh 2010 at 98–99.
895 As was the case in KKO 2017:94.
896 Similarly in Sweden, see Nerep at 26.
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from 100 percent makes the assessment more difficult. The issue becomes what is 
predictable enough. Naturally, the corporations can operate in an unsustainable 
manner and cover the obligations from other sources of funding, for example, 
capital investment or group subsidies. The current case law has had the advantage of 
hindsight, as the corporations in the cases have cumulatively neglected obligations 
over an extended period. Thus, it has been easy for the Supreme Court to use the 
term “certain.” This is all well for their purposes, but I am concerned with predicting 
what obligations are certain enough at the time the decisions are made.
As for the United States, significance is given to the liabilities that are 
certain or likely enough to arise over the course of the business in light of the 
circumstances and the competence of the management.897 Swedish literature 
has adopted the view on certain or likely enough. Inadequate resourcing is 
understood as the corporation not being given enough resources to meet 
the expected liabilities, taking into account the risks and obligations that 
operations of that scale and type might cause.898 Some give significance to 
how predictable those liabilities are.899 The courts should also be allowed 
to consider not only the initial resources given to the corporation but also 
whether those resources have been siphoned away during the operation.900 
In NJA 1947 s. 647, the corporation could not have operated its business 
without continuing financial support from the shareholders. This was 
interpreted as a sign that the corporation was not on economically solid 
ground, which in turn supported holding the shareholders liable, although 
the initial capital level was compared to the debt amounts in the case.901 This 
should be interpreted as a sign that both are significant in deducing whether 
the resources were actually adequate.
The English take is total denial of this view, and isolation for known 
tort risk and other obligations is well within the allowed corporate uses.902 
Even in situations where the damage has already emerged though no court 
 
897 See Judge Keating (dissenting) in Walkovsky v. Carlton (1966), In Re Mobile Steel Co. (1977). See 
also See Barber 1981 at 390, Millon 2007 at 1355–1358 and Sparkman 2016 at 402–404 and 411–416.. 
Cf. Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat (1999), Bainbridge 2000 at 53 and 59 and Huss 
2001 at 114–115, Axtmann v. Chillemi (2007) at 17–18 and 21–22 and Martin v. Freeman (2012) at 14.
898 See NJA 1975 s. 45, the appellate court in NJA 1982 s. 244 and NJA 1992 s. 375. In literature, see 
Hellner 1964 at 166, Nerep 2003 at 18–23, Stattin 2008 at 447–448 and Nerep 2015 at 25–28.
899 NJA 1982 s. 244. Also SOU 1987:59 and Nerep 2003 at 22.
900 NJA 1982 s. 244 and Stattin 2008 at 447–448.
901 See also NJA 1975 s. 45, where the criterion was repeated. Also worth noting is the NJA 1982 s. 244 
dcision. For more about undercapitalization in the decisions, see Moberg 1998 at 62–67. 
902 See Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1990) and Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013). Cf. Re F.G. Films 
(1953).
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proceedings have been initiated, arrangements to limit liability exposure are 
allowed.903
I present four situations where liability is predictable enough: 1) the liabilities are 
already known to arise; 2) the liabilities are thought to be likely enough to incentivize 
the controller to create an abusive arrangement to evade them; 3) the liabilities are 
accumulated systematically throughout the timespan of the corporate arrangement; 
and 4) the management should have known that liabilities would arise. 
The first of these is concrete knowledge. I would use the English Adams v. Cape 
Industries Plc (1990) case as an example. In it, the arrangement was created only after 
the first asbestos trial was over and the management knew additional compensation 
claims would appear. They reacted to the now-established precedent by creating the 
subsidiary structure to evade these claims. The English court deemed this perfectly 
acceptable, but I should note that the English jurisdiction shows that this allowance 
was due to the formal interpretation and hostility toward piercing. I would argue 
that the other jurisdictions would not treat this arrangement similarly.
The second argument is a combination of knowledge and unacceptable motives. 
The controlling party knows that a form of liability is likely to arise; it estimates 
this likelihood to be significant and the potential compensation amount to be high 
enough to desire a new arrangement to escape that liability. The NJA 2014 s. 877 
decision is a prime example of this. The chance of losing the trial and liability of 
the opponent’s costs was a known and significant possibility. The arrangement was 
created solely to circumvent that liability.
The third situation is based on historical information. Throughout the existence 
of the arrangement, the company has systematically accumulated liabilities. Through 
this knowledge, the controller has no doubt developed knowledge of what obligations 
are certain enough. If the arrangement ends up in a situation where a piercing claim 
is necessary, then this would show that the controller has not corrected this and 
has allowed the corporation to become undercapitalized. This is especially prevalent 
when the benefits of the operation are siphoned away at the same time. 
The KKO 2017:94 decision was a good example of this sort of situation. It is also the 
only Finnish decision citing inadequate resourcing in the veil piercing context. In it, 
the inadequate resourcing was used as support for veil piercing when the corporation 
has been siphoned until empty or operated so that it was incapable of covering its 
liabilities, and this was done to benefit another. The controller chose to move benefits 
to another entity while continuously neglecting payments and accumulating negative 
903 Liability rules might make it rather complex to limit exposure. Cape industries succeeded in this 
through eliminating its presence in the United States before the proceedings began, thus preventing the 
UK courts from enforcing judgments entered against it in the United States. See Adams v. Cape Industries 
Plc (1991).
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risks in the debtor corporation. This conduct went on for three years. This is an 
obvious and egregious form of inadequate resourcing. Any deviation toward more 
subtle inadequacy makes the condemnation more difficult. It is hard to predict how 
this argument would fare if the unsustainability argument is based only on future 
conduct or predictions of liabilities. This certainly makes the evidence harder to find. 
It should not, however, deny the possibility, however, as the disparities can be obvious.
In Sweden, some similar assessments exist. In NJA 1975 s. 45, the Swedish 
Supreme Court gave significance to whether a corporation was given enough 
resources for it to operate independently.904 If it was not given such resources, 
it could be said that the company providing the resources, and to whose 
benefit the operation eventually fell, is the one operating the business instead 
of the inadequately resourced corporation.905 The same conclusion was 
reached in NJA 2014 s. 877.906
Although the US piercing literature is dominated by undercapitalization, 
inadequate resourcing is still also noted. Asset stripping is often cited in 
piercing cases, and it can definitely be part of the reason why the resources 
are inadequate. Similarly, using corporate assets for personal expenses is often 
viewed in support of piercing.907 In Insituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic 
TopHat, LLC (2013),908 the corporate arrangement was similar to KKO 
2017:94. Cosmic TopHat was operated in a manner that did not allow it to 
sustainably meet its obligations, and the arrangement allowed the shareholder 
to favor whomever among the claimants to the cash flows of the firm. In 
fact, this sort of favoring or intention to do so is often required to pierce.909 
Combined with the allocation of the benefits of the symbiotic operation, this 
would support holding sibling corporations liable.
In the Appellate Court of Turku 26.10.2016 no. 1070 decision, the court did 
ponder the relevance of the neglected payment sum. It specifically assessed the 
sum of the claims that the plaintiffs sought in that trial and concluded that lesser 
claims would not support finding inadequate resourcing. This type of comparison 
is biased by hindsight, though. There are multiple points in the process preceding 
904 Similarly, in an earlier case, NJA 1947 s. 647.
905 See Svensson 2010 at 263.
906 See also NJA 1982 s. 244.
907 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission v. Bronson Partners, LLC (2009) at 391 and Harris v. 
Kupersmith (2009) at III.B.
908 See also GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014), in which the ar-
rangement allowed the controller to decide which creditors were paid.
909 See for example, the discussed Insituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC (2013) and 
Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc. (2006).
257
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
the trial that can eliminate claims from the consideration. The claims made do not 
represent a true picture of the resources in relation to the claims. This is why the 
assessment should be made based on the totality of the resources and the totality of 
the liabilities that the corporation has and is likely to face at the time the disputably 
abusive arrangement is created.
The fourth situation is about what the management or the controller should have 
known—what liabilities were such that their occurrence should have been predicted 
and proper preparations made. The first step in this determination would be the 
level of negative risks the business operates with. A business with higher negative 
risks needs more capital or insurance to cover these risks should they realize. For 
example, companies involved in mining have more significant negative risks than 
an accounting office. The assessment should look into the typical negative risks 
confronting those types of businesses and determine whether the amount of 
resources is adequate in comparison.910 If the corporation has a convincing level of 
resources compared to the scope of the business, veil piercing should remain unlikely. 
The industry also affects what liabilities are reasonably predictable. Another similar 
element is the size and scale of the business.
This sort of assessment of probability has emerged in KKO 2001:29. The case was 
about whether the debtor’s debts exceeded their assets. One particular debt was based 
on a security. The debtor had promised to pay the debt of a corporation if it could 
not pay that debt itself. The probability was determined by examining the payment 
history and profitability of the corporation.911 The nature of the obligation made the 
predictability rather easy in that case. It does seem that the type of obligation does 
alter the assessment of probability.
This prediction could also derive some support from the solvency test (Company 
Act 13:2) used when distributing assets.912 According to it, assets cannot be distributed if 
the distribution rendered the company insolvent. In determining this, the management 
needs to account for all the predictable obligations of the company. Unfortunately, 
the process of this prediction is highly based on the subjective experiences of the 
management. The core of the test is to account for known issues in the operation.
6.2.5.  What Are the Resources?
Now that we have established what inadequate resourcing means, it should be 
explicitly stated what to account for when assessing whether the resources are 
adequate. A good starting point is that everything that can be used to satisfy the 
debtors’ claims can be considered resources when assessing inadequacy. This includes 
910 See Easterbrook – Fischel 1991 at 59.
911 See also Tuomisto 2012 at 48–49.
912 About the solvency test, see Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 2018b at 41–51 and Ruohonen 
2012.
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liquid funds, easily liquefiable items such as stocks or bonds, property items whether 
real or chattel and even the ability to obtain additional credit from the market. Every 
category of available funds must be accounted for, even those sets that have been 
transferred forward but can be recovered. 
One particularly useful interpretation from the United States should be adopted 
in Finland also. According to the Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp. (1992) decision, 
insurance should also be considered capital, at least regarding the creditors with 
access to these funds.913 This opinion has also emerged in Sweden.914 Insurance 
offers readily available funds to satisfy these creditors. If the business is well insured 
against the typical negative risks it operates with, it has properly considered the risks 
involved. The arrangement cannot be viewed as reprehensible then because, instead 
of placing the capital in the corporation, they have contracted an insurance company 
to cover certain risks. Thus, they have not forced the negative risks on the creditors 
with a unilateral decision but have appropriately paid someone to carry those risks. 
Without insurance, the corporation carries the same negative risk, and payment can 
be taken from its property. 
Finnish case law has addressed the significance of insurance in other 
compensation situations, specifically when discussing tort liability. Two 
cases involving fire damage from roofing installations considered the lack of 
insurance as prohibiting the liability. In KKO 1994:5, the damaged party had 
neglected the contractual obligation, mandating insurance coverage. This 
violation prevented it from claiming the damage. In KKO 1991:176, the party 
suffering the damage had insurance, and during negotiations, they specifically 
addressed its existence, which prevented the moderation of the compensation 
amount. Perhaps the discussion during contract negotiations was interpreted 
to mean that both parties had accepted the insurance amounts, especially the 
amount of one’s own risk, in the insurance terms. The damaged party had 
already received some compensation from its own insurance, lessening the 
liability of the tortfeasor, which meant that the amount was not unreasonable.
These decisions do not offer exactly the same view as the arguments I have 
brought forward here. They do highlight the significance of insurance as 
proper preparation. In the KKO 1994:5 decision, the connection between the 
insurance and available compensation was more clear. The insurance should have 
913 Similarly, see Barber 1981 at 394–395 and Millon 2007 at 1377–1380. The connection between as-
sets and insurance was also recognized in Walkovszky v. Carlton (1966) at 419–420 and American Trading 
& Production Corp v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. (1970).
In Finland, support could be derived from the moderation of tort amounts. In this context, neglecting 
insurance shows a lack of proper preparation. Allowing moderation in such a situation would allow the 
tortfeasor to indirectly benefit from neglecting insurance.
914 See Hellner 1964 at 166. 
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been in place. Had it been in place, it would have provided compensation to the 
damaged party. Thus, the party that had neglected taking the insurance had to 
suffer the consequences. The decision is hard to connect to the discussion here 
since there was a clear contractual obligation to be insured. In addition, both 
decisions were such that the damaged party had or should have had insurance. 
Subordinated loans, hybrid bonds and binding guarantees from owners or from 
the corporate group should also be considered capital.915 No doubt, these fill the 
same requirements as insurance does, providing readily available compensation. If 
inadequate resourcing is understood as part of the arrangement to minimize asset 
exposure to risks, then it should be noted that these instruments do the opposite. 
They expose assets at risk and speak to the legitimate and bona fide intention behind 
the use of the entity.
In practice, the assessment of the debtor’s financial state is usually difficult 
since reliable information is hard to come by.916 The creditor has no access to the 
bookkeeping of the debtor and must settle for information provided by the debtor 
and public financial statements. In addition, the debtor might have little motivation 
to keep accurate accounts in a sham corporation or a business in a crisis.917 Even if 
kept correctly, the business lives on, and the public statements are only historical 
information.918
6.3.  Shareholder-Provided Resources – A Sign of Good Intentions?
The pattern in which shareholders fund the corporation might tell us something 
of the purpose behind the arrangement. There is no case law support for this in 
Finland, and the following analysis is mostly based on Swedish influences, though 
some support could be derived from other jurisdictions also. Although this is not 
authoritative support for the interpretation, the logic behind the argument is 
compelling and could be accepted and should at least be considered in Finland.
The basic structure of the argument comes from the earlier mentioned case NJA 
2014 s. 877.919 In that case, the shareholders provided the company with minimal 
915 See Nerep 2015 at 25 discussing SOU 1987:59.
916 See Koulu 2009 at 155.
917 See Koulu 2009 at 155.
918 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 239–240.
919 Another good example with similar asset transfers would have been GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. 
Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014). In it, the court found that “the evidence supports the district 
court’s finding that the LLC had inadequate capital due to manipulation by its member, a publicly traded 
corporation, and that Appellant used its position to control the amount of money that would be trans-
ferred to LLC, and to decide which bills of LLC would be paid with transferred monies.”
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assets that matched the realized expenses. At the same time, there was the easily 
foreseeable risk of legal costs from the trial, and the company had no other sources 
of cash flow. It is easy to argue that the company was not sustainably able to meet its 
obligations. It was reliant on the will of the shareholders to provide it with funds, 
and the shareholders were under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the pattern here 
shows that the purpose of the arrangement was to break the symmetry of the rule 
on trial costs compensation. This conclusion was easy in the decision because the 
company had no business other than the trial and no other income, and the funds 
provided went directly to pay the attorney of the corporation. All the pieces fit 
together in a manner that leaves no other reasonable explanation for the purpose of 
the arrangement.
Another Swedish case worth noting is NJA 1982 s. 244, where the payment 
pattern and financial reporting gave creditors the impression that the parent 
company was liable.920 The parent had also informed creditors that the 
subsidiaries would have their own substance, but their operations would be 
controlled by the parent. In NJA 1947 s. 647, the Swedish Supreme Court 
gave significance to the fact that the corporation could not have operated its 
business without continuing financial support from the shareholders. All of 
the owners readily provided the corporation funds, although no agreement 
existed to compel them to do so. This was interpreted as a sign that the 
corporation was not on economically solid ground, which in turn, supported 
holding the shareholders liable.921 
The same situation has come up in the United States also. In United States 
of America v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985),922 the parent corporation ( Jon-T 
Chemicals, Inc.) argued that the subsidiary ( Jon-T Farms, Inc.) should not 
be considered undercapitalized because it had virtually unlimited access to 
credit in the form of loans from its parent. To this, the court responded: “In 
our view, Chemicals’ argument misses the point. The underlying question is 
whether Farms was an economically viable, independent entity or whether it 
operated merely as the adjunct or alter ego of Chemicals. The fact that Farms 
continually had net operating losses and survived due to massive and ongoing 
transfusions from Chemicals does not indicate that Farms ever stood on its 
own two feet. Quite the contrary; it reinforces the district court’s conclusion 
that Farms did not have any separate financial existence.” It is important to 
note that these loans amounted to seven million dollars, were made without 
920 About the case, see also Ramberg 1990 at 252–257, who sees the case as an assumption of liability.
921 For more about the undercapitalization in the decision text, see Moberg 1998 at 62–64.
922 See also Gartner v. Snyder (1979), GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. 
(2014) at 465–466, Macey – Mitts 2014 at 129–130 and Sparkman 2016 at 371–374.
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corporate resolutions authorizing the loans and without demanding any 
collateral or interest.
Birbara v. Locke (1966) demonstrates the opposite situation.923 A publicly 
held corporation purchased a private corporation that had fallen in distress 
due to changes in taxation laws. The new parent corporation then injected 
the subsidiary with funds in the form of loans. Absent of any evidence to 
attempts at personal gain at the creditors’ expense, or of any asset flow from 
subsidiary to parent for that matter, these loans were not viewed in support 
of piercing. The difference from the Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. case is obvious: 
these loans were made to save the business, which was in financial distress 
due to business-related reasons. The intention behind the loans was clearly to 
rejuvenate it as a profitable business on its own. In the Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. 
case, on the other hand, the parent systematically loaned to the subsidiary 
to cover expenses resulting from all of its operations, and all the while, the 
benefits of the operation befell the parent. The intention behind it was clearly 
to run a supportive operation that was not profitable in itself but reasonable 
through a symbiotic relationship with the parent.
The comparative look reveals something useful here. It is usually considered a sign 
of good intentions when a shareholder provides a company in a solvency crisis with 
new funds.924 After all, this can be extremely risky. What, then, objectively discerns a 
legitimate attempt to save the business from an abusive intention? Is the arrangement 
in such totality that the corporation’s existence benefits only another party in the 
arrangement? If so, the additional funds given by a shareholder can fit the pattern of 
the arrangement.925 The shareholder benefits from keeping the arrangement afloat 
until the big risk meant for isolation through the arrangement realizes. In this case, 
the company must be operated so that it is constantly reliant on the shareholder-
provided funds, even though it could develop its operations to allow it to survive 
on its own. 
For example, the shareholder controlling the intercorporate relationships could 
make the pricing of contracts between the corporations such that it would allow 
both corporations to operate profitably, or at least without a loss. In such a situation, 
the shareholder has made the conscious choice of operating the other corporation at 
a loss, only providing it with the minimum amount of resources required to keep the 
risk isolation arrangement afloat. If the additional investment is only large enough 
to cover the losses or to pay the creditors—with whom the co-operation is essential 
for the continued existence of the arrangement—then there is no evidence of 
923 See also Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelly & Sons Company (2013).
924 Expressly in Barlow v. Budge (1942) at 442–443.
925 As in the United States of America v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (1985).
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goodwill and these payments should be considered to be only the maintenance cost 
of the abusive arrangement. If the additional investment is large enough to allow the 
corporation to develop its functions toward a level where it can operate sustainably, 
then it should be considered an attempt to save the corporation.
The view expressed in the analysis of debtor’s dishonesty is in contradiction 
here. Vento stated that if the level of risk to the creditors does not change with the 
actions taken, the action is always acceptable.926 We are not concerned here with the 
acceptability of the action itself, however. No doubt, these payments are acceptable 
and necessary, and their pattern—not the individual actions—needs to be viewed. 
Does the pattern show that funds are provided to fulfill choice obligations to keep the 
arrangement afloat?
These payments should be considered the cost of keeping the limitation 
arrangement afloat. Even if this situation is present, applying piercing also requires 
additional criteria. Even if the shareholder’s contribution cannot be considered an 
attempt to save the business, it still does not prove the requirements of veil piercing. 
With this last bit of analysis, I have attempted to prove that the shareholder’s 
additional investments in the corporation do not necessarily act as evidence of 
good intentions. To put this in simple form, if the corporation’s need for additional 
funds from shareholders is the result of the same shareholder’s choice to favor the other 
entities in the arrangement either by neglecting or making payments and the situation 
would have allowed the corporation to operate without losses, then the corporation is 
inadequately resourced, and the shareholder’s investment in it should not be considered 
an attempt to save the corporation unless other evidence so proves.
6.4.  Disparity of Benefits and Negative Risks
The allocation of benefits and negative risks is significant for piercing the veil. The 
Krendls’ third category included situations in which the lack of economic substance 
includes operating a corporation unprofitably or having the corporation do business 
exclusively with the dominant party so that all of the profits of the transaction 
are reaped by the dominant party or an entity of its choice. This entails two key 
elements: distribution of the benefits and the exclusivity of the corporate operations. 
This view can be further developed through the judgment-proofing theory 
of LoPucki discussed in II.5.1. of this work. In it, he argues that substantially all 
judgment-proofing has a single essential structure: a symbiotic relationship between 
two or more entities, in which one of the entities generates disproportionately 
high risks of liability and another owns a disproportionately high level of assets. 
Through the contract that unites them, the two entities allocate the gains from 
926 Vento 1994 at 236–240.
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judgment between them. Typically, the asset-owning entity guarantees the payment 
of selected contract obligations of the liability-generating entity (the “operating 
entity”) necessary for the latter to continue in business. The contract types include at 
least the following: lessor-lessee, secured lender-borrower, buyer-seller, franchisor-
franchisee, licensor-licensee and parent-subsidiary.927 All the veil piercing cases that 
have emerged in Finland thus far can be explained within this structure of judgment-
proofing.928 Still, the wording of the piercing test from KKO 2015:17 does not limit 
itself to judgment-proofing situations.
In KKO 2017:94, the business was divided into two entities, and the contractual 
relations between them enabled the corporation holding the assets to obtain the 
potential profits of the business practiced in a symbiosis. It could not have operated 
the business without truck drivers, and it rented those drivers’ work input from 
the other corporation in the arrangement. The corporation thus got the ability to 
practice its business and generate profit from the symbiotic relationship. The other 
corporation in the arrangement only held the workers’ contracts. The rent agreement 
between them was construed so that the renting corporation could not generate 
profit or operate sustainably. It was thus given none of the benefits in the symbiotic 
arrangement, whereas the other corporation was given all of them. The allocation 
and inadequacy of resources was reached through contract pricing.
As for the risks, the asset-holding corporation was secured. In case of a reduction 
in its transportation contracts, it would only hold the asset maintenance costs and 
the loss of revenue. The other company, however, held all the legal obligations 
related to employees, claims for unpaid wages and administrative fees. There is a 
clear disparity of risks here. However, in the case, this was not enough by itself. The 
case presented a clear manipulation of the contract prices and systematic neglect 
of taxes and other administrative fees to amass credit in the company. When the 
crisis occurred, the decision was made to let the corporation bearing the negative 
risks claim bankruptcy. All this combined created the impression that the whole 
operation was a designed and systematic attempt to isolate negative risks into separate 
entities from the benefits of the business. Absent a plausible other explanation for 
the arrangement, the corporate veil was pierced.
Another excellent example of this disparity is the NJA 2014 s. 877 case discussed 
earlier in the inadequate resourcing part of this work. In it, the two shareholders 
founded a corporation to participate in a trial of its initiative, but the corporation 
had no resources. When needed, the shareholders provided it just enough funds 
to pay for attorney costs. Similar to KKO 2017:94, they manipulated the resource 
levels in a manner that allowed the corporation to continue its operations and left 
the ultimate costs to the creditor. The risks of the trial meant that the loser would 
927 See LoPucki 1998 at 149.
928 As demonstrated in II.5.1. of this work.
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have to pay the winner’s trial costs. In the corporation, there were no assets, so the 
negative risks of the operation were all with the corporation and ultimately with the 
counterparty to the trial. Yet all the benefits, meaning the funds receivable should 
the claim succeed, would be freely utilizable to the shareholders, although they were 
also within the corporation in form. The difference is that the NJA s. 877 situation 
was an all-or-nothing situation in which there would either be benefits and no costs 
or only costs and no benefits. In this sort of arrangement, the disparity exists just by 
placing this dual chance in a corporation and eliminating the negative risk.
Through these cases, I would determine the allocation disparity as significant for 
veil piercing as follows:
1) systematic amassing of credit and/or negative risks for one entity;
2) placement of assets on another entity;
3) business operation practiced in symbiosis between the two entities, e.g., one 
cannot operate without the output of the other; and
4) the arrangement and its operation are not explainable through a valid business 
reason.
Now this reasoning is remarkably close to the judgment-proofing structure.929 The 
addition here is that we are not necessarily concerned with only judgment creditors 
but also possibly with other creditors that make their claims with a delay. This would 
include at the least the tax authorities as well as the pay security authority. The basic 
elements are the same, however.
There are some similar issues related to this situation in the Swedish legal literature, 
and it would seem useful to discuss them here. In Sweden, some older case law has 
given relevance to whose benefit the business is driven.930 This is rather obvious 
and merits no further comments. Torsten Sandström sees the possibility of holding 
the shareholders liable when they manipulate the factual circumstances behind a 
corporate transaction and when this manipulation causes the corporation the 
inability to meet its obligations.931 Although his opinion is limited to transactions, 
it is important to note that the manipulation of circumstances should enable 
extensions of liability.
In Swedish case law, the NJA 1982 s. 244 decision holds facts matching the 
allocation manipulation. The parent held all the liquid assets, whereas the subsidiary 
handled the payments. The subsidiary was entirely dependent on the parent 
as to whether it could pay the bills, and the court found that the subsidiary was 
929 Also, the assessment of closeness in the Asset Recovery Act gives emphasis to similar factors. For 
example, it remarks the right to the profit of another. Admittedly, there is no such right per se, but only 
in fact. The closeness section also mentions practicing business through another entity or establishing a 
foundation for the sole benefit of the corporation. I would dub these as earlier mentions of the symbiosis 
I have discussed here. See HE 102/1990 vp at 45.
930 NJA 1925 s. 652 and NJA 1928 s. 57. See also Svensson 2010 at 244–248.
931 Sandström 2015 at 6.
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systematically kept this way. The parent even transferred valuable assets from the 
subsidiary to itself. This, among other issues, was used to conclude that the subsidiary 
was not an independent corporation from the parent.
Some distinguish whether the corporation operates to serve the direct interests 
of the shareholders more than to create profits within the corporation.932 It 
would even seem plausible to claim that the corporate purpose of creating profit 
for the shareholders is not realized in these situations. If the corporations are in a 
symbiotic relationship, the supporting corporation operates to the benefit of the 
other corporation. Naturally, that other corporation can be the parent entity, 
but not necessarily. Even if the two corporations have the same shareholders, it is 
questionable whether the corporate purpose can legitimately be realized through 
another corporation as an intermediary, e.g., indirectly.
Analogous support for considering the benefit allocation is strong. When assessing 
tax avoidance, some emphasis is given to the benefit allocation.933 The attempt is to 
locate the entity in which the benefits materialize and tax that entity, even if said 
entity is not the one that should formally be taxed. The Act on Compensation for 
Environmental Damage also considers benefit allocation. The preparatory works for 
the act note that there may be situations in which environmental damage is caused 
within an activity that is practiced for the benefit of another. Then the other party, 
in reality but not formally, is the operator of the activity as intended by the act.934 
Enforcement Code 4:14 names the benefits received by the debtor as one of the 
objective factors hinting toward the arrangement being artificial. I would conclude 
that the allocation of benefits to an entity that does not carry the negative risk in the 
arrangement universally supports liability in the analogous doctrines. Even in the 
evaluation of the closeness of a corporation in an asset recovery context, significance 
is given to the one who reaps the benefits of the operation.935
In the Finnish legal literature, the separation of benefits and risks has also been 
thought of as significant. af Schultén sees the allocation of benefits as significant 
when piercing. If the subsidiary operates in its own name but the whole group or the 
parent benefit, the subsidiary is operating on the parent’s account. He goes as far as to 
suggest placing the burden of proof on the parent to show that the subsidiary is used 
in a loyal manner. This would apply to situations in which the subsidiary’s benefits 
are allocated to the parent, the negative risks remain with the subsidiary and the 
subsidiary is inadequately capitalized.936 The benefits are relatively easy to transfer, 
even though several restrictions do exist. Under- or overpriced contracts or dividend 
932 See Andersson 2014 at 1. See also Hellner 1964 at 166.
933 See Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 at 358–360.
934 HE 165/1992 at 26–27.
935 See Tuomisto 2012 at 24.
936 See af Schultén 1984 at 96 and 113.
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payments are old and known methods to this. Their interpretation is ambiguous, 
though, and using them to strip the corporation of assets adds yet another level of 
complexity to the piercing cases, thus reducing the probability of being caught. In 
case law, the allocation of benefits was considered in the decision of KKO 2017:94. 
In it, the appellate court allowed for piercing partly because the arrangement could 
be explained as reasonable only because one corporation received the benefits and 
the other carried the negative risks.
In the United States, the allocation of benefits does come up. Krendl and 
Krendl hold it as a necessary requirement for piercing. Otherwise, there 
would be a potential for suits against parties with only remote relationships 
with the corporate wrongdoer.937 In GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western 
Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014),938 the court stated that the manipulation 
of assets and liabilities between the member and company so as to concentrate 
the assets in the former and the liabilities in the latter can be suggestive of 
improper use of the LLC as well. It is also arguable that the unity of interests 
required by some piercing tests means that businesses were engaged in a joint 
effort to accomplish the same purpose.939
The purpose of the piercing doctrine remains unclear in the US. Thomas 
K. Cheng has suggested in his analysis that the purpose of the doctrine 
is to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of the creditors.940 This 
view is compatible with the benefit allocation argument presented here. 
Someone receives the benefits of a symbiotic operation, and this results in 
unjust enrichment. Asset stripping is one of the more common behaviors 
the courts use to fulfill the impropriety requirements of piercing decisions. 
Asset stripping means emptying the formally liable corporation of assets and 
allocating them in another entity’s or the shareholder’s possession.941 This, in 
part, would support the characterization as unjust enrichment. Regardless of 
the characterization, asset stripping seems to support piercing in both Finland 
and the US. 
In the decision UfR 1997 s. 1642,942 two companies had organized music 
festivals together. One operated ticket sales and the other operated beverage 
937 Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 24.
938 at 458. See also Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelly & Sons Company (2013) at 898 
stating that veil piercing requires the party claimed liable to have directly benefitted from the corporate 
arrangement. See also the older case, Pepper v. Litton (1939). In the literature, see Vandekerckhove 2007 at 
178 and Cheng 2011 at 36–37 and Sparkman 2016 at 375–379 and 398–399.
939 Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007) at 1067.
940 See Cheng 2010 at 500.
941 See Pepper v. Litton (1939). In the literature, see Vandekerckhove 2007 at 178 and Cheng 2011 at 
36–37 and Sparkman 2016 at 375–379 and 398–399.
942 For a similar case, see also NJA 1975 s. 45.
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and food sales. The ticket sales company was constantly short on cash, whereas 
the restaurant company had a steady cash flow. Cash was constantly transferred 
from the restaurant company to the ticket company to cover the festival’s 
expenses. Due to the hectic circumstances of a three-day festival, no accurate 
records of the lent sums were available. This lack of proof was interpreted 
in favor of the claimant, and veil piercing was awarded. Additionally, the 
restaurant company acquired the property of the now-bankrupt ticket sales 
company without compensating the goodwill value the property had due to 
their joint operations. The Danish Supreme Court found that the economic 
operations of the companies were combined to a meaningful degree, and the 
division of tasks allowed them to unequally distribute profits and negative 
risks. Both companies were held liable for the bankrupt ticket sale company’s 
debt to the tax bureau and customs. The allocation of benefits is therefore 
a worthy consideration in Denmark, though the decision remains rather 
unique.
In the UK, the courts have given significance to the economic integration 
of the corporations when placing liability. Thus, the effects of symbiosis 
to liability appears there also. Unfortunately, these decisions are not veil 
piercing decisions. On the contrary, the courts take extra care not to use veil 
piercing.943 That being said, the factor is not unheard of in veil piercing either. 
In older case law, the parent corporation treated its subsidiary’s profits as its 
own supported liability.944 However, in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991) 
the court found that the business of the corporation might have been run 
entirely to the practical benefit of the entity sought liable without exposing 
that entity to known tort liability. This was interpreted as an inherent right 
of the commercial actors according to English law, and it created no basis for 
liability.
The analysis thus far would suggest that operating at market value would reduce 
the chances of piercing.945 Deals with persons close to the corporation need to be 
made according to the at-market-value standard. The terms of the contract need to 
resemble those that would have been reasonable if the parties did not have a close 
relationship, although the close parties can safely give each other somewhat more 
favorable terms. This, in part, prevents abusing the close relationship to channel 
improperly large benefits from the corporation. Contracts that differ from the 
standard can be deemed unlawful distribution and the payments returned to the 
943 See Chandler v. Cape Plc. (2012) and Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc (2014). See also Mujih 
2018 at 394.
944 Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v. Birmingham Corporation (1939).
945 Similarly in the US, see Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986) at 285–287.
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corporation.946 It is entirely possible that only part of the benefits of the division result 
from the transfer of assets, whereas the rest result from the isolated negative risk, i.e., 
the chance of bankruptcy in the UfR (1997 s. 1642) case above. The deviation from 
market value could be interpreted to support the finding of reprehensible intent to 
avoid exposure of assets. If the price is set to reflect the success of the corporation 
holding the risk, there is nothing inherently wrong in it. However, if this is done in 
a way that allows the profits to be siphoned out of that corporation based solely on 
the contract, then it speaks to the existence of a reprehensible symbiotic relationship 
and supports piercing.947
6.5.  Commingling and Confusion
Commingling and confusion refer to situations in which the operations of the 
entities are intertwined and mixed with each other to the point that it is hard or 
impossible to determine who the actual operator is. Commingling means that the 
companies utilize the same resources interchangeably without formal agreements 
on their transfer from one to the other. It can also include situations where the same 
persons are employed in both corporations. Confusion, on the other hand, refers to 
how the entities interact with third parties. If the interaction creates an ambiguous 
image as to the real operator, confusion is present. These both support the finding of 
control and somewhat support deeming the conduct unacceptable.
The commingling of funds means that the funds of the controller and the 
corporation(s) in the arrangement are mixed. They are not kept separate as they 
should be. On the other hand, the funds can be kept separate, but they are used 
interchangeably without formal transfers. For example, the expenses of the parent 
are paid from the account of the subsidiary, or the subsidiary has no bank account 
of its own.948 A difficult line drawing could result from the common practice of 
centralized corporate group accounts. The answer should be looked for in the funds’ 
terms of use. If the funds are distributed arbitrarily without business reasons and 
to the detriment of the creditors, the use supports piercing. If the distribution is 
controlled and requires certain conditions to be fulfilled, the funds are hardly 
commingled, as there are clear rules for their use. Alternatively, the shareholder 
owner might withdraw large sums from the company whenever a personal need 
946 See Rasinaho 2016 at 214–216.
947 Similarly in the United States, see LoPucki 1998 at 153–154 and Collet v. American National Stores, 
Inc. (1986) at 281 and 285–286.
948 It should be noted that the existence of separate accounting, bank accounts and assets should not 
in itself preclude piercing and does not mean that there is no commingling. The accounts can be used 
interchangeably and the asset location manipulated. See KKO 2018:20 and GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. 
Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014) at 466–469.
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arises.949 As a result, an examination is unable to determine which funds belong to 
which entity, as they have shown a capability of using them interchangeably. This 
hints that the corporation has not had a legitimate business purpose separate from 
its controller or other corporations used in the arrangement. This supports piercing 
the veil.950
This sort of commingling of finances is a common factor in piercing cases. 
The earlier-mentioned Danish decision UfR 1997 s. 1642 is a well-known 
precedent in Denmark. Sweden has its own similar case,951 and commingling 
of finances is one of the most often-cited factors in piercing decisions in the 
United States.952 One court even states that if two entities with common 
ownership failed to follow legal formalities when contracting with each other, 
it would be tantamount to declaring that they are indeed one and the same.953 
Moving money in between the companies and even shareholders without 
formal contracting seems to favor piercing in many a jurisdiction. It should 
be noted that there are specific norms to combat these sorts of transactions, 
although they need not necessarily exclude piercing.
In the US, proof of commingling of funds or other assets may be used to 
illustrate the domination of the entity or the controlled entities’ status as an 
alter ego.954 This factor has been emphasized by the courts since the early days 
of the doctrine.955 It may also be considered under the observance of corporate 
formalities, as there must be records on the use of corporate assets.956 Even 
personal guarantees have sometimes been cited in support of veil piercing.957 
Guarantees should usually speak against piercing and not in support of it.958 
949 Strictly with veil piercing in mind, the shareholder-owner should arrange for a regular salary or a 
dividend instead in order to avoid claims of commingling. This argument was presented in regard to the 
US system by Bainbridge (2000 at 46), and I foresee no reason why it should not apply in Finland also.
950 See Huttunen 1963 at 156. He sees no reason to adopt commingling as a justification for piercing 
when the commingling has benefitted the corporation at the expense of the shareholder. Huttunen does 
recognize the situation in which the shareholder benefits at the expense of the corporation, though he 
remains silent on the subject.
951 NJA 1975 s. 45
952 Oh 2010 132–139 and Thompson 1991.
953 Trustees of Village of Arden v. Unity Construction Co. (2000) at 3, NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC 
Commc’n, LLC. (2008). See also Sparkman 2016 at 379–381.
954 Huss 2001 at 115 and Sparkman 2016 at 417–419. See also American Trading & Pro. Corp. v. 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc. (1970).
955 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. (1926), noting that wages of employees such as motormen and conduc-
tors were paid by the subsidiary itself. See also State v. Swift & Co. (1945) and Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. 
v. Oppenstein (1964).
956 See for example, Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp. (1974) at 732–733, Miles v. CEC 
Homes, Inc. (1988) at 1024–1025, and Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson (2007) at 270–271.
957 See, for example, Hamilton – Booth 2006 at 402.
958 Cheng 2010 at 558.
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However, they can be part of the pattern that shows a systematic choice of 
which creditors receive payment in a symbiotic corporate arrangement.
Even in the piercing-hostile United Kingdom, concealing the facts in an 
attempt to obstruct, obfuscate and deceive the court in its decision-making has 
allowed the courts to make certain assumptions in support of liability, albeit 
this possibility has more to do with interpreting the lack of evidence against 
the party who could easily have provided it.959 In Prest v. Petrodel Resources 
Ltd (2013), the defendant had withdrawn funds from the corporations he 
did not even formally own for personal expenses without any formalities. He 
treated the funds like he owned them. The Supreme Court did not address 
these factors in relation to piercing, though.
Continuing with the UK, commingling is cited in a few decisions. In 
Wallensteiner v. Moir (1974),960 Dr. Wallensteiner had several legal entities 
under his control. He made circular check arrangements through them and 
used their assets interchangeably and without reference to anyone. Combined 
with absolute control over the entities, this suggested that Dr. Wallensteiner 
should be held liable. Only one of the judges was ready to pierce, though, and 
liability was eventually placed on the basis of breach of directorial duties.
Commingling of employees means that the corporations involved in business share 
the employees. Again, examined in isolation, there is nothing wrongful about this. 
As part of the overall examination, though, it can be used as part of the pattern to 
achieve some unacceptable result.
When the employees are commingled, the results of work are assigned arbitrarily 
between the corporations in the arrangement. Between the corporations, there are 
no clear contracts or even orders specifying who the employees are working for at 
a given time. They are moved around informally and according to the will of the 
controller. Yet the work they do or where they work does not necessarily change. 
Leppänen argues that this sort of commingling supports finding the separateness of 
the corporations to be artificial, hinting that they do, in fact, form a single economic 
whole.961 I would agree, though I need to update this view to match the piercing test 
adopted in this work. The changes are rather simple, though, as I would claim that 
the commingling instead hints that there is no genuine business purpose behind the 
separation of the operation into several entities.
959 See Prest v. Petrodel Resources Limited at 4, 15 and 44 and British Railways Board v. Herrington 
(1972) at 930–931. Similar considerations were expressed in the UfR 1997 pg. 1642 decision also, and 
the unclear factors should be interpreted against the party responsible for maintaining clarity.
960 The veil piercing considerations of the judgment are on pages 1013 and 1032.
961 See Leppänen 1991 at 297–303, Appellate Court of Turku 28.11.1986 no. 974 and Appellate 
Court of Turku 8.12.1989 no. 1121. See also KM 1992:32 at 372.
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It could be argued, though, that the commingling of employees has significance 
as a criterion of its own, especially when piercing in labor-related situations—for 
example, pay security and employer duties. This is due to the conflict of norms and 
abuse approach to piercing I have adopted in this work. The nature of the abused 
norm or conflicting norms guide the overall assessment to emphasize facts related to 
the normal application of the norm. In employee relations, it is significant how the 
employees’ work is attributed between corporations, and thus, it would be significant 
when piercing in an employment-related situation. In non-employment related 
situations, the commingling of employees could be cited in support of artificiality, 
too, but its impact is undoubtedly lesser.
Similar considerations have also appeared in Sweden. In NJA 1992 s. 375, 
the two corporations had a contract of co-operation. It allowed one of the 
corporations to utilize the staff, buildings and other material of the other. 
The staff functions were managed by one corporation in a group in the case 
NJA 1982 s. 244, though the court did not emphasize this fact in its liability 
decision.
An example would be in order here. In the case of the Appellate Court of Turku 
8.12.1989 no. 1121, three companies were declared bankrupt, and all were deemed 
liable for unpaid wages. One of the companies denied liability since it had not 
employed anyone. The court still held it liable. The reasoning was that the employees 
had worked to the benefit of all the companies, and it was not clearly possible to 
indicate where the profits had materialized. In addition, all the corporations’ offices 
were at the same place and they had the same owners and the same controller. 
The business and employment relationships in the case were so unclear that no 
formally responsible corporation could be designated.962 The court deemed that the 
corporations formed a single whole and held all three liable.
Confusion as to the real operator entails situations where it is ambiguous who is 
really making the actions, who is the real operator. The expressions given to third 
parties are meaningful. The actor can be held liable if they have acted in a manner 
that allows the other party to assume that they are actually a party to the contract.963 
If the corporate actions to the outside seem like the actions of another, there 
is confusion. Significance is given to the impressions of the targeted audience of 
the actions.964 Confusion can have an effect in two ways: It can create legitimate 
expectations toward the given appearance and, as a consequence, can lead to liability 
962 See Leppänen 1991 at 298.
963 See af Schultén 1984 at 88 and Leppänen 1991 at 280.
964 See KKO 1958 II 43, KKO 1991:186 and KKO 2015:17. The audience was a creditor, the employ-
ees and the customers, respectively.
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on the basis of general principles of private law. On the other hand, it can support 
finding the artificiality and control requirements of the veil piercing test, even if the 
confusion itself is not enough to incur liability.
An example case is in order, I think. Unfortunately, this has not appeared to 
be too significant in piercing case law. In the case KKO 1958 II 43, the CEO and 
board member of Länsi-Lapin Radio Oy had started a business called Länsi-Lapin 
Radio in another town. The corporation had created the impression that it owned 
the business using various public methods. Trusting this impression, a creditor 
had supplied items for the business. The creditor was entitled to collect from the 
corporation.965 Although the liability was due to legitimate expectations and not 
piercing, some guidelines can be derived from it. The corporation had created an 
impression to the public that it was the owner. From the outside, it had seemed as if 
the corporation was involved in the business. It had actively sought to misguide its 
contractual partner, who then developed legitimate expectations. With its actions, 
the corporation created the impression that it was liable for the obligations, and the 
creditor was allowed to trust the impression.966
A similar decision has appeared in Sweden also. In NJA 1982 s. 244, the 
creditors were allowed to trust the impressions created through payment 
patterns and financial reporting. The parent company also exercised intrusive 
control over the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary that the court deemed 
its operations as merged. Their operations seemed inseparable to outside 
parties, and the parent’s payment instructions created the impression that 
the parent was responsible for the payments. The creditors were allowed to 
trust this impression. Arguably, some of the circumstances that created this 
impression would not suffice anymore, as concentrating fiscal functions on 
one corporation in a corporate group has become a common practice.
Support could be drawn from the United States, where commingling and 
confusion are well established, albeit controversial, factors in veil piercing.967 
In the case Zaist v. Olson (1967), a person named Olson owned East Haven 
965 For a comprehensive description of the case KKO 1958 II 43, see Telaranta 1960 at 325 footnote 
147. He interprets the case as principal’s liability for legitimate expectations created by a representative.
Similarly in Sweden, see NJA 1928 s. 57 and Svensson 2010 at 246.
966 Kaisanlahti arrives at the same conclusion about the case. He goes on to emphasize how active Län-
si-Lapin Radio Oy had been in creating the public impression. He also brings forth the economic view 
that the corporation had been able to acquire the contract performance for too cheap a price due to 
misrepresentation. Thus, the efficiency argument supported holding Länsi-Lapin Radio Oy liable. Kai-
sanlahti 1996 at 241–242.
967 See, for example, Holland v. Joy Candy Manufacturing Corp. (1957), Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aero-
nautical Corporation (1963) at 161, American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 
Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, (1991) and Birbara v. Locke (1996) at 1239. In the literature see, 
Georgakopolous 2007 and those cited there.
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Inc. and later founded three other corporations. All of them operated from 
the same address, had mostly the same shareholders and none of them 
held the mandatory general meetings. The corporations were managing a 
shopping mall construction project. All the construction work benefitted the 
owner of the land. At all times, one of the corporations held the title to the 
land, but Olson constantly changed the holder. Those contracting with the 
corporations could not be aware of which held the land. All the construction 
work was contracted in the name of East Haven, but that corporation never 
held the land. The court pierced the veil and held Olson and one of his 
corporations liable for the obligations of East Haven.
The Turku Appellate Court case I described when discussing the 
commingling of employees and the Zaist v. Olson (1967) case are good 
examples of the active controller of the corporate arrangement attempting 
to create an extremely confusing situation in which no one could be entirely 
certain who held what assets and who was liable for which obligations.968 The 
Turku Appellate Court decision found it impossible to identify the real liable 
party, whereas in the Zaist v. Olson case, the liable party was clear, but the 
owner of the assets was somewhat hidden.
Commingling has come up in the UK also. In Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne 
(1933), the company had no physical premise and was only located in a 
garage in Horne’s home, and it used almost the same letterheads that Horne 
had used before. Also, the company had only two directors and shareholders: 
Horne’s wife and his former colleague. The Court pierced the veil citing these 
factors among others. The case is old and hardly reflects the current view on 
formalities. It was introduced here to demonstrate that commingling factors 
are not unheard of in the UK. Similar factors were cited in support of a 
piercing claim in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991), but the court eventually 
gave higher significance to the motives behind the arrangement. The motive 
was to establish a corporation with a genuine business run by a third party. 
Although the initial impulse behind transferring such business interest to a 
genuine third party came from the certain future tort claim directed against 
the parent.
The same sort of argumentation can be seen in the KKO 2015:17 decision. 
Arctecho’s business was practiced on Verkkokauppa’s web page without separating 
it from Verkkokauppa’s own business. The business targeted Finnish consumers 
exclusively, and after purchase, confirmation e-mails were sent by an employee of 
Verkkokauppa. Arctecho was not even mentioned in the e-mail. From the customers’ 
968 See also Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source (1991) and Bernadin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp. 
(1975).
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perspective, it seemed as if the business was, in fact, Verkkokauppa’s.969 There was a 
commingling of employees and confusion as to the operator. These factors helped 
the Supreme Court find that the whole Arctecho endeavor had been made for the 
improper purpose of neglecting the remunerations.
The same that was said of how similar control structure applies to commingling 
and confusion also. The wordings of the analogous doctrines are general enough to 
allow for the examination of commingling and confusion. It could be included in 
all the analogous doctrines’ applications’, though none of them explicitly assert it 
as significant. Case law proves the significance of commingling and confusion, as 
analogous support is hazy. Perhaps piercing case law can provide some new tools for 
the analogous doctrines in this regard.
6.6.  Artificial Division of an Existing Business
I have discussed artificiality in relation to veil piercing in V.4.2. of this work. 
Artificiality in legislation usually refers to the disparity of the legal form and the 
economic reality. Enforcement Code 4:14 and the tax avoidance provision both 
utilize this view. Similar condemnation can also be found with environmental 
liability.970 These doctrines examine the standard and accepted use of the given 
legal instruments and assess whether their use in the case matches these standards. 
With the environmental damage liability, some support was found for the view that 
piercing should be accepted more readily when the damage is caused by operations 
that used to lie with the benefitting entity. With the artificial division of an existing 
business, I refer to situations in which the business was originally practiced in one 
entity and later a part of it; holding an especially high risk for costs was transferred to a 
separate entity without the reality of the operation changing in any way. In this work, 
the artificial division of business refers to these situations exclusively. It can be used to 
show the reprehensible nature of the arrangement. Obviously, the artificial division 
of an existing business also fulfills the artificiality requirement. Any arrangement 
where the business is separated into multiple entities from the beginning might also 
be artificial, but not artificial division of business as understood here.
The artificial division of business concerns especially corporate groups and 
intercorporate relationships. It means situations in which the business conducted 
in one corporation is divided so that part of it is transferred to another corporation, 
either a new one founded for this purpose or to an existing one if it allows for the 
evasion of negative risk. This is usually a perfectly normal business action. What 
969 See KKO 2015:17 at 2–4 and 32.
970 See HE 165/1992 at 26–27, where the stance against the evasion of liability includes both the 
transfers of the business and artificial isolation arrangements.
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makes it artificial is the lack of legitimate business purpose behind the division. 
The division cannot be reasonably explained with reasons other than avoiding an 
obligation or isolation of negative risks. The corporate actors’ information is what 
separates the artificial division of an existing business from setting up the division 
from the beginning. Over the course of the business, some of its parts are found to be 
more prone to negative risk than others. The existing knowledge of the negative risks 
and potential liabilities makes dividing an existing business into separate entities 
more easily reprehensible.971 The damage is simply more easily predictable, making 
it more plausible that the purpose of the division was inappropriate. No assumption 
should be made, though. The fact that operations used to lie with the other entity 
does support the finding of reprehensibility, but the claimant still needs to show 
reprehensibility, i.e., with intent to harm. Division alone is not enough to pierce 
the veil, even when there are no acceptable economic reasons behind it.972 Artificial 
division is but a situation of such a nature that it easily damages creditors. As such, 
the controller is, or at least should be, aware of this probable consequence.
Both of the recent major veil piercing cases involved this sort of situation. In 
KKO 2015:17, the subsidiary was deemed to operate a part of the parent’s existing 
core business.973 The especially negative risk-prone operations were operated by 
the subsidiary. In KKO 2017:94, the existing business operation was divided into 
the negative risk–bearing and benefit-bearing entities, while the operation itself 
remained as it was. The changes were only formal. The fact that an existing operation 
was divided was not central in these decisions, though, but it was one factor in 
the total assessment of the facts of the cases. In connection to this factor, both 
decisions emphasized the fact that the supporting corporation’s operations were 
tightly connected to the other corporation, and they were operated in symbiosis. 
Additionally, in KKO 2017:94, there was no evidence that the operations were 
meant to be developed into a sustainable and independent business.
To my knowledge, this criterion is a new construction and does not appear 
in the veil piercing literature. In case law, situations matching this do exist, 
however. For example, in Sweden, the earliest piercing case was about a 
tailoring business that was first practiced in the entrepreneur’s own name and 
then transferred to an entity without changes to the business itself.974 
This differs from the United States, where the artificial division of business 
resembles what is more commonly known as a single economic unit. The 
971 Cf. the UK doctrine laid out in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991).
972 See also Leppänen 1991 at 277. Although holding only one corporation liable when it is, in fact, 
part of a larger economic whole is dubious toward the rights of the creditors.
973 The relevance of the separate entities serving the business purposes of their controller was also rec-
ognized in KKO 1994:136.
974 See NJA 1935 at 81.
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term in the legal literature in the US refers to operations where one single 
business is unnecessarily and abusively operated under several entities.975 The 
problem with this view is discerning legitimate intercorporate co-operation 
from artificial division. It basically needs a plethora of these other criteria 
before it can even be used to support piercing the veil, making it more of a 
veil piercing test than a supporting factor. The Finnish version itself is capable 
of contributing something meaningful to the piercing assessment.
Some discussion also revolves around the enterprise liability theory.976 
According to the theory, liability should be placed on the entire business, 
regardless of how many separate entities it holds. Separate entities are 
disregarded when, in reality, they act under a unified interest. The separate 
entities are viewed only as agents of that interest. The theory is rarely seen in 
case law, but it is not unheard of.977 Often, enterprise liability theory and veil 
piercing could be used interchangeably.978
In the UK, the timing of the incurrence of the legal obligations and the use 
of corporate structure to avoid them is crucial.979 Veil piercing is applicable 
only when the corporate structure avoiding the obligation is created after the 
legal obligation already exists. This leads to a very different analysis than in 
Finland and the US. Dividing an existing business to evade future liabilities 
is verified as legitimate, no matter how probable or even how certain those 
liabilities are to arise.980 However, if the division would exhaust an existing 
claim or an obligation, it can be targeted with piercing. It remains debatable 
as to what an existing obligation is. In Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991), 
the parent shut down and transferred the operations of the liable subsidiary 
after a default judgment was given. The court determined the foundation of 
the first subsidiary as the relevant point where the existing liabilities were 
checked. The parent was not held liable, as the default judgment had not 
existed at that time. 
Also, Yukong v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. (1998) demonstrates a flaw in 
the evasion reasoning. If the operations are transferred to a company that exists 
prior to the transfer, the reference point should not be the incorporation; it 
should be modified from the time of incorporation to the time a corporate 
975 See Hamilton – Booth 2006 at 39–42, Bainbridge 2000 at 6. See also Walkovszky v. Carlton (18 
NY2d 414 (1966 ) Court of Appeals of New York), Holland v. Joy Candy Manufacturing Corp. (1957), 
Ampex Corp. v. Office Electronics, Inc. and Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc. (1958).
976 See Berle 1947 and Oh 2011 at 132.
977 For example, Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc. (1958). See also Mull v. Colt Co. 
(1959).
978 Similarly, Bainbridge 2000 at 63.
979 See Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd. and Cheng 2011 at 37.
980 See Adams v. Cape Industries Plc (1991).
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entity is utilized.981 This problem seems to disappear with the Prest decision, 
as it words the evasion: “[A] company is interposed so that the separate legal 
personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement.”982 
The wording interposed supports the inclusion of already existing corporations 
if using one allows for the evasion. The same argument should hold true in the 
Finnish system, though it has not been contested in Finland.
Yet another problem with the UK approach is determining whether a 
claim exists. Is a judgment required? Is a claim enough, or should we look 
at when the damage occurred? Certainty and preventing strategic behavior 
would dictate that the event that gives rise to the liability is used to determine 
whether liability exists provided that the company knows or should have 
known that the event might expose it to liability.983 This criterion of knowing 
is utilizable in Finland also. This is not an accepted view in the UK, though. 
In Adams, the parent was aware of the potential liabilities before setting up 
the second subsidiary, as it had previously settled such claims. Yet the veil was 
not pierced. In Finland, this should have heavily favored piercing.
In Sweden, some similar ideas exist within the dependence of a corporation 
criterion. To recap, this meant that the corporate operation is indistinguishable 
from the shareholders’ own operation and thus fulfills the shareholders’ interests 
directly rather than through generating profit within the corporation.984 
Dependence is further divided into the dependence of management and 
dependence of operations.985 Moberg understood this to mean that the 
corporation’s business purpose is not independent of the shareholders’.986 One 
can easily spot the similarities with the Finnish KKO 2015:17 decision, in 
which the Supreme Court argued that the parent corporation practiced one 
core part of its business through the subsidiary. The Swedish counterpart does 
not address whether that part was derived from existing business, though. 
Similar to my interpretation of the artificial division of business, the Swedish 
legal literature seems prone to interpret the dependence of the corporation as 
an indicator when assessing whether the corporate use is unfair or abusive.987 
This sort of finding would support holding the arrangement as reprehensible.
981 Cheng 2011 at 39.
982 Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd. at 28 and 35.
983 See Cheng 2011 at 41.
984 See Hellner 1964 at 166, SOU 1987:59 at 132, Moberg 1998 at 76. For a critical view see, Nerep 
2015 at 28–29.  
985 See Nerep 2003 at 23–26 for a good description on the concept.
986 Moberg 1998 at 76–77.
987 See SOU 1987:59 at 132. Cf. Nerep 2015 at 28–29. Nerep rejects the use of dependence as an 
indicator of unfairness. If viewed in isolation, this is no doubt true. However, if the dependence is part 
of a systematic pattern of active design to avoid liability, then, in my opinion, it is meaningful in piercing 
assessment.
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There is weak support in Swedish case law. In NJA 1975 s. 45, liability was 
established because the formal judicial characterization of the arrangement 
changed while the reality of the operation remained the same. The case was 
about a commission agreement between two corporations, where one was to 
run the operation in its own name for the benefit of the other. This practice 
included the benefitting corporation taking full responsibility for all the 
debts of the operation. This arrangement was desirable because of tax benefits. 
The corporations in the case had this agreement terminated and made a new 
contract stating that both were now operating independently. In reality, 
however, the operations did not change. At the same time, the benefitting 
corporation was no longer liable for the debts of the operation. This allowed 
the Supreme Court of Sweden to hold the benefitting corporation liable for 
some of the debts. This decision somewhat resembles the artificial division 
criteria I am discussing here. An existing operation is changed in judicial form, 
but no changes or only minor changes appear in the actual operation. Changes 
in judicial form can be the division of business functions into other entities or 
contractual re-characterization of a dependent entity as self-standing.
Artificial division could be used as a discerning factor when all the corporations 
practice some business. If the business practiced by the liable corporation has been 
transferred from the original corporation and the liable corporation provides services 
exclusively for the original corporation, the situation is no doubt artificial.988 Any 
deviation from exclusivity makes the assessment harder, though; reprehensibility 
still needs to be determined from other factors. Finding artificial division negates 
the legitimate business purpose argument in these situations.
Isolating the part of the business at especially high risk for costs and liabilities 
into a separate entity is economically beneficial to the business, but this isolation 
of negative risk might not be acceptable, even though it is economically sound. An 
acceptable economic purpose in these situations refers to reasons other than limited 
liability protection. No doubt, attaining the effects of the abused provision of law 
cannot serve to legitimize the arrangement.989 Even if the division can be reasonably 
explained only by the limitation of liability, it is still valid and acceptable as long as 
the controller acts in good faith and with loyalty toward creditors and third parties. 
The division is artificial then, but it is not improper; some other factor must be used 
to show the impropriety.
988 As was the situation in KKO 2017:94.
989 As I have discussed in V.4.2. of this work. Similarly in tax avoidance. See See KHO 2014:66 and 
Myrsky – Räbinä 2015 s. 351. See also Tikka 1972 at 217, who is of the opinion that the tax avoidance 
norms mainly cover cases where no purpose other than paying less tax can be shown.
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The controller does not necessarily keep the original business corporation active. 
In so-called chaining,990 a person uses a corporation to conduct business, invests 
the profits to the business or channels them to personal use amassing debt to the 
corporation. When further amassing becomes overly difficult, the controller sells 
the business to another corporation under their control while leaving the liabilities 
to the old corporation. The operation is continued in this fashion, and the business is 
moved from one corporation to another. The business in its entirety should be liable 
for the damage caused, meaning all the corporations that once held the business 
should be jointly liable for the damage.
The legal literature in the United States refers to this phenomenon as 
“mere continuation.”991 The successor company can be held liable for the 
predecessor’s obligations if the corporations are deemed essentially the 
same.992 Although it could be argued in independent doctrine, it is utilizable 
within the piercing doctrine, as shown in the example below. The courts 
can hold either the new corporation or the shareholder/controller liable 
for the obligations of the old corporation. In the case K.C. Roofing Center 
v. On Top Roofing, Inc. (1991), one person operated a roofing business. He 
operated under different corporate names, amassing debt from suppliers and 
paying large sums to himself and his wife as salaries and rent. After the first 
corporation, he founded four more, having a total of five companies within 
five years, all of which were in operation for a year. Through the entirety 
of the operation, the business was conducted publicly under the name On 
Top Roofing, regardless of the name of the corporation that was officially 
responsible. When questioned, the shareholder said he founded a new 
corporation every time he felt the business needed a fresh start: “it is a very 
competitive business.” The court utilized the “instrumentality” veil piercing 
test as laid out in Missouri993 and established the unjust act part of the test by 
deeming the subsequent corporations as mere continuation.
The United Kingdom has taken a strange approach to mere continuation 
situations. They have prohibited using the same or similar name(s) as a 
company that has gone into insolvent liquidation within five years of the 
liquidation. Additionally, the use of such a name is only prohibited for 
those formally involved in the liquidated business as a director or shadow 
director. Anyone violating this could face personal liability for the company’s 
990 About chaining corporations and veil piercing, see Laine 2011.
991 See Hamilton – Booth 2006 at 39. See also Axtmann v. Chillemi (2007).
992 See California Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC (2007) at 1063–1065.
993 Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986) at 284–287.
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obligations.994 This no doubt lessens misleading situations in which the legal 
entity conducting the business is changed but the name is not. This does not 
prevent mere continuation arrangements, but makes them more arduous and 
lessens the incentives to utilize these arrangements as they are unable to use 
the goodwill of the original company. Still, the solution reflects the formal 
approach to company law in the UK. Instead of forbidding the arrangement 
itself, they prohibit one objectively discernible key factor in it. This is no doubt 
a safe choice regarding predictability and legal certainty, though reliance on 
the name makes it a bit toothless and easy to circumvent.
6.7.  Neglecting Corporate Formalities
Neglecting corporate formalities is understood here as conduct in which the 
controller uses the corporation without conforming to the formalities required 
by such use. This includes neglecting general meetings, keeping the minutes, 
bookkeeping, making written decisions and contracts and even self-contracting 
between the controller and the corporation while the controller represents it. Not 
too much weight should be given to these factors. At best, they can be used to 
support claims that the controller could act within the corporation without having 
to consider the interests of others. This capability, in turn, speaks to the existence of 
control over the corporation.995 It is in how this capacity is utilized that can show 
reprehensibility.
On the other hand, in neglecting hints of the subjective intentions of the 
controller,996 combined with commingling and confusion, one can derive that the 
controller has not considered the corporation as a separate entity. Finnish case law 
places no emphasis on this, but in the United States, some courts have pierced the 
veil due to the shareholder not treating the corporation as separate. This is done by 
utilizing the concept of estoppel.997
The inexistence of business purpose, however, cannot be derived from neglecting 
the formalities. A dependent corporation can just as well have an operating business. 
Whereas it is true that attempting to abuse the corporate form for one’s own benefit 
has no incentive to abide by corporate formalities, it is not sufficient to rule out 
other plausible explanations. One must also keep in mind the objective of said 
994 Insolvency Act 1986 Sections 2016–217.
995 Similarly in the US, see Tzovolos v. Wiseman (2007) at 839–841 and Sparkman 2016 at 387–392, 
especially at 388.
996 See KKO 2005:98 and KKO 2011:49. Open and honest co-operation with the authorities creates 
an assumption of the proper nature of the arrangement. Also Linna – Leppänen 2015 at 153 and Marttila 
2006 at 777.
997 See Powell 1931 at 6§.
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formalities.998 Most serve the informational needs of those with interests in the 
corporation, and neglecting them results in the non-enforcement of transactions or 
some other determined sanction. If some formality-serving creditor protection is 
neglected, this could support veil piercing.999 As such, neglecting formalities could 
help show some elements of misrepresentation or intent to mislead. Also, Company 
Act Chapter 5, Section 1 does allow the shareholders to skip some formalities when 
the decision is unanimous. Support for veil piercing should not be derived from using 
the possibility to shortcut those formalities. Neglecting some mandatory formalities 
could instead support veil piercing, though mostly with regard to control.
This issue about the purpose behind these formalities has been addressed in KKO 
2015:81. The case was about consumer credit and collection. The credit agency and 
the collection agency both operated without a permit, and the claimant argued that 
this made their operation violate acceptable practices, which in turn would make the 
credit agreement void. The formality here is the permit required by the operation. 
The Supreme Court looked into the permit and deduced that it was for purposes 
other than regulating the relationship between the debtor and the creditor. Thus, 
neglecting the formal requirements did not make the credit agreement void. The 
decision aligns with the argumentation here, and its principle can be extended to 
piercing cases with little effort.
In the United States, the rise of LLCs—limited liability companies—has 
shifted much of the small businesses out of the corporate form. Compared to 
the corporation, these limited liability companies offer much more freedom 
to organize the management of the company. There are few mandatory 
formalities. The existence of this freedom meant that neglecting corporate 
formalities should be given less meaning when piercing an LLC veil, whereas 
in a corporate setting, the formalities are stricter and should have a bigger role 
in piercing.1000 Thus, we arrive at a similar interpretation as in Finland.
Neglecting formalities offers flimsy support at best, although the KKO 2018:20 
decision held that arranging the management, accounting and auditing in an 
appropriate manner and separately in the corporations involved speaks against 
piercing. I take it that these factors were especially significant in that particular case, 
as it was about accounting fraud, which itself sanctions following these formalities, 
and piercing was only one issue in the case. Additionally, these factors were not 
998 Similarly in the United States, see Cheng 2010 at 553, who manages to express this idea in an ex-
cellent example: “If the entire body of shareholders decides to siphon off corporate assets for their own 
personal benefits, a requirement that the removal of assets be approved by a shareholder vote will not 
protect the creditors.”
999 Cheng 2010 at 553.
1000 GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (2014), especially at 459–469.
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neglecting formalities but were more about commingling and confusion. Thus, 
Finnish case law around veil piercing has not placed much, if any, significance on 
this factor. This is undoubtedly for the best, as a look into the confusing uncertainty 
around the subject in the United States shows an alarming example:
In the United States, neglecting corporate formalities is one of the most often 
cited considerations in veil piercing, although not that often in decisions where 
piercing was accepted.1001 This is strange considering the weak connection this 
criterion has with the damage.1002 At most, neglecting corporate formalities 
should be viewed as a sign of indifference, as there is no causal link between 
the damage and the neglecting of formalities; if you play fast and loose with 
formalities, maybe the court will think you play fast and loose with your bills 
also.1003 On the other hand, Cheng characterizes neglecting formalities as a 
form of misrepresentation—a failure to convey to the counterparty that it is 
making a transaction with a corporation.1004 Another critique of the doctrine 
comes from the apparent disproportion of the consequences compared to the 
neglect. Personal liability via piercing can be devastating, whereas neglecting 
a few formalities is hardly that harmful.1005 Even if the formalities were 
observed, the companies likely could do the same actions, leading to creditor 
damage.1006 Still, some courts view neglecting formalities as evidence of not 
treating the corporation as separate, and this would deny them limited liability 
protection. For example, in the Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co. 
(1979), the court declares “[s]ince defendant did not treat the corporation 
as a separate legal entity, he should not be entitled to its protection against 
personal liability.”1007 This view was utilized in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. 
W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. (1976). In the decision, the fact that shareholders 
and officers other than the alleged controller did not receive salary, dividends 
or fees from the company supported piercing. The lack of remunerations was 
used to show that they were nothing but figureheads. The controller instead 
withdrew funds from an undercapitalized business to the exact amounts that 
could be withdrawn from the company. The company was not treated as a 
separate entity but rather for the controller’s personal benefit.1008 Courts have 
1001 See Thompson 1991 at 1063 and Oh 2010 at 133.
1002 For an extensive discussion on this connection, see Cheng 2010 at 551–555. See also Gelb 1982 at 
7–8, Matheson – Eby 2000 at 174–176, Huss 2001 at 113, Marcantel 2011 at 225, Macey – Mitts 2014 at 
109 and Sparkman 2016 at 423–429.
1003 Bainbridge 2000 at 43. Similarly, Millon 2007 at 25.
1004 Cheng 2010 at 519.
1005 See Millon 2007 at 25.
1006 Barlow v. Budge (1941) at 443.
1007 At 513.
1008 See also Gelb 1982 at 8.
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held that neglect alone is not enough to pierce the veil.1009 Although the court 
did not explain why this mattered, I argue that this factor somehow hinted 
toward the controller not treating the corporation as a separate entity.
Between states, there are differing court opinions as to the weight of this 
criterion.1010 Instead, if neglecting formalities is to support piercing at all, 
the formalities not intended solely for the protection of shareholders should 
be excluded from the piercing assessment.1011 In contrast, some courts have 
refused piercing when there has been severe neglect of the formalities.1012
It would be an understatement to say that the importance of neglecting 
formalities in veil piercing assessment is confusing and unclear. As a precaution, 
some states have directly commented on the issue in legislation. California 
has directly precluded neglecting meetings as a basis for member liability in 
limited liability entities.1013 Texas addressed the issue directly in its corporate 
statute that shareholders or others have no liability for any obligation of the 
corporation on the basis of several named veil piercing tests or due to the failure 
of the corporation to observe any corporate formality.1014 These opinions in 
the literature, as well as the court decisions, seem to allocate unnecessarily 
large meaning and effect to neglecting formalities. Using neglect to show 
intent would seem more fruitful than examining the causal link between the 
damage and neglect. Veil piercing is not the doctrine to combat neglecting 
the formalities. Instead, it targets abusive use of a corporation, the existence 
of which the neglect speaks of, albeit indirectly and only weakly. Neglecting 
formalities has also been used to show control over the corporation.1015
The issue is significantly less discussed in the other jurisdictions. In 
England, some mentions of neglected formalities appear in case law.1016 Their 
significance is not explicit, though, as they relate to the ambiguous façade 
considerations. In Sweden, I have found no analysis on this issue.
1009 Soloman v. Western Hills Development Company (1981) at 263–264.
1010 For example, Consumer’s Co-op. of Walworth Co. v. Olsen (1988) states that neglecting formalities 
should not automatically lead to piercing. In Nevada, neglecting the formalities would not support a 
veil-piercing claim without evidence that the plaintiff had been harmed by these failures. See Polaris Indus. 
Corp. v. Kaplan (1987) at 877. In Georgia, failure to follow formalities is excluded as grounds for personal 
liability. See Insituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC (2013).
1011 Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat (1999).
1012 Zubik v. Zubik (1967) at 271 and Barlow v. Budge (1942).
1013 California Corporate Code § 1710(b). See also Huss 2001 at 118, making the connection between 
corporate veil piercing and limited liability entities in this regard.
1014 Texas Business Corporation Act 2.21. This was adopted in 1989 after the questionable Castleberry v. 
Branscum decision where liability was based on its inequitable result alone. See also Oh 2010 at 121–123, 
Sparkman 2016 at 424–426 and Peterson 2017 at 91–93.
1015 United States v. WRW Corp. (1993) at 28.
1016 See, for example, the facts in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v. Horne (1933) and Adams v. Cape Industries Plc 
(1991). See also Kershaw 2009 at 74–76.
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One must remember Company Act 5:1, which allows the shareholders to neglect 
the general meeting and make a unanimous decision. Especially in wholly-owned 
companies, this procedure is surely in common use. Still, the provision requires 
the decision to be written and signed, and the decisions are only made public to 
the shareholders. To neglect making a written decision can thus damage only the 
shareholders and should not support veil piercing. Keeping the minutes and holding 
a general meeting are provisions protecting the shareholders and their information 
gain, and neglecting them should not support veil piercing.
Self-contracting could be understood as the neglect of required corporate 
formalities and refers to situations in which the controller acts as the representative 
of the corporation and makes a contract with herself.1017 These actions are heavily 
restricted. First, the controller is disqualified to make such a contract as the 
representative of the company. The shareholders can make the contract decision, 
though, since they can take on matters that belong to the management by default. 
Shareholders can make a decision about self-contracting deals, and even a disqualified 
shareholder can take part in the procedure if all the shareholders are disqualified. In 
a wholly-owned corporation, self-dealing is possible. Since these deals need to be 
made according to the at-arm’s-length standard, self-dealing contracts differing from 
this are easily deemed unlawful distribution. This, in part, prevents the abuse of the 
close relationship to siphon improperly large benefits from the corporation.
Besides these, one should examine whether the corporation has acted openly 
and honestly toward officials such as the tax authority and police.1018 Neglecting 
tax payments or employee-related payments, withholding information or lack 
of co-operation in a criminal investigation can be used to show the corporate 
arrangement’s purpose as reprehensible. If payments are systematically neglected, 
the purpose of the arrangement is likely the isolation of negative risk and damaging 
creditors or systematic unconcerned operation for personal gain. Again, this could 
be proven false by showing a legitimate business reason. If the neglect results from 
poor business judgment, inability or failure of the business, they can hardly hint at 
ill intentions.
6.8.  Conclusions on Supportive Factors
In this section, I focused on the so-called supporting factors of veil piercing, the 
objectively discernible facts. These are circumstances in corporate operations that 
1017 This includes any legal action where the controller as a person and the corporation both have an 
interest. 
1018 See KKO 2005:98 and KKO 2011:49 and the appellate court in KKO 2017:94. Open and honest 
co-operation with the authorities creates an assumption of the proper nature of the arrangement. 
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show or at least hint toward the fulfillment of the more abstract piercing requirements. 
I began the inspection by assessing how inadequate resourcing might evidence the 
unacceptable motives and artificiality of the arrangement. Inadequate resourcing 
referred to situations in which the corporation operates with capital that is clearly 
inadequate compared to the liabilities it is likely to face. The difficulty with this 
criterion is that the demanded level of resources is hard to determine. I examined the 
decision in KKO 2017:94 and made a thorough comparative analysis of the possible 
methods of determining the correct level of resources. This resulted in a failure to 
deduce an objective standard. I still managed to make the subjective standard more 
explicit and concluded that the resources are inadequate if the corporation cannot 
operate sustainably when accounting for reasonably predictable liabilities. The 
assessment also needs to inspect this from the perspective of the controller. If the 
controller reasonably, in bona fide thought the resources were adequate, they should 
be considered so. I also argued that anything that can be used to the satisfaction of 
the creditors should be considered a resource and that shareholder-provided assets 
commonly but not always speak of bona fide intentions.
Next, I addressed the disparity of benefits and negative risks. I defined this 
behavior through these elements: 1) systematic amassment of credit and/or negative 
risks on one entity; 2) placement of assets on another entity; 3) business operation 
practiced in symbiosis between the two entities, e.g., one cannot operate without the 
output of the other; and 4) the arrangement and its operation are not explainable 
through a valid business reason. This sort of arrangement speaks to the unacceptable 
motives and artificiality of the arrangement.
After this, I examined the commingling and confusion criteria. Commingling 
was defined through the commingling of assets and of employees. This refers to the 
controller using or assigning assets, employees or their work arbitrarily between 
the entities involved without regarding the entity to which they formally belong. 
This can hint toward the reprehensibility of the arrangement and control over the 
entities. Per confusion, I defined it as the inability to determine the real operator. 
This criterion emphasizes what the third parties perceive and the impression they 
get. If they get the impression that the operation was not that of the formal operator, 
this would support piercing.
I proceeded to discuss a pattern of artificially dividing an existing business. This 
is a new factor for veil piercing in Finnish literature, but it is backed by case law. 
With it, I refer to situations in which the business was originally practiced in one 
entity and later a part of it; holding an especially high risk for costs was transferred 
to a separate entity without the reality of the operation changing in any way. This 
supporting factor is especially vulnerable to the existence of legitimate business 
reasons, i.e., if the divided part of the business developed into something more than 
what it was when it was part of the original. The artificial division of an existing 
business speaks to artificiality and unacceptable consequences or motives.
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Finally, I proceeded to inspect a very widely discussed piercing factor from the 
United States. Neglecting corporate formalities is controversial there, and it has 
also appeared in Finland a few times. Based on my analysis, this factor has little to 
do with piercing situations and would lead to a mountain of problems if adopted. 
Still, its significance could not be entirely explained away. Thus, neglecting proper 
documentation of transaction and contracts, not following the formal decision-
making procedure, and even oversights in accounting could potentially play a minor 
role in support of piercing.
7.  Who Should Be Held Liable?
7.1.  Introduction
Now that we have established a test for veil piercing along with the supportive 
factors, I will proceed to examine who could be claimed liable through piercing. 
Before delving into this, a quick preliminary question should be addressed: at what 
point can the piercing claim be made?
Although bankruptcy typically brings the need to rely on veil piercing claims, it 
should not be considered a requirement or the sole environment.1019 If the formally 
liable corporation has not been found to be unable to meet the obligation, the 
claimant arguably has no concrete need for protection to make the piercing claim. 
Thus, the starting point should be that veil piercing liability be secondary.1020 The 
corporation should be primarily liable for the damage, and only after it has been 
found unable to satisfy the claim, veil piercing could extend the liability to other 
parties. However, this was not adopted in the KKO 2015:17 decision. The original 
demand was to hold both corporations liable from the beginning without even 
examining whether the subsidiary could cover the claim, although the decision 
brings up the fact that the subsidiary’s operations had been shut down after it was 
demanded payment.1021 It would thus seem that the inability of the formally liable 
corporation to meet the creditor’s receivable either has no significance, or the 
piercing claim is allowed if the inability is apparent enough. Current case law hints 
toward the latter, though it is not discussed anywhere.
Having established this, we can proceed to who should be liable. Per the definition 
adopted in the very beginning chapter of this work, veil piercing liability does not 
1019 See af Schultén 1984 at 81. See also KKO 2015:17, where the insolvency or capital structure of the 
subsidiary were not addressed. It was clear that the subsidiary had seized its operations, but it was not 
declared bankrupt.
1020 See KM 1992:32 at 358 and af Schultén 1984 at 96. Also, the duty of mitigation found in tort law 
would offer some analogous support for this view.
1021 For the same, see Savela 2015 at 413.
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target a specific group of persons in the corporate environment. The shareholders 
and parent corporations are the ones traditionally named as potentially liable parties 
when veil piercing is discussed. Other possibilities include board members. Outside 
the formal corporate actors, the corporation’s actual controller could be held liable, 
that is, if the formal control has been separated from the control in reality. Sister 
corporations can face liability as well, as shown in KKO 2017:94. A little more 
adventurous liability form would be the liability of the economic whole of the 
business. Although liability has been placed in case law on persons in all of these 
positions, the liability should not rely on formal position. In KKO 2017:94, the 
Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to place liability on the entity that received 
the benefits of the arrangement.1022
I will discuss here the traditional view of shareholder liability, liability based 
on control and influence, liability of the economic unit and finally the liability of 
the beneficiary. Discussing these is perhaps not necessary, but deviation from the 
traditional view in the literature merits its justifications, even if that deviation is 
backed by the Supreme Court.
7.2.  Liability of a Shareholder
Shareholder liability is possible when a shareholder has used the corporation to 
escape some obligation. The obligation was either originally held by the shareholder 
and later transferred to the corporation, or the corporation was founded only for 
the purpose of acquiring something for the shareholder without attaching the 
obligations that usually follow. Often, the legal literature specifically defines piercing 
as holding the shareholders liable for the obligations of the company.1023
Exclusivity to shareholders is a view many adopt in the legal literature. In the 
US literature, a division has been suggested between veil piercing liability 
and enterprise liability, the former being liability of the shareholder and the 
latter being liability within the corporate group.1024 As the following inquiries 
into potentially liable parties will show, the US courts have not restricted 
themselves to this view.1025
1022 Similarly, see Toiviainen 1995 at 280.
1023 See Huttunen 1963 at 150–187, whose work operates solely around the question of whether the 
shareholder can be held liable or the separateness disregarded.
See also Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 291 and the Company Act Committee of 1990 memo at 355. The 
committee memo limits veil piercing exclusively to shareholders.
1024 See Bainbridge 2000 at 61–71 and Oh 2013 at 131. See also Berle 1947 at 354, arguing that the 
disregard means looking to the enterprise.
1025 For an express statement of this, see Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986) at 285.
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Similar views have appeared in Sweden also. The NJA 2014 s. 877 decision 
names the board members as potentially liable parties. Still, in the literature, 
their liability has been argued as secondary and only applicable when the 
shareholders cannot be named.1026
The shareholder should not face veil piercing liability due to their position as 
a shareholder or their legally appointed set of rights.1027 Traditionally, piercing has 
been viewed as shareholder liability doctrine. However, if we look closer at why 
shareholders have been thought liable by piercing, we discover that it is mostly 
due to the control they possess and how they use that control. This is not a feature 
unique to the shareholder, though, as I will demonstrate next. Nothing prevents 
the shareholder from constructing such an arrangement where they act under a 
corporate name. Yet veil piercing does exactly that. If the earlier presented argument 
is accepted, formal control is enough for veil piercing, and the assessment should 
focus on the impropriety of the arrangement. Shareholders do definitely control the 
corporation. To be exact, liability is not attached due to the position or the rights 
of the shareholder but rather how they are used. This essentially turns the analysis 
back to the question of when the shareholder controls a corporation. A shareholder 
can be held liable, but not due to their position.1028 The illegal or disloyal actions 
of a shareholder controlling the corporation can create a liability, though.1029 One 
1026 See Sandström 2015 at 10.
1027 See Huttunen 2007 and the Supreme Court cases he discusses therein. He argues that the Supreme 
Court has taken a strong stance in emphasizing the separateness of corporations. The parent corpora-
tion is not considered the owner of a subsidiary’s property. This is definitely the default position when 
considering corporations. He aims to prove that veil piercing has not been accepted, not that it could 
not be accepted. Most of the cases he discusses do not address piercing at all, but only have to do with 
separateness of a corporation and its owners when other remedies are available. Huttunen manages to 
prove the strength of the default rule, though later developments in case law have shown that exceptions 
are possible. See KKO 2015:17.
1028 KKO 2008:20 at 79. Full ownership without a specific basis is not a justification for liability. A mu-
nicipality acted as a shareholder of a few housing co-ops. The municipality, among others, was demanded 
liable for the damage caused by a mold problem in the apartments owned by the co-op. The Supreme 
Court found that the municipality had only exercised its legal rights and duties in controlling the co-ops 
and had not attempted to free itself from obligations or liabilities. Liability requires a basis other than full 
ownership.
See also Huttunen 2007, who argues throughout the article that the owner of the stock is not considered 
the owner of the corporation’s property. This is definitely the rule, but it is not without exceptions. Hut-
tunen 1996 at 30–33 and the KKO 24.8.1989 no. 2240, S 86/993 analyzed therein are also of interest. 
They expressly deny piercing based on full ownership, control or use of legal rights. In addition, see KKO 
1982 II 184, KKO 1983 II 185 and Tammi-Salminen 2001 at 292 and 299.
See Leppänen 1991 at 277 footnote 18. Limited liability means that the shareholder cannot be held liable 
for corporate obligations because of their position in the corporation.
1029 See Savela 2015 at 403 and the Danish case, UfR 1998 s. 166, cited there. Similarly in the United 
States, see Barber 1981 at 373.
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important distinction is that the passive shareholder should not be held liable,1030 
meaning that the damage caused needs to be somehow causally related to the control.
7.3.  Controller Liability
No one should be held liable for an action they had no control over. As veil piercing 
requires the use of the corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or 
shareholder’s control, it would seem natural that veil piercing liability can attach to 
someone who is able to control these factors. The controller of the corporation is 
thus a potential bearer of liability.1031 Controller’s liability seems justified since they 
are the person who is able to determine the actions taken. They can decide whether 
the illegitimate arrangement is undertaken in the first place, and their decision is 
causally necessary for the results to materialize. Moreover, without the existence of 
the corporate shield, the controller would be the one liable for the fulfillment of the 
obligation.
In the criminal liability case KKO 1995:99, A and B held control over the 
corporation. Together, they also derived the benefits from illegal actions performed 
under the corporate guise. The Supreme Court held them jointly liable with the 
corporation to return the economic benefits of illegitimate actions. Liability can be 
attached if someone behind the corporation conducts the corporate operations.1032 
Although it was a criminal liability case, it addressed the placement of liability in 
a reasonable fashion and can be taken into account when piercing. The control 
was found rather formally, as both A and B held positions in the corporation. The 
existence of benefits was found to be equally formal. The court deduced that the 
formal controllers of the corporation gained economic benefits directly from the 
corporation. The decision emphasized both the control and the benefits; they 
happened to coincide, though that might not always be the case. I will later discuss 
the beneficiary’s liability and why it should be primary.
The controller’s liability seems to be the obvious liability placement when the 
arrangement involves only one corporation. The controller uses this one entity to 
escape an obligation that would otherwise be theirs. The only players involved are the 
corporation and the controller, who had the initiative and motivation to go through 
with the arrangement. In the legal literature, it has sometimes been argued that only 
the controller could be held liable by piercing the veil.1033 Holding the controller 
liable would also conform well with the wording of the KKO 2015:17 decision, 
1030 See Nerep 2015 at 30.
1031 See Savela 2015 at 414.
1032 See Savela 2015 at 402.
1033 See Toiviainen 1995 at 280.
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which notes the connection between using the corporate form and the undesirable 
result.1034 Only the person controlling the use can cause the result. It cannot be 
the only possibility, though, as the situation may require different solutions,1035 
e.g., holding sister corporations or corporations connected by the same controller 
liable as was done in KKO 2017:94. Then, holding the corporate controller liable 
would seem excessive since the harmful operation includes multiple entities, and the 
harm could be removed without holding the controller liable. The arrangement was 
disregarded only to the extent to remove the benefits it created.
In the United States, the inclusion of the causal relationship between 
liability and one’s actions is a common suggestion for the improvement of 
the veil piercing test. Opinions in the literature seek to reform the piercing 
test to only induce liability when the shareholder’s actions have caused the 
damage.1036 The courts have adopted more creative solutions, though, holding 
sister corporations and passive shareholders liable on occasion. Veil piercing 
claims are usually targeted at one or a few shareholders responsible for the 
wrongdoing.1037 Even those critical of veil piercing see the minimum reform 
as tying the liability to actions taken by the persons involved.1038 This would 
effectively exclude any passive shareholder and anyone not directly influencing 
the arrangement or whose actions are not in direct causation to the damage. 
Liability would follow the capability and the exercise of that capability to 
make a decision in the corporation leading to siphoning, misrepresentation, 
fraud or other wrongdoing. Liability would be that of the controller.
Swedish case law has gone in a slightly different direction. If a person 
is to be held liable by veil piercing in Sweden, that person needs to have a 
controlling influence over the corporation.1039 No causal relation is required. 
The NJA 2014 s. 877 decision mentions the board members as potentially 
liable by piercing. An earlier committee memo mentions just “persons who 
have decisive influence without being shareholders.”1040 Based on this, there is 
a strong connection between liability and control in Swedish piercing.
The Swedish literature mentions some abuse of control in the corporation. 
If one abuses their position of influence to the detriment of the creditors, 
liability can be extended to that person.1041 Although not expressly mentioned, 
1034 KKO 2015:17 at 29.
1035 See KKO 2017:94, where this approach was taken.
1036 For example, see Marcantel 2011 at 227–228.
1037 Cheng 2010 at 527.
1038 See Gelb 1982 at 18–21 and Marcantel 2011 at 226.
1039 NJA 2014 s. 877 and SOU 1987:59 at 128.
1040 SOU 1987:59 at 128.
1041 See SOU 1987:59 at 15 and Larsson 1995 at 347 and 352.
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some causality seems required between how the control rights are used and 
the damage to creditors.1042 Similarly, the control needs to be used abusively, 
thus requiring an element of reprehensibility.
Similar considerations are not unheard of in England, either, although 
the hostile environment for veil piercing certainly curbs these considerations 
there. In Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd 
(1921), the court stated: “if a company is formed for the express purpose of 
doing a wrongful act or if, when formed, those in control expressly direct 
that a wrongful thing he done, the individuals as well as the company 
are responsible for the consequences….”1043 Both control and the causal 
relationship its exercise has to the damage would constitute liability. 
If controller liability is accepted as one potential outcome of a veil piercing claim, 
then any party capable of exercising control over the corporation could be held liable. 
The question of who can control a corporation was discussed earlier in chapter V.3. 
Any of those parties, including the powerful creditor and outside parties controlling 
straw men, could be held liable. It should still be noted that the position as a creditor 
or financer in itself is not enough.1044 Piercing would still require using the influence 
of such a position to compel the corporation to do something abusive.
The United States courts rarely accept creditor’s liability by piercing, even 
if the creditor does take part in corporate affairs and is quite powerful.1045 
No clear standard exists, however. The creditor was successfully held liable 
in A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. In it, the creditor retained rather 
obtrusive rights to itself: (1) the creditor’s constant recommendations; (2) 
the creditor’s right of first refusal to buy grain; (3) the debtor’s inability to 
mortgage its property, purchase stock or pay dividends without the creditor’s 
approval; (4) the creditor’s right to inspect Warren’s premises; (5) the 
creditor’s criticism of the debtor’s business practices; (6) the creditor’s belief 
that the debtor needed “strong paternal guidance”; (7) the debtor’s drafts and 
forms containing the creditor’s name; (8) the creditor’s financing of all of the 
debtor’s grain purchases and operating expenses; and (9) the creditor’s power 
1042 See Moreno 2006 at 349–350. Cf. Mark- och miljööverdomstolen, judgment 2013-06-26, M 
11429-12.
1043 At 476.
1044 As with the environmental damage compensation. See III.2.3. of this work and HE 165/1992 at 27. 
Similarly also in asset recovery context, see Ovaska 1991 at 155 and Tuomisto 2012 at 31.
1045 Gelb 1982 at 20 and Lundgren 1984. See also Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.) 
(1938) at 962–967, Ford v. CE. Wilson & Co. (1942) Credit Managers Association of Southern Calfornia 
v. Superior Court (1975), Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp. (1973), A. 
Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. and Collet v. American National Stores, Inc. (1986) at 285–286.
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to discontinue the financing of the debtor. The court did not base liability 
on the financing of an operation. In the case, the financing only allowed the 
creditor to establish control over the debtor. This control, in turn, enabled 
creating an enterprise that was markedly different from ordinary bank 
financing. The creditor was an active participant in the debtor’s operation 
rather than simply a financier. The reason for financing was not to make 
money as a lender but rather to establish a source of market grain for the 
creditor’s business. In Credit Managers Association of Southern Calfornia v. 
Superior Court (1975), the creditor assigned a consultant for the debtor. 
That consultant was able to overrule and supplant the board of directors and 
shareholders in the operation of the business. This created a fiduciary duty for 
the consultant. Although the case was not a piercing case, it provides a good 
example of how the creditor’s control can exist.
The creditor’s liability by piercing has also been discussed in Sweden, where 
it is tied to the decisive influence a party holds.1046 In a controversial decision, 
a Swedish court held the parent corporation liable for environmental damage 
caused in a subsidiary’s operation. Liability was not based on the exercise of 
that control but the mere possibility of influencing the operation combined 
with the financial enabling.1047
7.4.  Liability of the Economic Unit or Enterprise liability
The economic unit is one potential liable party for veil piercing. The concept of an 
economic unit entails entities that are economically dependent on each other, albeit 
formally separate; they have their own actions, but only when those actions are seen 
as part of a larger whole do they make sense. The operation is divided into smaller 
units to isolate externalities, much the same way a ship is compartmentalized into 
smaller blocks to prevent sinking if the hull is breached in one place. They operate as 
a whole in all matters other than liability.
Enterprise liability means deeming the corporate group or corporations under 
the same person’s control as the economic unit and holding it liable. In the 
US, Bainbridge has suggested a strict division between veil piercing as holding a 
shareholder liable and enterprise liability in corporate groups.1048 Although this 
division could be made in Finland also, the test construed in KKO 2015:17 does not 
differentiate. It names using the corporate group structure, intercorporate relations 
or shareholder’s control as the actions targeted by veil piercing. Still, it remains 
1046 SOU 1987:59 at 15 and Larsson 1995 at 347.
1047 Mark- och miljööverdomstolen, judgment 2013-06-26, M 11429-12.
1048 Bainbridge 2000 at 61–71.
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useful to confess that veil piercing considerations and relevant facts adapt and differ 
based on which of these named actions is assessed in the case.
As noted above, the US literature usually, though not exclusively, regards 
veil piercing as a liability of the shareholder and separates it from enterprise 
liability theory, which would allow for reaching other entities within the 
arrangement.1049 Peter Oh remarks that enterprise liability borrows heavily 
from traditional veil-piercing; and, not surprisingly, they can be confused 
for the same purpose.1050 In this work, veil piercing is understood from the 
Finnish perspective, and it unquestionably covers enterprise liability also.1051 
In Harris v. Kupersmith (2009), the result was described as piercing and the 
two doctrines considered capable of reaching the result were instrumentality 
and enterprise liability.1052
In the UK, the DHN Food Distribution Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets (1976) decision introduced the liability of the economic unity 
theory of piercing. It was highly criticized1053 and has not been used in high-
profile cases ever since.1054 However, some authors have recently recognized 
the disparity of economic reality and separate personality within corporate 
groups. The separate personality within the group is viewed as inappropriate 
because most commercial activities are integrated within the group.1055
1049 See, for example, Angelo Tomasso v. Armor Construction & Paving, Inc. (1982), stating that if [the] 
plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the independence of the 
corporations had in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity 
would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape liability arising 
out of an operation conducted by one corporation for the benefit of the whole enterprise (emphasis added). See 
also Tzovolos v. Wiseman (2007) utilizing the Angela Tomasso decision. Further affirmation in Harris v. 
Kupersmith (2009) at III.B.
About the theory of enterprise entity in its original form, see Berle 1947. The debate between Landers and 
Posner is also noteworthy. They discussed whether a group of affiliated companies seeks profit through 
enterprise or separate profit centers. Landers 1975, Posner 1975 and Landers 1976.
1050 Oh 2013 at 132. For a deeper analysis arriving at the same conclusion, see Bainbridge 2000 at 31–63. 
He admits that the line is blurry and similar factors come into consideration in both.
1051 As evidenced by the Supreme Court of Finland in KKO 2017:94.
1052 At III.B. Although the doctrine there was not called enterprise liability but “identity” doctrine. The 
formulation was the same as the one used here under the label enterprise liability.
1053 See Mujih 2018 at 388–389 for a description on the criticism. See also the decision Woolfson v. 
Strathclyde Regional Council.
1054 About the theory in the US and in the UK, see Cheng 2011 at 59–82 and the cases cited there. It 
has even been suggested that the liability of entities should be entirely replaced with the liability of the 
enterprise. See Blumberg 1985 at 699–704 and Thompson 1994 at 35–40.
1055 See Mujih 2018.
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Although the economic unit theory has not found much support in Finland,1056 
veil piercing liability can attach to whoever holds the benefits of the arrangement. 
Who would have been liable if the obligation had not been evaded? The economic 
unit within which both assets and obligations are moved around and arranged 
rather freely may be held liable. These potential units are corporate groups and 
corporations that have identical or similar control structures. Even then, the easier 
and less controversial solution would be to ignore the economic unit theory and 
focus on the controller and beneficiaries of the arrangement.
Defining exactly the relevant economic unity required for liability is impossible. 
Derived from the Asset Recovery Act, it would be a fundamental connection of 
economic interests. The preparatory works define this interest through ownership, 
control, share in profits or loss. The party’s right to profit or part of the loss would 
qualify it as a close party only if their legal position concerning profits and loss 
resemble that of the shareholder. Actual control, control in fact and corporate group 
relationships are mentioned in the preparatory works as relationships constituting 
close party status.1057 Naturally, corporations in business with each other always 
share economic interests, and these do not render fundamental interest.
Corporate groups make it possible to move around assets and even hide them from 
the creditors. A corporation as a controller always increases the negative risk of the 
creditors, especially those of the subsidiary.1058 Often in legal literature, the parent 
corporation is thought to be a more justified target for veil piercing liability.1059 
The status as the parent is not enough for piercing, though, as corporate groups 
and corporations as shareowners are accepted in the legal order almost universally. 
Holding a group of companies liable by piercing seems easier to accept since the 
original investors of the parent still enjoy their limited liability shield.1060 Multiple 
layers of limited liability are easier to condemn than just one. Sister corporations 
are potentially liable if the assets are moved and hidden within the group. If the 
corporations in the group are, in reality, only parts of a larger economic unit, veil 
piercing applies more easily.1061
It is possible to split the business into several corporations so that the operation 
is not reasonable when the corporations are viewed as single units. The division and 
the totality, however, start to make sense when these corporations are considered 
1056 Although Leppänen (1991 at 297–303) does mention it.
1057 HE 102/1990 vp. at 45.
1058 Koski 1977 at 304–307.
1059 See Savela 2015 at 414 and af Schultén 2003 at 10.
1060 See Savela 2015 at 414, Kaisanlahti 1996 at 249 and Appellate Court of Turku 28.11.1986 no. 974 
and Appellate Court of Turku 21.4.1989 no. 326 and THO 8.12.1989 no. 1121. About all, see Leppänen 
1991 at 297, 301 and KM 1992:32 at 372. The court justifies piercing with the argument that the involved 
corporations form a single whole.
1061 See Huhtamäki 1999 at 143 and THO 8.12.1989 no. 1121.
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part of a whole. The business itself is such that it could be practiced under one entity, 
but it has been divided to achieve some results, acceptable or not. If the division 
cannot be explained as reasonable with acceptable motives, the economic whole 
could be held responsible for the debts of its units.1062
Enterprise liability is also the default rule in European competition law. There 
it does not matter, whether the business is separated into multiple entities. 
Liability for violations of competition law and damage caused by such 
violations is joint. Not even dissolving the primary company responsible for 
the violation stops this liability.1063 EU-law interprets the concept of enterprise 
in a manner that often resembles veil piercing assessment. The emphasis is on 
control rights and whether the companies are economically identical.1064
The controller does not necessarily keep the original business corporation active. 
In so-called chaining,1065 a person uses a corporation to conduct business, invests 
the profits into the business or channels them for personal use, amassing debt to the 
corporation. When further amassing becomes overly difficult, she sells the business 
to another corporation under her control while leaving the liabilities to the old 
corporation. The operation is continued in this fashion, and the business is moved 
from one corporation to another. The business in its entirety should be liable for the 
damage caused, meaning all the corporations that once held the business should all 
be jointly liable for the damage.
In chaining cases, it might be feasible to hold the controller liable alongside the 
companies used. After all, the controller conducted the business and extended its 
operation past its viable lifespan for her own benefit. The controller’s liability needs 
to derive from the facts of the case, yet it seems likely that, in the case of chaining, 
improper reasons influenced the activity. It should not matter whether the controller 
drew personal benefit or used the funds to expand the business. It could be thought 
that the original corporation was a legitimate attempt at business, and only the 
consequent corporations were improper conduct.
1062 See NJA 1975 s. 45 and Huttunen 1996 at 12. The manner in which the business was run in the NJA 
1975 case was deemed decisive justification for piercing. The case was about a business split in two, where 
the profits were channeled into one corporation and liabilities left with the other. Both corporations were 
held liable. See also UfR 1997 s. 1642.
1063 See C724/17.
1064 See C516/15 P, EU:C:2017:314 at 52 and C-597/13 P, EU:C:2015:613 at 35–36.
1065 About chaining corporations and veil piercing, see Laine 2011.
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7.5.  Liability by Removing the Advantage
Whereas liability could be explained to follow the aforementioned criteria, they are 
only possible allocations. These constructions describe parties that can be held liable 
by piercing and why. These descriptions do not answer the question of who should 
be held liable. How should the court determine the liable party in the case at hand? 
Veil piercing is an in casu doctrine, and as such, it cannot adopt a standard solution. 
Some guidelines could be derived by asking another question: who would have been 
liable without the disregarded corporation? This allows any of the aforementioned 
parties to be liable while providing the criterion and the basis of why. It simply 
removes the externalities created and spares others.
The KKO 2017:94 decision did mention that liability is reasonably placed on 
the party that received the benefits from the arrangement. In that case, the business 
was divided into two corporations under the same controller and shareholder. The 
insight of the Supreme Court to allocate liability was sort of a surgical extraction. 
It removed the externalities of the use without extending liability further than was 
absolutely necessary. This should be the guiding principle in veil piercing liability. At 
this point, I would cite an opinion from the United Kingdom for greater clarity of 
expression. “The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only 
for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they 
would otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate legal personality.”1066 The 
removal of externalities and advantages are interchangeable here—the advantage of 
the arranger is simply the externality suffered by the damaged party.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not adopted this extraction completely. If 
we limit the liability to what is absolutely necessary to remove the externalities, then 
the liability amount should also be measured in this manner. The Supreme Court 
did not discuss this in KKO 2017:94, and liability was placed simply as the amount 
of neglected payments covered by pay security. Arguably in that case, however, the 
complete liability and minimal involvement to remove benefits would have been the 
same. The obtained benefit was the isolation of risks caused by the employees, and 
when that realized, the resulting benefit was the entirety of neglected payments.
In addition, the KKO 2015:17 decision can be cited in support of this solution. 
It named three possible ways to use the corporate form. All three allow piercing, and 
each of them demands a different inspection of a liable party also. If the piercing 
claim is about an arrangement where the corporate group structure is used, the 
liable party is the parent or sister corporation. If the use is about the shareholder’s 
control over the corporation, the controller should be demanded liable by piercing. 
If the intercorporate relationships are used, then the liable party should be the 
corporations involved in that relationship. Some support can also be derived from 
1066 Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) at 35.
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the KKO 1997:146 decision, which was made in casu but was tailored to deviate 
from the law only for the part that concerned the claimant.1067 
?
Figure 7. Who could be liable based on the allocation of advantages?
1067 The same argumentation can be found in the appellate court’s opinion in the decision in KKO 
1997:17. The appellate court would have pierced the veil and held the mortgage on company assets as 
ineffective in relation to other creditors of the company. The Supreme Court did not pierce and thus did 
not address this question in the decision.
Similarly Tammi-Salminen 2013 at 361. 
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Control always makes it possible to hold the controller liable, but this should 
not be the primary answer to the allocation. The externalities can often be remedied 
without it. Control is the primary tool used to achieve the arrangement, whereas 
it is not always the tool used to cause the externalities. The upper left relationship 
in the chart represents using intercorporate relationships to extract benefits. The 
controller can allocate the profits to one of the controlled corporations. Removing 
the advantage in the case does not require the controller to be held liable but the 
corporations to be held jointly liable. If the controller tunneled the benefits back 
for personal gain, liability would need to be attached to the controller to remedy 
the externalities. Liability was allocated like this in the UfR 1997 s. 1642 and KKO 
2017:94 decisions. Similarly, it could be argued that the controller in the case has 
not abused the separate personality between themselves and the business, only the 
separateness between the two entities used to run the business.
The upper right situation represents using the corporate group structure. The use 
enables the controller to accrue more gains for the parent, for example. Then the 
parent and possibly the sister corporations should be liable, and this would remove 
the externalities. On the other hand, if the controller has allocated the benefits of 
the arrangement from the parent to themselves, removing the externalities might 
require holding them liable as well. The KKO 2015:17 decision is an example of this 
sort of liability allocation.
In the United States, Cheng and Oh have separately suggested reforming 
the piercing doctrine in a manner that would place liability based on unjust 
enrichment. In this model, liability assessment would focus on whether 
a corporation’s inability to satisfy a judgment results in an unjustifiable 
allocation of benefits.1068
The bottom left situation is meant to describe a situation in which the controller 
has an obligation or a restriction and then transfers it to a corporation to avoid it. 
The externalities in the case are suffered by those who held interest in the controller’s 
obligation. Removing the externalities requires holding the original holder liable as they 
benefit from the removal of that restriction or obligation. An example would be the 
Migrit Solarna Energija decision made by the government. The Russian investors held 
the control, and they needed the corporation to circumvent nationality restrictions. 
Their advantage was being free from the restriction. In this case, externalities were 
suffered by the one setting these restrictions, i.e., the Finnish government.
A similar case can be found in the UK. Daimler v. Continental Tyre and 
Rubber (1916) was about whether a corporation incorporated in the UK, 
1068 Cheng 2010 at 528–540 and 582–585 and Oh 2013 at 118. 
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all but one of whose shareholders were German, should be deemed an enemy 
company during the First World War. The nationality of the shareholders 
was deemed decisive instead of the nationality of the corporation. The key 
aspects were whether the resources from the corporate operations would 
end up in enemy hands. This is also a good example of how the nature of the 
applied statute and the policy goals behind it affect the factors relevant for 
veil piercing.
Last, the bottom right picture shows where the corporation contracts the 
obligation. This is a situation in which control combined with limited liability is 
the primary cause of the externalities. Yet it is also the primary method of a sensible 
business operation. Only when the control is used in a reprehensible manner should 
liability follow. And this is most easily proved by elimination—showing that the 
corporation had no purpose other than the illegitimate restriction of liability. This 
is by far the hardest piercing situation to show in court since the arrangement is so 
close to the legitimate use of the corporate form. Discerning factors are hard to come 
by. Should the controller tunnel the benefits so that they themselves become the 
beneficiary, the externalities are suffered by the corporation’s creditors. Removing 
the advantages requires holding the controller liable. If the benefits are left with 
the corporation, there is no case for piercing the veil. One should note that a more 
beneficial risk position is a benefit in itself. Isolating the potential liability in a 
corporation that is in no way capable of covering it is a benefit. It is like a forced 
discount on a lottery ticket. A prime example of piercing in this fashion would be 
the NJA 2014 s. 877.
From the perspective of using veil piercing to remove the externalities, the 
most acceptable allocation can be found. This does place a lot of significance on 
control structure and the allocation of benefits. One could argue that removing 
the externalities does not require locating the benefits. However, in cases where the 
corporate arrangement is designed to benefit at the expense of others, the benefits 
and externalities coincide.
It could also be argued that placing liability this way is for the protection of the 
controller. The initial real person investing in the corporation does not need to lose 
the limited liability shield if the benefits can be returned from another corporation 
within the arrangement. Also, locating the benefits does help deem the use of 
control as reprehensible because, combined with control, it can qualify as seeking 
self-interest at the expense of others.1069
1069 In a similar fashion, the benefits help determine whether an arrangement is artificial in the Enforce-
ment Code Chapter 4, Section 14 sense.
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The creditor’s liability is potentially available if they become the controller.1070 
Even the creditor of a company can acquire the position of a controller 
with or without a formal legal device bestowing it.1071 It is easy to imagine 
a situation in which a corporation is dependent on a large creditor, and the 
creditor starts to protect their interests by demanding certain actions of 
the corporation. Should the corporation deny these requests, the creditor 
threatens to withdraw the credit. The corporation has no choice but to 
comply because losing the credit would mean the end of the business.1072 The 
creditor uses its financial leverage to protect its own interests; in other words, 
it exercises control over the corporation to better its own risk position at the 
expense of other creditors.1073 For the creditor to have such a high degree of 
control, it needs to be able to regulate the major part of the corporation’s 
finances. If there are many creditors, one is less likely to obtain control.1074
7.6.  Conclusions on Who Should Be Liable
The discussion in this section revolved around the liable party. Potential liable 
parties included the shareholder, the controller, the economic unit and the removal 
of advantages. Share ownership was dismissed as a criterion for liability as it would 
1070 Existence of a legal device makes finding control easier, though. The creditor status itself is never 
enough to pierce or consider the creditor a close party. See Villa 1997 at 371–374 and 381–385.
1071 See Villa 1997 at 374 and 384. The control given with a legal device can be partial. The corporation 
and shareholders can bestow the creditor with differing rights such as total vote control in the general 
meeting, the right to determine business decisions within the competence of the board or just veto rights. 
These rights can be limited to certain subjects such as obtaining additional financing or sale of property. 
Villa is of the opinion that control through veto rights is not enough to make the corporation a close par-
ty. Veil piercing requires an even higher degree of control than asset recovery, so veto rights are definitely 
not enough.
About creditor’s contractual control and specific contractual terms, see Villa 1997 at 361–364 and 370–
374. Although Villa examines creditor’s control in relation to the definition of close party given in the 
Asset Recovery Act, the same considerations about the creditor’s position are valid here.
The different forms of creditor positions created by financial engineering dampen the line between the 
shareholder and the creditor. Sometimes, the creditor can obtain a set of rights that, in fact, renders them 
a shareholder. If the situation demands, the court can disregard the legal form of the credit relationship 
and consider the creditor a shareholder in relation to a norm. Borrowed capital can be considered equity 
capital. If so, then the debt changes its form and becomes equity, but only in relation to third parties. 
Inter partes, the capital is still characterized according to the terms of the original contract. Villa 1997 at 
381–385.
1072 The same arrangement could possibly be established by blackmailing or even by threatening with 
legal action with the potential to paralyze the corporation’s business. The preparatory works for the Asset 
Recovery Act acknowledge the possibility of controlling a corporation through financial arrangements or 
other contracts. See HE 102/1990 vp. at 45.
1073 See Villa 1997 at 372.
1074 See Villa 1997 at 373.
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constitute too formal an approach and result in unfair treatment. The controller 
was found to be a potentially liable party as they are able to determine the corporate 
actions however they want. Still, the principle demanding minimal interference 
to remove externalities would suggest discarding the controller’s liability also. The 
economic unit was thought of as a strong possibility, though the vague definition 
of unity makes it impractical. Instead, I would strongly support using the approach 
of removing the advantages. This approach can result in liability in casu for any of 
the other mentioned targets but does not compromise them in an arbitrary manner.
I proceeded to inspect four different situations in which the advantages appear 
in a different fashion. Each of these was backed by case law. The analysis showed 
that locating the advantages leads to different results depending on the construed 
arrangement. Even the liability allocation is made based on overall assessment and 
in casu examination. While the traditionally liable parties appeared as possibilities, 
they should not be viewed as the sole targets for liability and liability definitively 
should not be based on some formal position.
8.  Further Themes
8.1.  Who Can Make a Claim for Veil Piercing?
8.1.1.  A Damaged Party?
The procedural standing to demand veil piercing follows this general rule: the one 
whose rights have been violated and who needs protection has the standing to 
demand veil piercing. The standing is not defined by procedural rules but follows 
persons’ material rights. The claim can be made by those whose material right is 
the basis for the proceedings. Thus, the standing to demand veil piercing follows 
the material relationship, which usually is debt. In evasion of provision cases, the 
standing follows the relationship that would have existed without the evasion. The 
one who was affected by the evasion can make the claim. For example, the State has 
standing when it has been forced to cover some costs or when it has lost revenue due 
to the evasion.
The creditors without a doubt can make the claim.  They have a relationship with 
the corporation and a material right, the fulfillment of which is the reason behind the 
claim. In bankruptcy and even in on going business, it would simply be beneficial for 
creditors if the liability could be extended.1075 In the existing case law, the question of 
standing to claim proceedings has not been addressed. In all cases, the creditor has 
made the claim for piercing.
1075 Leppänen 1991 at 277.
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In the KKO 1997:17 case, the creditor was not directly a party to the legal 
relationship in which piercing was demanded. It had a standing to bring 
proceedings as a bankruptcy creditor. If the parent’s claim had been accepted, 
the creditor would have been worse off since the bankruptcy estate would 
have had fewer funds. The right to contest a bankruptcy debt is given in 
Bankruptcy Code 13:4. This would allow the bankruptcy estate itself to make 
a veil piercing claim.
Piercing should be available only for those harmed by the dishonest operations 
of the business.1076 Even if the removal of the dishonest parts by judicial action 
wound up destroying the rest of the business, the rest of the creditors should not be 
awarded the piercing remedy. They are not in a different position than they would 
have been had the neglected obligations been addressed properly. It could be argued 
that contract creditors would not have contracted with the corporation had they 
known of these liabilities. The situation could then be addressed as active misleading 
though, and no piercing is necessary. The situation is just another failed business, the 
same as an insurmountable tort liability or a failed product, for example.
It is contestable who is actually harmed by the inappropriate operations. It could 
be argued that only those who have been unable to collect their claim are harmed. 
This would mean that the formally liable entity must first be found insolvent or 
unable to cover the liability.1077 In KKO 2015:17, the claim for remunerations were 
made simultaneously against both the subsidiary and the parent. No considerations 
were made as to whether the claim against the parent was premature as the subsidiary 
was still conducting business. This could partly be explained with the amount of the 
claim, as it would surely have severely hindered the subsidiary’s capability of operating 
and perhaps would have even bankrupted it. This issue remains to be addressed 
directly in case law, as other piercing cases with monetary claims have emerged 
from insolvency situations. From the existing Finnish case law supplemented with 
international review, it would seem that a piercing claim can be made if the original 
debtor is insolvent or is likely enough to be incapable of satisfying the claim.
The United States has a clear stance on this issue. There, veil piercing is 
claimable only when the primarily liable party cannot satisfy the payment. 
This offers no help for the Finnish interpretation, however, as the US situation 
1076 Similarly as the extension of the debt enforcement process duration (Enforcement Code 2:26). 
The extension is a remedy available for the creditor who ended up worse off due to the debtor’s conduct 
during the enforcement process. The creditor needs to show the damage caused by the debtor’s actions. 
If successful, the extension is awarded to them, not to all the creditors. See Bräyssy 2017 at 54–56 and 
Linna – Leppänen 2014 at 213–219.
1077 Savela 2015 at 413 and af Schultén 1984 at 96. Similarly in the United States, see Marcantel 2011 at 
229–230.
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can be explained with the equity remedy nature of piercing. Claims in equity 
can only be made where there is no adequate remedy at law and equity only 
helps those who have done everything to help themselves.1078
This issue has arisen in England also. In Ord v. Bellhaven Pubs Ltd (1998), 
the claimants sought to substitute the original debtors as the defendants in 
the case with the parent corporation of the debtors. The lower court allowed 
this as the claimants had demonstrated that the debtor corporation could not 
satisfy the claim anymore, but this was due to corporate group restructuring 
and not insolvency. This does match the current legal situation in Finland 
quite well. The court of appeals decided that such substitution was not 
possible because it would constitute a new cause of action.
8.1.2.  The Bankruptcy Estate?
Thus, it is clear that a creditor with a reasonably predictable loss is capable of making 
the piercing claim. More vexing is the question about the bankruptcy estate. In 
the legal literature, Leppänen is of the opinion that, without a specific provision 
in law, the bankruptcy estate cannot make a piercing claim. This kind of collective 
claim would face a few practical problems, such as payment order and privileged 
positions. He argues instead that each creditor has the right to demand piercing 
liability and payment.1079 Veil piercing is an in casu decision, and the obligations 
should be examined separately. Not all creditors are necessarily victims of abuse. 
The piercing assessment accommodates many creditor-specific elements, such as 
whether the creditor was voluntary or whether they were aware of the arrangement. 
Establishing reprehensibility requires an assessment of the corporation’s, controller’s 
and creditor’s positions and their relationships to each other.1080 A collective claim 
is hardly possible unless the arrangement was abusive toward all of them, though it 
should be noted that the in casu nature also allows the inclusion of many differing 
situations within the piercing doctrine.
It should not be excluded that a corporate arrangement can be abusive toward 
all of the bankruptcy creditors, especially since the corporation and contract as 
institutions are flexible and allow the arrangers much room to design. Through 
guarantees and other contracts, it is possible to choose the creditors that receive 
payment and those that are made to participate in the bankruptcy. If all the 
bankruptcy creditors are in that position due to design and abusive intentions, then 
I would not deny a collective piercing claim.
The bankruptcy estate in one specific situation can make a piercing claim. The 
administrator has the power to dispute a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy, which 
1078 See Kennedy 1997 at 630 and Peterson 2017 at 68–71.
1079 Leppänen 1991 at 308–309.
1080 Similarly in Sweden, see Stattin 2008 at 439.
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would mean the disputed claim would not be taken into account. It is entirely 
plausible to make this sort of dispute based on piercing the veil.1081 Not one of 
the abovementioned arguments against the estate’s right to a claim applies to this 
situation. The claim is not collective, it does not affect payment order or privileged 
positions and the piercing assessment can be limited to the facts surrounding a single 
creditor.
This approach would provide a favorable position for the creditors who can claim 
piercing. Most other methods—asset recovery, refund obligation and management’s 
liability in damages1082—return assets to the bankruptcy estate. Piercing liability 
would return them to the creditor directly. This does not necessarily create an issue 
with creditor equality. Veil piercing liability is secondary, so the piercing creditor 
will receive their share from the estate’s assets. Piercing liability does not provide 
them a better position within the estate, and using the available legal remedies can 
hardly be thought of as unequal, even if those remedies are not available to all the 
creditors in the estate. The situation could simply be compared to joint and several 
tort liabilities when one debtor is the corporation. Naturally, if a collective claim can 
be made, the additional assets come into the bankruptcy estate’s possession and are 
thus eventually divided by the creditors.
8.1.3.  Self-Piercing
Aside from the creditors and the state, it could occur that the corporation itself or 
its controller would like to pierce the veil. The corporate form, limited liability and 
separate personality separate the owners from the corporation. It is entirely possible 
that the controller would want to disregard the corporate form in order to apply or 
deny the application of a statute. For example, an entrepreneur that has chosen the 
corporate form is ineligible for unemployment benefits. If the business fails, the 
entrepreneur is left standing without security, and the unemployment subsidies can be 
obtained only after they no longer own the corporation. Winding up the corporation 
could take months, and during that time, the entrepreneur is considered self-employed. 
It would benefit the entrepreneur greatly if the corporate form could be found as 
artificial and its actions as the actions of the entrepreneur. The same goes for applying 
for debt adjustment proceedings. The proceedings disallow the adjustment of debt 
from entrepreneurial activity under the limited liability company. If the company is 
disregarded, the debtor could even have their company-related debts adjusted.
1081 See KKO 1997:17 where a claim exactly like this was made by another creditor. The result of this 
dispute succeeding would be the phenomenon usually referred to as indirect piercing in the veil piercing 
literature.
1082 Though the liability in damages can be toward a single creditor, the circumstances creating such 
liability are complex and reliant on setting specific norms into the Articles of Association. Thus, this sort 
of liability is unlikely to realize, especially in a company that has been designed to abuse. See Savela 2015 
at 148 and Kärki 2017 at 171–172.
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These sorts of claims remind of those made by contract creditors. They have 
voluntarily made a choice and, after the damage, have attempted to change that 
choice; they attempt to renegotiate the deal. The same argument applies for the veil 
piercing claims of the controller and the corporation. They have initially made a 
choice to operate under the corporate form and are responsible for the results of 
their choice.1083 Claiming ignorance or misinterpretation of the legal repercussions 
of their actions is generally an unacceptable defense. Everyone must be aware of the 
law.1084 Therefore, they who have chosen to operate under the corporate form should 
not be allowed to pierce.1085
In the United Kingdom, DHN Food Distributors v. Tower Hamlets (1976) 
is a rare occurrence of successful “self-piercing” or “voluntary piercing.” In it, 
the business was divided into two corporations owned by a holding company. 
A land title was owned by one corporation and the business operations by 
another. The land was compulsorily purchased. The business operation was 
initially denied compensation due to disruption of business because it held 
no title to the land. The three corporations successfully argued that they 
should be treated as one in regard to the compensation norm. Other than 
this decision, case law is almost uniform in hostility toward self-piercing. In 
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council (1978), the Court addressed the 
DHN decision and saw the complete control as an absolute requirement. 
The existence of one other shareholder owning one share was enough to 
distinguish from this.1086 The owner cannot say that they are entitled to take 
the benefit of any advantages given to them by the formation of a company 
without simultaneously accepting the liabilities arising from them.1087
In the United States, voluntary piercing is rarely accepted, though a variety 
of approaches exists. Cheng recognizes three categories: 1) applying the 
same analysis as in other piercing cases; 2) more open-ended policy analysis 
1083 Similarly, one cannot seek the disregard of a fake legal action for one’s own benefit. See Helsinki 
Court of Appeals 18.12.2015, nro 1835, dnro S 14/311 and Hemmo (2003) at 315.
1084 But the Ius finitum argument has lost some of its relevance in the modern flood of regulation. See 
Mäkelä 2010 at 195.
1085 See Huttunen 1963 at 182, 194 and 200. See also Huttunen 2007 at 128. However, in some cases, 
piercing can be used to benefit the controller. One example would be the Criminal Code 6:4 cumulative 
punishment, as it allows assessing all the formal and actual consequences of a criminal liability. If both 
the corporation and the sole owner/director of it are given a sentence, the actual consequence is double, 
whereas the formal consequences are only personal. Then it is possible to consider the corporation and the 
controller a single party and leave the corporation without a punishment. See Kuusiniemi 2001 at 11 and 
Jaatinen 2000 at 145–146.
1086 See also Kershaw 2009 at 66.
1087 Tunstall v. Steigmann (1962) at 601. See also Tate Acces Floors Inc. v. Boswell (1991) at 531.
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on voluntary piercing; and 3) rejecting voluntary piercing on principle.1088 
The rejection on principle has gained some prevalence.1089 In In re Ekstrom 
(2010), the court denied reverse piercing, stating that the debtor has enjoyed 
the benefits of limited liability and must now accept the consequences of 
such estate planning.1090
In a case decided by the Appellate Court of Turku (5.1.2016 15/948), the 
plaintiff managed to pierce the veil between herself and a company she owned. The 
company had hired a man, and the attempt was to adjust the contract. The owner 
of the company had acted as its representative when the contract was made. For the 
moderation to succeed, the owner needed her personal conditions to be taken into 
account. The problem was that she was not a party to the contract, but the company 
was. The court disregarded the separateness and allowed the personal conditions to 
be considered. This, in turn, allowed the contract terms to be adjusted.
Veil piercing was sort of a preliminary decision in the case. It did not facilitate 
liability but extended the legally relevant facts in a way that was beneficial to the 
corporate owner. This is a clear deviation from the argumentation presented 
previously. Why should the one choosing to operate under the corporate form be 
allowed to disregard that form if it turns out to be unfavorable to themselves? This 
just goes to show that every decision to pierce the veil is an overall assessment of 
the relevant legal facts made in casu. The whole purpose of the corporation was to 
facilitate the necessary day-to-day needs of the physically handicapped owner. The 
corporation received subsidies from the municipality for hiring a personal assistant 
for the owner. The court also found evidence of unacceptable compelling in the 
formation of the contract. The purpose of the moderation norms is to protect the 
weaker party from unduly exorbitant contract terms. The court simply identified the 
actual weaker party in need of protection. It was within the spirit of the law to make 
such a decision, which should be seen not as a veil piercing case but as a moderation 
case. Piercing considerations in the decision were out of place. The case would 
therefore not support accepting voluntary piercing, and it should remain rejected.
Unfortunately, the decision did not address the question of artificial or 
reprehensible use of a corporation. This opens up many problems since the element 
of abuse has been seen as a necessary element of piercing. One argument is to turn 
the table and say that the employee was able to abuse the corporate form in this 
case. He did not have control over the corporation, though. In this sort of case, the 
requirements of improper behavior, creditor damage and evading a provision should 
1088 Cheng 2011 at 44. See also Thompson 1991 at 1057, noting the significantly lower success rate of 
voluntary piercing claims.
1089 See All Star, Inc. v. Fellows at 813. See also Sparkman 2016 at 465–471, especially at 469.
1090 Similarly in Turner v. Andrew (2013) at 276.
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be disregarded altogether. The assessment becomes about having complete control 
over the corporation and the spirit of the law demanding disregard of separateness. 
Perhaps this decision should have been argued solely with extreme circumstances, 
extending the scope of acceptable conditions for moderation without relying on veil 
piercing doctrine. The argumentation could have resembled piercing even then, but 
at least it would not have further clouded the piercing doctrine.
8.2.  Difference of a Natural Person or Another Corporation  
as a Debtor
There can be two kinds of parties deemed liable by piercing: a natural person 
or another corporation. It is generally more acceptable to pierce the veil when 
the liability is placed on another corporation. Reasons for this revolve around 
limited liability. The realization of the benefits of limited liability does not require 
legislation to allow corporations to be shareholders. Instead, corporate shareholders 
allow the externalities of limited liability to manifest fully. A natural person as a 
shareholder is the default situation considered in legislation. Limited liability is 
thought to be necessary to attract capital to a business. It encourages rational risk-
taking and enables the realization of risky projects that are potentially beneficial to 
society. Nevertheless, the current legislation allows corporations as shareholders 
and controllers of other controllers. Therefore, it is necessary to inspect the special 
considerations of the controller’s person.1091
The argument goes that natural persons as shareholders should be better protected 
from veil piercing as the corporate institution was created to facilitate investment 
from natural persons.1092 Corporations, however, should not enjoy the full benefits 
of limited liability. The essential difference is that there is already one layer of limited 
liability between the controller corporation and its shareholders. Thus, allowing the 
corporation to own shares encourages excessive risk-taking. The investors are already 
protected, and the corporation is free to gamble with whatever surplus the original 
corporation has created. This argument against the corporation as a shareholder is 
more of a moral one, as it relies on the principle of protecting the weaker party. It 
has been formed by thinking of a small investor and their ability to diversify their 
investment.
1091 See Leppänen 1991 at 300
1092 See Bainbridge at 64–65. Also, the justifications of limited liability hold true much more often in 
the case of natural person shareholder.
See also Nial – Johansson 1998 at 231, who also argue that the natural person shareholder should be 
protected more thoroughly than the parent corporation.
See also KKO 2015:17, the judgment of the Helsinki Court of Appeals, which held veil piercing possible 
at least when the entities involved formed a corporate group.
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Veil piercing is often understood as a valve alleviating the externalities caused by 
the economic effectiveness of the limited liability.1093 There are strong arguments 
that it would be more effective for the economy as a whole to uphold the limited 
liability and separate personality meticulously.1094 The economic analysis of veil 
piercing does not support the different treatment of corporations as shareholders 
when assessing piercing for voluntary creditors.1095 What the economic analysis 
finds effective is not the best solution in legal analysis, though. Favoring economic 
analysis over moral factors would seem the correct choice when assessing the basic 
principles of an economic institution such as a corporation. This seems unacceptable 
with veil piercing, however. Veil piercing in itself is a deviation from economic 
efficiency based on arguments of justice and even morals. Thus, in the veil piercing 
context, the moral argument on the stricter treatment of corporations as shareholders 
should prevail over the argument of the equal treatment of shareholders regardless of 
their person based on efficiency.1096
The significance of this argument in veil piercing has not been addressed in 
Finland. The Finnish piercing test does not seem to differentiate between these two 
in theory either. Quite the contrary, in KKO 2015:17, the use of group structure 
and shareholder’s control were both mentioned as potential piercing situations. 
This could be interpreted as recognition of the natural person shareholder as a 
potentially liable party, but in reality, this mention was hardly intended to include 
such considerations. It cannot even logically exclude the shareholder’s control to 
address only natural person shareholders, as the parent in a group can also use it.
8.3.  The Creditors of the Party Held Liable by Piercing
In the legal literature, several authors have expressed their concern over the creditors 
of whoever is held liable by veil piercing.1097 The argument goes that these (original) 
creditors contract or make a claim against one person (original debtor) expecting 
that person to possess the assets they formally have. Then a veil piercing claim is 
made, holding this person liable for the liability of another entity. This brings in new 
creditors (piercing creditors) as claimants to the assets. This surprise liability would 
1093 This is an often cited view. See, for example, Cheng 2010 at 523–524 and 549.
1094 See Bainbridge 2000 at 12–36 justifying limited liability and 46–49 arguing against piercing on the 
grounds of predictability and legal certainty. His economic analysis should be considered universal and 
applicable to Finland also.
1095 See Kaisanlahti 1996 at 243–246. See also Bainbridge 2000 at 66–71.
1096 See also Krendl – Krendl 1978 at 43–45.
1097 See Kukkonen 2018 at 366 and Airaksinen – Rasinaho – Pulkkinen 2018a at 19. See also Könkkölä – 
Linna 2013 at 790–791, who take a more moderate stance on the issue and concede it as uncertain. They 
identify several practical issues piercing could create.
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then violate the creditors’ expectations and harm them significantly. This could even 
mean the total absorption of the entity’s creditor collective into the liable person’s 
creditor collective.
I would object to this and view it as a lesser problem. In this work, I have adopted 
the view that veil piercing is a personal liability of the obligations of another entity. 
Still, this liability is not without basis. It is placed because the person acted in an 
abusive and condemnable manner. In this sense, it is similar to tort or criminal 
liability. The original debtor did something the legal system does not allow. When 
the liability is established based on criminal liability or tort, no one claims that the 
new claimant to the assets should be denied because it would mean fewer assets 
available to the previous creditors. This argument could even be turned around.
Since veil piercing liability is based on the actions of the original debtor, not 
holding them liable by piercing would create unjust enrichment for the original 
creditors at the expense of the piercing creditors. After all, piercing targets 
arrangements where the original debtor has sought benefits through abusive use, 
and these benefits indirectly improve the position of the original creditors.
The counterargument to this would be the surprising and unpredictable nature 
of veil piercing. As it is not yet concrete in its requirements, the original creditors 
cannot prepare for it as well. This would separate the situation from tort or criminal 
liability, which I compared it to earlier. This work is my attempt to make it more 
concrete, and I hope to have lessened the weight of this argument. On the other 
hand, criminal activity other underhanded dealings are behaviors that the original 
debtor no doubt wants to hide from their creditors. This would make it so that the 
original creditors are likely surprised even then. Tort liability, on the other hand, 
can be just as unpredictable. The original debtor could make a misjudgment that 
eventually leads to a damage claim at any time.
Besides this, many liability issues are complex, and legislation is open to 
interpretation. The same arguments used in the literature to allow taking the original 
debtors’ positions into account could then be used as an interpretative argument 
in any situation in which the interpretation could harm them. In the extreme, we 
can take the following example: the tort claim needs to be rejected because the 
interpretation of liability for pure economic loss to a third party has no clear and 
strongly established interpretation, and such liability would diminish the assets 
available to the original creditors. This sort of argumentation should be dismissed. 
The piercing creditors become creditors of whoever is made liable by piercing—
equally with the original creditors.
VI CONCLUSIONS –  
THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL
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1.  Theoretical Basis
This final chapter is meant to give a short description of the piercing doctrine 
based on my findings in this work. I will not repeat the argumentation behind each 
interpretation as those are found earlier. I will simply gather the results here. I have 
addressed veil piercing in this work starting with the test laid out in KKO 201:17. 
The test can hardly be called optimal or practical, but it is authoritative.
My attempt in this research was to make this ambiguous doctrine more concrete 
and predictable. For this purpose, I adopted a somewhat unusually fact-centered 
version of legal dogmatics, the situational sensitive legal dogmatics. This approach 
first appeared in the emphasized role of analogy in both interpretation and norm 
formulation. Discovering the relevant facts to justify analogy was necessary. Second, 
a fact-specific approach was necessary to discover what can be cited in support of or 
in opposition to veil piercing. The ambiguous doctrines and principles of the past 
research and case law were not enough for me. In a sense, my analysis even resembles 
the pondering of evidence. I sought different patterns of conduct and interpretation 
as to the meaning of these patterns. Almost all of the factors I discovered are ordinary 
in business, but when seen as part of the pattern, they take on a new meaning.
I began the work with the background theory, though. I construed veil piercing 
to reflect the prohibition of the abuse of rights. Based on my inspection, the 
Finnish legal system prohibits the abuse of rights. I formulated a synthesis between 
the Supreme Court decision and the reflective sections of law combined with 
Pöyhönen’s formulation of the principle. I construed the principle as such: The effects 
of a legal action can be denied if those actions are taken by unacceptable motives or if the 
consequences prove unacceptable. Additionally, the denial requires that the use of the 
legal action does not match the intended purpose of the utilized legal norm, i.e., the use 
is artificial.
I also considered two other theories: the conflict of norms and judgment-proofing. 
The conflict of norms means that two norms of the legal system demand results 
that exclude the application of the other norm. One must yield. When piercing the 
veil, the other norm is the limited liability or separate corporate personality of the 
corporation. The other norm varies case by case. Judgment-proofing means that there 
is a symbiotic relationship between two or more entities, in which one generates 
disproportionately high risks of liability and another owns a disproportionately 
high level of assets. The business is divided into asset entity and operating entity. 
Through the contract that unites them, the two entities allocate between them the 
gains from the operation. In this work, I decided to consider judgment-proofing 
more as a description of a typical arrangement targeted by piercing instead of an 
actual background theory. Still, this division should support piercing.
 I concluded that both the conflict of norms and judgment-proofing can and 
should be adopted as compatible with the abuse of rights theory, and therefore, there 
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is no need to choose between them. The prevalence of abuse theory holds a specific 
consequence in interpreting the reprehensibility part of the veil piercing test.
The conflict of norms theory proved especially useful in one interpretation. The 
conflicting norms affect the relevant fact set in a piercing decision. On one side of 
the conflict, there is always the separate personality and limited liability. On the 
other side, the conflicting norm can be pretty much any legally binding norm. As 
piercing decisions are made in casu, the assessment emphasizes different things each 
time based on the relevant facts to the standard interpretation of the conflicting 
norms. This means that the facts relevant to separate personality and limited liability 
are always relevant, but the other half alters. For example, the claim can be about 
remuneration duty or tort from mining operations. It would seem obvious that 
the former emphasizes distribution, customer impression and device importation. 
In the latter, the questions more prominently focus on control over the activity in 
causal relation to the damage. Perhaps the most prominent example of this kind of 
focus is still employee protection norms, which guide the assessment toward the one 
who acts as the employee and gains the benefits of the employee’s work.
2.  Veil Piercing Test
2.1.  Use of Corporate Form
In KKO 2015:17, the Supreme Court laid out the abstract requirements of piercing: 
1. The use of corporate group structure, intercorporate relationships or 
shareholder’s control
2. in a way that is artificial and reprehensible
3. causing damage to a corporation’s creditors or evasion of a legal duty.
I will now proceed to provide an interpretation of these requirements in light of 
my finding in this research.
The first part of the test could be dubbed the use of corporate form. It includes 
using the group structure, intercorporate relationships and shareholder’s control. 
While the Supreme Court’s description is more precise, it still neglects to mention 
the common element, which is the benefits and the damage resulting from the use of 
the corporate form through one of the methods mentioned. Most often, this would 
mean benefitting from the limited liability shield or separate personality.
This formulation of the test mentions the shareholder’s control specifically. This 
is a deviation from the traditional piercing opinions where control was a central 
requirement. However, this deviation is only illusory. Using something does require 
one to control the used object to some degree. Therefore, control remains relevant.
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For determining the one who holds control over a corporation, several methods 
exist. Case law has found control through formal positions as shareholders and 
directors. There are no specific interpretations of what level of shareholding is 
enough. Guidelines vary from majority control and qualified majority to complete 
share ownership. KKO 2015:17 made it clear that total ownership is not required. 
It would seem more fruitful to view whether the control was thorough enough to 
enable using the corporation to achieve the unacceptable results. The existence of 
minority shareholders should not be interpreted through the concept of control, but 
rather their existence has relevance to the artificiality requirement. Their existence 
speaks to genuine business purpose.
The control can be informal as well. The formal control holders can be disregarded 
in the control assessment. They could have agreed through a contract, compelling or 
pure authority to act per the wishes of another. Then, this other entity should be 
viewed as having control over the corporation. Intermediaries or straw men will not 
prevent piercing.
2.2.  In an Artificial Manner
Artificial use is using the corporation in a manner that does not promote honest 
business and trade. The defined purpose of a corporation according to Company 
Act is to generate profits for the shareholders. Thus, anything beneficial for that 
group would constitute business purpose, preventing a finding of artificiality. When 
assessing whether limited liability or separate personality constitutes abuse, the 
fact that the use is beneficial to the company cannot legitimize the arrangement. 
However, in a definitive sense, the arrangement does have a business purpose when it 
is beneficial. Showing artificiality thus essentially requires an evaluation of whether 
the corporation has any business activity. If the company has no business whatsoever, 
the use of such a corporation is always artificial. Similarly, if the business is founded 
solely on a model that is not lawful, then the use is artificial. In these two situations, 
should the corporation also have a business purpose, piercing becomes a balancing 
act as to whether the business purposes are significant enough compared to artificial 
use. Alternatively, the situation could allow for piercing if the corporate use on 
which the piercing claim is made has no connection to the business itself.
Of the supporting factors, especially the artificial division of existing business and 
inadequate resourcing speak to the existence of artificiality. If the corporation has not 
been given enough resources to tackle the business in a sustainable manner, it could 
be argued that it was never meant as a real business. This sort of resourcing is even 
more obvious when an existing business is divided and the risks are thus more likely 
known. Similarly, commingling, confusion and even neglecting corporate formalities 
hint toward artificiality. If the entities and employees within the arrangement are 
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used interchangeably and without formal contracts, it could indicate that there is no 
genuine business purpose to include multiple entities in the arrangement.
2.3.  In a Reprehensible Manner
I used two criteria as the main categories in establishing reprehensibility: 
unacceptable consequences and unacceptable motives. Within these categories, I 
found several more specific patterns to establish these more abstract criteria. The 
unacceptable consequences section consisted of two subcategories, the first of which 
was excessive or undue damage. This was understood in relation to artificiality. 
Excessive or undue damage criteria are more readily present when a corporation has 
fewer genuine business operations. This would shape the piercing assessment into 
a similar balancing act of business purposes and illegitimate benefits as in the tax 
avoidance norm. This model, however, is impossible to make completely objective 
and concrete. The second category was the unacceptable ramifications view, which 
emphasized the incentives given to business operators via a judgment accepting 
some form of corporate use. If the judgment legitimized some use that was obviously 
harmful to society, then the consequences are unacceptable in accordance with the 
piercing test.
The unacceptable motives section was divided into three subcategories. I first 
discussed the arranger’s intent to damage and benefit at someone else’s expense. This 
led to confusion in the core element of limited liability, which logically results in 
benefits if the negative risks realize. I solved this issue by emphasizing the difference 
between abstract motives to benefit and the specific, known and predictable motives 
to benefit. The second subcategory drew an analogy from the banning of business 
operations. The moral condemnation there is the systematic and unconcerned 
operation for personal gain. I crystalized this criterion into a systematically construed 
disparity in the allocation of negative and positive risks, resulting in personal benefit 
at the expense of others. This sort of behavior should be enough to deem the use 
reprehensible in a piercing context. The third issue I discussed was fraudulent 
behavior and misrepresentation. I concluded that these should be considered 
their own doctrine and not a part of the veil piercing test. In cases of fraud or 
misrepresentation, the reasonable expectations of the party receiving the false or 
misleading information are protected, and the legal rights are affirmed to match the 
representation.
Of the objective supporting factors, almost all of them hinted toward 
reprehensibility. Some of them hint more strongly toward artificiality, though. One 
should especially note the disparity of assets and negative risks when pondering 
reprehensibility. If done in a systematic and high-risk manner, this alone could fulfill 
the reprehensibility requirement.
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2.4.  Evading a Provision
The difference between breaking the law and evading a provision is subtle. Breaking 
the law means committing an act that is forbidden by law. Evading a provision of 
law is committing an act that is legal in itself; this act is such that the legal norm 
should accommodate it, but it does not match the usual or intended content of the 
arrangements covered by that norm. It is an act that has been made to avoid the legal 
consequences of another legal norm by making an artificial arrangement. It means 
using legal forms in a manner they were not meant to be used to achieve results that 
are either impossible or forbidden by law. 
One can attempt to modify the prerequisites in order to either allow or prevent 
the application of some written norm. This modification becomes evasion when 
the legal prerequisites are met in form, but the actions do not match the form. The 
realities normally behind the chosen form are not present, whereas the action still 
fulfills the formal requirements. A tension between the form and reality exists, as 
the achieved result is either forbidden or impossible by law. This tension is present 
in tax evasion and artificial arrangements also, both of which address the disparity of 
the legal form and the economic reality of the case. It should be noted that evasion 
of a provision is highly case-specific, and no general rules or legal tests for detecting 
evasion can be crafted.
In the corporate context, this means using separate personality and limited liability 
shields to obtain benefits that normally are not obtainable through corporate use. 
The reality remains the same, as the corporate founder can assume full control over 
the corporation. She can act as before, only now in the name of another. The actor, 
in reality, has not changed, only the actor in form. So, considering the purpose of 
the evaded norm, veil piercing allows a norm that can be applied “through” the 
corporation when the situation is factually the same as it would be without the 
corporation.
2.5.  Causing Damage to a Creditor
The first thing to determine is what should be considered damage. I arrived at the 
conclusion that any unbeneficial change in the legal rights of a party should be 
considered damaging.
The more pressing issue was the treatment of voluntary and involuntary 
creditors. I would derive from the traditional view to treat voluntary creditors 
more strictly due to their position. Instead, I would look at the arguments made 
in favor of this strictness: ability to influence the terms and choice of becoming 
a creditor. From this insight, I recommend looking into the actual influence and 
choice the creditor had. Different contractual creditors can be of vastly differing 
positions here. The bank and the employees are both voluntary creditors, for 
316
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
example. I would suggest a non-exhaustive list of five criteria in the assessment of 
these creditors:
1. level of sophistication
2. bargaining power
3. access to information
4. capability to diversify
5. reliance on the debtor
3.  About the Evidence and Burden of Proof
In a piercing claim, the claimant needs to prove that, more likely than not, the use 
of corporate form, control, reprehensibility, artificiality, damage and causality exist 
in the case. In addition, within the sphere of property law, the separation in the 
evaluation of these factors need not necessarily be absolute. Failing to prove one 
factor completely can be compensated by the strong evidence of another. It is in the 
nature of an overall assessment to make this sort of compensation.
It is important to note that control, damage and causality are much easier to prove 
and are commonly present in a piercing situation. Thus, they should not be allowed 
to compensate the lack of artificiality or reprehensibility extensively. Control is 
simply too common, and in the corporate context, it is ordinarily found to have 
an extensive role in the evidence. Similarly, the evasion element is almost always 
apparent and even obvious. It should thus only be used cautiously, if at all, when 
used to compensate the impropriety requirement. The ability to compensate for the 
other requirements of the test seems most strongly linked to the involuntary versus 
voluntary viewpoint I examined in this chapter. The creditor’s lack of influence 
would support giving that person additional protection through the piercing 
doctrine. Then the nature of the damage could compensate the otherwise lacking 
impropriety requirement. Alternatively, it could just be interpreted to support the 
existence of improper elements in the arrangement.
4.  Who Should Be Liable?
I would strongly support using the approach of removing the advantages. This 
means piercing the veil only to deny the advantages the arrangement has created 
for the users. This approach can result in liability in casu for any of the controller, 
shareholder or “economic unit” targets but does not compromise them in an 
arbitrary manner.
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I proceeded to inspect four different situations in which the advantages appear 
differently. Each of these situations was backed by case law. The analysis showed 
that locating the advantages leads to different results depending on the construed 
arrangement. Even the liability allocation is made based on overall assessment and 
in casu examination. While the traditionally liable parties appeared as possibilities, 
they should not be viewed as the sole targets for liability, and liability definitively 
should not be based on some formal position.
5.  Role of Veil Piercing
In hindsight the goal of making the ambiguous piercing doctrine more concrete 
might have been ill-placed. More often than not, I was able to detect situations, 
where piercing clearly could not apply. Elimination turned out to be easier than 
confirmation. This, however, might be completely inevitable. The nature of the veil 
piercing doctrine is general. It is meant to be a loose standard and giving it a too 
specific content would eliminate an essential part of the doctrines capabilities in 
combatting abuse. The merit of my research is thus limiting the most grievously 
wrong and opportunistic uses of the doctrine. The result is a better balance between 
predictability and flexibility as well as a better understanding of veil piercings 
purposes and role in the legal system.
The role veil piercing in the legal system is as complex and adaptive as that of the 
corporate form, separate personality and limited liability. By nature, they are tools 
that are widely usable for a multitude of purposes. The benefits of the corporate form 
appear in almost every area of the law, and new creative uses appear constantly. I am 
unable to conjure any other legal institution that can be used in such a multitude 
of purposes—to share business risk, promote funding, encourage business, escape 
jurisdiction, deny tort compensation or circumvent nationality requirements. The 
whole institution is about having someone else—another person—doing things for 
you according to your instructions. This privilege is meant for business ventures, but 
for a creative mind, the chances for mischief are obvious. The role of the corporate 
form is thus limited to things another person could legally do for you. This versatile 
nature as a person allows the corporate form to escape even the sphere of civil law in 
which it used to be at home. Veil piercing similarly follows this to weed out the most 
egregious mischiefs.
There would be no problems with the corporation if the law was created to match 
the reality of corporate operations. However, it does not do this. Instead, it has taken 
a rather formal view of corporations. The starting point is that the corporation is an 
independent entity separate from its shareholders. This reflects reality only in the 
bigger corporations and those with diversified ownership. Economic reality works 
318
Kärki: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Finland
differently. Control can exist despite formal independence. Similarly, benefits can be 
moved freely between controlled entities. Liability, on the other hand, is strictly tied 
to the entity. The economic and contractual phenomena of control create a tension 
where the regulation relies on formal criteria that are based on the independence 
and separate nature of the corporation.1098 Veil piercing can provide some answers 
for singleton abuses, but it does not eliminate the tension. 
Still, the most uses for veil piercing remain in the civil law sphere and in connection 
to insolvency. There is rarely a need to demand piercing if the primary liable party 
is capable of fulfilling the obligation, although a connection to insolvency law and 
insolvency procedures seems unnecessary. The traditional view of veil piercing’s 
application has been about the protection of creditors from the opportunistic actions 
of the parent corporation or natural person shareholders. The recent developments 
in case law show that creditor protection—especially those unable to influence the 
credit terms—still remains important in veil piercing. Still, the description of the 
typical situation should be modified a bit. The emphasis on parent or shareholder 
liability should be discarded, and the recipient of the benefits should be targeted 
instead.
The path less traveled moves toward the direction of general evasion of law. The 
KKO 2015:17 decision opened this path, though none have walked it yet. It is 
precisely the evasion situations that widen the application of the doctrine. Potential 
uses include nationality requirements, choice of jurisdiction, the ne bis in idem 
limitation, the application of discovery rules, etc. It should already be apparent from 
the pages of this work that these applications of the piercing doctrine are novelties 
only in Finland and the Nordic region. However, it is natural that the doctrine will 
develop toward these directions, as the separate personality is easily abused in the 
interpretation of these norms. Veil piercing can be developed to combat situations 
where some unwanted attribute is isolated to a separate person to allow a favorable 
result at the expense of another person. The more apparent direction of expansion is 
the procedural law, but the application should in no way be limited to that.
As such, the role of the Finnish doctrine of piercing the veil is approaching 
the United States doctrine, but this is specific to the general evasion part of the 
doctrine. The Finnish doctrine can potentially be used for similar purposes as its 
equivalents in the United States. Still, the Nordic region in general does have much 
more limited use for veil piercing. Several works before my research have noted the 
more comprehensive creditor protection norms in the Nordic region, but I feel the 
need to repeat this statement. Many of the piercing cases in the US could have been 
resolved with written law norms in the Nordic. As for the United Kingdom, their 
reluctance to pierce is unique. Their formal approach seems to make piercing rather 
difficult, though they have recognized some of the typical abuses of the corporate 
1098 See Leppänen 1992 at 119.
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form and have created legislation forbidding them, for example, wrongful trading 
laws, shadow director norms and regulation on phoenix companies. These could 
also be characterized as creditor protection norms, though they are different from 
the ones the Nordic region has adopted. Each of the approaches in the compared 
jurisdictions is rather unique, and piercing seems to serve a multitude of purposes 
depending on which conducts are already addressed in the written law. 
